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Chapter Nine 
The Contract/Conveyance Borderland 
Immoveable Property 
When dealing with a transfer of immoveable property, it is important to bear in mind 
the distinction which exists between an agreement to create or convey an interest in 
such property, and the actual conveyance of such an interest., The distinction, which 
is long-standing, 2 was more recently relied upon in Hamilton v. Wakefield, 3 where 
Sheriff Jessop held that, "Scots law does recognise the validity of an obligation to 
convey heritage made in a foreign country in accordance with the legal requirements 
of that foreign country. "4 The distinction was also observed in British South Africa 
t Savigny, F C, `A Treatise on Private International Law' (1869), p269; and Falconbridge, J D, `Essays 
on the Conflict of Laws' (1947), p523. Falconbridge suggests, at p528, that, "... there may be sound 
reasons of social convenience or practical expediency for resorting to the lex rei sitae as to some legal 
relations with respect to land and to some other law as to others. " Cf. Second Restatement (Reese, W 
L M, 1971), paragraph 189, comment (a); Robertson, A H, `Characterization in the Conflict of Laws' 
(1940), p217/8; Schott & Rembar, `Choice of Law for Land Transactions' (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 1049, 
at p1049; Goodrich, H F, `Two States and Real Estate' (1941) 89 Uni. of Pen. L. Rev. 417,419; and 
Colwyn Williams, D, `Land Contracts in the Conflict of Laws - Lex Situs: Rule or Exception' (1959) 
11 Hastings Law Jo. 159,165. Weintraub referred to the dichotomy as "another major crack in the 
situs monolith. " (Weintraub, R J, `An Inquiry into the Utility of `Situs' as a Concept in Conflicts 
Analysis' (1966) 52 Cornell L. Q. 1,35) Cf. Gardner, J C, `The Decreasing Influence of the Lex Situs' 
(1934) 46 J. R. 244,253. 
2 E. g. Cunninghame v. Semple (1706) VI M. 4462, at p4464: "The Lords found the indentures, though 
not made according to the forms and laws of this kingdom, may be the title and foundation of a process 
for claiming a succession or heritage of real rights here. "; and Cood v. Cood (1863) 55 Eng. Rep. 388, 
per Sir John Romilly, M. R., at p392: "... the law of which country is it that governs the transactions 
and the actors in it? The right to land in Chili [sic] must, no doubt, be determined by the lex loci 
[presumably shorthand for the lex loci rei sitae], but a contract entered into between three English 
gentlemen, two of them domiciled and residing in England, and the third residing in Chili, but not 
having acquired a foreign domicile must, I think, be governed and construed by the rules of English 
law. " Cf. Erskine, `Institute' III. 2.40.: "... though obligations to convey, if they be perfected secundum 
legem domicilii, are binding here; yet conveyances themselves of subjects within Scotland are not 
always effectual, if they are not executed according to the solemnities of our law. In the conveyance of 
an immoveable subject, or of any right affecting heritage, the granter must follow the solemnities 
established by the law ... of the state in which the heritage lies, and from which it is impossible to 
remove it. " 
3 1993 S. L. T. (Sh. Ct. ) 30. 
4Ibid., p33. Cf. Crichton's Trustee v. Crichton's Trustee (1706) VI M. 4489: "Personal contracts, or 
even obligations to convey heritage in Scotland, which are executed abroad, and according to the 
forms there established, may be effectual; but the deed in question ... 
laid [the granter] under no 
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Co. v. De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd., 5 but in that instance, Cozens-Hardy, M. R. 
alluded to the subordinate nature of the contractual lex causae, stating that, "Contracts 
relating to immovables are governed by their proper law as contracts, so far as the 
lex Situs of the immovables does not prevent their being carried into execution. ,6 
According to Article 3 of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, contracting parties may select the law which is to govern their contract, 
even where the subject matter of the contract is a right in immoveable property or a 
right to use immoveable property, but according to Article 4(3), insofar as the 
applicable law has not been chosen, "... to the extent that the subject matter of the 
contract is a right in immoveable property or a right to use immoveable property it 
shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with the country where 
the immoveable property is situated. "7 Furthermore, it is submitted that Article 4(3) is 
obligation ... unless it 
be good as an actual settlement of heritage, to the validity of which it is 
essential, that it be completed according to the rules of our own law. "; Robertson's Creditors v. 
Mason's Disponees (1706) VI M. 4491; Countess of Findlater and Seafield v. Earl of Seafield 1814 
Faculty Decisions 553, at p555: "The doctrine regarding the necessity of strict Scots law formality 
relates only to the actual feudal transmission of heritable rights, not to deeds of contract binding 
parties in regard to these rights. "; Adams v. Clutterbuck (1883) 10 Q. B. D. 403; Mackintosh v. May 
(1895) 22 R. 345; and Gaillard v. Chekili [2001] I. L. Pr. 33. In Hamilton v. Wakefield, Sheriff Jessop 
held "In terms of that contract the seller was bound to grant a conveyance in proper Scots form and 
completed in accordance with the requirements of Scots law which would actually transfer the 
heritable subjects to the purchaser. " (ibid. ) Cf. Falconbridge, ibid., at p528: "... it has sometimes been 
held and more frequently assumed that questions arising from contracts with respect to land ... may 
be 
overned by some other law [than the lex rei sitae]. " 
[ 1910] 2 Ch. 502. 
6Ibid., p514/5, citing Westlake, J, `Private International Law' (2nd edition), paragraph 216. Consider 
Morris, JHC, `Cases and Materials on Private International Law', 4th edition, at p351: "Contracts 
relating to land are governed, not by the lex situs as such, but by their proper law, which is usually but 
not necessarily the lex situs. " 
7 Cf. Second Restatement, paragraph 189: "The validity of a contract for the transfer of an interest in 
land and the rights created thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the 
parties, by the local law of the state where the land is situated unless, with respect to the particular 
issue, some other law has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in paragraph 6 to 
the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied. " (Reese, 
ibid. ) E. g. where the lex Situs, but not the lex loci contractus, imposes a contractual incapacity on one 
or both of the parties, it might be considered that the lex loci contractus has a more significant 
relationship to the transaction etc. and should, accordingly, be applied (particularly if the parties are 
domiciled in the locus contractus). Consider in this regard Poison v. Stewart (1897) 167 Mass. 211, 
per Holmes, J.: "... the lex rei sitae cannot control personal covenants not purporting to be 
conveyances, between persons outside the jurisdiction, although concerning a thing within it. " 
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the least likely of all the Article 4 presumptions to be rebutted by Article 4(5) which 
applies where "... it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is 
more closely connected with another country. "8 
While the distinction between real and personal rights may be clear in theory, in 
practice it may be less so. 9 It is quite feasible that a party, obligated in terms of an 
enforceable contract, may nevertheless be encumbered by a legal disability under the 
lex Situs, which prevents him or her from performing the obligation or carrying out 
the agreement. The contractual lex causae (where that does not coincide with the lex 
situs10) may subsequently make an order, or grant relief, which conflicts with the lex 
situs. In such a case, the general view would appear to be that the lex situs must 
prevail: "Thus, irrespective of what the law governing the contract may provide, it is 
8 The authors of the Giuliano & Lagarde Report suggest, however, at p21, that the Article 4(3) 
presumption would probably be rebutted in the case of a contract between two Belgians, for rental of 
an Italian holiday home, with the result that their contract would be governed by Belgian law. 
(Giuliano, M and Lagarde, P, `Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations' [1980] OJ C282) 
9 E. g. Is the need for delivery a contractual or proprietary matter? Do repair and maintenance covenants 
incorporated in lease or security documentation run with the parties, or with the immoveable subjects? 
Consider Venturini, G C, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume 111, Chapter 20 - 
Property' (1976), at p22: "While, for example, according to French, Belgian, Italian and Japanese law, 
title is acquired as a result of the contract itself other legal systems require ... that immoveables must 
be registered in the appropriate register etc. " Cf. Gardner, ibid., p253; unattributed note in (1963) 111 
Uni. Pa. L. Rev. 482 (per Weintraub, ibid. ): "... the fact that many land transactions can fit 
comfortably into either characterisation demonstrated the inadequacy of the contract-conveyance 
dichotomy as the sole choice-of-law rule. "; and Goodrich, ibid., at p425: "Perhaps the distinction is 
valid, but it must be confessed that it is just a little hard to follow. " Falconbridge considered that the 
contract/conveyance distinction was imposed, "... without sufficient or indeed much consideration of 
the difficulties inherent in the alleged distinction between interests in land and contractual or personal 
rights with respect to land, or without much or sufficient consideration of the possible conflicts 
between rights of the parties existing under the lex rei sitae and the rights of the parties as declared by 
a court in an action in a country other than that of the situs of the land. " (ibid., p528) 
10 E. g. Where Article 4(5) displaces the presumption in Article 4(3), or where the law selected 
according to Article 3 is not the lex situs. (Although consider comment (c) relative to paragraph 189 of 
the Second Restatement, viz.: "... it can often be assumed that the [transacting] parties, to the extent 
that they thought about the matter at all, would expect that the local law of the state where the land is 
situated would be applied to determine many of the issues arising under the contract. ") Note also 
Goodrich's remark that, "... civilization would not crumble if the [contract/conveyance] distinction 
disappeared and both the contractual and conveyancing sides of the transfer of land were referred to 
the law of the place where the land is. " (Goodrich, ibid., p422) In light of the Article 4(3) presumption, 
this is, in many cases, already the position in practice. 
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for the lex rei sitae to grant or to deny acquisitive effect to the contract itself. "11 For 
example, if X (of Polish domicile, but resident in Scotland), agrees to sell to Y (a 
Scots domiciliary), land in Poland, the parties may expressly stipulate that their 
contract is to be governed by Scots law. It is a rule, however, of the Polish lex situs 
that non-Polish nationals are forbidden to acquire sole title to land in Poland. 12 
Accordingly, the contract, valid by its proper law, would be denied "acquisitive 
effect" by the lex situs. While Y may be able to sue X for breach of contract, he or she 
would have no rights in rem in respect of the land in question. 
Questions of capacity to deal with land abroad arose in Bank of Africa Limited v. 
Cohen. 13 The case concerned an English woman's ability to transfer land in 
Johannesburg to the Bank, as security for advances made by the Bank to her husband. 
The Court at first instance held that the question of capacity to enter into a contract 
concerning immoveable property in the Transvaal was governed by Transvaal law, 
according to which Mrs Cohen was incapax. 14 On appeal, Counsel for the appellant, 
made the point that Eve J. 's judgment "... loses sight of the distinction between the 
capacity to contract and the capacity to convey. It is the latter only which is governed 
by the lex situs. "15 The distinction, however, was not drawn by the appellate court, 
Buckley, U. holding that, "A person's capacity to make a contract with regard to an 
" Venturini, ibid., p23. 
12 The Sunday Telegraph has carried reports of this Polish prohibition, which is adversely affecting 
German-Polish war exiles seeking to return to the properties in western Poland, from which they were 
ousted by the Red Army, in and around January 1945. (The Sunday Telegraph, 22 July 2001) 
Similarly, a contract with Scots applicable law, between A and B, to sell A's Swiss chalet to B, is likely 
to fall foul of the rule of the Swiss canton lex situs to the effect that purchasers must be Swiss nationals. 
13 [ 1909] 2 Ch. 129. 
14 Eve, J. stated that, "... if the lex situs shews that the contracting party had not the capacity to 
contract, the whole contract is void, and nothing can be done in this country to enforce that contract 
against the contracting party ... 
1 am bound to hold that the disability goes to the root of the contract, 
and that, consequently ... it is a contract which is a contract only in form, and in substance is one 
by 
which the person incapable of entering into it is not bound. " (ibid., p 135) 
15 Ibid., p138. 
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immoveable is governed by the lex Situs. "16 This decision has been strongly 
criticised, '7 suggesting that the distinction between capacity to contract, and capacity 
to convey should be more firmly drawn. 18 
Moveable Property 
In the same manner that the contract/conveyance distinction is important as regards 
immoveable property, so too the distinction impinges upon the conflicts treatment of 
moveable property: "Attention must be paid to the distinction between questions of 
personal liability affecting the parties to a contract of moveable property and the 
matter of real right to the property itself. " 19 
The distinction has been strictly observed in international harmonising initiatives. 
Article 8 of the Annex to the 1964 Hague Convention relating to a Uniform Law on 
the International Sale of Goods20 expressly states that, "The present Law shall govern 
only the obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from a contract of sale. In 
particular, the present Law shall not ... 
be concerned with ... the effect which the 
contract may have on the property in the goods sold ... " Similarly, 
Article 4 of the 
1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
states that, "In particular ... [this Convention] is not concerned with: ... (b) the effect 
16 Ibid., p143. 
17 E. g. Morris, ibid., at p350: "This decision is incomprehensible. " In particular, interest analysis 
proponents have objected to the decision in Cohen. (E. g. Castel, J G, `Notes and Materials on the 
Conflict of Laws' (1960), at p574; and Weintraub, R J, `An Inquiry into the Utility of `Situs' as a 
Concept in Conflicts Analysis' (1966) 52 Cornell Law Quarterly 1,38) 
18 Cf. Gaillard v. Chekili (2001] I. L. Pr. 33. 
19 Anton, A E, `Private International Law' (1990), p613. Cf Zaphiriou, G A, `The Transfer of Chattels 
in Private International Law' (1956), at p4: "The distinction between a contract and a transfer, or ... 
between contractual and proprietary questions, which ... are regulated 
by entirely different conflict 
rules must be emphasised right at the beginning; because it is a lack of a clear distinction that is the 
main source of the existing confusion in this important topic of the conflict of laws. " 
20 Ratified by the United Kingdom on 31 August 1967. 
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which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold . 
"21 These provisions 
give the rather deceptive impression that formally to distinguish the rules which 
respectively govern matters of contract, and matters of property, is the end of the 
matter. That, however, is not so. 
The contract/property distinction rests upon whether the action affects ius in rem, or 
only ius in personam. 22 Graveson has advised that, "Where a contract not merely 
creates personal rights and obligations between the parties, but purports also to 
transfer, convey or assign property or any interest in properly, it ceases to be 
governed exclusively by the rules of conflict of laws relating to contracts as such, and 
becomes subject to the far less certain body of law governing assignments. "23 Certain 
types of transfer have an existence which is independent of contract (e. g. inter vivos 
donations), whereas other types of transaction are rooted in contract24 (e. g. the grant 
of a mortgage over corporeal moveables, or a conditional sale agreement). 25 
21 Goode has explained that, "The proprietary effects of commercial dealings have been largely ignored 
... a 
deliberate decision was taken to exclude from CISG [Convention on International Sale of Goods] 
the property aspects of sales law in view of the wide divergences in approach among legal systems and 
the perceived difficulty of finding solutions ... 
Where attempts were made to tackle some aspects of the 
law relating to property in moveables they usually foundered, sooner or later, because the goal was 
over-ambitious and the task too daunting. " (Goode, R, `The Protection of Interests in Moveables in 
Transnational Commercial Law' (1998) Uniform Law Rev. 453, at p453) 
22 Graveson 
,RH, `The Conflict of Laws - Private International Law' (1974), p454. 23 Graveson (1974), ibid., p454. Cf. Carnahan, W, `Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws' (1935) 
2 Uni. of Chi. L. Rev. 345, at p345, citing Cable Co v. McElhoe 58 Ind. App. 637,647 91915), per 
Caldwell, J.: "Any contract may present itself for construction in either of two aspects, perhaps both. 
Thus it may involve the personal rights, duties and obligations of the parties to it, under its terms, or it 
may relate to the title to, or interest in, property transferred or reserved by it. " 
24 Cf. Carter, PB (In Lalive, P A, `International Sales of Works of Art' (1988)), at p317: "... although 
title may be acquired in other ways for example by way of gift (or indeed, in certain circumstances by 
way of theft), title is usually acquired pursuant to discharge of a contractual obligation. " 
25 Consider comment (c) relative to paragraph 244 of the Second Restatement, which states that, "A 
conveyance of interests in a chattel ... is likely to involve both property and contractual questions. 
" 
Further, comment (d) relative to paragraph 251: "The creation of a security interest in a chattel is likely 
to involve both property and contractual questions ... There is no clear line of 
distinction in these cases 
between property and contractual rights e. g. what interests in the chattel are transferred by reason of 
the security interests from one party to the other ... 
" 
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The distinction is not purely academic since a transaction may be unenforceable as a 
contract, but nevertheless effective so as to transfer property (or, more commonly 
perhaps, vice versa). 26 Validity and enforceability of the underlying agreement, and 
effectiveness of the property transfer may not necessarily coincide. Whilst the 
personal aspects of such a transaction (as between the contracting parties) are referred 
to the contractual lex causae, 27 any questions of a proprietary nature are referred to the 
lex situs. 28 This distinction is not always clear in practice, 29 since the lex situs, in 
26 Zaphiriou, ibid., p8; and Weir, T, `Taking for Granted - The Ramifications of Memo Dat' (1996) 49 
Current Legal Problems 325, at p344: "... modern practice is overwhelmingly based on the view that 
property may pass by traditio despite the invalidity of the causa. " Cf. comment (a) to paragraph 191, 
Second Restatement. Consider also Elder v. Kelly [1919] 2 K. B. 179, in which it was held that the 
effect of a contravention of the Sunday Observance Act 1677 upon a contract of sale was to avoid it, in 
the sense that it could not be sued upon in a civil action, but it did not avoid the contract so far as to 
relieve the seller from liability to prosecution if the article sold thereunder, being an article of food, was 
adulterated. Bray, J., stated, at p181, that, "The effect of [the] illegality no doubt was to prevent either 
party from enforcing the contract. But it is untrue to say that the transaction had no operation at all. " 
Similarly, at p182, Shearman, J., remarked that, "The seller of the milk could have been fined for 
selling it during prohibited hours, but that does not show that the property in the milk did not pass to 
the purchaser so that he might lawfully have drunk it. " Similarly, in Stocks v. Wilson [ 1913] 2 K. B. 
235, it was held that, notwithstanding the Infants Relief Act 1874, the delivery of goods to the 
defendant with intent to pass the property therein, operated to vest the property in him, and, 
accordingly, he was not liable for conversion of the goods. Per Lush, J., at p247: "I am satisfied that ... 
the property passed by the delivery, notwithstanding the fraud ... 
" Cf., with reference to contracts 
concerning immoveable property, Second Restatement, paragraph 189, comment (a). 
27 Consider Venturini, ibid., at p9: "... the lex rei sitae does not extend to the determination of the 
transaction which underlies [the moveables'] acquisition and to the contractual effects arising 
therefrom. " Cf. McCormack, G, `Reservation of Title' (1995), p234. Consider too the position in 
America: paragraph 191 of the Second Restatement states that, "The validity of a contract for sale of an 
interest in a chattel and the rights created thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice 
of law by the parties, by the local law of the state where under the terms of the contract the seller is to 
deliver the chattel, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other law has a more significant 
relationship under the principles stated in paragraph 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which 
event the local law of the other state will be applied. " Comment (f) advises that, "On occasion, a state 
which is not the place of delivery will ... 
be the state of most significant relationship ... e. g. when the 
contract contemplates a continued relationship between the parties which will be centred in a state 
other than that where delivery took place. " (Cf. Chapter Eight, supra - `The Transfer of Corporeal 
Moveable Property', and the role of the lex loci expeditionis. ) 
2R Dicey & Morris, `The Conflict of Laws', 130' edition, p1333, paragraph 33-109; Collier, J G, 
`Conflict of Laws' (2001), p245; and Morse, CGJ, `Retention of Title in English Private International 
Law' (1993) J. B. L. 168,170. Contra the position in America, according to comment (c) to paragraph 
244 of the Second Restatement, which states that, "... the law selected [being the law which has the 
most significant relationship to the parties, the chattel and the conveyance] will be applied to determine 
such issues as what interests in the chattel are transferred by reason of the conveyance from one party 
to the other and whether one party has a right of action for breach of warranty against the other. " 
29 Consider Baxter, IFG, `Conflict of Law and Property' (1964) 10 McGill Law Jo. 1, at p7 et seq: "It 
may not be an adequate solution to say that the rules of contract shall apply when the problem is 
mainly concerned with the contractual aspects -for these aspects may be too interwoven. The creation 
of certain abstract property may be, in substance, only an agreement, or a declaration by a transferor 
- there being no physical property or indispensable instrument. " 
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determining questions of a proprietary nature may first require to test the validity of 
the contract according to its proper law. 30 It is probable that, as regards moveable 
property, the distinction generates more true conflicts than are likely to occur in the 
context of dealings with immoveable property. The primary reason for this is that, 
unlike contracts concerning immoveable property (which may be subject to Article 
4(3) of the Rome Convention), 31 there is no presumption that, in the absence of an 
express choice of contractual lex causae by the parties, a contract concerning 
moveable property will be governed by the lex loci rei sitae. The contractual lex 
causae in respect of moveable property will, it is submitted, less frequently coincide 
with the lex Situs of such property, with the result that more than one potentially 
applicable law will vie for position. 
Accordingly, the initial hurdle in any transaction concerning moveable property is 
characterisation of the constituent elements of the transaction. 32 In the face of a true 
conflict of laws, delimitation between contractual and proprietary matters is central to 
application of the correct conflict rule. 33 As Lalive has advised, "characterization is 
30 Consider Glencore International A. G. v. Metro Trading International Inc. [2001] 1 Ll. Rep. 284, per 
Moore-Bick, J., at p293: "Zahnrad v. Terex [1986 S. L. T. 84] provides some support for the view that 
the lex situs itself may recognize the effect of a transaction and hence its proper law ... 
" 
31 As explained at note 8, supra, the presumption in Article 4(3) has buttressed the situs rule. This, it is 
submitted, conflicts with the rationale underlying the contract/conveyance dichotomy, the purpose of 
which was implicitly to curtail the situs rule. 
32 Consider Chesterman, M R, `Choice of Law Aspects of Liens and Similar Claims in International 
Sale of Goods' (1973) 22 I. C. L. Q. 213, at p221: "... orthodoxy requires that ... one should 
first decide 
whether the relevant issue is 'contractual' or 'proprietary', then apply the proper law or the lex Situs 
accordingly. " 
33 Cf. Baxter (1964), ibid., at p7: "An inherent difficulty in this branch of private international law is 
the overlap between the law of contract and the law of property. Contract helps to create many 
proprietary rights. It may be difficult, if not impossible, to separate the contractual and property 
aspects ... 
The characterisation of such problems can be intrinsically difficult. " Cf. Cheatham, E E, 
`Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws' (1957), at p666: "What consideration should govern the 
classification of a right as contractual or proprietary? For instance, is the right to rescind the sale and 
recover the chattel a contractual or proprietary right? "; and Falconbridge, J D, `Essays on the Conflict 
of Laws' (1947), who writes, at p385, of the "borderland between contract and conveyance. " 
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nothing else than the selection of the proper law in disguise. , 34 The question which 
arises, therefore, is, by which law should a particular matter (e. g. the need for 
delivery, the existence or extent of rights of stoppage in transit, the effect of error, or 
the passing of risk) be characterised as contractual, or proprietary: 35 the contractual 
lex causae, the lex Situs, or the lexfori? The general rule of international private law is 
that the characterisation process should be performed by the forum, according to the 
lex fori, 3G though the characterisation of the nature of property by the lex situs, and the 
potential for a subsequent domestic re-characterisation within the lex causae, should 
be borne in mind. 37 
Consider, for example, the following scenario: A (a Utopian domiciliary) contracts to 
buy from B (also domiciled in Utopia), a quantity of jewellery, manufactured in, and 
situated, at the time of conclusion of the contract, in Eldorado. The parties choose to 
subject their contract to Utopian law, according to which risk passes at the time of 
conclusion of the contract. According to the law of Eldorado, risk passes on 
delivery. 38 Before the goods are delivered to A, they are stolen. Thus, if risk has 
passed, the loss will fall on A. 39 If, however, risk has not yet passed, B will bear the 
loss. 40 B, seeking to rely on the Utopian law of the contract, avers that the passing of 
risk is a contractual matter; according to the contractual lex causae, risk has passed. 
34 Lalive, P A, `The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws' (1955), p142. 
35As Venturini has advised, "[Some systems] tie the passing of risk to the passing of title (e. g. French, 
Italian, Belgian) while others regard it as an independent question (e. g. German, Swedish, Dutch 
law). " (Venturini, ibid., p25) See also note 38, infra. 
36 Crawford, E B, `International Private Law in Scotland' (1998), p43, paragraph 4.07. 
37 Crawford, ibid., p308, paragraph 14.02. 
38 Cf. Section 20(1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979: "Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the 
seller's risk until the property in them is transferred to the buyer, but when the property in them is 
transferred to the buyer the goods are at the buyer's risk whether delivery has been made or not. " 
" E. g. Pignatoro v. Gilroy [ 1919] 1 K. B. 459. If A should refuse to pay for the goods, he or she will be 
in breach of contract. 
40 Unless the contract has been frustrated, B will be required to perform his or her obligations 
thereunder. 
267 
A, on the other hand, avers that it is a proprietary matter, dependent upon the lex 
situs; in that event, B will bear the loss. Evidently, it is important to ascertain which 
law determines whether the passing of risk is to be characterised as a contractual or 
proprietary matter. 
This issue does not appear to have been addressed by conflict scholars. 41 A similar 
problem of characterisation, however, has arisen in two other contexts, first, 
characterisation of parental consent to marriage as a matter of formal or essential 
validity, and secondly, characterisation of a state's claim to the property of a deceased 
person, as one qua ultimus haeres, or qua successor to bona vacantia. 
As regards parental consent to marriage, Lord President Clyde, in the case of 
Bliersbach v. McEwen, 42 advised that, "The solution of this problem depends in my 
opinion upon a consideration of the nature and quality of the impediment to marriage 
created by the requirement of parental consent. "43 The question, not explicitly posed, 
was, according to which law the "nature and quality" of the impediment was to be 
determined. It can be inferred, however, from his Lordship's reference to Canon law 
as incorporated into Scots law, that the court characterised the nature of the 
impediment according to the Scottish lex fori, rather than the Dutch lex domicilii. 44 
This appears also to have been the approach taken in Sottomayor v. De Barros 
41 Zaphiriou stated that, "The French writers take the view that according to the classification of the 
French lex fori the question of risk is closely connected with the transfer of ownership and must 
therefore be governed by the lex situs. But the view generally prevailing is that the question of risk is a 
contractual question and must be governed by the proper law of the contract. " (Zaphiriou, ibid., p98) 
This does not, however, answer the question as to which law should characterise the passing of risk as 
contractual or proprietary. At most, it alludes to the likelihood of a false conflict. 
42 1959 S. L. T. 81. 
43 Ibid., p86. The question was whether lack of parental consent constituted an impedimentum 
impeditivum, or an impedimentum dirimens. 
44 Ibid., p86. Reference was made to Viscount Stair ('Institutions', 1.4.6. ) and Lord Fraser ('Husband 
and Wife', 1.55). 
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(No. l ), 45 as approved in Ogden v. Ogden46: "In our opinion this consent must be 
considered a part of the ceremony of marriage, and not a matter affecting the 
personal capacity of the parties to contract marriage. "47 
As regards the characterisation of a state's claim to the property of a deceased person, 
there is likewise authority that characterisation should be carried out according to the 
lexfori (e. g. In re Barnett's Trusi ). In contrast with this, however, in the case of In 
the estate of Maldonado, deceased, 49 characterisation was performed by the lex 
causae: "... by Spanish law the State of Spain is the heir of the deceased. "50 
Arguments in support of characterisation by the lex causae assert that, "Rules of a 
foreign legal system ought not to be torn from their native jurisprudence ... they 
should be considered in their proper context, which is the legal system from which 
they are derived. s51 
The approach taken in the case of In the Estate of Musurus, deceased, 52 is less 
conclusive: Sir Boyd Merriman stated that, "I am quite satisfied now that it is 
45 2 P. D. 81,3 P. D. 1. 
46 [ 1908] P. 46, per Sir Gorell Barnes, at p75. 
47 3 P. D. 1, per Cotton, LJ., at p7. (Emphasis added) 
48 [1902] 1 Ch. 847, per Kekewich, J., at p857: "[The Austrian Crown] ... does not represent the 
deceased at all, except that by our law he is put in his place to defend actions by creditors or by 
persons claiming the estate against him. " (Emphasis added) Cf. Goold Stuart's Trustees v. McPhail 
1947 S. L. T. 221, in which Lord Sorn interpreted `next of kin' in accordance with the Scots lex fori, as 
opposed to the Australian lex ultimi domicilii. 
°[ 1954] P. 223. 
50 Ibid., per Morris, LJ., at p251, approving the decision of Barnard, J., at p231, viz.: "I have accepted 
the Spanish conception of heirship, for it would be wrong in my view to apply the English conception 
when dealing with Spanish law; and even to try to apply the nearest English equivalent to the Spanish 
conception of heirship would only lead to confusion. " Consider Crawford, ibid., p359, at paragraph 
17.15: "The case of Maldonado is renowned for the unaccustomed generosity of the forum (the Court 
of Appeal) in yielding to the foreign law of the domicile the power to classify the nature of its own 
claim. " Cf., in the context of the law of contract, In re Bonacina, Le Brasseur v. Bonacina [ 1912] 2 Ch. 
394, per Kennedy LJ., at p403: "The effect of the 'privata scrittura' as a legal obligation must be 
determined by the law of Italy. " (Emphasis added) 
51 Hancock, M, `Torts in the Conflict of Laws' (1942), p 188. 
52 [1936] 2 All E. R. 1666. 
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impossible to talk of that deposit ... as 
being anything in the nature of the succession 
of an heir", 53 but his Lordship did not advert to the law (Turkish, or English) 
according to which he had been satisfied. 
Where the contractual lex causae and the lex Situs reach different conclusions as to 
characterisation of, say, the passing of risk, or the need for delivery, it has been 
proposed that the "choice of law rules governing assignments should prevail over 
those governing contracts, since assignment will normally be the dominant purpose of 
the transaction. , 54 In any case, it has been suggested that "the conflict between the 
law governing the contract and that governing the assignment of a right of action 
created by the contract is often more apparent than real. "55 This does not, however, 
resolve the characterisation problem; rather, it dictates a priori that the situs rule 
should prevail. There is no obvious reason for such an approach (at least as between 
the original parties to the transfer of the goods in question). 
Where the purported transfer of property is void according to the lex situs, but valid 
according to the contractual lex causae (e. g. where according to the contractual lex 
causae property passed to the purchaser on conclusion of the contract, but according 
to the lex Situs, delivery is deemed to be a prerequisite of the transfer of title, with the 
effect that no such title has passed), Graveson has advised that "the court would 
probably treat it as an agreement to assign, provided the defect in the purported 
assignment related to some matter of form or capacity, not, for instance, to a matter 
53 Ibid., p1667. 
54 Graveson, ibid., p454. Cf. Falconbridge, ibid., p451/2. At p385, Falconbridge writes that, "... the 
contractual rights and duties of the parties under the proper law of the contract can be enforced only 
in so far as they are consistent with the recognition of the property rights existing or created under the 
lex rei sitae. " Consider F&K Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property [ 1954] 1 All ER 145, 
per Pearson J., at p 157. 
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of legality, or breach of public policy. In treating a defective assignment in this way, 
the court would be applying a well-established principle of equity. "56 
Instead of automatically deferring to the lex Situs rule (either to the substantive lex 
situs, or to the characterisation of a particular matter by that law), it is submitted that 
the characterisation process should be performed by the forum, according to the lex 
fori. As Lorenzen has advised, to act otherwise would result in the lexfori "... no 
longer [being] master in its home. "57 What is recommended, however, is adoption of 
an `enlightened' lex fori approach, according to which, "The judge must characterize 
by the concepts of his own law, but must only apply those concepts after taking into 
consideration the part which a foreign rule of law plays in its own system. "58 
Although, for the purposes of international private law, classification of property as 
moveable or immoveable falls to the lex situs, 59 it is submitted that to classify a matter 
as pertaining to contract or to property, according to the lex situs (or indeed, to the 
contractual lex causae) would be to beg the question. To take recourse to the 
characterisation made by a foreign law, before the forum has even determined that 
such law is applicable, is illogical. Although Lorenzen has suggested that, "... [t]he 
first consequence resulting from the adoption of a law for the regulation of a certain 
55 Graveson, ibid., p455. 
56 Graveson, ibid., p455. 
57 Lorenzen, E G, `The Theory of Qualification and the Conflict of Laws' (1920) 20 Col. L. R. 247,259. 
58 Robertson, A H, `Characterization in the Conflict of Laws' (1940), p45. Falconbridge termed this 
approach the `via media'. Robertson expanded on this, advising that, "... the judge must look to the 
context of a foreign rule of law, that is to say must take notice of the foreign characterisation, but is not 
bound to follow it, because the law of the forum is his principal guide. " (ibid., p45) Cf section 9(2) of 
the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, where "The characterisation for 
the purposes of private international law of issues arising in a claim as issues relating to tort or delict 
is a matter for the courts of the forum. " (Emphasis added) Consider too Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate 
Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [1996] 1 W. L. R. 384, per Auld, U., at p407: "... classification of an issue 
and rule of law for this purpose, the underlying principle of which is to strive for comity between 
competing legal systems, should not be constrained by particular notions or distinctions of the 
domestic law of the lex fori, or that of the competing system of law, which may have no counterpart in 
the other's system. Nor should the issue be defined too narrowly so that it attracts a particular 
domestic rule under the lexfori which may not be applicable under the other system. " 
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relationship is the necessity of adopting also the nature which it attributes to it", 60 in 
this instance, neither the lex situs, nor the contractual lex causae, has actually been 
adopted. Only once the lex fori has classified the matter as pertaining to property 
should the question be referred to the lex situs; if it transpires that the lex situs would, 
in fact, classify the matter as one pertaining to contract, there would be scope for a 
renvoi transmission. Indeed, on occasion, reference to the lex Situs would be 
impossible. Consider, for example, a case where A agreed to buy from B goods 
deliverable in State X. If the goods were lost in transit, never actually arriving at the 
intended destination, characterisation of the `passing of risk' rule as contractual or 
proprietary, could only be performed by the lexfori, the contractual lex causae, or the 
proper law of the transfer. In such a case, regardless of whether the contractual lex 
causae fell within Article 3 or 4 of the Rome Convention, it is likely that the 
contractual lex causae and the proper law of the transfer would coincide, giving rise 
to a false conflict. 
Returning briefly to the case of the Utopian jeweller, 61 it is submitted that the issue of 
the passing of risk should be characterised by the [Utopian62] lexfori. It may classify 
the issue as contractual (placing the loss on A), or as proprietary (placing the loss on 
B). 
Conclusion 
What then is the significance of the characterisation issue? For reasons already 
mentioned, it is submitted that the significance is greater as regards transfers of 
59 See Chapter Three, supra - `The Distinction between Moveable and Immoveable Property'. 
60 Lorenzen, ibid., p263 (referring to the writing of Despagnet). 
61 Note 38, supra. 
62 The dispute is likely to be heard in a Utopian forum. 
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moveable, as opposed to immoveable, property. Nevertheless, there will be equivalent 
cases where a true conflict of laws arises in relation to immoveable property. 63 
It is interesting to note Chesterman's observation that, "... special claims [rights of 
stoppage, lien etc. ] manifestly occupy a position on the borderline between 
contractual and proprietary so that any decision to the effect that a particular claim 
falls on one side of the line rather than the other is likely to be both difficult and 
controversial. s64 While characterisation of these rights as contractual or proprietary 
accords with strict conflicts methodology, one suspects that the characterisation 
arrived at may be rather arbitrary. 65 Adherence to traditional methodology may 
disguise the fact that the contract/conveyance distinction is, at times, rather strained. 
In the case of original-party disputes, it may be more honest (and less legalistic) to 
refer the issue to the lex actus, that is, to the law which is most closely connected to 
the particular issue in dispute. 66 This would offer scope for party autonomy (which 
63 E. g. Where A (a Scots domiciliary) contracts to buy from B (also of Scots domicile), a converted 
farmhouse in Italy. If their contract is expressly governed by Scots law, or if Article 4(3) were 
displaced (as per note 8 supra), the contract would be construed in accordance with Scots law. If, 
following the conclusion of missives, but prior to the date of transfer of title (i. e. the date of entry, or 
the date of registration of title) the farmhouse were destroyed by fire, the question whether or not risk 
has passed would arise. Once again, the passing of risk must be characterised either as a matter of 
contract (to be determined by the Scottish law of the contract), or of property (to be determined by the 
Italian lex situs). This matter, it is submitted, should also be characterised according to an enlightened 
lex fori. (Of course, in determining what is the appropriate forum - which, in turn, means determining 
whether or not Article 16 of the Brussels Convention [or Article 22 of Council Regulation 44/20011 
applies -a circulus inextricabilis arises, for the very question in issue is whether or not the proceedings 
"have as their object rights in rem in immoveable property. ") 
64 Chesterman, ibid., p221. 
65 Cf the divergent characterisation techniques employed, and the substantive results reached, in the 
various cases of parental consent to marry, and succession to the estates of deceased persons. (Note 42 
et seq., supra) 
66 Bear in mind Chesterman's warning that, "... the detailed rules as to characterisation in the conflict 
of laws should be the servants of this general aim, not masters in their own right. " (ibid., p223) Cf. 
Second Restatement, ibid., introductory note to paragraph 244, viz.: "The local law of the state of most 
significant relationship governs the property rights, as well as the contractual rights, of the parties to a 
single transaction involving a chattel, or a group of chattels, because this is the law that can most 
appropriately govern such controversies between the parties, and because in these situations there may 
be no clear line of distinction between property and contractual rights. " 
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would be particularly appropriate in cases of goods in transit), 67 and in cases where 
the applicable law has not been expressly chosen by the parties (or demonstrated with 
reasonable certainty), it would permit the forum to refer the particular issue to what it 
considered to be the most appropriate law, without being unduly bound by what 
appears (in this context) to be a rather artificial and cumbersome characterisation 
process. 
67 On a practical level, one would anticipate that in many international sale of goods transactions, for 
the sake of consistency and convenience, contracting parties would elect to regulate matters such as the 
passing of risk and the significance of delivery, according to the law which governs their contractual 
relationship. This, it is submitted, would be especially true in cases where the contracting parties 
enjoyed or contemplated an ongoing commercial relationship in respect of diverse (or diversely sited) 
commodities. 
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Chapter Ten 
The Treatment of Cultural Property 
  THE PROBLEM 
Interest in cultural property is ever increasing, witnessed by the creation of numerous 
museums and galleries, a growing number of exhibitions, a "constantly increasing 
flow of visitors to collections, monuments and archaeological sites, and the 
intensification of cultural exchanges. "' This escalating curiosity is accompanied by 
aggravated risk of theft and illicit trafficking. The art market, almost by definition, is 
an international market, and theft and illicit trafficking continue to be lucrative 
industries. Estimates of the value of cultural objects stolen each year within the UK 
vary quite dramatically, but the figure for insured losses lies somewhere between £50 
million and £150 million per annum. 2 
It is intended in this chapter to outline some of the problems experienced by players in 
the international art market, using various examples which highlight the hazards, 
including the early nineteenth century exploits of Lord Elgin, the repatriation of the 
Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt, and certain property disputes which emanate from the Nazi 
era. 
1 UNESCO Recommendation for the Protection of Moveable Cultural Property (28/11/78). 
2 Report of the Ministerial Advisory Panel on Illicit Trade (December 2000), paragraph 21. 
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Lord Elgin's exploits - enlightenment or embezzlement? 
A renowned example of alleged pillaging of cultural property is the acquisition, in 
1802, by Thomas Bruce, seventh Earl of Elgin and eleventh of Kincardine, 3 of various 
fifth century BC marble sculptures from the Parthenon in Athens. So infamous is the 
Earl's procurement of the Marbles that the term `elginism' has become "synonymous 
with the uprooting of ancient monuments piece by piece ... and then exporting them 
under a guise of legality. "4 
Lord Elgin's purpose in removing the Marbles was essentially a commendable one - 
to educate and nurture the artists and artisans of his home country. 5 Indeed, he was 
motivated by a rather more laudable objective than was Napoleon Bonaparte, Elgin's 
adversary in the quest for the Marbles; Napoleon wished merely to accumulate "a 
collection of original works of art of all periods from all over the known world to 
emphasize the power and grandeur of the imperial city of Paris. "6 
In removing the Marbles from the Acropolis, Lord Elgin did not, as is often forgotten, 
act entirely without official sanction; the antiquities were removed only after the issue 
of a `firman', a formal grant of authority, from the Ottoman authorities in 
Constantinople to the Ottoman authorities in Athens. That said, Lord Elgin's agents 
did coax the Athenian authorities into exceeding the terms of the firman, to permit his 
removal of the sculptures from the Parthenon. 7 Nevertheless, Lord Elgin's 
3 Lord Elgin was also Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty 
to the Sublime Porte of Selim III, Sultan of Turkey. 
4 Williams, S, `The International and National Protection of Movable Cultural Property' (1978), p9. 
5 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (1 Feb. 1816 -6 March 1816), Volume 32, columns 577 
and 578. At column 823, per the Chancellor of the Exchequer: "Every person acquainted with that 
noble Lord must be aware that his object had been solely directed to the advancement of the arts. " 
6 St Clair, W, `Lord Elgin and the Marbles' (1998), p129; and Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Commons (26 April. 1816 -2 July 1816), Volume 34, column 1028, per Mr Bankes, MP. 
Merryman, J H, `Thinking about the Elgin Marbles' (1985) 83 Michigan Law Review 1880,1889. 
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displacement of the Marbles bore a stamp of local assent. 8 Quite legitimately, 
therefore, in 1984, it was asserted during UK parliamentary proceedings that "The 
collection secured by Lord Elgin, as a result of the transactions conducted with the 
recognised legitimate authorities of the time, was subsequently purchased from him 
and vested by an Act of Parliament in the trustees of the British Museum in 
perpetuity. "9 The UK has maintained this stance since 1816 when Lord Elgin was 
exonerated by the House of Commons Select Committee responsible for investigating 
his acquisition of the collection and subsequent sale of it to the British government for 
a sum of £35,000.10 
At present, the Marbles remain in the custody of the British Museum, but only amid 
sustained pressure that they should be restored to Greece. ' 1 Regrettably, arguments in 
support of the British Museum's retention of the collection (founded mainly on its 
skills of trusteeship and preservation) have been undermined by allegations that some 
of their conservation techniques have in fact caused more damage than good. 12 
Calls for repatriation of the Marbles are not a new phenomenon: since the foundation 
of the modern Greek state in 1833 the Greek authorities have expressed their disquiet 
about the UK's retention of the collection. There has always existed a certain chagrin 
8 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (26 April. 1816 -2 July 1816), Volume 34, column 
1028, per Mr Bankes, MP; and Merryman, ibid., p1900. 
9 Official Report Sixth Series, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (1983-84, April 9-27), 
Volume 58,188w, per Mr Whitney, MP (10 April 1984). 
lo Williams, ibid., pp25-26; and Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (26 April. 1816 -2 July 
1816), Volume 34, column 1037, per Mr Crokes, MP. The motion supporting purchase of the Marbles 
was carried with a majority of 52 votes. (col. 1040) 
11 In March 2001, the Greek government voiced concern about British safekeeping of the sculptures, 
prompted by the theft by a light-fingered visitor of a marble hand from a 400BC Greek frieze in the 
British Museum. (The Daily Telegraph, 10th March 2001) The theft is thought to have taken place in 
November 2000 and although passing unnoticed for a few months by the museum authorities, the 
incident was pounced upon by the Greeks. 
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regarding Lord Elgin's conduct, verbalized over the years by various commentators 
and in various forms, including no less eloquent a form than the words of Lord Byron: 
"Tell not the deed to blushing Europe's ears; 
The ocean queen, the free Britannia, bears 
The last poor plunder from a bleeding land. "13 
St Clair cites Lord Byron's rather more blunt feelings on the subject, viz.: "I opposed 
- and ever will oppose - the robbery of the ruins from Athens to instruct the English 
in sculpture - but why did I do so? - the ruins are as poetical in Piccadilly as they 
were in the Parthenon - but the Parthenon and its rock are less so without them. " 
4 
One does not doubt that Greece is the sentimental favourite. 
A novel feature of the recent campaign for restitution has been the heavier reliance 
upon policy-based arguments. In the past, the case for and against return of the 
Marbles to Greece was an inter-governmental one, but now international opinion has 
been mobilized on all fronts, including American ex-presidents, HRH Prince of 
12 The Herald, 6 May 1999. This is irrespective of the fact that had the Marbles remained in situ, they 
would, by now, have suffered decay at the hands of nature. 
13 "Cold is the heart, fair Greece! That looks on thee, 
Nor feels as lovers o'er the dust they lov'd; 
Dull is the eye that will not weep to see 
Thy walls defac'd, thy mouldering shrines remov'd 
By British hands, which it had best behov'd 
To guard these relics ne'er to be restor'd 
Curst be the hour when from their isle they rov'd, 
And once again thy hapless bosom gor'd, 
And snatch'd thy shrinking Gods to northern climes abhorr'd! ' 
Lord Byron (1788-1824), `Childe Harold's Pilgrimage' (1812) Canto II, stanza 15. Lord Byron 
travelled to Athens in 1809. (per www. englishhistory. net. byron) See also Siehr, K, `International Art 
Trade and the Law' (1993) VI Receuil des Cours 9. 
14 St Clair, ibid., p243. 
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Wales, even tourists to the Acropolis. 15 Now, more than ever, there is an acute 
awareness, not only of the benefit which the UK has derived from its custody of the 
Marbles, but also of the deprivation endured by their country of origin. It is the public 
perception of this deprivation that motivates the rather volatile and sporadic campaign 
for restitution of the Marbles, not any reasoned legal argument. This is characteristic 
of the treatment of what is called `cultural' property; particularly where such property 
is concerned, we are in danger of allowing public sentiment to direct our handling of 
issues which more appropriately fall within the ambit of due legal process. 
Only a few of the proponents for return of the Marbles appreciate that Lord Elgin's 
taking does not give rise to "any legal claim which can be presented in a court of law, 
... any settlement of the claim, on a non-adjudicatory 
basis, cannot create a legal 
precedent. " 16 The Earl took good title to the Marbles according to the law then 
applicable in Greece, and, in turn, he was able to transfer good title in England. 
'7 
Technically, the Marbles belong to the Trustees of the British Museum to whom they 
were transferred by Act of the United Kingdom Parliament, and repatriation would 
only be possible if de-accession legislation were passed. '8 Some claim that the fate of 
the Marbles is not merely an Anglo-Hellenic issue, but that it is one of global 
15 E. g. `Clinton backs Elgin Marbles Claim' http: //news. bbc. co. uk. hi/enelish/world/europe (20 
November 1999). On 16 January 2002, a group of British celebrities and politicians launched the 
`Parthenon 2004' Campaign, supporting repatriation of the Marbles. (http: /news. bbc. co. uk - 15 
January 2002) 
16 Evidence of the [USA] Institute for Law and Culture, Committee on the Parthenon, to the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee (pre-Seventh Report) (March 2000), 
paragraph 5. 
7" Satisfying the English (and Scottish) conflict rule concerning the transfer of moveable property. See 
Camell v. Sewell 1860 5 H&N 728; Luther v. Sagor [1921] 3 K. B. 532; and Princess Paley Olga v. 
Weisz [1929] 1 K. B. 718. 
18 Official Report Sixth Series, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (1983-84, April 9-27), 
Volume 58,188w, per Mr Whitney, MP (10 April 1984): "A Bill to amend the British Museums Act of 
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concern; 19 the fate of the Marbles, however, rests in the hands of Parliament, which 
currently, by a small margin, seems to support repatriation. 20 
The Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt 
On a local, as opposed to a national, stage, similar considerations arose concerning the 
case of the Lakota Ghost Dance Shirt. Whilst performing in Glasgow in late 1891, one 
George Crager, a member of the American Buffalo Bill's Wild West Company, sold 
and gifted various North American artefacts to the authorities of the City of 
Glasgow. 21 Included in the sale was a century-old shirt, apparently removed from the 
body of a deceased Sioux brave at the Massacre of the Wounded Knee. Since 1891, 
the shirt, together with various other artefacts, was held and exhibited at Glasgow's 
Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum. Swayed, however, by the entreaties of the 
Lakota tribe (and particularly by the testimony of seventy five year old Ms. Marcella 
LeBeau (otherwise known as Pretty Rainbow Woman), secretary of the Wounded 
Knee Survivors' Association, the City Council's Arts and Culture Committee agreed, 
at the end of 1998, to repatriate the shirt. 22 The shirt was eventually repatriated in 
August 1999. Not everyone, however, was convinced by the rationale for 
repatriation; 23 in particular, the then Lord Provost accused the Committee of 
1963 to empower the trustees to return items to their countries of origin, should they so wish, was 
rejected in another place on 27 October 1983. " 
19 Evidence of the [USA] Institute for Law and Culture, Committee on the Parthenon, to the 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, paragraph 1.10. The Committee asserts that 
`Since the European Renaissance, the Parthenon, including its marble sculptures, have become the 
international symbol for enlightened cultures and of democracy itself. ' Sections 3 and 5 of the British 
Museum Act 1963 prohibit the British Museum from alienating its holdings, save in strictly restricted 
circumstances. 
20 A recent parliamentary poll carried out by The Economist magazine indicated House of Commons 
support for return of the Marbles by a vote of 66 to 34, and in the Lords, 41 supporting, and 59 
opposing repatriation. (The Economist, 18 March 2000, p120) 
21 Madra, S, `Glasgow's Ghost Shirt' (1999), p12. 
22 The Herald, 20 November 1998; and The Herald, 18 December 1998. 
23 Including, most notably, the City's Head of Museums. (The Herald, 3 June 1999) A motion for 
return of the shirt was carried by the City's Art and Culture Committee, by a majority of 13: 2. (Madra, 
ibid., p23) 
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`emotional spasm' which "if repeated could deplete the cases within the city's 
museums. , 24 
This was an instance where, in terms of the lex situs rule, the City acquired a valid 
and marketable title to the artefacts, but where legal process was engulfed by a wave 
of public feeling. In certain cases, repatriation of the relevant property will constitute 
the proper course of action, but there lurks a legitimate fear of failure properly to 
distinguish between, on the one hand, the question of bona fide ownership and an 
owner's voluntary decision to repatriate property and, on the other hand, a legal 
obligation, imposed by the relevant lex situs, requiring the `owner' to make 
restitution. 25 This distinction will require to be more firmly drawn if our museums are 
confronted with a floodgates scenario (that is, having made one voluntary gesture of 
returning an artefact or exhibit, thereafter being urged to engage in an exercise of 
wholesale repatriation). Contrary to the opinion of Glasgow City Council, there is a 
reasonable possibility that this may, in fact, ensue; 26 as one journalist has remarked, 
"Most of our great museums and galleries contain many objects which first left their 
original home when someone with power or wealth was in a position to take 
24 The Herald, 20 November 1998. 
25 The distinction between the moral and the legal arguments was considered by Merryman, ibid., 
p1896, and at p1903: "... it occasionally happens that what is legal seems morally wrong, even to those 
making the legal decision. " Merryman concludes, at p1910, that, "The Greeks do not have a strong 
legal or moral case against Elgin. " 
26 The opponents of repatriation of the Elgin Marbles list this factor as one reason for maintaining the 
status quo. There is some evidence in support of the notion: the curator of the South Seas Tauranga 
Vananga (formerly known as the Cook Islands) National Museum recently embarked upon a project to 
recover his nation's heritage. Comprised within this project was a claim in respect of two seed and 
shell necklaces in the custody of a Montrose museum. According to Museum archives, the necklaces 
were donated to the Museum in 1922. Angus Councillors were required to vote upon the issue 
(presumably conscious of the fact that the repatriation project was supported by the British Executive 
Service Overseas). (The Herald, 3 March 1999) More recently, an Edinburgh church has succumbed to 
the pleas of the Ethiopian government, having agreed to return to Ethiopia a sacred wooden carving 
brought to Scotland by a soldier who purchased it at a military auction, following a siege in the North 
African country in 1868. The carving was gifted to the church by the soldier. (The Herald 6 December 
2001) The suggestion has been made that at least forty British museums are preparing to repatriate their 
collections of Australian Aboriginal and native American art. (The Sunday Telegraph, 26 August 2001) 
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advantage of another's temporary or permanent misfortune or greed ... No matter 
how and when acquired, the collections of the great museums of the world are being 
looked upon as though they constituted vast Fagin's kitchens of `stolen' property. , 27 
The Nazi Cases - confiscation or constraint? 
Museums, it seems, may be prepared to open the floodgates as regards the repatriation 
of Holocaust looted art. Consider the following case: in 1932, a German Jew, a 
partner in a private bank in Düsseldorf, and keen collector of Old Master and 
Impressionist paintings, acquired a painting entitled, `A View of Hampton Court 
Palace', by the Dutch artist Jan Griffier the Elder (c. 1645-1718). One year after 
acquiring the painting, its owner was dismissed from his employment, by the Nazis, 
and by 1937, he was presumed dead. In 1939, the deceased's wife despatched her 
personal belongings, including the painting, to Belgium, where she also was to seek 
refuge. Following the German occupation of Belgium in 1940, she sold her paintings, 
one by one, to finance the basic necessities of life; the Griffier, apparently, she sold to 
a gallery in Brussels for the price of `an apple and an egg'. Sixteen years later, the 
painting, then described as `A Castle in Northern France' by Lucas Van Uden was 
sold at auction in Cologne to English art dealers. The German auctioneers could not 
(would not? ) advise as to the post-war history of the painting, but they intimated that 
the previous owner was `a serious private collector in South Germany'. In 1961, the 
Friends of the Tate Gallery purchased the painting (under its original description) and 
donated it to the Gallery. In accordance with the Tate's rotation policy, the painting 
27 The Herald, 19 May 1997. The Times, 7 February 1997, reported upon the lingering resentment in 
India about the loss of priceless pieces taken home by the officers of the British Raj before 
independence in 1947. Resentment even extends to the Koh-i-Noor diamond, which was found on the 
banks of the Krishna River in 1656. After having been held by a succession of Afghans and Sikhs, the 
stone was passed to Queen Victoria in 1850, subsequently mounted in Queen Mary's crown in 1911, 
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has been on view for over 70% of the 40-year period following its acquisition. In 
1999, a claim was lodged with the Tate by the son of the original Jewish owners, 
seeking not return of the painting, but compensation for its loss. 28 
At the International Military Tribunal held at Nuremberg in 1946, Alfred Rosenberg, 
Head of the Centre for National Socialist Ideological and Educational Research, 
remarked that "Between October 1940 and July 1944 my organization accomplished 
the greatest art operation in history. "29 The organization of which Rosenberg spoke 
was the notorious Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (the `ERR'), the Nazi task force 
charged with ravaging art treasures from within Germany and the occupied territories. 
The ERR "... crystallised into an organ for the seizure and pillage of cultural 
treasures for the Reich .,, 
30 Never before had the world beheld a systematic, 
premeditated crusade of confiscation such as motivated the Nazi troops. 31 Not before, 
nor since, has such a prodigious art collection32 been assembled with so few scruples. 
In view of this, it is probable that the Griffier claim will be one of a number of 
comparable claims likely to emerge over the next few years. 33 
and finally, in 1937, was set in Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother's crown, for the occasion of the 
coronation of George VI! 
28 Report of the Spoliation Advisory Panel in respect of a Painting now in the possession of the Tate 
Gallery (HC1 11), 18 January 2001 ('S. A. P. Report'), paragraphs 8-16. 
29 Chamberlin, R, `Loot! The Heritage of Plunder. ' (1983), p149; De Jaeger, C, 'The Linz File - 
Hitler's Plunder of Europe's Art' (1981), p142; and Feliciano, H, 'The Lost Museum' (1997), p6. 
30 Williams, ibid., p25/6. 
31 Williams, ibid., at p28: "The problem of looting and pillaging was not a question of actions by 
individual soldiers, which is common to all wars, but a ruthless campaign by a disciplined corps 
formed for that very purpose. " Feliciano has pointed to the accuracy and detail of the inventories and 
art files prepared by the Reich. (ibid., pp7 and 47) Cf. Petropoulos' description of the Third Reich as a 
'kleptocracy'. (Petropoulos, J, 'The Faustian Bargain - The Art World in Nazi Germany' (2000), p5) 32 Nicholas has pointed to the "... highly trained art specialists" within the Nazi ranks. (In Simpson, E, 
ed., 'The Spoils of War' (1997)) Treue remarked that, at the Nuremburg trial, Counsel for the 
prosecution doubted whether "... any museum in the world, the Metropolitan in New York, the British 
Museum in London, the Louvre in Paris, or the Tretiakow Gallery in Moscow, could furnish such a list 
... 
Never in the history of the world was so great a collection assembled with so little scruple. " (Treue, 
W, `Art Plunder' (1960), p249) 
33 Consider, in this regard, the claim currently being considered by Glasgow City Council's 
Repatriation Working Group. The claim, which has been made by descendants of a German Jewish 
family, is in respect of `Le Pate du Jambon', a painting attributed to Jean-Baptiste-Simeon Chardin, 
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Acutely calculating, the Nazis sought to clothe their modus operandi with an air of 
propriety. When acting within (what the Nazis deemed) their own territory, their 
confiscatory operation, even though discriminatory, was considered by traditional 
conflict of laws thinking to be valid. 34 When functioning extra-territorially, the ERR 
was apparently conscious of the potential limitations upon its arrogatory powers and, 
in certain circumstances at least, tried to forge an impression of regularity: a 
considerable number of items were not looted in the traditional sense, but were 
purchased (as, for example, was the Griffier): "No matter that the transaction itself 
was made under pressure, or that sums paid were far less than would have been 
obtained in the open market, receipts existed, contracts had been signed. , 35 When 
European social order was rapidly disintegrating into a general cultural and 
administrative malaise, it seems that even a semblance of commercial probity was 
enough to validate the essentially confiscatory exploits of the ERR. It was certainly 
enough to appease the wilfully restrained36 enquiries of individuals then involved in 
the art trade (again evidenced by the Griffier case). In view of the degenerating social 
climate, and the common desire to remove person and property to a safe haven, the 
hasty sale of a valuable work of art, at a reduced price and particularly by a Jewish 
vendor, would not have been wholly exceptional or even questionable. Only with the 
and forming part of the City's Burrell Collection. The painting is one of two hundred and thirty two 
works owned by the City Council and in respect of which provenance details cannot be completed for 
the period 1933-1945. The list of paintings was compiled in response to the National Museums 
Directors' Conference Statement of Principles and Proposed Actions for Institutions (June 1998), 
concerning spoliation of works of art during the Holocaust and World War II period. (See further, 
www. nationalmuseums. org. uk/spoliation. html) The Chardin case is not unique; the Dulwich Picture 
Gallery in London has recently received a claim from the Czechoslovakian Baron Vladimir de Dubric 
in respect of its collection of one hundred and eighty Old Masters (including three works by 
Rembrandts, one by Canaletto and one by Rubens). Like the Chardin, the Dulwich claim results from 
dubious wartime provenance. 
34 Frankfurther v. Exner [1947] Ch. 629; and Novello v. Hinrichson [1951] Ch 1026. 
35 Chamberlin, ibid., p179. 
36 De Jaeger, ibid., p96. 
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harsh judgment of hindsight, do we censure the art dealers for indulging the `ask no 
questions' culture that then prevailed. 37 
The obstacles inherent in trying to trace Nazi looted property are manifold. 38 As 
acquirers (in whatever manner) of Nazi treasures returned home from the War, they 
crossed borders, physical and legal, complicating further the question of ownership of 
the assets in question. The result was that many items of property, once confiscated by 
the State, or stolen by an opportunist mercenary, were circulated on the open market, 
and, in time, acquired by independent third parties acting in varying degrees of good 
faith. 39 
One example of this can be seen in the American case of Goodman v. Searle. 40 In July 
1987, Daniel Searle, a US pharmaceuticals magnate, paid $850,000 for `Landscape 
with Smokestacks', a pastel by Edgar Degas. In 1996, the Goodman family raised an 
action against Searle in a New York forum, for damages and recovery of the painting, 
averring that it had, in fact, been stolen from their ancestors during the Second World 
War. The plaintiff's complaint stated that the pre-War owner, Friedrich Gutmann, was 
beaten to death after he refused to sign a document transferring all of his possessions 
to the Third Reich. Shortly before a federal jury court in Chicago was due to hear the 
case in the spring of 1999, the parties reached a compromise agreement in terms of 
which Searle relinquished a one half share of his interest to the plaintiffs and donated 
37 Consider Petropoulos' reference to the `Faustian Bargain' made between certain art `professionals' 
and the Third Reich. (ibid., p4) 
38 Consider the comment in The Economist magazine: "Turning the collections of the world upside 
down so as to send works back to their place of origin would be little easier than matching souls to 
bodies on Judgment Day. " (The Economist, 18 March 2000, p21) 
39 Consider the view of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, viz.: "La propriete c'est le vol. " (`Qu'est-ce que la 
propriete') (1840) 
40 http: //www. courttv. com/library. misc/naziart. html; and The Boston Globe, 25 February 1999 (Walter 
V. Robinson) (http: www. boston. cone/globe/nation/packages/paintings/081498. html) 
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the remaining share to the Art Institute of Chicago (on whose Board, incidentally, he 
then sat). Unfortunately, from the perspective at least of the commentators, the 
settlement meant that several critical questions of proof, title, prescription, personal 
bar and good faith remained unanswered: "Was this pastel the same work that was 
owned by the plaintiff's family and sent to Paris during the war for safekeeping? Had 
it in fact been sent to Paris not for safekeeping, but for sale, as Mr. Searle suggested? 
Had the Guttman heirs waited too long to bring their suit, especially considering that 
the Degas in question had been publicly exhibited on several occasions since Mr. 
Searle purchased it in 1987? Should Mr. Searle - or the curators at The Art Institute 
of Chicago who researched the landscape's provenance for Mr. Searle before he 
purchased the work have known or been able to know that there was an old claim on 
it or that there was a suspicious name in the provenance history ? 5941 
Similar issues have also arisen in an English forum: the conjoined cases of City of 
Gotha v. Sotheby's and Cobert Finance S. A. and Federal Republic of Germany v. 
Sotheby's and Cobert Finance S. A., 42 which concerned a painting by the Dutch artist, 
Joachim Wtewael, offered the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court an 
opportunity to consider these vexing matters. The facts of the case, whilst not entirely 
clear from the terms of the report, would appear to be as follows: at the end of World 
War II, the painting, `The Holy Family with Saints John and Elizabeth' went missing 
from the Gallery of the Ducal Family of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, in the city of Gotha, and 
was removed, in 1946 (it is presumed, by a member of the Russian forces) to Russia. 
Thereafter, it was smuggled from Moscow in the mid-1980s, emerging but briefly in 
West Berlin in 1987. In 1988, the painting appears to have been acquired by one Mina 
41 Sharon Flescher, International Foundation for Art Research Journal (`IFAR Journal') Volume 1, 
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Breslav and was received by Sotheby's (on her behalf) in London, in November 1988. 
Cobert, a Panamanian corporation, purchased the work from Ms. Breslav in March 
1989 and, three years later, in April 1992, the company marketed it for sale, once 
again, through Sotheby's. Sotheby's withdrew the painting when uncertainties 
emerged as to its post-war provenance. The City of Gotha, asserting a possessory 
interest, sought return of the painting whilst, in a consolidated action, the Federal 
Republic of Germany ('FRG') claimed ownership thereof. The critical issues were 
twofold: first, whether FRG could establish title to the painting and, secondly, if it 
could so establish title, whether the claim was time-barred in terms of the German law 
of limitation. Moses, J. held that the English court would recognize and enforce 
FRG's title to the painting, title having derived either expressly from an expropriatory 
law of 1945 or, alternatively, from a German act of dissolution of 1950 (but not, 
interestingly, stemming from the painting's 1987 sojourn in Germany). Curiously, 
despite recapitulating the lex Situs rule, it would appear that the court did no more 
than consider the lex situs of the painting in 1945 (or possibly in 1950), but that it did 
not consider the lex Situs at any later date, in particular, at the later date of the alleged 
transfer of ownership. Specifically, Moses, J. reflected that "No-one has suggested 
that Soviet law is relevant to this issue of title. 943 This is somewhat perplexing given 
that the painting was admittedly removed to Russia in 1946 and that it remained in 
Moscow as late as the mid-1980s. But, whatever the rationale, Moses, J. also 
remarked that "There was no argument before me as to the effect of Soviet law on 
proprietary rights whilst the painting was within Soviet territory. "44 Rather 
Number 3, Autumn 1998, p7. 
42 The Times Law Report (Q. B. D. ) 8 October 1998. 
43 City of Gotha v. Sotheby's and Cobert Finance S. A. and Federal Republic of Germany v. Sotheby's 
and Cobert Finance S. A. (1998) Case transcript (Case No 1993 C3428; 1997 G185), p14. (1998) The 
Times, 8 October, C. A. 
- 44 Ibid. 
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incongruously, however, Moses, J. went on to state that "Under Soviet law if the 
transfer of possession occurred without lawful consent of the owner, no subsequent 
possessor could acquire title. 945 With respect (and bearing in mind, of course, the 
relative ambiguity of the report), one is moved to ask on what basis the learned judge 
made this statement, in view of the fact that, by his own earlier admission, no 
evidence was led as to the content of Soviet law. (If the learned judge arrived at this 
conclusion through assimilation of Russian law and English law - in light of the fact 
that foreign law, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is presumed to be the 
same as the lex foci - this is nowhere articulated in the report. ) Moses, J. 
acknowledged that the painting was in the Soviet Union in 1950, but, when discussing 
the impact upon it of a German law passed at that time and purporting to affect 
property extra-territorially situated, he thereafter scrutinized the matter purely through 
the eyes of the German authorities, dismissing as immaterial the perspective of the 
Soviet lex situs. 46 It must, therefore, be concluded (insofar, at least, as may be gleaned 
from the report) that the approach of Moses, J. was not in full accord with the 
established lex situs principle, namely, that the relevant system to determine whether a 
party has acquired a valid title is that of the country in which the property is situated 
at the time of the particular transaction in question. 47 
The `Nazi cases' are particularly delicate ones for courts to adjudicate upon since 
emotions understandably run high48 and covert issues of policy inevitably (and 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., pp24 and 30. 
47 Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [1996] 1 WLR 387,400 per Staughton 
U. 
48 Consider, for example, the exhibition in London in 1999, marking the centenary of the death of 
Johann Strauss. Robert Dachs, the curator of the Strauss exhibition, allegedly accused the Austrian 
government of having reserved certain items stolen by the Nazis from the Strauss family during the war 
years. Significantly, and illustrative of the enduring problem regarding the `private law' consequences 
of confiscation etc., Dachs, when interviewed on the subject of the Strauss memorabilia, is reputed to 
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perhaps quite legitimately) intervene. But before considering how these cases are now 
being resolved, it is necessary to examine another facet of the wider problem. 
The commercial link 
What is the relationship between this mechanical rule of international private law and 
the treatment of cultural property? Complications arise because the demarcation of 
cultural property looting from private market transacting is neither clear nor absolute. 
Cultural property which is potentially protected by international convention might 
easily pass into private market channels and so become unavoidably infected with 
`private law' consequences. Mr Crager of the Wild West Show could easily have 
disposed of his Lakota artefacts to a private individual rather than to the City Fathers, 
and as regards the Parthenon Marbles, it is known that certain items from the 
consignment transported from Greece were retained by the Elgin family and that "... 
some pieces were later sold, including some ... to the Getty Museum in Malibu, 
California. s49 Contemporary looting stands at the crossroads between public law and 
private law. This is illustrated by the exploits of contemporary tomb raiders. In recent 
times, for example, the scale of robberies from ancient Buddhist temples and 
monuments has forced the Buddhist kingdom of Bhutan to consider introducing the 
have disclosed that seventy per cent of it had been purchased from the descendants of Nazi agents, still 
living in Austria. Dachs is quoted as having divulged that "I had the feeling that they [the children of 
the Nazi agents] are disgusted with what happened, but they knew that they could never sell these items 
on the open market because people would wonder who they were and where they got them" (The 
Sunday Telegraph, 9 May 1999) With cruel irony, one might reflect upon the strategy reputedly 
promulgated by Heinrich Himmler, namely, "You have to kill all the Jews because if you don't kill 
them, their grandchildren will ask for their property back. " (Israel Singer, Chairman of the World 
Jewish Congress) (FI' Weekend, 6/7 March 1999) 
49 St Clair, `Lord Elgin and the Marbles' (1998), p260. Cf. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons 
(26 April. 1816, - 2 July 1816), Volume 34, column 1027: arguing in favour of the Government's 
purchase of the collection, Mr Bankes, MP asserted that, "By declining to purchase the Elgin marbles, 
the public must renounce all right in the thing, and leave my lord Elgin at liberty to deal with any other 
person who offers to purchase. " 
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death penalty in an attempt to deter looters. 50 Treasures which have been cherished for 
generations are being stolen (sometimes to order) and sold to black market dealers in 
India and Nepal who supply the growing demand for Himalayan Buddhist artefacts in 
the Western art markets. The tiny Kingdom, until relatively recently hidden from the 
eyes of the world, now faces real concern about the drain of its cultural heritage onto 
the coffee tables and pedestals of western collectors. 
  THE SOLUTIONS 
In July 2000, a House of Commons Select Committee published a Report on Cultural 
Property: Return and Illicit Trade. 51 Shortly before publication of the Select 
Committee Report, the Government appointed an expert Advisory Panel on Illicit 
Trade. 52 Operating under the chairmanship of Professor Norman Palmer, Barrister and 
Professor of Commercial Law at University College, London, the Advisory Panel was 
appointed, first, to consider the nature and extent of the illicit international trade in art 
and antiquities, and the extent to which the United Kingdom is involved in this, and, 
secondly, to consider how most effectively the United Kingdom can play its part in 
preventing and prohibiting the illicit trade, and to advise the Government 
accordingly. 53 
50 The Sunday Herald, 7 January 2001. A different strategy has been adopted to frustrate the looting 
and destruction of Afghanistan's cultural heritage; a privately-funded (but UNESCO-backed) museum 
has been established in Switzerland, the aim of which is to purchase black-market antiquities and to 
exhibit them publically in an Afghan `museum-in-exile'. (The Sunday Telegraph, 18 November 2001) 
51 Department of Culture, Media and Sport - Seventh Report (18th July 2000) (HC 371-I) (hereinafter 
`Select Committee Report'). 
52 The Advisory Panel was appointed on 24 May 2000. 
53 Report of the Ministerial Advisory Panel on Illicit Trade, Executive Summary. 
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In framing its recommendations, the Advisory Panel was invited to take into account 
the earlier recommendations of the Commons Select Committee. The Advisory Panel 
reported to the Government in December 2000.54 On 6 March 2001, the Government 
responded to the initial Select Committee Report, and on 22 March 2001, the Select 
Committee published its Second Special Report. 
Ironically, some of the key recommendations of the Advisory Panel are diametrically 
opposed to those published a mere six months earlier by the Select Committee. The 
Government response reveals that it prefers the recommendations of the Advisory 
Panel. 55 
Among the Advisory Panel's principal recommendations is one that the UK should 
accede to one of two international conventions, and it is to a consideration of these 
that we now turn. 
The international arena - the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
International intervention in this area derives largely from the vigour of public 
international lawyers. There has been a developing landscape of cultural property 
regulation. The area has been dominated by two Conventions, the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property ('the 1970 Convention'), and the 1995 
sa Hereinafter the `Advisory Panel Report'. 
ss Which, incidentally, intimated its belief that its proposals are consonant with the European 
Convention on Human Rights and that the Minister may properly so certify in accordance with section 
19 of the Human Rights Act 1998. (Advisory Panel Report, p8) Subject to the demands of public 
interest, every legal and natural person [but which person in the chain? ] is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of its possessions under Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR. "That right extends to 
the enjoyment of cultural objects as much as to the enjoyment of other property and includes the right 
to transact commercially as well as to hold privately. Recognition of the right may also require that 
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UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects ('the 1995 
Convention'). Until 13 March 2001, notwithstanding strong pressure from various 
quarters, the United Kingdom refused to accede to either Convention; on that date, 
however, the Arts Minister, Alan Howarth, announced that the Government had, 
finally, agreed to sign the 1970 Convention, joining ninety-one other nations in the 
fight against illicit trade in cultural property. 56 
In principle this step is to be commended, since it gives a clear signal about the 
United Kingdom's stance against the illicit trade in cultural objects. The essence of 
the 1970 Convention is that, "The import, export or transfer of ownership of cultural 
property effected contrary to the provisions adopted under this Convention ... shall 
be 
illicit. "57 State Parties undertake to recover and return to the State Party of origin 
cultural property which has been stolen from a museum or public monument or 
similar institution in another State Party, provided that the property features on that 
institution's inventory. 58 
Much of the language of the 1970 Convention is "loose and confusing. "59 Although 
the Commons Select Committee Report applauded the sentiment of UNESCO, it 
expressed concern about the lack of clarity of the provisions. 60 The 1970 Convention 
only imposes duties upon States; recovery is dependent upon State intervention: the 
former possessor of stolen cultural property (i. e. the victim of the theft) is denied a 
direct personal right of action. Moreover, the range of illicit practices attacked is 
public authorities provide proper legal machinery to vindicate legal rights over cultural objects in the 
event of unlawful deprivation. " (Advisory Panel Report, Starting Propositions, paragraph 7) 
56 House of Commons Written Answers, 13 March 2001, Column: 569w. 
57 1970 Convention, Article 3. 
58 ! bid, Article 7(b)(ii). 
59 Advisory Panel Report, paragraph 60. 
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relatively restricted61 and the range of objects caught by the 1970 Convention's net is 
narrow; although the Convention contains a very broad definition of cultural property, 
property must be explicitly designated by a State as important for its archaeology, 
history, literature, art or science if it is to merit protection. 
62 Even if the 1970 
Convention were retroactive (which it is not63), this requirement alone would foil Mr 
Winkworth's claim. 
The international arena - the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
In a specific attempt to deal with the private law aspects of illicit trade, and as a 
measure complementary to the work of UNESCO, UNIDROIT (the International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law) produced a draft Convention on Stolen 
and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects which was adopted at the 1995 Rome 
Conference. The 1995 Convention, which has been ratified by only twelve countries, 
lays down a scheme which is largely dependent upon private action. It offers a 
mechanism whereby a private individual may seek to recover an object of stolen 
cultural property, without need for governmental intervention and without the 
requirement that the stolen object be state-designated. 64 Importantly, however, the 
1995 Convention does not surmount the difficulty that a calculated use of the lex situs 
rule by professional traffickers 65 can extinguish any benefit bestowed by the 
Convention. In short, the 1995 Convention cannot prevent the sale and purchase of 
60 Select Committee Report, paragraph 109. 
61 Advisory Panel Report, paragraph 60. For example, it does not cover the unlawful taking of formerly 
unrecorded objects from archaeological sites. 
62 1970 Convention, Articles I and 4. 
63 Ministerial Advisory Panel Report, paragraph 55. 
64 Article 3 declares that `The possessor of a cultural object which has been stolen [according to which 
law? ] shall return it [to whom? ]. ' 
65 Consider Palmer, N, ed., `The Recovery of Stolen Art: A Collection of Essays' (1998), at p80: 
"Investment in a movement of cultural objects is used for tax evasion, for laundering money (obtained 
from drugs, gun smuggling or prostitution) or evasion of foreign currency controls. " 
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works of art, or exchange of cultural property if that is lawful in the eyes of the lex 
situs 66 
The Commons Select Committee, which recommended that the UK accede to the 
1995 Convention, explained that the Convention "opens up the prospect of the 
rightful owners of cultural property stolen in the UK and then taken abroad seeking 
restitution in the foreign courts, a prospect which no domestic alternative can 
offer. s67 This statement wholly ignores the rules of international private law, the very 
purpose of which is to deal with a scenario such as this. In contrast with the Select 
Committee, the Advisory Panel has recommended that the United Kingdom refrain 
from signing the 1995 Convention, and, for the time being at least, the Government 
prefers the latter approach. 68 To gauge the 1995 Convention's value, one might ask 
whether it would have assisted Mr Winkworth. The answer is `no'. Article 1 states 
that it applies only to claims of an "international character. " Ironically, the 
accumulation of factors which connect Mr Winkworth's case with England would 
preclude such a characterisation. 69 
The international arena - the 1993 EU Directive 
Until the Government's March 2001 announcement, the sole international measure 
applicable in the United Kingdom was an EU Directive of 1993 on the Return of 
Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed from the Territory of a Member State. 70 The 
66 Williams, ibid., p3. 
67 Select Committee Report, paragraph 110. 
68 Advisory Panel Report, paragraph 49. 
69 Palmer, N, "Unidroit and the EU Directive: Revisiting some early case law" in "Recovery of Stolen 
and Looted Works", Institute of Art and Law, December 1998, p2/3. 
70 Council Directive 93/7/EEC (15 March 1993), as amended by Council Directive 96/100/EC, and 
enacted in the United Kingdom by the Return of Cultural Objects Regulations 1994 (S. I. 1994/501), as 
amended by the Return of Cultural Objects (Amendment) Regulations 1997 (S. I. 1997/1719). 
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Directive only operates among member states of the European Union7' and, like the 
1970 Convention, it only confers a right of action upon member states, not upon 
private individuals. 72 Consequently, the Directive "shall be without prejudice to any 
civil or criminal proceedings that may be brought, under the national laws of the 
Member States by the requesting Member State and/or the owner of the cultural 
object that has been stolen. "73 
The Directive obliges a State to which a request is submitted for return of an 
unlawfully removed cultural object, to comply with the request, provided that "the 
object satisfies the requisite criteria and the prescribed procedures are followed. "74 
For example, to fall within the protection of the Regulations, a cultural object must be 
a national treasure of artistic, historic or archaeological value, and in addition, either 
belong to one of the limited categories listed in the Directive (in some cases with a 
financial threshold), or feature on the inventory of a public collection or ecclesiastical 
institution 75 Fundamentally, Professor Palmer has stated that "the right of action 
conferred on the member state from which the object was unlawfully removed does 
not extinguish any title acquired by a good faith buyer under a post-theft sale of the 
object, when the object was located in a country which regards that sale as conferring 
a good title"76 (i. e. the Directive endorses the lex Situs rule of international private 
law). Perhaps without surprise, the Ministerial Advisory Panel reported that the 
Directive appears to have had `few, if any, concrete results". 77 
'1 Advisory Panel Report, paragraph 32. 
72 Regulation 6(1). 
73 Article 15. See also H. L. Sixth Report, p23, and "Statutory, Forensic and Ethical Initiatives" in "The 
Recovery of Stolen Art -A Collection of Essays", Palmer, N, ed. (1998), p20. 74 Advisory Panel Report, paragraph 31. 
75 Biondi, A, `The Merchant, the Thief and the Citizen: the Circulation of Works of Art Within the E. U. ' 
(1997) C. M. L. R. 1173,1184. 
76 Palmer (1998), ibid, p21. 
77 Advisory Panel Report, paragraph 32. 
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The international arena - the EU Directive and International Private Law 
The point to note is that the lex situs rule has not been deposed by the EU Directive. 
The Directive does not change national rules of moveable property, whether domestic 
provision, or conflict rule. 78 Indeed, it is expressly stated that "Ownership of the 
cultural object after return shall be governed by that law of the requesting Member 
State. "79 In practice, therefore, rules of international private law must dominate any 
question concerning the cross-border transfer of cultural property. Any benefit 
conferred by the Directive may clearly be subjugated by a transfer of the particular 
object in a manner compatible with the lex Situs of the object at the time of the 
transfer. For as long as bespoke provisions concerning the transfer of cultural property 
do not trump rights conferred on private individuals by the lex Situs, wider rules 
regarding member states' title to sue, rights of recovery etc., are in a sense futile, 
insofar as they can be rendered redundant by operation of the lex situs rule (e. g. by 
sale of the stolen item of cultural property to a bona fide purchaser in Italy). This 
loophole stems not only from the dichotomy between systems which protect the good 
faith acquirer of stolen property, and those which adhere to the principle that a thief 
cannot transfer good title, but also from a clash between public and private law, and 
between public international law and international private law. 8° It is not the grand 
gesture of the international conventions which matters in the final analysis. 
It seems that a conflict of laws issue - the question of which country's law governs a 
given dispute - frustrates the global co-operation needed to restrain the illicit traffic in 
78 Siehr, K, "The Protection of Cultural Heritage and International Commerce" 1997 (6) I. J. C. P. 304, 
314. 
79 1993 Directive, Article 12. It is not clear whether `law' is to be construed narrowly, or `in the round'. 
(See Crawford, E B, `International Private Law in Scotland' (1998), p58, paragraph 5.01) 
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cultural property. 81 Whilst international efforts have historically concentrated upon 
regulation of cultural property (including export and import control82), it becomes 
apparent that a more pressing matter and more immediate cause for concern is, in fact, 
the very substance of the general international private law property rule, that the lex 
situs determines all questions of proprietary right. The rule which presently pertains in 
international private law is one which, prima facie, permits easy evasion of cultural 
property measures, ironically through deliberate reliance upon the lex Situs rule. How, 
if at all, can the accent and objectives of the international instruments be reconciled 
with the strict operation of the situs rule? Instead of focusing exclusively on the 
question of cultural property, it is submitted that there is merit in taking matters one 
step further back, to assess the efficacy of the situs rule itself. 
The Nazi cases - the Spoliation Advisory Panel 
In February 2000, the Government announced the creation of a new panel, the 
Spoliation Advisory Panel, to help resolve claims in respect of cultural objects looted 
during the Nazi era (1933-1945) and now held in United Kingdom national 
collections, or other UK museums or galleries. The Panel will consider claims and 
advise the claimant and institution in possession of the object on what action might be 
taken. The Arts Minister, Alan Howarth (appealing to conscience, if not to conflict of 
laws reasoning), has explained that "The purpose of this Panel will be to offer an 
alternative to costly legal proceedings and to help [parties] reach a satisfactory 
solution to claims that is both fair, just and as speedy as possible. , 83 
80 Prott (In Palmer, ibid. ), p205. 
81 Fox, C, "The Unidroit Convention: an Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural 
Property" 1993 (9) Am. Jo. of Inter. Law & Policy 225, at p255. 
82 E. g. Attorney-General of New Zealand v. Ortiz [ 1983] 2 All E. R. 93; 3 All E. R. 432. 
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The Spoliation Advisory Panel -a legal lacuna? 
The Panel's task, as prescribed by its Terms of Reference, 84 includes a duty "to 
evaluate on the balance of probabilities the validity of the claimant's original title to 
the picture and the validity of the institution's title thereto, subject to the important 
reservation that [the Panel's] conclusions on questions of law are not determinative of 
the parties' legal rights. "85 The impression is that this particular task is secondary to 
another of its prescribed tasks, namely, "To give due weight to the moral strength of 
the claimant's case, and to consider whether any moral obligation rests on the 
institution. , 86 
The Panel's Constitution stipulates that "In exercising its functions, while the Panel 
will consider legal issues relating to title to the object, it will not be the function of the 
Panel to determine legal rights, for example as to title. "87 The Panel's proceedings are 
intended to be an alternative to litigation, not a process of litigation, and it is therefore 
considered quite legitimate to take into account non-legal obligations, such as the 
moral strength of the claimant's case. 88 Any recommendation made by the Panel is 
not intended to be legally binding either on the claimant, the institution or the 
Secretary of State. 89 One must ask whether this is honest or useful. 
This leaves the legalities of ownership in limbo. It appears that even if the institution 
in question has acquired a valid and marketable title to a certain painting in terms of 
83 Department of Culture, Media and Sport Press Release (35\2000), 17 February 2000. 
84 Spoliation Advisory Panel, Constitution and Terms of Reference, paragraphs 7(d) and (f). 
85 Report of the Spoliation Advisory Panel, 18 January 2001, paragraph 6(2). 
86 Ibid, paragraph 6(3). (Emphasis added) 
87 Ibid, paragraph 5(a). (Emphasis added) 
88 Ibid, paragraph 5(b). 
89 Ibid, paragraph 5(c). 
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the lex situs rule, due legal process (including the choice of law rule) has been shamed 
by its lack of sensitivity to and accommodation of moral considerations. 
Given the remit and status of the Spoliation Panel, it is extremely unlikely that any of 
the national museums would refuse to honour or implement the Panel's 
recommendations. If, however, a private claimant should be dissatisfied with what he 
or she perceives to be an adverse recommendation, the option of litigation is still open 
to him or her. 
Interestingly, the Panel's Terms of Reference establish that "The Panel shall also be 
available to advise about any claim for an item in a private collection at the me 
request of the claimant and the owner. "90 Since both parties must support the 
reference, one might suppose that the `owner' would not lightly spurn the Panel's 
recommendation. But, if the lex Situs rule were to corroborate the `owner's' title, then 
even although the Panel's recommendation might deny such a title, it is possible that 
the `owner' might refuse to implement the Panel's recommendation. In such a case, 
the claimant's only resort would be to litigation. But, in that event, any court charged 
with making a conclusive determination of ownership would apply the rule of 
international private law, that is, the situs rule. Scope, once again, for the lex situs to 
trump the moral favourite. 
'Cultural Property' and International Private Law 
At present, our rules of international private law make no distinction between the 
treatment of cultural property and any other type of property. As far as choice of law 
90 Spoliation Advisory Panel, Terms of Reference, paragraph 3. (Emphasis added) 
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is concerned, items of cultural property effectively lose their privileged status as soon 
as they enter private law commercial channels. From a choice of law perspective, the 
legal issues regarding cultural property have been resolved simply by reference to the 
rules applying to all forms of moveable property. 91 "Trading in objects of art is only 
one kind of trading in movables. The national systems of conflict of laws have 
developed general rules applicable to all kinds of trade. "92 If it were otherwise, the 
overriding problem would be one of definition: how could a legal system draw a clear 
and serviceable distinction between cultural property/cultural objects/cultural heritage 
(however labelled) and any other type of property? Professor Jean Chätelain, adopting 
a pragmatic stance, has said that he "still cannot see any compelling reason to 
construct a new, specific art law, if only because the first thing to do, logically, would 
be to define the work of art, which alone should be enough to make any conclusion in 
this field a distant dream. , 93 
Nevertheless, there are those who call for a discrete set of conflict rules, applicable 
only to cultural property and tailored accordingly. 94 With respect, it is submitted that 
until such time as our general property rule has been reviewed, the foundations upon 
which a distinct choice of law rule, applicable only to cultural property, could be 
constructed, may well prove to be unstable. Cultural property is not so idiosyncratic 
an aspect of the law as to merit a unique, tailored treatment, wholly divorced from the 
rules applicable to other types of property (though there may, admittedly, be scope for 
91 Carter, P, "Transnational Trade in Works of Art: The Position in English Private International Law" 
in "International sales of works of art" (In Lalive P, ed. ) (1988), p322. 
92 Sandrock, 0, "Foreign Laws Regulating the Export of Cultural Property" (In Lalive P, ed. ), p457. 
There are no special rules for trading in specific objects, and it has been said that there cannot be 
special rules for any specific trade "because otherwise the body of rules of conflict of laws would grow 
to an unoverseeable and unmanageable extent. " (p462) 
93 Chätelain, J, "Synthesis" (In Lalive P, ed. ), p654. 
94 E. g. Prott, L V, "Problems of Private International Law for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage" 
(1989) V (217) Hague Receuil 215,306. 
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additional excavation provisions, export and import controls etc. ). To investigate the 
rules relating to the transfer of cultural property before reviewing the rules generally 
applicable to the transfer of moveable property, is akin to placing the proverbial `cart' 
before the `horse'. It is suggested that to characterise the treatment of cultural 
property as anything other than a sub-category of property law would be 
unproductive. 95 Only when the general conflict rules of property have been scrutinised 
and settled should we seek to refine them for use in particular areas, including, inter 
alia, cultural property. 
The tale of two innocents 
The perennial struggle between an original owner of goods whose goods are stolen or 
confiscated from him or her, and the subsequent bona fide purchaser of those goods is 
well known to conflict scholars. An examination of the situs rule in the context of 
cultural property demonstrates some of the disadvantages of the rule. If mechanical 
compliance with the lex situs rule gives rise to what the forum perceives to be an 
injustice to the deprived `owner', the logical question is whether a more flexible, 
temperate rule should be articulated as a substitute for the present rule which, as a 
(sometimes) reluctant final resort, sanctions its own evasion via the arbitrary and 
amorphous route of public policy (i. e. where application of the situs rule grossly 
offends the forum's public policy -a high threshold - the situs rule can be disapplied). 
There will always in international private law be a genuine need for an ultimate policy 
safeguard, but that should not, it is submitted, be the first port of call from an 
entrenched, obdurate connecting factor such as the lex Situs. The particular danger in 
this connection is that resort to the public policy escape route pre-empts consideration 
95 Contra Prott (1989), ibid., p314. In light of Prott's view, some consideration will be given to the 
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of the situs rule, and that public policy becomes an emotional response to the 
supplications of a one-time dispossessed owner, fluctuating unpredictably according 
to the `sensitivities' of the time. 
Where the innocent purchaser is an individual acting in good faith (as opposed to a 
museum or public collection), it is less likely that the full weight of public clamour 
will come to fruition, for no reason perhaps other than the fact that that there is less 
public awareness of the contents of a private as opposed to a public or national 
collection. But, there is little logic in applying (or endorsing) different benchmarks 
relating to the use of the public policy safety net, depending upon the nature and 
identity of the acquiring party. As far as cultural property is concerned, there will 
always exist a visible struggle between private demand to own culturally important 
items, and public outcry to preserve and repatriate such items. 96 Repatriation of goods 
on the basis of public outcry should not be conceded merely because the `owner' 
happens to be a public as opposed to a private collector. 
  THE PROBLEM WITH THE SOLUTIONS 
The international conventions 
First and foremost, as already outlined, the international conventions present a 
problem of definition: of `cultural property/objects/heritage', of `owner' and 
`unlawful' taking - according to what law? But there is a further problem, one of 
justification. Even assuming that we could define the key terms, it is submitted that 
possibility of bespoke cultural property rules in Chapter Fourteen, infra - `The Lex Proprietatis'. 
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there is little justification at this stage for a set of discrete rules of choice of law 
applicable only to cultural property. It is suggested that a more appropriate course of 
action is, first, to revisit the choice of law rules applicable to the transfer of property 
generally. 
The Spoliation Advisory Panel 
Has the case for special treatment of cultural property displaced during the Second 
World War, and now in the hands of United Kingdom museums, been convincingly 
argued? It does appear that this is a special problem deserving of a special solution. 
But, it must be acknowledged that in the event of an `owner's' rejection of the Panel's 
recommendation, there remains scope for the situs rule to frustrate the good intentions 
of politicians and the Panel. 
The lex situs rule - the tensions 
The hurdles to be surmounted by a party claiming title to property (including, inter 
alia, issues of proof, prescription, personal bar and good faith) constitute complex 
issues, but ones which, nevertheless, are potentially capable of being relegated to a 
position of relative insignificance, at the behest of public vehemence (most 
conspicuously where title to items of cultural property is concerned). Where title to 
cultural property is concerned, the touchstone of the authoritative (yet frustratingly 
insensitive) lex Situs rule is, on occasion, in danger of being deposed by public policy 
arguments. 97 Such displacement of the situs rule stems from good intentions, but often 
lacks the clarity, certainty and logic of the general rule. The hazard now baiting 
museums is the inclination (in an effort to appease public sentiment and the 
96 WAR Journal, Volume 1, Number 3, Autumn 1998, p17. 
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supplications of re-created nations and cultures) to refute their legal entitlement to 
property (entitlement validly conferred by application of the lex situs rule) and to 
repatriate (foreign) cultural objects within their custody. This way lies chaos, and 
doubtless also increased risk of physical damage to the objects concerned. 
Whilst in some cases repatriation of goods is being urged and justified by a sometimes 
reasonable, sometimes manipulative public policy argument, in other cases the public 
policy ideal is being denied in order, say, that the reasonable expectations of an 
acquiring party may be shielded. 98 This constitutes an unpredictable, inconsistent use 
of public policy, disguising perhaps an irreconcilable strain amongst ideals of cultural 
autonomy, public ownership and private possession. It would appear that, in this 
context at least, our choice of law rules are presently languishing somewhere between 
the Scylla of a stringent lex situs rule and the Charybdis of an indeterminate, volatile 
resort to public policy. Preferable would be a rule which would permit the forum to 
consider the provenance of the property in question, and to apply a law which, as 
suggested by Counsel for Mr Winkworth is more closely connected with the property, 
and the circumstances of acquisition than may be an entirely fortuitous or contrived 
lex Situs. In particular, we need a rule which, in the case of cultural property, less 
readily frustrates the purpose of the international conventions. 
The practical solutions 
Historically, condonation of the lenient practices and protocols of the art market was 
responsible for nurturing underhand and unscrupulous trading. In the past, it seems 
that if goods should have arrived in London, then in spite of (or because of? ) its 
97 Nationally, in the case of the Elgin Marbles, and parochially, in the case of the Lakota Shirt. 
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reputation as an international art centre, certain of the auction houses and dealers 
would apparently have sanctioned a `no questions asked' policy. 99 There have been 
allegations, in particular, that many of the antiquities offered for sale were offered 
without authentication or legitimate provenances, "giving rise to the plausible 
assumption (which can sometimes be substantiated) that these are 'hot' pieces that 
have illegally left their country of origin in recent years. "loo 
As recently as 1997, those involved in the art market, principally the leading auction 
houses, were publicly rebuked for engaging in less than honourable practices. 10' An 
inquiry was launched by the Department of Trade and Industry (primarily to 
investigate allegations of professional impropriety on the part of Sotheby's 
Auctioneers) and, simultaneously, leading figures in the international art world 
(possibly as a measure of self-defence) called for immediate scrutiny of the London 
market. Ashamedly, it emerged that parallel to the reputation for excellence of the 
London market stood its renown as an asylum for stolen property. At that time, Italian 
police, in particular, recognized the United Kingdom as a preferred destination for 
treasures clandestinely removed from Italy. 102 An officer in the Carabinieri anti-art- 
theft squad has remarked to the British press that "Unfortunately, Britain is not only 
pre-eminent in the legal art market, it is universally recognised as the leading market 
for receipt of stolen art works. " 103 
98 E. g. Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. [ 1986] 1 Ch. 496. 
99 See generally Lacey, R, `Sotheby's - Bidding for Class' (1998). 10° The Times, 7 February 1997. 
101 Not only for dealing in `stolen' property, but also for `ringing' (whereby dealers negotiate a joint 
bid for an item at a figure less than its true worth, sell it on and share the profit) and `chandelier 
bidding' (whereby the auctioneer pretends to take non-existent bids in order to create a false impression 
of interest). The latter two tactics are, to a certain extent, countenanced as being no more than "routine 
deceptions of the auction process. " (The Times, 7 February 1997) 
102 The Times, 7 February 1997. 
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Whilst concern as to the probity of the United Kingdom market remains tangible, 104 
the changing professional mores of art dealers and museum authorities must be 
highlighted. As recently as twenty years ago, it was remarked that the disappearance 
of cultural property was exacerbated by "clandestine archaeological or 
ethnographical expeditions, or by purchases by antique dealers assisted by a network 
of `local jobbers'. "los Dealers, conscious of the market for their goods, have 
traditionally been willing to satisfy that demand, even if it meant that full descriptions 
of the artist and the chain of previous owners were not supplied. 106 The position now 
seems generally to have changed, 107 but this is due less to an inherent corporate 
"evolving morality" than to a fuller measure of integrity being urged by the guiding 
hand of public pressure. 108 There currently pertains a general consensus that 
"prevention is better than cure" 109 and this is nowhere better illustrated than in the 
surge of codes of ethics and statements of good practice which have recently been 
promulgated. ' 10 These are principally directed at the regulation of acquisition policies. 
103 Ibid. 
104 E. g. A former chairman of Sotheby's has recently been convicted of conspiring with a former 
chairman of Christie's, to operate a price-fixing scheme. (The Herald, 6 December 2001) See also the 
retort of a British art dealer convicted (in France) of purchasing looted art. (The Herald, 7 July 2001) 
10 Williams, ibid., p2. (Foreword - Baxter, R, R) 106 E. g. Treue, ibid., at p181: "There were alert and knowledgeable British dealers and agents in Italy 
and all over the continent, ready to fall on the harvest of fine works of art put at their disposal ... 
It did 
not occur to them to offer these pictures and sculptures, which they had as a rule picked up for next to 
nothing, to their former owners; on the contrary, they were delighted with their windfalls and added 
them with joy to the art treasure of their country. They were not art robbers in the literal sense, but 
they took what they were offered. " Cf. Prott's explanation that in certain countries, auctioneers, as 
agents for the vendors, do not, in general, require to assume responsibility for any defects in the title of 
the vendor. At the same time, by being able to conceal the identity of the vendor, they can frustrate 
legitimate inquiries on the part of bona fide purchasers. (ibid., p275) 
10 The Times, 7 February 1997: "Morality in these matter is evolving and perhaps one should not be 
too severe over past misdeeds. " (p 10) 
108 E. g. IFAR Journal, ibid., at p20, cites, in particular, the U. S. Association of Art Museum Directors' 
1998 Statement of Principles regarding the World War II confiscations. 
109 Cf. Palmer, ibid., at p12: "The proliferation of prevention and retrieval methods has made a 
valuable contribution to the suppression of art theft. " 
10 E. g. Code of Practice for the Control of International Trading in Works of Art (per Palmer, ibid., 
p10); International Art Dealers' Code of Practice 1984; The British Dealers Code of Practice 1986 
(cited by the Chancery Division in Kingdom of Spain v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. [1986] 1 
W. L. R. 1120,1124); International Council of Museums Code of Professional Ethics 1986; National 
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It has been suggested that art dealers should be accountable in respect of three specific 
matters, namely, "guaranteeing authenticity, providing connoisseurship and 
warranting title. "11' The significance of these responsibilities has been neatly framed: 
"an honest and reputable dealer is the first line of defense for a private buyer. "' 12 The 
motivation for statements of good practice has stemmed largely from a desire to see 
the art market restored to a position of respectability and trust. In the context of the 
Organizing Seminar for the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets ("the 
Washington Conference"), ' 13 U. S. Under-Secretary Stuart Eizenstat gave substance to 
this proposition by declaring that "We want the international art market to be open, 
stable and free of uncertainty that it might be trading in works whose history is 
tainted by Nazi looting. "1 14 
The terms of reference of the Washington Conference, whilst re-stating the goal of a 
transparent market, 115 incorporate an encouragement, both to national museums 
(including government buildings) and to private art owners (including museums, 
auction houses, art dealers and other traders of art) to take "a more active approach 
with respect to their art holdings ... both by conducting thorough research into the 
provenance of holdings and by searching for the rightful owners or heirs ... so that 
greater due diligence in researching the provenance of artwork is made standard 
Museums Directors' Conference Statement of Principles; and Museum and Galleries Commission 
Statement of Principles. 
111 IFAR Journal, ibid., p3. 112 Ibid. 
113 30 June 1998, to explore further the matters raised at the London Conference on Nazi Gold, 
December 1997. (http: //www. ushmm. org/assets/eizen. htm, p2) 
114 Ibid., opening statement. 
115 Terms of Reference, released by the U. S. Department of State, 26 October 1998, pl. 
(http: //www. state. gov/www/regions/enr/). The policy of openness was intended to include "open 
archives, shared information, public engagement, Internet dissemination", as well as art loss registers. 
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practice. s'16 The effect of such a practice, Under-Secretary Eizenstat hoped, would be 
that "From now on the sale, purchase, exchange and display of art from this period 
[the Nazi era] will be addressed with greater sensitivity and a higher standard of 
responsibility. " 117 Although these remarks were made in the context of the 
Washington Conference, they can appropriately be extended so as to encompass the 
transfer of art and antiquities from all periods. Indeed, although certain principles 
have been agreed dealing specifically with the particular problems of Nazi looting 
(e. g. the principles agreed by the American Association of Art Museum Directors), 
there also exist other statements of practice, more general in their nature and inclusive 
of all types of art work (e. g. International Council of Museums Code of Professional 
Ethics), which establish specific rules governing "the acquisition and de-accessioning 
of collections and personal responsibility towards the collections, the public and the 
profession. "' 18 In particular, there is increasing pressure upon museums and dealers 
not to acquire any object, title to which cannot be clearly and continuously 
documented. ' 19 Such pressure, however, regardless of how well-intentioned it may be, 
suffers one fatal defect, namely, 120 "... the principles adopted at the Conference 
aren't legally binding on countries ... 
[they] represent a moral commitment among 
nations which all in the art world will have to take into account. "121 Irrespective of 
how laudable the aims and substance of the Conference and the various codes may be, 
116 Ibid., ppl/2. 
117 Laura Myers, The Associated Press, 3 December 1998. (http: //www. ihawaii. net/ webnews/wed/dr/ 
Aholocaust-conference) 
118 ICOM Press Release 14 January 1999. (http: //www. cs. reading. ac. uk/icom/worldwar2. html) 
119 E. g. ICOM Code of Professional Ethics, Clauses 3.1 and 3.2 (http: //www. icom. org/ethics/html); in 
addition, individual museums apply their own acquisition safeguards such as checking with 
governmental agencies of the country of origin etc. 
20 This defect was stated in the particular context of the Washington Conference, but it is true, by 
analogy, of all professional statements of practice. 
121 Laura Myers, The Associated Press, 3 December 1998. (http: //www. ihawaii. net/webnews/wed/dr/ 
Aholocaust-conference) 
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they cannot deal comprehensively with the issue of `private law' consequences; 122 as 
Palmer has indicated, " ... having (at most) purely contractual force [dealers'] codes 
can be enforced only by and against members of the relevant group or their 
disciplinary body. They give no direct right to third parties such as dispossessed 
owners. , 123 
Of perhaps greater significance, is the fact that while ethical persons will instinctively 
abide by ethical practices, compliance with such practices is alien to persons of 
dubious scruples. Accordingly, whilst codes of ethics etc. are useful expressions of 
prudent practice, they are ineffectual as a prophylactic measure in the fight against 
international art theft and can be no substitute for more refined and sensitive conflict 
rules regulating the transfer of property. Disreputable persons will always connive at 
means by which to evade or defeat ethical conventions and it is essential, therefore, 
that the deepest root of the problem be eradicated, rather than merely that we 
participate in a process of grappling with the peripheral nuisance. 
Conclusion 
While one ponders the niceties of the lex situs rule, and the politicians contemplate 
ratification or not of international instruments, the ownership disputes continue. 
In Greece, all hope is pinned on repatriation of the Elgin Marbles in time for the 2004 
Olympic Games in Athens. In a leap of faith the Greek Government has committed 
122 "The Conference recognizes that among participating nations there are differing legal systems and 
that countries act within the context of their own laws. " (Laura Myers, The Associated Press, 3 
December 1998 (http: //www. ihawaii. net/webnews/wed/dr/Aholocaust-conference), p2) 
123 Palmer, ibid., p22. 
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itself to construction of a new Acropolis Museum, intended to house the Parthenon 
Marbles. 124 
In Britain meanwhile, the Tate Gallery's legal title to the Griffier painting has been 
declared unassailable by the Spoliation Advisory Panel. 125 But the Panel has been 
persuaded that the claimant has a valid moral claim to the painting, 126 having regard 
to the spoliation which his family suffered, and that this should be reflected in an ex 
gratia payment of £125,000.127 Declaring the Tate free of moral and legal turpitude, 
however, the Panel has recommended that payment should be borne by the taxpayer. 
The Tate has simply been called upon to display alongside the painting an account of 
its provenance during and since the Nazi era, with special reference to the interest of 
the claimant and his family. 128 In a press release the Arts Minister announced that the 
Government has agreed to pay the compensation, but under admission that "the 
family, who wish to remain anonymous, have no legal title to the painting, and that 
there is no criticism whatsoever of the Tate Gallery. s029 
In this particular tale of two innocents, all's well that ends well for claimant and 
Gallery alike. The decision, however, does not sit comfortably either with the lex situs 
rule, or, one might surmise, with the taxpayer. 130 One might do well to bear in mind 
the advice of Alexander Solzhenitsyn: 
124 Select Committee Report, paragraph 151. Reports indicate that construction of the Museum (the 
estimated cost of which is £40 million) is being partially funded by the E. U. (http: /news. bbc. co. uk - 22 
August 2001) Consider also reports in The Sunday Telegraph, 19 August 2001, and The Sunday Times, 
20 January 2002. 
125 S. A. P. Report, paragraph 40. 
126 S. A. P. Report, paragraph 44. 
127 S. A. P. Report, paragraph 68(1). 
128 S. A. P. Report, paragraph 68(2). 
129 Department of Culture, Media and Sport Press Release (12/2001), 18 January 2001. 
130 As regards the Chardin claim (note 33, supra), it is interesting to note the comments of Bailie John 
Lynch, chairperson of Glasgow City Council's Repatriation Working Group, namely, "If a cash 
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"Do not pursue what is illusory - property and position: all that is gained at the 
expense of your nerves decade after decade and can be confiscated in one fell 
night. 9031 
settlement was recommended ... there would have to be discussions with the Scottish Executive or the 
exchequer. " (The Herald, 6 October 2001) More interesting, however, is the response of a spokesman 
for the Scottish Executive, viz.: "We do not envisage any role for the executive at this stage. " (The 
Herald, ibid. ) 
131 www guotationspaie. comiquotes. php3? author=Alexander+Solzhenitsyn 
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Chapter Eleven 
The Assignation of Incorporeal Moveable Property 
Incorporeal moveable property rights comprise, "certain kinds of immaterial or 
incorporeal abstractions, which exist only as rights or bodies of legal claims and 
rights and have no physical existence which can be actually possessed, and which, 
moreover, are deemed not like or connected with land and are accordingly moveable 
rather than heritable in succession. "' Incorporeal moveable property may be divided 
into three categories of rights: first, those which are purely rights of action, having an 
existence which is wholly independent of corporeal property (e. g. debts, claims in 
contract, delict or succession); secondly, those which exist as a concomitant to (albeit 
distinct from) corporeal property (e. g. the copyright which attaches to a book, or the 
goodwill which attaches to business premises); and thirdly, those rights which are 
represented by documentation which may itself be negotiated or transferred (e. g. 
negotiable instruments, or the rights represented by a share certificate). Generally, the 
expression incorporeal moveable property may be said to refer to property which 
exists ex lege, having "... only a legal, not a physical existence, and [which is] ... 
accordingly capable only of legal, not physical, movement. "2 
Within the category of incorporeal moveable property falls a wide miscellany of 
rights, ranging for example, from court decrees for payment or specific implement 
(which impose an obligation upon defenders and vest in pursuers a "jus exigendi 
enforceable by diligence , 3), to claims of debt emanating from non-purification of 
1 Walker, D M, `Principles of Scottish Private Law' (1989), Volume III, p492. 
2 Graveson, R H, `Private International Law' (1974), p469. 
3 Walker, ibid., p494. 
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pecuniary obligations, and rights of action, or relief, which flow from breach of 
contractual, delictual or restitutionary obligations. Even within the general class of 
claims of debt, there exists a varied collection of rights, including personal bonds, 
debentures, rights in security and reversionary interests. Particular rights of 
incorporeal moveable property also arise in the contexts of succession (e. g. prior 
rights of a surviving spouse, legal rights of a spouse and issue, and the beneficial 
rights of a liferenter or absolute beneficiary), and commerce (e. g. partnership 
interests4 and company share holdings5). Also in the commercial frame, bills of lading 
for goods, as well as constituting documentary evidence of cargo shipped or carried, 
are deemed to be representative of the goods themselves and can, accordingly, be 
transferred by means of endorsement and delivery. 6 
Negotiable instruments constitute a special class of incorporeal moveable property. 
Negotiability is the character attributed, ex lege, to certain classes of documents, 
evidencing "indebtedness and conferring a right to obtain payment of money. "7 
Within this class fall cheques, bank notes, dividend warrants, promissory notes, 
bankers' drafts etc. It is the quality of negotiability which implies, first, that a 
particular document is transferable either by delivery alone, or by endorsement and 
delivery, without need for formal assignation and intimation, and secondly, that a 
transferee will acquire good title, notwithstanding any defect in the title of the 
4 In Scots law, the assignee of a partnership interest is entitled to share in partnership profits, but by 
reason of delectus personae, he or she is not generally entitled to participate in the business of the 
partnership. (Section 31 of the Partnership Act 1890) 
Noting, however, that there will often be express restrictions upon the transfer of shares in English or 
Scottish incorporated private limited companies, according to the relevant Articles of Association. 
Consider section 8 of the Companies Act 1985, and S. I. 1985/805 (Companies (Table A to F) 
Regulations), including, in particular, Article 24 of Table `A' Articles of Association. 
6Hayman v. McLintock 1907 S. C. 936. 
7Walker, ibid., p498. 
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transferor. 8 It is not proposed to examine the particular choice of law rules concerning 
negotiable instruments. 9 
Another significant class of incorporeal moveable property is that of intellectual 
property, but similarly, a detailed treatment of the conflict rules concerning such 
rights is beyond the scope of this work. 1° 
The diverse nature of incorporeal moveable property rights in Scots law is apparent. 
One might reasonably ask what is the common denominator among such rights. 
Professor Walker has suggested that the thread which runs through all such rights is 
the capacity to be "... turned into money ... [they are] assignable inter vivos ... 
[they] 
transmit to executors on death and [pass] to the trustee in sequestration on the 
holder's bankruptcy. "11 Accepting, therefore, that incorporeal moveable property 
rights may be created, acquired, disposed of and transmitted, it is necessary to 
consider the choice of law rules which are applicable to such transactions. 
Choice of law and the assignation of incorporeal moveable Property 
It was demonstrated in Chapter Eight12 that, over time, various connecting factors 
have vied for application to disputes concerning the transfer of corporeal moveable 
property. Collier has remarked that, "If the choice of law rule relating to title to 
tangible moveables is now tolerably clear, the same cannot be said of that concerning 
8 Bechuanaland Exploration Co v. London Trading Bank [ 1898] 2 Q. B. 658. 
9 For further details, see Crawford, E B, `International Private Law in Scotland' (1998), p323, 
paragraph 14.28 et seq., and Dicey & Morris `The Conflict of Laws', p1431, paragraph 33R-314 et seq. i0 For a full treatment of the subject, the reader is referred to Fawcett, J, & Torremans, P, "Intellectual 
Property and Private International Law' (1998). 
11 Walker, ibid., p493. Cf. Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume 18, paragraphs 11,16 and 120. 
12 `The Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property'. 
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title to intangibles. "13 In 1952, Cheshire described the transfer of choses in possession 
as "... perhaps the most intractable topic in English private international law", 14 but 
it is submitted that the complexity of the rules concerning chattels is, in fact, 
surpassed, by the rules which concern choses in action. 15 
Where rights of incorporeal moveable property are concerned, certain potentially 
applicable localising agents may not be immediately discernible (e. g. the lex situs or 
the lex loci actus), and may not be detectable until a more penetrating investigation 
into the particular circumstances of the case has been conducted. Nevertheless, patent 
and latent factors alike have been contenders for signifying the lex causae appropriate 
to determine the validity of assignations of incorporeal moveable property. 
Assignability 
Before identifying the law which is appropriate to regulate the assignation of 
incorporeal moveable property, a question arises as to whether the right in question is, 
in fact, assignable. By which law should assignability be determined? This question 
arose in the case of Grant's Trustees v. Ritchie's Executor, 16 in answer to which Lord 
Young declared that, "By our law a subject which has not vested, or a right which has 
not vested, is not transmissible; but ... 
by the law of the country [England] where this 
will was made the provision here in question ... was nevertheless from the 
death of 
the testator a transmissible interest. Now, I must take the law of this deed to be the 
13 Collier, J G, `Conflict of Laws' (2001), p251. The same author expresses a degree of surprise at this 
result, insofar as, "... in commercial matters, the law relating to intangibles in the conflict of laws 
seems much more important than that concerning tangibles. " (ibid., p25 1) 
14 Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law' 4th edition (1952), p428. It is indicative of the 
convolutions in this area of law, and of the unusually slow pace of change, that Cheshire's sentiment is 
reiterated at p938 of the current (130) edition of `Private International Law'. 
15 Cf. Dicey & Morris, `The Conflict of Laws', p977, at paragraph 24-047: "The choice of law rules 
which govern the assignment or transfer of intangible property are not easy to state with certainty. " 
16 (1886) 13 R. 646. 
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law that governs the rights given by it [i. e. English law]. "17 Assignability is 
determined according to the proper law of the right, that is, the proper law of the 
original transaction from which the right derived, or the law under which the right 
was created. ' 8 
Although this view was reiterated by Lord Robertson in Pender v. Commercial Bank 
of Scotland Ltd., 19 his Lordship also outlined how the rule may be defeated by other 
considerations: "Although a jus crediti may be sua natura [i. e. according to the proper 
law of the right] assignable, yet, I think, the holder of it may be precluded by the law 
of her domicile from assigning it. i20 It appears, therefore, that assignability according 
to the proper law of the right may nevertheless be frustrated by operation of the 
transferor's lex domicilii. In other words, the rule as to assignability is subordinate to 
the rule regarding capacity to assign. 21 Conversely, if the proper law of the right 
should consider the right in question to be non-assignable, it is of no consequence that 
'7 Ibid., p650. Cf. Maher, G, `International Private Law: Cases and Statutes' (1985), at p2 10: "Matters 
relating to the validity of the debt ... are governed 
by the legal system under which the debt or property 
is created (sometimes called the proper law of the debt). The same system of law also governs the 
characteristics of the debt, including whether it is capable of being assigned by the creditor to a third 
party. "; Wolff, M, `Private International Law' (1950), p546; Carnahan, C W, `Conflict of Laws and 
Life Insurance Contracts' (1958), p430; and Graveson, ibid., p476. Consider the rule in the U. S. A., 
embodied in paragraph 208 of the Second Restatement, viz.: "Whether, and under what conditions, a 
contractual right, which is not embodied in a document, can be effectively assigned is determined by 
the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship to the contract and the parties 
with respect to the issue of assignability. " Comment (a) to paragraph 208 cites, as examples of such 
`conditions', the question whether consent to the assignment, by the obligor or a third party, is a 
prerequisite to effective assignation. 
S Cf. Graveson, ibid., p477; Companhia Colombiana de Seguros v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co 
[1965] 1 Q. B. 101, per Roskill, J., at p128; and Trendtex Trading Corp v. Credit Suisse [1982] A. C. 
679, in which the plaintiffs appeal was dismissed on the basis that, "... any such assignment of the 
English cause of action as was purported to be made by the agreement for the purpose stated was, 
under English law, void ... It remains a 
fundamental principle of English law that one cannot assign a 
bare right to litigate. " (p679) A right may be unassignable on grounds of delectus personae (e. g. in 
Scots law, the right of an employee under a contract of employment, or the right of a tenant under a 
residential lease, or an agricultural lease of ordinary duration). (McAllister, A, `Scottish Law of 
Leases' (1995) 2nd ed., p67) 
19 1940 S. L. T. 306; Cf. Campbell Connelly & Co Ltd. v. Noble [1963] 1 W. L. R. 252; and Libertas- 
Kommerz GmbH. v. Johnson 1977 S. C. 191. 
20 Ibid., p308. 
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some other law, say, the lex loci actus or the lex domicilii, should consider it to be 
assignable. 22 
As regards voluntary assignations effected by contracts entered into after 1 April 
1991, it should be noted that, by virtue of statutory provision echoing the common 
law rule, assignability is determined by the law governing the right to which the 
assignation relates (i. e. the proper law of the right). 23 
Ascertainine the lex causae - significant distinctions 
It is important to observe three distinctions, namely, (1) contractual and non- 
contractual assignations; (2) original-parties and remote-parties disputes; and (3) 
voluntary and involuntary assignations. 
(1) Ascertaining the lex causae: contractual and non-contractual assignations 
Incorporeal moveable property may be assigned by means of contract, or 
alternatively, by means of non-gratuitous unilateral obligation, or outright gift. 24 The 
contractual (or non-contractual) character of the incorporeal right itself should not, 
21 Alternatively, personal (in)capacity to assign must be regarded as an essential component of 
assignability. 
22 There is no room in Scots or English law for the interest analysis approach sometimes employed in 
the U. S. A., and illustrated in comment (a) to paragraph 208 of the Second Restatement, viz.: H and W, 
both domiciled in X, entered into a Separation Agreement by which H assigned to W one-half of his 
future wages. H subsequently acquired a domicile of choice in Y and entered into a contract of 
employment there with Z. W seeks an order, in X, requiring H to pay to her one-half of his wages. 
Wages are assignable by X law, but not by Y law. To ascertain the appropriate lex causae, comment (a) 
suggests that the key question is: what is the purpose of the Y rule of non-assignability? If its purpose 
is to protect wives and children, then no significant interest of Y would be prejudiced were the 
assignation to be upheld by the application of X law. If, on the other hand, Y law were intended to 
protect husbands or employers, Y's interests would be impaired by the application of X law. 
Accordingly, to ascertain the lex causae, a U. S. forum must assess whether X's interest in W's welfare 
outweighs Y's interests in H's welfare and the protection of H's employer. 
23 Article 12(2) of Schedule 1 to the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
24 Re Westerton [1919] 2 Ch. 104 
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however, be confused with the contractual (or non-contractual) character of the 
assignation. 25 
(a) Contractual assignations 
The rules concerning the (voluntary) contractual assignation of a `right against 
another person', are contained in Article 12 of the Rome Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (hereinafter `the Convention'). 26 Article 1 of 
the Convention narrates that it shall not apply, inter alia, to contractual obligations 
relating to wills and succession, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial 
relationship, or rights and duties arising out of a family relationship, including 
maintenance obligations in respect of illegitimate children, 27 or to certain contracts of 
insurance. 28 The general exclusions of Article 1, it is submitted, transcend the 
potentially inclusive drafting of Article 12(1). 
Article 1(1) of the Convention provides that the Convention "... shall apply to 
contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of 
different countries. " Where the subject matter of a dispute concerns the non- 
contractual assignation of a non-contractual obligation, 29 reference to the common law 
rules regarding the assignation of incorporeal moveable property is clearly 
necessary. 30 This is also the case where a dispute concerns the non-contractual 
25 Subject to rules of assignability, a non-contractually created right, such as copyright, may be 
transferred contractually, and conversely, a contractually created right, such as a debt, may be assigned 
otherwise than by means of contract (e. g. by gift or succession). 
26 Incorporated into Scots and English law by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, and applicable 
to contracts concluded on or after 1 April 1991. 
27 Rome Convention, Article 1(2)(b). 
2,8 Rome Convention, Article 1(3). 
29 E. g. The gift of the benefits arising under a right of copyright. 
30 See note 32 et seq., infra. 
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assignation of a contractual obligation. 31 In contrast, Article 12 of the Convention is 
applicable where a dispute concerns the contractual assignation of a contractual 
obligation. A more difficult question is whether Article 12 applies to the contractual 
assignation of a non-contractual obligation, such as a claim for delictual damages. In 
such a case, an obligation exists on two levels, first, the delictual obligation between 
the original parties (i. e. the perpetrator of the delict, and the injured party), and 
secondly, the contractual obligation between the assignor (the injured party), and the 
assignee. Clearly, the Convention applies to the contractual obligation between the 
assignor and the assignee; this accords with Article 1(1), and corresponds to the 
wording of Article 12(1). It is submitted, however, that the submission of this scenario 
to Article 12(2) (which would seek, in effect, to regulate the non-contractual 
obligation between the assignee and the debtor, the perpetrator of the delict), would 
be at odds with the wording of Article 1, which restricts the ambit of the Convention's 
operation to `contractual obligations'. After conclusion of the contract between the 
injured party and the assignee, all that exists between the perpetrator of the delict and 
the assignee is a delictual, not a contractual obligation. In short, Article 12(2) may, on 
occasion, overstep the boundaries established by Article 1(1). It is acknowledged, 
however, that the prejudicial effect of this may be minimal, since Article 12(2) 
denotes, in any event, application of the law governing the right to which the 
assignment relates (i. e. the proper law of the delictual right), not the contractual lex 
causae. 
31 E. g. The gift of a contractually created right, such as a debt. 
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(b) Non-contractual assignations 
Where assignations are non-contractual, reliance is still placed upon the common law 
rules, which generally are renowned for their unintelligibility. 32 As Graveson has 
observed, 33 some courts have favoured a contractual analysis of the problem, 34 while 
others, a proprietary analysis, and others still, a middle path. Confusion derives 35 36 
from the fact that, frequently, some or all of the putative connecting factors (e. g. the 
lex domicilii, the lex loci actus and the lex situs) coincide. By reason of the false 
conflicts thus arising, courts have often failed to state explicitly the particular capacity 
in which the lex causae is being applied. 
Before considering the potentially applicable connecting factors, it is worth stating 
that these rules apply, not only to non-contractual assignations, but also to contractual 
assignations of obligations which fall within the Article 1 exclusions (and thereby, 
outwith the scope of the Convention). 
The connecting factors deemed, at one time or another, to be pertinent to the transfer 
of corporeal moveable property have, in like manner, been applied to the transfer of 
incorporeal moveable property. 
32 Consider the unattributed remark made at the beginning of the last century, that "There are various 
views as to what law governs the voluntary assignment of a chose in action ... 
The cases on the subject 
are singularly inconclusive. " (Note, `The Law Governing the Recording of an Assignment of a Chose in 
Action' (1906/7) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 636, p637) Cf. Cheshire & North, 13`h edition, ibid., p963; and 
Fletcher, I F, `Conflict of Laws and European Community Law' (1982), at p176, where the rules are 
described as comprising "a highly unsatisfactory and retrograde jurisprudence. " 
33Graveson, ibid., p475. 
34Lee v. Abdy (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 309. 
35Re Queensland Mercantile & Agency Company [1891] 1 Ch. 536. 
36 Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez [1927] 1 K. B. 669. 
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Lex causae - mobilia seguuntur personam 
During the period of its general prime, 37 application of the brocard `mobilia sequuntur 
personam' was extended to transfers of incorporeal moveable property. 38 Lord Karnes 
and Joseph Story, writing on different sides of the Atlantic, both advocated 
application of the mobilia principle. 39 The theory, which attributes to the property a 
notional situs at the owner's domicile, is attractive insofar as its bias towards domicile 
acknowledges that property of this character lacks a physical situs. 40 The theory was 
applied in at least one Outer House decision'41 and appears to have been one of the 
(several) bases of decision in Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez. 42 The facts in 
Republica de Guatemala were "peculiar and picturesque, but (so far as material to 
the point reported) not complicated ... C made in Guatemala a voluntary assignment 
in writing to N of a sum deposited by C in a London bank, both C and N being 
domiciled in Guatemala and N being a minor. , 43 The assignment was valid according 
to English law, but invalid according to Guatemalan law. The proceedings were 
intended to determine the entitlement as between N and the Republic, to which C, 
while in prison, had subsequently assigned the deposited sum. The question was 
whether English law or Guatemalan law should determine the validity of the 
assignment to N. The Court of Appeal applied Guatemalan law, but for reasons which 
were not unanimously supported by the three members of the Court. Bankes, U. 
appears to have placed more emphasis upon the lex domicilii than did Scrutton, U., or 
Lawrence, LJ., who both referred, additionally, to the lex loci actus. Scrutton, LJ. 
37 See Chapter Eight, supra - `The Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property'. 38 Some authors have even suggested that the theory was, in fact, more suited to dealings with 
intangible property: "The theory had, perhaps, a stronger justification in the case of intangibles by 
reason of the absence or nebulous nature of the situs of incorporeal property. " (Graveson, ibid., p473) 
39 Karnes, `Principles of Equity', 1II. 8.4.; and Story, `Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws', 
paragraphs 362,395-404. 
New York Life Insurance Company v. Public Trustee [1924] 2 Ch. 101, per Atkin U., at p119. 
4'Forbes v. Official Receiver in Bankruptcy 1924 S. L. T. 22. 
42 [ 192711 K. B. 669. 
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explained that the court was "Freed from the picturesque facts ... to determine the 
dry 
question of law", 44 but the case has been sorely criticized for failing to lay down a 
clear ratio: the author of a note published shortly after the decision described it as a 
"... curious addition to the cases in which all the members of a strong court have 
arrived at the same result, but all for different reasons. "; 45 Sykes concluded that, "[It] 
is difficult to extract anything very tangible from the welter of opinions. "; 46 and 
Collier has described the case as "confused and indeterminate. "47 
In common with the eventual demise of the mobilia principle in transactions 
concerning corporeal moveable property, and largely for the same reasons, the 
principle is no longer considered appropriate to determine the validity of assignations 
of incorporeal moveable property. As one author has written, "The fetish mobilia 
sequuntur personam long ago lost caste ... 
"ý8 Part of the reason for corrosion of the 
mobilia theory seems to have been the fact that the lex domicilii frequently coincided 
with the lex loci actus, or the lex Situs. In Lee v. Abdy, 49 for example, Day, J. advised 
that, "[The parties] are domiciled and are contracting in Cape Colony, and by the law 
of that colony, as it seems to me, the validity or invalidity of such contract [an 
assignment of a policy of life insurance] must be determined. "50 Similarly in the case 
43 F P, `Note - Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez' (1927) 43 L. Q. R. 296, at p296. 44 Ibid., p687. 
45 F P, ibid., p296. 
46 Sykes, E I, `Cases and Materials on Private International Law' (1962), p594. 
47 Ibid., p255. 
48 Unattributed note, `What Law Governs the Assignment of a Bank Account? ' (1926-27) 40 Harv. L. 
Rev. 989, at p989. 
49 (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 309. This case concerns a contractual assignation, but the principle can be extended 
by analogy to non-contractual obligations. 
50 Ibid., p312. In the later case of Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez [1927] 1 K. B. 669, Scrutton U. 
noted, at p689 that, "Neither judge [in Lee v. Abdy - Day, J. or Wills, J. ] draws a distinction between 
the lex domicilii or the lex loci actus, " and further, "... where, as here the two laws are the same it is 
not necessary to decide between them. " Cf. Webb & Brown: "It is by no means clear whether Day, J. 
really decided ... 
[Lee v. Abdy] on the basis of the lex loci actus of the assignment or on that of the 
domicile of the parties. The same ambiguity pervades Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez. " (Webb, PR 
H, and Brown, DJL, `Casebook on the Conflict of Laws' (1960), p376) 
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of In re Anziani, Herbert v. Christopherson, 51 the document in question was invalid 
because its validity was a matter for Italian law, the lex domicilii and the lex actus. 52 
Lex causae - lex loci actus 
The notion that incorporeal moveable property lacks a factual situs also prompted for 
a time application of the lex loci actus to govern the validity of an assignation of 
incorporeal moveable property. 53 The lex loci actus theory (which gives rise, of 
course, to the question: what is the locus actus? ), 54 subjects the validity of a particular 
assignation to the law of the place where the assignation was made or effected. 55 So, 
for example, in Scottish Provident Institution v. Cohen, 56 Lord McLaren held that, "It 
appears to me to be reasonably clear that the validity of the assignment must be 
determined by the law of the country within which the assignment was made. "57 
Whilst this theory may be of some value in determining the validity of an assignation 
as between the assignor and the assignee, it must be refuted that the lex loci actus is 
51 [1930] 1 Ch. 407. 
52 Ibid., per Maugham, J., at p422: "... the comity of nations, whatever that phrase may include, 
certainly does not require the Courts of this country to recognize as valid a voluntary assignment of a 
moveable [situated where? ] entered into here by a domiciled Italian which by Italian law, for reasons 
off public policy, is regarded as null and void. " 
5 Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez [1927] 1 K. B. 669. 
54 C f. Aldous, J., in Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [1996] 1 W. L. R. 387, at 
p424: "... applying the lex loci actus ... can raise 
doubt as to what is the relevant transaction to be 
considered and where it takes place. That is particularly so ... with the explosion of communication 
technology. " 
ss E. g. Scottish Provident Institution v. Cohen (1888) 16 R. 112, per Lord President Inglis, at p 116: 
"The transaction took place in England and the constitution of the creditor's rights must be determined 
according to the law of the country where the transaction took place - that is, the law of England. " The 
views of Lord McLaren, the judge at first instance, were held to be "very sound" (ibid., p116), viz.: 
"We have nothing to consider under the law of Scotland ... except to see that a valid right of credit 
is 
created by the policy in the form recognized by our law ... The validity of that assignment will, 
in 
general, be determined by the lex loci contractus - that is, according to the law of the country in which 
the transference is made or the security given. " Cf Scottish Provident Institution v. Robinson (1892) 29 
S. L. R. 733, per Lord Stormonth-Darling, at p734: "The moment that the insured transferred his right of 
credit in a manner recognised as sufficient by the law of the country where the transaction took place, I 
think he became divested of his right, and incapable of transferring it to anybody else, or at least to 
anybody who had notice of the prior transfer. " 
56 (1888) 16 R. 112. 
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appropriate as regards the original debtor who is not, in fact, a party to the subsequent 
assignation. As Graveson has pointed out, "The effect of governing his [i. e. the 
original debtor's] rights under the assignment by the lex actus [in this context, 
meaning the lex loci actus] may well lead to the untenable position of increasing his 
obligations under the debt. , 58 
As regards disputes concerning priority among competing assignations, the lex loci 
actus theory is deficient, for in the event that each assignation is valid by its 
corresponding lex loci actus, the theory provides no solution whatsoever. Admittedly, 
the lex loci actus may evince legitimate interest in the formal validity of an 
assignation, 59 but this does not justify wider application of the lex loci actus. At any 
rate, Staughton, I. T. has recently asserted that, "At all events, for choses in action in 
general, the lex loci actus has been rejected. , 60 
Lex causae - lex Situs 
By extension of the rule applicable to corporeal moveable property, Westlake, Dicey 
and Falconbridge each considered that the lex situs (or more properly, the lex loci rei 
sitae) was apt to govern all disputes concerning incorporeal moveable property. 61 As 
has been demonstrated in Chapter Four, however, the situs of such property is a 
complex and artificial notion, and for reasons of definition, if none other, the situs 
57 Ibid., p116. 
58 Graveson, ibid., p473. 
59 Anton, A E, `Private International Law' (1967), p410; Falconer v. Heirs of Beatie (1627) Mor. 
4501; Sinclair v. Murray (1636) Mor. 4501; and Erskine v. Ramsay (1664) Mor. 4502. (Note 104 et 
seq, infra) 
60 Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [199611 W. L. R. 387,402. 
61 Westlake, J `A Treatise on Private International Law', 5th edition, p207; Dicey & Morris, `The 
Conflict of Laws' 1st edition (1896), Rule 141; and Falconbridge, J D, `Essays on the Conflict of Laws' 
(1954), p274. Consider also F&K Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property [1954] 1 W. L. R. 
139, per Pearson, J., at p156: "Evidently, there is a considerable weight of authority in favour of the 
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rule is inconclusive. As has been noted, however, the situs rule is one of the most 
despotic choice of law rules. 
In Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez, 62 Lawrence U., opined that, "Wherever a local 
situation can properly be attributed to a debt it seems to me logically to follow that 
the same principle should be applied to its assignment as is applicable to the transfer 
of goods ... The principle that a transfer of goods made according to the lex Situs is 
valid is ... well established. 
"63 His Lordship considered that, "In the present case the 
debt is connected in so many ways with England that there is no difficulty in arriving 
at the conclusion that it has its situation or quasi-situation64 in England65 ... In the 
case of a debt so situated I am unable to appreciate why on principle an assignment 
valid according to the lex sites should be rendered ineffectual merely because it was 
made in Guatemala, where the parties to it were domiciled, and because it did not 
comply with the requirements of the law of Guatemala. , 66 This is a surprising passage, 
since it is effectively a dissent from the majority decision that the validity of the 
assignment should be governed by the law of Guatemala, but oddly, his Lordship did 
not explicitly proclaim his dissent. On the contrary, he declared that, "I have come to 
the conclusion that the gift to the defendant, who by his personal law and by the law 
of the place where it was made was disabled from accepting it, cannot properly be 
treated as valid in England, notwithstanding that the subject-matter of the gift was 
view that only the lex situs can alter the title to debts and choses in action, and the authorities cited to 
prove the contrary proposition do not seem to have that effect. " 
62 [1927] 1 K. B. 669. 
63 Ibid., p695. 
64 This is a significant reference to notional Situs. 
65 For example, "The contract with the bank was made in England - the nature and extent of the bank's 
obligations under the contract fall to be determined by English law - the debt is payable in England 
where the bank is resident and domiciled and England is the place where the debt is properly 
recoverable. " (ibid., per Lawrence, LJ., at p697) 
66 Ibid., p697. 
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situate here. "67 This constitutes a veiled capitulation by the lex Situs in favour of the 
accumulating lex domicilii and lex loci actus. 
In the same manner that the lex domicilii often coincides with the lex loci actus, so too 
the lex loci actus often corresponds with the lex situs. As Scrutton, U., noted in 
Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez, 68 with reference to the case of In re Queensland 
Mercantile and Agency Co, 69 "The law of the situs of the debt, the unpaid calls, and 
the law of the place of the transaction the effect of which was being considered, the 
arrestment, were the same, and it was therefore unnecessary to decide which would 
prevail in case of difference. North, J. [in In re Queensland Mercantile and Agency 
Company] treated the law of the place where the debt was situate as overriding the 
law of the domicil of the creditor. He did not deal with the lex loci actus, which was 
also the lex loci rei sitae. The Court of Appeal did not deal with the case in these 
terms at all but on the lines that the Scottish court was administering the jus gentium 
and the English court would not interfere. s70 Again, it is evident that the basis upon 
which the lex causae is applied might frequently be obscured by a variety of links 
between the parties and their circumstances, and that law. 7' Whilst such an 
accumulation of factors may confirm that the lex causae is apposite, 
72 this does not 
assist in ascertaining the appropriate connecting factor, or in determining the lex 
causae, in cases which have more diverse legal ties. 
67 Ibid., p701. 
68 [1927] IK. B. 669. 
69 [1891] 1 Ch. 536; affirmed [1892] 1 Ch. 238. 
70 Ibid., p693. 
7l E. g. Warrington, J., in Kelly v. Selwyn [1905] 2 Ch. 117, at p121, noted that In re Queensland 
Mercantile and Agency Company [ 18921 1 Ch. 219, "... merely decided that where there is a chose in 
action owing from persons residing in a particular country (in that case in Scotland) an assignment in 
that case by process of law of those choses in action, valid according to the law of Scotland, would be 
valid elsewhere. 1 do not think that case decided anything more. " 
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The simple fact that a precise situation may notionally be ascribed to incorporeal 
moveable property, does not, per se, warrant the application of the lex situs to all 
questions concerning that property. The question of `appropriateness', however, has 
often been overlooked. This was the case in F&K Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli 
Absentee Property, 73 where Pearson, J., held that, "... if the action to recover a debt 
or chose in action is brought in the country where it is properly recoverable and 
therefore situated, and if there is a conflict between the lex Situs and the proper law 
(the one having legislation which vests the debt or chose in action in A and the other 
having legislation which vests the debt or chose in action in B), the court trying the 
action will be bound to apply its own law which is the lex situs. "74 Hence, Pearson, J. 
admits that the lex sites need not necessarily be the proper law. 
The arguments proffered in support of applying the lex Situs to assignations of 
incorporeal moveable property, mirror, by simple (too simple) analogy, those 
arguments promulgated in support of applying the theory to transfers of corporeal 
moveable property. 75 However, the rationale which exists for applying the lex Situs to 
corporeal moveable property, is distorted when the rule is extended to assignations of 
incorporeal moveable property. 76 Considerations such as ease of ascertainment, 
72 Sed contra, Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd [ 1980] 1 Ch. 496. 
73 [1954] 1 W. L. R. 139. 
74Ibid., p156. 
75 The attribution of a `situs' to incorporeal property is intended to facilitate the conflict of laws 
regulation of the assignation of such property. Accordingly, as Anton has noted, "... there has been a 
tendency on the part of private international law lawyers to resolve questions relating to their [i. e. 
incorporeal objects'] assignation by rules similar to those governing the transfer of corporeal 
moveables, that is, according to the lex situs principle. " (Anton (1967), ibid., p408) Cf. Graveson, ibid., 
p474; and Rogerson, P J, `The Situs of Debts in the Conflict of Laws - Illogical, Unnecessary and 
Misleading' [1990] 49 C. L. J. 441,453. 
76 Cf. Note (1926), ibid., p990: "The frailty of the notion of situs in its application to a debt has been 
demonstrated repeatedly. If the concept be not limited to tangibles, its use merely implies a metaphoric 
description of a result attained on independent grounds. " 
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uniformity, control, and commercial expediency do not apply with equal force to 
dealings with incorporeal moveable property. 
These considerations led Morris to conclude that the situs test is inadequate. 77 This 
view was judicially endorsed by Staughton, U. in Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate 
Investment Trust plc (No. 3): 78 "In the case of a simple contract debt the lex Situs is 
thus rejected, because it is uncertain. That was not always Dicey's view. "79 
Furthermore, in the recent case of Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich v. Five Star 
General Trading LLC, 80 Mance, U. advised that, "... application of the lex Situs 
cannot provide a satisfactory solution in all cases ... in cases of global assignments, 
for example, under factoring or discounting arrangements, it may well not be 
appropriate to adopt a rule which would make the validity of assignment depend upon 
consideration of the residence of each debtor and lex situs of each debt assigned81 
77 Morris, JHC, `Cases and Materials on Private International Law', 4`s edition, at p370: "Westlake ... 
and Dicey ... thought that the 
lex situs of the debt is the test. This view has been overruled by the 
majority of the Court of Appeal (Republica de Guatemala) and by Maugham J. in Re Anziani ... at any 
rate so far as voluntary assignments are concerned. The objection to it is that though a debt may be 
regarded as situated in the place where it is properly recoverable ..., that is presumably where the 
debtor resides and may be sued, the debtor may reside in more places than one" Cf. Rogerson (1990), 
ibid., at p453, where the author asserts that "... application of the lex situs to intangible property is an 
implausible stratagem. " 
78 [1996] 1 W. L. R. 387. 
79 Ibid., p401. His Lordship referred to a dictum of Cozens-Hardy, J. in In re Maudslay [1900] 1 Ch. 
602, at p610, in which reference was made to rule 141 of the 1S` edition of Dicey's work (1896): "An 
assignment ... of a 
debt, giving a good title thereto according to the lex situs of the debt (in so far as by 
analogy a situs can be attributed to a debt) is valid. " 
80 [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1344; [2001] 3 All E. R. 257. 
81 Benjamin has explained that as regards immobilised securities, "The interest of the participant is 
characteristically unallocated ... Of course, where all interests are represented by an undivided 
Global, the interest of the participant is not only unallocated, but inherently unallocatable. " 
(Benjamin, J, 'Determining the Situs of Interests in Immobilised Securities' (1998) 47 I. C. L. Q. 877, 
924/5) Benjamin had previously warned that, "... although [the] securities business is international 
and electronic, settled law does not yet reflect this. " (Benjamin, J, `The Law of Global Custody' (1996), 
p49) 
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[Some scholars82] favour the law of the assignor's residence as the applicable law in 
such cases. "83 
Lex causae - lex actus 
To formulate a mechanical choice of law rule - whether lex domicilii, lex loci actus, 
or lex Situs - intended to govern every question which could potentially arise in 
connection with the assignation of incorporeal moveable property is clearly 
contentious. A more viable rule may be one which is more flexible and which permits 
account to be taken of each relevant factor. 84 
As was demonstrated in Chapter Eight, Professor Cheshire was an early exponent of 
the lex actus theory, advising that "It is reasonable and logical to refer most questions 
relating to a debt to the transaction in which it has its source and to the legal system 
which governs that transaction. "85 
The difficulty inherent in applying a strict and exclusive connecting factor, stemming 
from a resolute characterisation of the problem in issue, was highlighted in F&K 
Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property86 and, more recently, in Raiffeissen 
82 E. g. Goode, R, `Commercial Law', p1128; and Moshinsky, M, `The Assignment of Debts in the 
Conflict of Laws' (1992) 108 L. Q. R. 591,613. 
83 [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1344,1359. This would appear to be mobilia sequuntur personam cast in a modern 
light. 
84 Cf. Second Restatement, paragraph 250: "Whether a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors 
of the debtor's interests in moveables is effective to transfer the debtor's interests in chattels or in 
intangible rights is determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, 
has the most significant relationship to the debtor and the assignment. This state will usually be the 
state of domicile, if the debtor is an individual, and the state of incorporation, if the debtor is a 
corporation. " Cf. Graveson, ibid., at p474: "[The proper law theory] proceeds on a treatment of 
property, not as rights existing independently of, and unrelated to the transaction out of which they 
arose, but as part of the contract or transaction which created them. " 
"Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law', 7th edition, p422. 
86 [195411 W. L. R. 139. 
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Zentralbank Österreich v. Five Star Trading LLC. 87 Similarly, Staughton, U. 
preferred to apply, not the situs rule per se, but the related, though more flexible, 
factor of `proper law of the right': "Situs is now replaced by the proper law of the 
contract by which the debt was created. But with other monetary obligations the 
choice of the law governing the creation of the thing approximates closely, in my 
opinion, to the lex Situs. 88 
Accordingly, it seems that relating a debt or other incorporeal right to the transaction 
which underpins it, now justifies, not only in Article 12 cases, 89 but also in non- 
contractual cases, reference to the `proper law' of that transaction, that is, to the legal 
system with which the transaction has its closest and most significant connection. As 
Staughton, U. suggested, however, the proper law of the right will, in many cases, 
constitute the lex Situs of the incorporeal moveable property. 
The proper law approach, while leading often to application of the lex situs, permits 
additional flexibility insofar as the constituent parts of a particular transaction (e. g. 
capacity of the parties, formal validity of the transaction, essential validity of the 
transaction etc. ) may be referred to the particular legal system with which those parts, 
respectively, enjoy the closest and most significant connection. It might be argued that 
the court in Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez9° adopted this `discrete' approach, 
separately tackling the various problems of capacity to take, formal validity, and 
priorities. Unfortunately for the theorists, however, development of the lex actus 
theory was stunted by the emergence of a false conflict, with the various competing 
87 [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1344; [2001] 3 All E. R. 257. (Note 140 et seq., infra) 
88 Macmillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [199611 W. L. R. 387,401. 
89 Note 135 et seq., infra. 
90 [192711 K. B. 669, per Scrutton, U., at p693. 
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factors being represented by the same law, namely, the law of Guatemala. 91 It is 
possible that Lee v. Abdy92 may also be construed in this light. 
Aspects of validity: capacity to assign 
The tendency of the courts has been to mask the contract/conveyance (or 
agreement/assignation) distinction by referring the question of capacity to make or 
accept an assignation, to the law which governs capacity to contract (i. e. to the proper 
law of the contract, traditionally the lex loci actus). 93 The Rome Convention does not 
lay down a general rule of choice of law concerning the capacity of a natural person to 
give or to accept title under an assignation of incorporeal moveable property. Specific 
provision, however, is made in Article 11, to the effect that, "In a contract concluded 
between persons who are in the same country, a natural person who would have 
capacity94 under the law of that country may invoke his incapacity resulting from 
another law only if the other party to the contract was aware of this incapacity at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract or was not aware thereof as a result of 
negligence. " The effect of this provision is to create, in these restricted circumstances, 
a presumption in favour of applying the lex loci contractus, subject, however, to any 
91 Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez [1927] 1 K. B. 669, per Scrutton, LJ., at p 693. 
92 (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 309. Cf. Morris, 3`' ed., p362, and 4th ed., p323. Consider too Trendtex Trading 
Corp v. Credit Suisse [ 1982] A. C. 679, per Lord Wilberforce, at p695. 
93 Re Korvine's Trust [1921] 1 Ch. 343. Cf. Graveson, ibid., p477; and Carnahan (1958), ibid., at p453: 
"The majority of the cases dealing with the question have held that the law of the place of assignment 
governed the capacity of a married woman to assign or to accept an assignment of an interest in an 
insurance policy. " Carnahan modified this assertion, at p455, where he stated that, "Capacity to accept 
an assignment has been determined by reference either to the law of the place where the original policy 
of insurance was payable (in these cases it may be inferred that that state was also the place of making 
of the contract of insurance) or to the law of the domicile of the parties to the assignment. In cases of 
this type it is difficult to determine the true basis of the decision. " As far as capacity to contract is 
concerned, Dicey & Morris now refer this issue to the law of the country with which the contract is 
most closely connected, or the lex domicilii, or residence. (p1271, paragraph 32R-213) 
94 Capacity, it is presumed, to contract, not to transfer an interest in property (i. e. contractual, rather 
than proprietary, capacity). 
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incapacity under, say, the lex domicilii, or the lex loci rei sitae, of which the other 
transacting party was, or should have been, aware. 95 
As far as proprietary (as opposed to contractual) capacity is concerned, resort must be 
had to Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez. 96 Once again, due to the coincidence of 
connecting factors in this case, the factor applicable to the particular issue of capacity 
is not incontestable. 7 In Republica de Guatemala the question of capacity to take an 
assignment of personal property was held to be governed by either of the Guatemalan 
lex domicilii, 98 or the law of the place where the assignment took place. Since both 
factors denoted the law of Guatemala, a false conflict arose, and the court held that it 
was immaterial which connecting factor ought to prevail. 99 
In a revisionist view of Republica de Guatemala, Morris suggested that, "The validity 
or invalidity of an assignment of a chose in action on the ground of lack of form or 
lack of capacity is governed by the proper law of the assignment. "' 00 Maher has taken 
95 Dicey & Morris, p 1271, paragraph 32R-213. 
96 (1927] 1 K. B. 669. 
97 Consider Sykes (1962), ibid., p594; and Collier, ibid., p255. 
98 Consider Sykes: "It should be remembered that the ... 
[Republica de Guatemala] case posed issues 
both of form and of capacity and the presence of the latter category may explain the tenderness shown 
in some quarters to the lex domicilii. " (ibid., p594) According to the lex domicilii, a minor could not 
accept an assignment of the type in question, except by the consent of a judicially appointed 
representative, a requirement which had not been satisfied. (F P, ibid., p296) 
99 Ibid., per Scrutton, LJ., at p693: "In my opinion, both the validity of the parties to enter into such a 
transaction and the validity and effect of such a transaction in form and results must be determined by 
one or other of those laws [i. e. the lex loci actus or the lex domicilii] and in this case they are the 
same. " Cf. Lawrence, U., who remarked, at p701, that "... the gift to the defendant, who by his 
personal law and by the law of the place where it was made was disabled from accepting it, cannot 
properly be treated as valid in England notwithstanding that the subject-matter of the gift was situate 
here. " Consider Webb & Brown, ibid., at p379: "The same ambiguity is to be found in this [Republica 
de Guatemala] case as in that of Lee v. Abdy - viz., as to whether the court was deciding the matter 
before it according to the lex domicilii or the lex loci actus. In the Guatemala case, however, there is 
the further complication that two issues were raised with regard to the alleged assignment to Nunez: 
(1) that of capacity and (2), the question of formal validity. " 
10° Morris, JHC, `Cases and Materials on Private International Law', 4`h edition, p362. Cf. Second 
Restatement, paragraph 209: "The validity of an assignment of a contractual right not embodied in a 
document, which is assignable under [paragraph] 208, and the rights created thereby as between 
assignor and assignee are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular 
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issue with this interpretation, suggesting that, "Although it has been argued ... that 
issues of capacity to assign a debt should be governed by the proper law of the 
assignation, the case law suggests that this is governed by the law of the domicile of 
the parties. s1 °' Maher refers specifically to Black v. Black's Trustees, 102 and to 
Republica de Guatemala, but it is submitted that these cases do not, in fact, entirely 
support his assertion: any remarks made in Black with reference to incorporeal 
moveable property are obiter, and it has already been shown that Republica de 
Guatemala is inconclusive as to which law should determine questions of capacity. 
Although there is apparent confusion as to which law should determine proprietary 
capacity, it is submitted that an in favorem approach to capacity is best: "... capacity 
should be governed by the proper law of the transfer or possibly the proper law of the 
right. " 103 
Aspects of validity: formal validity 
The distinction between the validity of a contract to assign property, and of the 
assignation itself, must be borne in mind. Questions of form, 104 although often 
referred to the lex loci actus, 105 may require to be referred to the lex loci rei sitae, for 
otherwise, were the assignation to fall short of compliance with formalities prescribed 
issue, has the most significant relationship to the assignment and the parties. " Comment (a) explains 
that this rule applies to the capacity of the assignor to assign, as well as to issues of formal and essential 
validity. 
101 Maher, ibid., p215. 
102 1950 S. L. T. (Notes) 32 
103 Crawford, ibid., p320, paragraph 14.22. 
104 Consider Carnahan, ibid., where it is suggested that, "Questions of formalities necessary for an 
assignment have arisen in cases relating to the type of writing required, including the form in which 
the intent of the assignor must be expressed, and the formalities necessary to constitute delivery of an 
assignment otherwise in proper form. " (p456) 
405 Carnahan, ibid., states, at p459, that, "Under the rule which treats an assignment as being a 
contract, the formalities of delivery - actual or constructive - and the presumption of acceptance by 
the beneficiary should be decided by the law of the place where the assignment was made. " Cf. 
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by the situs (e. g. as to registration or notarial execution), the proprietary effects may 
be ineffective there. ' 06 
In Bankhaus H Aufhauser v. Scotboard Ltd., 107 Lord Hunter alluded to the possibility 
of a distinction between the laws which are appropriate to determine the formal and 
the essential validity of an assignation, but, on account of constricted pleadings, his 
Lordship was denied the opportunity to explore this possibility: "It is unnecessary to 
decide what the position might have been had the pursuers ... 
distinguished between 
the formal validity of the assignation and its essential validity ... Their case on record 
is not presented in a way which permits a decision on the basis of such a distinction, 
possibly because such a presentation would be pointless. " 108 
His Lordship also adverted to the fact that Scottish Provident Institution v. Cohen109 
"... was also concerned with a question of formal validity, and does no more than 
vouch the proposition that, in a question between the cedent's trustees and an 
assignee, compliance in point of form with the requirements of the lex loci actus will 
entitle an assignment to be regarded by a Scottish court as formally valid. "' 
10 
It is interesting to note that Article 9 of the Rome Convention takes a liberal, in 
favorem approach to the formal validity of a contract to assign. "' As regards the 
assignation itself, it is submitted that an in favorem approach should likewise be 
Republica de Guatemala v. Nunez [1929] 1 K. B. 669, in which the Guatemalan lex domicilii of the 
assignee required certain formalities for a voluntary assignment of money, which were not observed. 
106Dulaney v. Merry [1901] 1 K. B. 536,542. 
107 1973 S. L. T. (Notes) 87. 
los Ibid., p89. 
109 (1888) 16 R. 112. 
110 Ibid. 1973 S. L. T. (Notes) 87,90. 
111 Cf. Dicey & Morris, ibid., p1257, paragraph 32R-172. 
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favoured, with formal validity according to one or more of the proper law of the right, 
the proper law of the assignation, or the lex loci actus, sufficing. 
Aspects of validity: priority among competing assignees 
Lord McLaren advised in Scottish Provident Institution v. Cohen' 12 that, "... any 
question of competing right between the trustee and a creditor claiming upon a 
preferable security must apparently be determined by the law of the country in which 
the competition arises ... A competition 
between parties both deriving their rights 
from the creditor in the policy is not necessarily to be decided on the same principle 
as that which would regulate a question as to the liability of the debtor. "' 
13 
Where there is more than one assignation, the competition is generally governed, not 
by the proper law of the assignation, but by the proper law of the right. ' 14 Where the 
question, "... is simply one of priority in acquiring the jus crediti created by the 
policy, and admittedly subsisting in the person either of the insured or of some one 
deriving right from him ... that is a question which I think must 
be regulated by the 
law of the place where the jus crediti was first validly transferred. "' 15 
112(1888) 16R. 112. 
113 Ibid., p114. 
14 Kelly V. Selwyn [1905] 2 Ch. 117, per Warrington, J. (Although one might query the basis of his 
decision, at least as interpreted by Scrutton, U. in Republica de Guatemala, at p693, viz.: "Priorities 
have been said to be questions for the lex fori (The Colorado [1923] P. 102}, and I think this is the 
ground of the decision [in Kelly v. Selwyn]. " Consider too Morris (4th edition), ibid., at p367: "Where 
there are two or more competing assignments of a chose in action, each valid by its own proper law, 
questions of priority are determined by the proper law of the original contract. " Cf. the approach in 
Germany where priority between successive assignments is determined by reference to the law 
governing the claim assigned. (per Mance, U., in Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich v. Five Star 
General Trading LLC [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1344,1361) 
115 Scottish Provident Institution v. Robinson (1892) 29 S. L. R. 733, per Lord Stormonth-Darling, at 
p734. Cf. Rogerson (1990), ibid., p441. 
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Priorities are a proprietary, as opposed to a contractual, matter, 116 and unless the 
competing assignations are governed by the same proper law, it is appropriate that the 
competition be determined by the proper of the right (which will coincide with the lex 
Situs). 
"7 
Lex causae -a contemporary lex actus 
Rule 118(2) of the current edition of Dicey & Morris states that, "(2)But in other 
cases118 (semble), the validity and effect of an assignment of an intangible may be 
governed by the law with which the right assigned has its most significant 
connection. "' 19 In effect, the authors equate this law with the proper law of the right, 
being the "law of the country under which the right was created or otherwise 
arises. "120 Although Rule 118(2) (unlike Article 12(2)) is overtly expressed in `proper 
law' language, the essence of the two provisions is the same. Significantly, the 
authors of Cheshire and North have remarked that, "... it is to be hoped the courts will 
now abandon the old rules and apply the provisions of Article 12 by analogy to cases 
of voluntary non-contractual assignments. s121 The fulfilment of this hope may signify 
the acceptance of a broader proper law approach to incorporeal property law matters. 
Before applying the analogy, however, it is necessary to examine Article 12 in greater 
detail. 
116 Collier, ibid., p259. 
117 Cf. Second Restatement, paragraph 211: " (1) Questions of priority as between two or more 
assignees are determined by the law governing the assignments under [paragraph] 209 if the 
assignments are governed either by the same law or by different laws having the same rule of priority; 
(2) In other situations, questions of priority are determined by the law governing the assignability of 
the right. " This rule presupposes that the each assignation is valid as against the assignor. 
118 i. e. non-contractual assignations. 
119 Dicey & Morris, ibid., p977, paragraph 24R-046. 
120 Ibid., p984, paragraph 24-061. E. g. "... in the case of a legacy of moveables this would be the law of 
the testator's domicile at death; in the case of an interest under a trust, the law governing the trust; 
and in the case of a right of action, the lexfori. " 
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(2) Ascertaining the lex Causae - original-parties/remote-parties distinction 
Having observed the contractual/non-contractual distinction, it is important to 
recognize the further sub-division, between an original-parties and a remote-parties 
dispute. '22 The original-parties/remote-parties distinction, which was recently 
deprecated as regards dealings with corporeal moveables, 123 is of greater significance 
in the context of dealings with incorporeal moveable property. As Professor Anton 
has advised (at least concerning voluntary assignations), "... the fundamental 
cleavage appears to be between questions, on the one hand, arising from or 
depending upon the original relationship between the debtor and his creditor and 
questions, on the other hand, arising from the terms of the contract by which the debt 
is assigned. " 24 This dichotomy was recognised in Scots and English choice of law 
rules, even prior to the passing of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. In 
Dinwoodie's Executrix v. Carruthers' Executrix, 125 Lord Traynor remarked that, "As 
regards ... any question 
between the depositor and the depository, it may very well be 
that English law must govern ... On the other hand, in any question between the 
depositors themselves..., Scotch law must govern, seeing that the depositors are both 
Scotch, that they were dealing with moveable estate situated in Scotland and that they 
cannot be presumed to have transacted with each other on any footing than that their 
respective rights should be determined by the only law with which they are supposed 
to be acquainted, that is, the law of their own country. " 26 
121Cheshire & North, 13th edition, ibid., p963. 
122 Collier has remarked that, "The difficulty which pervades this topic stems from two sources of 
confusion. One, which complicates many of the decisions, is the failure to distinguish between 
questions which are related to the right assigned, and questions related to the assignment itself and 
rather old-fashioned views with regard to the latter. " (ibid., p25 1) Cf. Falconbridge, ibid., p423. 
123 Chapter Eight, supra - `The Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property'; Glencore International A. G. 
v. Metro Trading International Inc. [200111 Ll. Rep. 284. 
'24Anton, A E, `Private International Law' (1990), p621. 
125 (1895) 23 R. 234. 
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This view was shared by Lord McLaren in the case of Scottish Provident Institution v. 
Cohen, 127 in which his Lordship advised that, "The assignment of the right of credit in 
the policy is a new contract, distinct as regards its nature, mode of constitution and 
the law that regulates it, from the contract constituted by the policy itself. 55129 
Similarly, in Bankhaus H Aufhauser v. Scotboard Ltd., 129 Lord Hunter advised that, 
"It is easy to understand why, in a question between the assignor and the assignee, 
the intrinsic validity of the assignment should be governed by the proper law of the 
assignation; 130 but when issues of validity (other perhaps than mere formal validity) 
arise between the assignee and the other party to the original contract, the argument 
in support of the application of the proper law of the assignation, in preference to the 
proper law both of the original contract and of the debt claimed, is, in my opinion, 
inconsistent with both logic and equity. "' 31 
Where a matter is dependent upon the original contract or other relationship between 
the debtor and the creditor, Professor Anton has expressed the opinion that the 
liability of the debtor should be governed, "... in principle by the legal system under 
126 Ibid., p239. 
127 (1888) 16 R. 112. 
128 Ibid., p113. Cf. Scottish Provident Institution v. Robinson (1892) 29 S. L. R. 733, per Lord 
Stormonth-Darling, at p734: "1 shall assume that the policy of insurance was a Scottish contract, and 
that all questions connected with its constitution and fulfilment would be regulated by [Scots] law. But 
the transference of the right of credit in the policy was a new contract distinct in all its particulars from 
the contract constituted by the policy itself. " 
1291973 S. L. T. (Notes) 87. 
130 Consider in this regard comment (c) to paragraph 209 of the Second Restatement: "When the acts of 
assignment on the part of both assignor and assignee are done in the same state, this state will usually 
be the state of most significant relationship, except when the place of assignment bears no normal 
relation to the transaction. " The reporter has not commented upon what is intended by the expression 
`normal relation'. It is expected, however, that a common-sense approach would be taken to 
construction of this phrase. 
13' Ibid., p89. Accordingly, his Lordship concluded that, "... the pursuers, who, by virtue of the 
assignation claim in a Scottish court a real right in a Scottish incorporeal moveable, cannot in a 
question with the defenders [the Scottish debtors], who are parties to the contract but not to the 
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which the debt arose, whether this is the law governing the succession in which he is 
acting as executor or trustee, the law of the deposit which constituted the debt, or the 
law governing a contract entered into between the debtor and the creditor. "132 It is 
reckoned that the measure of the debtor's liability (at least in respect of his creditor) 
must be apparent from the outset of the parties' transacting. Accordingly, the creditor 
should not be able to augment, or make more onerous, the debtor's liability, by 
assigning his or her right to a third party by assignation governed by a law which 
differs from the proper law of the right in question. The nature and extent of the 
debtor's obligation crystallises at the point of its creation, and cannot thereafter be 
intensified, save by virtue of its own proper law. 
In contrast with this, however, questions arising between the cedent and the assignee 
are determined by the proper law of the assignation. 133 Furthermore, that law 
determines whether the rights of the assignee have been extinguished. 134 
assignation, insist on having the validity of the assignation and the defender's title to challenge that 
assignation determined by German law [the law of the assignation]. " 
132 Anton, (1990), ibid., p621; Williamson v. Taylor (1845) 8 D. 156,162. Cf. Collier, ibid., at p254: 
"Presumably, 'the law governing the right' means the law applicable to the contract, if any, out of 
which the interest arises, and not the lex situs of the interest. If this is so, the applicable law will be 
determined by the rules laid down in the Rome Convention if the contract out of which the right arises 
is one which falls within the Convention. If it is not within the Convention ... the applicable 
law will 
have to be determined by reference to the rules of common law ... 
[As regards rights which do not arise 
out of contract], the governing law should be the lex Situs. " 
133Anton (1990), ibid., p623; and Crawford, ibid., p320, paragraph 14.24, and p322, paragraph 14.27. 
Consider Strachan v. McDougle (1835) 13 S. 954; Taylor v. Scott (1847) 9 D. 1504; and Scottish 
Provident Institution v. Cohen (1888) 16 R. 112, per Lord McLaren, at pl 14: "Where the assignment is 
made between parties dealing with reference to the law of England ... we ought to recognize the 
assignment, provided it is in accordance with the requirements of that law. " Cf. Collier, ibid., at p254: 
"Article 12(1) ... now makes it clear that, insofar as the assignment is by way of contract (and if it is 
by 
way of gift the choice of law rules for contract can be applied by way of analogy), contractual issues 
are decided by the law which governs the contract of assignment and not by that which governs the 
interest assigned. " Cf. Note 121, supra. 
134 Re Anziani [1930] 1 Ch. 407. 
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The original-parties/remote-parties distinction has now been statutorily endorsed by 
the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. Article 12 of the Convention incorporates 
two discrete provisions, ' 35 viz.: 
1. The mutual obligations of assignor and assignee under a voluntary 
assignment of a right against another person ('the debtor') shall be 
governed by the law136 which under this Convention applies to the contract 
between the assignor and assignee. 137 
2. The law governing the right to which the assignment relates shall 
determine its assignability, the relationship between the assignee and the 
debtor, the conditions under which the assignment can be invoked against 
135 The authors of Dicey & Morris explain that the pre-1990 law (per The Conflict of Laws', l la' 
edition, p979, rules 121 and 122) was, in fact, akin to that which is encapsulated in Article 12 (13`s 
edition, p980, paragraph 24-050 et seq. ) 
136 Note that Article 15 of the Convention excludes the operation of renvoi. 
137 Professors Giuliano and Lagarde have stated that the interpretation of this provision should give rise 
to no difficulty: "... the relationship between the assignor and the assignee of a right is governed by 
the law applicable to the agreement to assign. " (`Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligations' [1980] OJ C282,1,34) Somewhat critically, however, the reporters remark 
that, "Although the purpose and meaning of the provision leaves hardly any room for doubt, one 
wonders why the Group did not draft it more simply and probably more elegantly. For example, why 
not say that the assignment of a right by agreement shall be governed in relations between the assignor 
and the assignee by the law applicable to that agreement. " (ibid. ) It seems, however, that use of the 
expression "assignment" may have caused difficulties for the German delegation, since that particular 
expression in German law includes reference, not only to the effects upon the assignor and the 
assignee, but also upon the debtor (i. e. upon an individual who is not a party to the assignation). Cf. the 
more flexible American approach, viz.: "The validity of an assignment of a contractual right not 
embodied in a document, which is assignable under [paragraph] 208, and the rights created thereby as 
between assignor and assignee are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the 
particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the assignment and the parties. " (Second 
Restatement, paragraph 209) Sed contra, Wolff, ibid., at p538: "In view of the character of an 
assignment as an alteration of the content of the debt it would appear reasonable for it to be governed 
by the same law, as governs the assigned debt. " 
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the debtor138 and any question whether the debtor's obligations have been 
discharged 139 
The operation of Article 12 was subjected to close judicial scrutiny in the case of 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v. Five Star General Trading LLC and 
others. 140 It is instructive to consider this case in detail. The claimant Austrian bank 
lent money to the first defendants, Dubai shipowners, to assist them in the purchase of 
a certain vessel, the `Mount F. In turn, the owners mortgaged the vessel to the 
plaintiffs, agreeing to assign to the bank the policy of marine insurance in respect of 
the vessel. Although the insurers were French, the insurance policy was governed by 
English law. By deed of assignment (also governed by English law), the owners 
purported to assign to the plaintiff "all their right, title and interest in and to the 
insurances. " Two weeks after the assignment, the Mount I collided with a second 
vessel, causing the latter to sink. The owners of the sunken vessel, together with the 
Taiwanese owners of its cargo, sought, in France, attachment orders in respect of the 
Mount I insurance proceeds. Accordingly, the bank commenced proceedings, in 
England, against the Dubai owner, the French insurers and the Taiwanese cargo 
owners, seeking various declarations, including one that, as from the date of the 
assignment, the owners had no right, title or interest, in or to the insurances, or to 
moneys payable thereunder, and that as from the same date, the bank was entitled to 
all such interests and money. The cargo owners, pleading French law, denied that the 
notice of assignment was valid or binding on them. 
138 Giuliano & Lagarde suggest that the expression `conditions under which the assignment can be 
invoked' includes the "conditions of transferability of the assignment as well as the procedures 
required to give effect to the assignment in relation to the debtor. " (ibid., p34) 
139 The present author agrees with Collier's remark that, "Logically, the treatment of such matters as 
assignability should have preceded a provision concerning the assignment. " The view is expressed that 
Article 12 is "inelegantly drafted. " (ibid., p254, note 53) 
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The principal issue for decision was whether the assignee of a marine insurance 
policy, made with French insurers, but governed by English law, was entitled to 
recover to the extent of his interest. According to French law, the assignment was 
invalid, '41 but according to English law, it was valid. The choice of law issue arising 
was a complex one of characterisation, 142 namely, whether the assignee's claim was to 
be determined by English law, as the proper law governing the underlying contract of 
insurance, or by French law, the lex Situs of the chose in action which had been 
assigned. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the matter should be governed by 
Article 12(2) of the Rome Convention, whereas Counsel for the defendant contended 
that since the Convention was applicable only to contractual obligations, it did not 
apply to the dispute in hand. 
The case called before Longmore, j", 143 who applied the conflicts methodology 
recommended by Staughton, LJ. in MacMillan Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust 
PIc., 144 namely, "First it is necessary to characterise the issue that is before the court 
The second stage is to select the rule of conflict of laws which lays down a 
connecting factor for the issue in question ... Thirdly it is necessary to identify the 
system of law which is tied by the connecting factor found in stage two to the issue 
characterised in stage one. " 45 
140 [2000] 2 Ll. Rep. 684; [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1344; [2001] 3 All E. R. 257. 
141 French law denied the bank's claim because notice of the assignment had not been given to the 
French insurers by or through a French bailiff, as required under Article 1690 of the French Civil Code. 
142 Longmore, J., explained it thus, "When he opened this case Mr Gruder, Q. C. [Counsel for the 
palaintiffs] said he proposed to set me an examination question. " ([2001] 2 Ll. Rep. 684,685) 
3 In the Commercial Court of the Queen's Bench Division, [2000] 2 Ll. Rep. 684. 
144 [199611 W. L. R. 387, per Staughton, U., at p391. 
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As regards the first stage, Longmore J., having attempted the characterisation task, 
concluded that, "... the first stage ... may be quite difficult to adopt especially since 
claims to different relief may give rise to different issues. If one has to ask the 
question whether the issues are contractual (as [Counsel for the plaintiffs] would say) 
or proprietary (as [Counsel for the defendants] would say), the answer would appear 
to be that issues'46] are contractual while issues'47 "48 [two [two ]are proprietary. 
In spite of this bifurcated characterisation, Counsel for the plaintiff contended that 
Article 12 of the Rome Convention should apply to each of the four issues. 
Conversely, Counsel for the defendants submitted that the Convention should apply 
only to `pure' contractual issues, '49 and that proprietary issues should be decided "in 
some other, more traditional way. "150 His Lordship was troubled by the call to 
characterise the plaintiff's claim as one related purely to the proprietary effects of the 
assignment: "In the case of the sale of goods (and, indeed, the sale of land) one is 
entirely used to the different concepts of contract on the one hand and the transfer of 
i"i [2000] 2 U. Rep. 684, at p686. This process was endorsed by Mance, LJ. at [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1344, 
at p1355. Mance, U. added that, "The process falls to be undertaken in a broad internationalist spirit 
in accordance with the principles of conflict of laws of the forum" 
146 Ibid., p686. The two `contractual' issues concerned, first, the question of validity of the notice of 
assignment of the contract of insurance, and secondly, the question to whom the insurance moneys 
were payable. 
147 Ibid., p686/7. The two `proprietary' issues concerned the right, title and interest in the contract of 
insurance, and the moneys payable thereunder. 
148 Ibid, p687. 
149 Counsel relied upon the authority of Professor Goode, who has stated that, "... it is widely assumed 
that Article 12 ... governs all aspects of assignment of 
debts but 
... such assumption 
is based on the 
misconception that assignment of debts is to be equated with a contract whereas such assignment is 
also a transfer of property and, as such is outside the scope of the Rome Convention. " (Goode, R, 
`Commercial Law', 2nd edition, p1126) (ibid., p687) Cf. Comment 2 to Article 1 of the Giuliano & 
Lagarde Report, which states that, "... since the Convention is concerned only with the law applicable 
to contractual obligations, property rights and intellectual property rights are not covered by these 
provisions. " (ibid., plO) 
150 Ibid., p687. Further, "Professor Goode then concludes that the proprietary effects of an assignment, 
like the proprietary effects of a contract of sale of goods, have nothing to do with the law applicable to 
the underlying contract and should be governed by the lex Situs. [Counsel for the defendants] submitted 
that I should follow this guidance and decide that the lex situs is (at least arguably) the applicable 
law. " Cf. Collier's comment that, "... the tendency to regard the questions as mostly contractual may 
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conveyance of title on the other 151 ... It is much less easy to apply this analysis to 
intangible things ... it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to divorce the concept of such title 
from the underlying contract which has created the chose in action in the first 
place. "' 52 It appears that too much importance is placed upon the semantics of the 
matter and upon the precise formulation of the plaintiff's claim: "... is the relevant 
question a question whether title or property in the contract of insurance has been 
transferred to RZB or is it not rather a question whether the insurers owe the 
obligation of payment contained in the contract of insurance to the shipowners or to 
RZB or to some third party? "153 If the former approach were taken, the question 
would be characterised as one of property, but if the latter were preferred, then the 
question would become one of contract. Longmore, J. advised that, "It is 
unsatisfactory for the application of the Rome Convention to depend merely on the 
way in which one phrases the relevant question. "' 54 Rather opaquely, his Lordship 
adjudged that, "... as a matter of English law, the Rome Convention should apply to 
any assignment of a contract unless, on its155 wording, such application is 
inappropriate. " 156 
be thought to lead to an overemphasis on the law governing the contract rather than on the lex situs. " 
(ibid., p252/3) 
151 His Lordship considered that, "It is comparatively easy to see that a different rule of conflict of laws 
may apply to determine whether a party to a contract is in breach of that contract from the rule that 
applies to determine whether title to particular goods (or land) has been transferred. " (ibid., p687) 
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p687. 
153 Ibid., p687. Cf. Falconbridge, ibid., at p424, where the author proffers three possible formulations of 
the tri-partite debtor/assignor/assignee scenario. The nature of the characterisation problem is apparent 
also from the judgment of Pearson, J., in F&K Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property, 
[ 1954] 1 W. L. R. 139, where his Lordship explained, at p152, that, " ... a 
debt or chose in action can be 
regarded in two ways: (1) it can be regarded as properly moveable property, and when so regarded it 
naturally falls under the lex situs; (2) it can be regarded as a still unperformed obligation under a 
contract, and therefore it might be still subject to the proper law of the contract and liable to be 
discharged or altered by that law. " 
154 Ibid., p687. 
155 Does `its' refer to the Rome Convention (e. g. where, on the basis of Article 1, the Convention rules 
are not applicable to the dispute in hand), or to the assignment in question (e. g. where the particular 
contract excludes or overrides the operation of the Convention)? 
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In the immediate case, the court held that Article 12(2) was applicable, and by virtue 
of that provision, the lex causae was deemed to be the law governing the right to 
which the assignment related (i. e. English law, the law of the underlying 
obligation). 157 The effect of the decision was that the plaintiffs were held entitled to 
the policy proceeds. Dissatisfied with this result, the cargo owners appealed, but 
without success. 158 
Although the Court of Appeal affirmed the substantive result of Longmore, J. 's 
decision, nevertheless, it varied his judicial declarations. '59 Mance, LT . 
160 appraised 
the conflicting contractual and proprietary analyses of the issues in dispute. The 
respondent bank maintained that the issue in dispute was a contractual one, that is, 
whether the insurance contract had been validly assigned by the owners to the bank 
The appellant cargo owners, on the other hand, maintained that the issue was 
essentially a proprietary one, concerning the validity (against third parties) of the 
assignment of an intangible right of claim against insurers. 161 
'56 Ibid., p687. 
157 Ibid., p688. According to English law, there was no doubt that the plaintiffs had a legitimate claim. 
158 [2001] 3 All E. R. 257. Mance, I. J. noted, at p261, paragraph 2, that, "The appeal raises at least one 
moot issue of private international law. The judge was warned that he was being set an examination 
question on the applicable law. We have to consider the judge's response, conscious that our own may 
itself be reviewed. Although a central issue involves the scope of the ... 
`Rome Convention'... there is, 
as yet, no court to which such an issue may be referred to ensure a uniform international 
interpretation. " Cf. Plender, R, and Wilderspin, M, `The European Contracts Convention' (2001), 2"a 
ed.: "When the first edition of this book was published in 1991, at the same time as the entry into force 
of the Rome Convention, it could scarcely have been imagined that, ten years later, the Protocols on 
the interpretation by the European Court of the Convention would not be in force. There are 
consequently at the time of writing no judgments of that court on the interpretation of the Convention. " 
(Preface, p. ix) 
159 Consider Rogerson's view that, "... Longmore, J. did not very satisfactorily answer the difficult 
question of whether such questions are proprietary or not. " (Rogerson, P J, [2000] All E. R. Annual 
Review, p106) 
160 Mance, LJ., delivered the leading judgment, Aldous, LJ. and Charles, J. merely expressing their 
concurrence. 
161 The cargo owners had no contractual nexus with the bank (ibid., p266). Contra Rogerson (2000), 
ibid., at p106: "... a simple proprietary analysis is unattractive because of the English court's fondness 
for the lex situs to answer proprietary issues ... 
Where the parties to a contract have chosen a law to 
govern their obligations, the application of the lex situs to determine issues like the form of notice leads 
to unpredictable results, both for the parties and others (such as assignees). " Mance, U. confessed that 
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His Lordship pointed to the straitened nature of the litigants' respective approaches, 
stating that, "These opposing analyses both assume that the factual complex raises 
only one issue and, in their differing identification of that issue, emphasise different 
aspects of the facts. In my judgment a more nuanced analysis is required. "162 Whilst 
the first issue concerned the effect of the voluntary assignment by the owners to the 
bank, upon the insurers' liability under the contract of insurance, the second issue 
concerned the effect of the preventative attachments obtained by the cargo owners 
(i. e. third parties) in the French courts. 
In exhorting the parties to make a 'more nuanced analysis', it is significant that 
Mance, U. recommended a more flexible approach to choice of law, in general, and 
to the process of characterisation, in particular, viz.: "While it is convenient to identify 
this three-stage process, 163 it does not follow that courts, at the first stage, can or 
should ignore the effect at the second stage of characterising an issue in a particular 
way. The overall aim is to identify the most appropriate law to govern a particular 
issue. The classes or categories of issue which the law recognises at the first stage are 
man-made, not natural. They have no inherent value, beyond their purpose in 
assisting to select the most appropriate law. A mechanistic application, without 
regard to the consequences, would conflict with the purpose for which they were 
he had entertained, "... an initial impression that the case fits readily into a contractual, and less 
readily into a proprietary, slot. " (ibid., p270, paragraph 34) 
162 Ibid., p266, paragraph 20. Further, per Mance, U., at p267, paragraph 25: "... a proper legal 
analysis cannot depend exclusively upon the legal systems for which two parties happen to contend in 
their own partisan interests. The jurisprudential and academic material which we have been shown 
indicates the existence of other possible candidates - such as the law of the assignor's place of 
residence or business and the law governing the contract of assignment - which may need to be kept in 
mind. " 
163 Per Staughton, U. See note 145, supra. 
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conceived 164 They may require redefinition or modification, or new categories may 
have to be recognised accompanied by new rules at stage (2), if this is necessary to 
achieve the overall aim of identifying the most appropriate law ... The three-stage 
process identified by Staughton Li. cannot therefore be pursued by taking each step in 
turn and in isolation ... There is in effect an interplay or even circularity in the three- 
stage process. "165 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal favoured a teleological approach: "... article 12(2) of 
the Rome Convention manifests the clear intention to embrace the issue and to state 
the appropriate law by which [the dispute between the insurers, the bank, the vessel 
owners and the cargo owners] must be determined. s166 The appellants contended that 
the reference in Article 12(2) to `the relationship between the assignee and the 
debtor' merely referred to their relationship under the contract, provided that there 
had been an effective transfer of property (i. e. that the contractual provision is only 
triggered when it can be demonstrated that there has been a transfer of property, valid 
according to the lex situs). Mance, LT., however, rejected this submission, stating that 
it "postulate[d] a most unlikely thought process on the part of the draftsmen of the 
Convention ... there is no hint in article 12(2) of any intention to distinguish between 
contractual and proprietary aspects of assignment. The wording appears to embrace 
all aspects of assignment. " 167 This, it is submitted, is the correct interpretation, for too 
many questions would be left unanswered were the appellant's proposition considered 
164 Cf. Harding, ibid., p354: "... it is undoubtedly the case that, in the process of making a subject more 
comprehensible, categories are devised and subjects are put into compartments so that, consciously or 
not, the interplay of rules and the true conflict of interest at the root of legal drama is left in the 
background or missed altogether... borderlines are often drawn with an arbitrariness which belies the 
complexity of the interaction between different sets of rules. " 
165 Ibid., p268/9, paragraphs 27/8. 
166 Ibid., p272, paragraph 43. 
167 Ibid., p272, paragraph 45. 
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to be correct (e. g. is the lex situs to be determined by the lexfori, or the applicable law 
of the contract, and are conditions such as delivery to be characterised as contractual 
or proprietary according to the lexfori, the lex situs, or the contractual lex causae? ). 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded that, "... whatever might be the domestic 
legal position in any particular country ... the Rome Convention now views the 
relevant issue - that is, what steps, by way of notice or otherwise, require to be taken 
in relation to the debtor for the assignment to take effect as between the assignee and 
debtor - not as involving any `property right', but as involving - simply -a 
contractual issue to be determined by the law governing the obligation assigned. " 168 
Hence, the issue whether, following assignment to the bank of the benefits under the 
insurance policy, the French insurer had to pay the insurance proceeds to the bank as 
assignee, rather than to the vessel owner, was characterised as a contractual, not a 
proprietary, issue. In consequence, Article 12 was deemed to be applicable and the 
tripartite dispute fell to be determined according to English law, the law governing the 
obligation assigned. 169 Although this view is buttressed by the Giuliano & Lagarde 
Report, 170 in which it is stated that, "[t]he words `conditions under which the 
assignment can be invoked' cover the conditions for transferability of the assignment 
as well as the procedures required to give effect to the assignment in relation to the 
debtor", 171 it is submitted that characterisation of notice provisions etc. as contractual, 
168 Ibid., p273, paragraph 48. 
169 According to English law, there was "... a valid equitable assignment of the benefit of the claims 
arising under the insurance, including any claim in respect of collision liability. " (ibid., p286, 
paragraph 85) 
70 OJ [1980] C282 1. 
171 Ibid., p34/5 (per Mance, U, at p273, paragraph 47). 
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even vis-ä-vis the debtor, with whom the assignee has no contractual nexus, is a 
curious and anomalous conclusion. 
It is submitted that to characterise all of the matters arising under Article 12(2) as 
contractual, is rather strained. That said, to provide that the law governing the right to 
which the assignment relates is, by virtue of the significance of that law's relationship 
with the parties and their circumstances, the law which is appropriate to determine the 
issue in dispute, is a sensible rule of choice of law (i. e. the choice of connecting factor 
and choice of law rule will generally be appropriate, even if characterisation of the 
issue as a purely contractual matter is not). Accordingly, it is submitted that a 
preferable approach would be one which demands not strict characterisation of the 
issues qua contractual or proprietary, but application, qua lex actus, of the law which 
governs the right to which the assignment relates, being the law which has the closest 
and most significant connection to the particular issue in dispute. '72 
(3) Involuntary assignations 
Reference was made at the beginning of this chapter to a third significant distinction 
which pertains, namely, between voluntary and involuntary assignations. Article 12 of 
the Rome Convention applies only to voluntary assignations (i. e. those cases where 
the creditor, of his own volition, assigns incorporeal moveable rights to a third party). 
The Convention does not apply to involuntary assignations, that is, those cases where 
the creditor's rights in the property are conveyed, against his will, by operation of 
172 See, in agreement, Plender and Wilderspin, ibid., p229, paragraph 11-25. Cf. Rogerson, who has 
suggested that, 
"All that is required is for the English court to apply the same rule as laid down in art 
12(2) of the Rome Convention to proprietary questions of intangible property. "(Rogerson, 2000, ibid., 
p 106) 
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law. 173 Involuntary assignations occur by virtue of legal process against the debtor's 
property, the most familiar means being by way of arrestment, or the equivalent 
English remedy of garnishment. According to these remedies, the judgment creditor 
arrests a sum of money due to the judgment debtor from a third party arrestee. If a 
debt is enforceable within the jurisdiction, even though it may be payable elsewhere, 
the courts will generally exercise jurisdiction to arrest funds in connection therewith. 
Since there is no common contractual law which can be applied to determine priority, 
the question of priority among competing voluntary and involuntary assignations is 
governed by the proper law of the right, that is, the lex loci rei sitae. 174 Application of 
the situs rule to involuntary assignations of incorporeal moveable property has been 
endorsed, in spite of the fictional nature of the situs of such property: "... the idea that 
the lex situs should be adopted to determine proprietary questions regarding debts is 
particularly prevalent in cases where the English courts are called upon to decide 
whether to recognise a foreign government's actions or whether to garnish a debt. "l75 
The law of the situs of the debt is generally relevant to the question of jurisdiction, as 
well as to that of priority of competing claims: "If ... an involuntary assignment 
occurs after a voluntary assignment has already been made, the law of the situs 
determines whether the rights of the voluntary assignee have been postponed or 
defeated; if the involuntary assignation occurs first, the law of the situs determines 
what rights, if any, the voluntary assignee has acquired. " 176 The lex situs may require 
to determine whether or not it should arrest funds, or perhaps more significantly, 
173 E. g. Upon the appointment of a receiver, or liquidator. 
174 Re Maudslay [190011 Ch. 603. 
15 Rogerson (1990), ibid., p442. 
176 Cheshire & North, ibid., p965. 
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whether it should recognise a foreign court's `arrestment order' as having duly 
discharged a debt, 177 for "... a debt is a species of property which may be recoverable 
by legal process from a debtor in more than one jurisdiction. " 178 
In Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich v. Five Star General Trading LLC, 179 Counsel 
for the appellants sought to argue that application of the lex situs in cases of voluntary 
assignment would be consistent with its recognised application in cases of involuntary 
assignment. 180 Mance, LT., however, sustained the distinction, stating that, "... 
consensual and non-consensual situations are, in their nature, quite different and it is 
neither surprising nor even inconvenient if the differences lead to the application of 
different laws. "181 
Conclusion 
The category of incorporeal moveable property is broad and diverse. In transactions 
concerning such property, it would appear that the borderland between contract and 
conveyance is more extensive, and from a choice of law perspective, more hazardous, 
than typically affects other types of property. As regards contractual assignations, this 
choice of law borderland may be negotiated with the assistance of Article 12 of the 
Rome Convention, but as the Raiffeisen Zentralbank' 82 case has demonstrated, 
litigants seeking to rely on the prima facie clear direction offered by Article 12, may 
yet stumble on the preceding obstacle of characterisation. In cases of non-contractual 
177 This is the `double jeopardy' factor: if the foreign order were denied recognition, the debtor would, 
in effect, be required to pay double the sum owed. Cf. Martin v. Nadel [1906] 2 K. B. 25, per Vaughan 
Williams, U., at p29. 
178BST v. Shell International [ 1990] A. C. 295, per Lord Oliver, at p343; Rogerson (1990), ibid., p449. 
179 [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1344. 
180 Ibid., p1359. E. g. In re Queensland Mercantile and Agency Co. [1891] 1 Ch. 536; [1892] 1 Ch. 219. 18' [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1344,1359. 
182 [2001] 3 All E. R. 257. 
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assignations, the decreasing influence of the lex situs may be noted, 183 coupled with a 
movement towards a more impressionistic, proper law approach: the contemporary 
lex actus approach indicates that the lex causae in such cases should be the law with 
which the subject matter of the right being assigned has the closest and most 
significant connection. ' 84 The approach is impressionistic because, as in Republica de 
Guatemala185 and Lee v. Abdy, '86 reliance is placed not on the particular capacity in 
which the lex causae is being applied, but upon a legal system's overall connection 
with the parties and their circumstances. This more generalist approach, combined 
with sensitivity to the original-parties/remote-parties distinction, and a more flexible 
characterisation of the issues as urged by Mance, U. in Raiffeissen Zentralbank, 187 
paves the way for a more flexible, proper law approach to other property law matters. 
183 Save, perhaps, as regards involuntary assignations. 
184 Dicey & Morris, ibid., Rule 118(2). (Note 119, supra) 
185 [1927] 1 K. B. 669. 
186 (1886) 17 Q. B. D. 309. 
'87Ibid., at p266, paragraph 20. 
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Chapter Twelve 
The `Situs' Rule - For and Against 
  Supporting the monolith - arguments in favour of the lex situs rule 
In view of the unquestionable support for application of the lex situs to property 
disputes, it is interesting to consider some of the arguments which have been 
promulgated in support of this ineluctable connecting factor. ' There is a wide variety 
of arguments, and it is revealing to note Wolff's remark that, "There is ... no 
unanimity on the reason why the law of the situs should be decisive. s2 
As regards immoveable property, one of the most commonly cited reasons for 
applying the lex Situs is the need to conserve the integrity and accuracy of title 
records/registers. 3 Practical convenience is a prerequisite of the sale and purchase of 
immoveable property and, has Alden has explained, "Without the situs rule, title 
searchers would be forced to analyze foreign laws to determine the effect of 
conveyances, and to search foreign courts to ensure that no extant litigation might 
destroy their interests. )74 If the rule were otherwise, "Recording systems would ... 
be 
1 Consider Goodrich's observation that, "Like some other general rules of law, the reasons which lie 
underneath are seldom stated. " (Goodrich, H F, `Two States and Real Estate' (1941), 89 Uni. of Penn. 
L. Rev. 417,418). Cf. Dicey & Mortis, 'The Conflict of Laws', 10th edition (1980), at pp555/6: "The 
English authorities on the law which governs the transfer of tangible movables are scanty and 
unsatisfactory, though sweeping dicta are common. " 
2 Wolff, M `Private International Law' (1950), p511. 
3 Consider Reese, WLM, `Restatement of the Law Second, Conflict of Laws' ('Second Restatement') 
Introductory Note: "In most instances, the courts of the situs would decide the case in accordance with 
their own local law. They would do so for sentimental and historical reasons as well as ... 
for the sake 
of their title recording systems. " 
4 Alden, R, `Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts' (1987) 65 Texas L. Rev. 585,592. 
Cf. Nott, S M, `Title to Moveables Acquired Abroad' (1981) 45 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 
279, at p279: "When an individual or company acquires goods abroad it is a matter of fundamental 
importance to ascertain whether or not a valid title has been established to those items. "; and 
Goodrich, ibid. p419. 
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rendered too cumbersome, costly and uncertain. "5 There is obvious value in keeping 
the search process as simple, expeditious and inexpensive as is possible; restricting 
the operation to the confines of one legal system is clearly advantageous. 6 
Whilst there ordinarily exists a comprehensive system of title recording in respect of 
corporeal immoveable property, generally no such system pertains to moveable 
property. 7 Vernon has explained that, "... personal property filing systems 
traditionally are incomplete in noting only security interests. Ownership interests, if 
unrelated to security, normally are not made a matter of record. "8 Accordingly, the 
title recording argument carries no weight other than in relation to land, but within 
that context, it is highly persuasive. 
Inherent in the title recording argument, is the notion that only application of the lex 
situs will protect creditors or third party purchasers. Cheshire has stated that in 
' Alden, ibid., p592. Cf. Nott, ibid., at p281: "... [the] inconvenience of re-assuring oneself of the 
propriety of the transferor's title ... might 
be a difficult thing to do. " 
6 Consider Weintraub, R J, `An Inquiry into the Utility of 'Situs' as a Concept in Conflicts Analysis' 
(1966) 52 Cornell L. Q. 1, at p3: "... it would substantially complicate the title search and enormously 
increase its costs to require the searcher to ferret out the foreign law, gain an understanding of its 
nuances, and apply it to the problem at hand ... 
In short, the recording system would be thrown into 
chaos and transactions in realty would become impossibly expensive, risky and impractical if any law 
other than that of the situs were to govern. " 
Or, indeed, to certain types of incorporeal immoveable property (e. g. prescriptive servitudes. Since 
servitudes of this nature relate entirely to the use of land, however, it is inconceivable that the law 
appropriate to determine and regulate such rights would be other than the lex situs of the [corporeal] 
immoveable property in respect of which the servitude is exigible. In a scenario where a servitude right 
pertained to a certain plot of ground, say, in Belgium, in respect of an adjacent plot, say, in the 
Netherlands, one would surmise that the existence and exercise of the right would be determined by the 
lex situs of the servient, rather than of the dominant, tenement. ) (Cf. Wolff, M, `Private International 
Law' (1950), p534) E. g. Sherrens v. Maenhout Case 158187, [1988] E. C. R. 3791. 
8 Vernon, D H, `Recorded Chattel Security Interests in the Conflict of Laws' (1962) 47 Iowa L. Rev. 
346, at p346. In any event, "Due to the mobility of personal property ... 
local filing is inadequate ... If 
a security interest is placed on record in County A and the property is moved to County B, checking the 
record in B is useless. Unless the debtor discloses the existence of the security interest - and if he does, 
filing is unnecessary - the prospective purchaser or lender in County B is in a difficult position. If he 
knows the person in possession brought the item from A to B, he can check the record in A. In the 
absence of such information, he must check in all counties in the state. " (ibid., p347) Obviously, this 
problem would be exacerbated in the international, as opposed to the interstate, context. See also 
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questions affecting third parties, "... business exigencies require that proprietary 
rights to moveables shall be determinable by the lex situs. s9 This view echoes earlier 
judicial pronouncements, in particular, the dictum of Maugham, J., in the case of In re 
Anziani: 10 "I do not think that anybody can doubt that, with regard to the transfer of 
goods, the law applicable must be the law of the country where the moveable is 
situate. Business could not be carried on if that were not so. "11 This is in accord with 
the view of Kruse, who considered that, "If we describe economic life by means of the 
Carnahan, W, `Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws' (1935) 2 Uni. of Chi. L. Rev. 345,361 et 
seq. 
9 Cheshire, `Private International Law' 7"' edition (1965), p411. This view was reiterated in the 8`h and 
9t' editions, the 9t` being the first edition for which Dr PM North carried sole editorial responsibility 
(although the preface confirms that the work was subjected to the former author's "careful scrutiny"). 
Cf. Baxter, IFG, 'Conflicts of Law and Property' (1964) 10 McGill Law Journal 1,21; Morse, CGJ, 
`Retention of Title in English Private International Law' (1993) J. B. L. 168, at p171: "The goods may 
be dealt with in a way which affects third parties, who, it is said, should be entitled to rely on the lex 
situs. "; and Williams, S A, `The International and National Protection of Moveable Cultural Property' 
(1978), at p87: "Any other solution would cause greater hardship to commerce in general and untold 
complications. " Even Hancock was "... troubled by a vague fear that the possibility of resort to foreign 
law in real property litigation might in certain cases jeopardize the claims of purchaser and 
mortgagees and so create cloud on titles. " (Hancock, M, `Conceptual Devices for Avoiding the Land 
Taboo in Conflict of Laws' (1967) 20 Stanford L. Rev. 1,37) 
10 In re Anziani, Herbert v. Christopherson [ 1930] 1 Ch. 407. 
ll Ibid., per Maugham, J. at p 420. This sentiment was endorsed in Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & 
Woods Limited [1980] 1 Ch. 496, per Slade, J. at p502, and again at p512 et seq, viz.: "Security of title 
is as important to an innocent purchaser as it is to an innocent owner whose goods have been stolen 
from him. Commercial convenience may be said imperatively to demand that proprietary rights to 
moveables shall generally be determined by the lex situs under the rules of private international law. 
Were the position otherwise, it would not suffice for the protection of a purchaser of any valuable 
moveables to ascertain that he was acquiring title to them under the law of the country where the 
goods were situated at the time of the purchase ... In these circumstances, there are ... very strong 
grounds of business convenience for applying the principle of Cammell v. Sewell even in a case such as 
the present ... [Maugham, J. 
's dictum] was putting the point very strongly. I think, however, that the 
most undesirable uncertainty in the commercial world would result if the choice of the system 
regulating the validity of a disposition of chattels were to depend not only on the situation of the goods 
at the time of the disposition, but also on the additional factors suggested on behalf of the plaintiff. " 
Further, Glencore International A. G. v. Metro Trading International Inc. [2001] 1 Ll. Rep. 284, per 
Moore-Bick, J., at p294: "Any other rule would require extensive and probably fruitless enquiries into 
the provenance of the goods and expose the transferee to great uncertainty. " Cf. Redmond-Cooper, R, 
at p150 (In Palmer, N, ed., `The Recovery of Stolen Art: A Collection of Essays'): "... concerns for 
commercial certainty and a policy of security of transactions frequently combine with a deep-seated 
sentiment that the dispossessed owner is to be regarded as more blameworthy than the good faith 
purchaser, with the result that title will pass more readily to the latter. "; and Harding, CSP and 
Rowell, M S, `Protection of Property Versus Protection of Commercial Transactions in French and 
English Law' (. 1977), at p358: "As commerce becomes more important to a society and a fast 
commodity turnover becomes crucial to the economic well-being of all, so the balance in the legal 
game is likely to tip in favour of the acquirer: active commercial life depends on some degree of 
security of acquisition. " 
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hackneyed simile of an organism, we might call this incessant passage of property 
from hand to hand the blood circulation of economic life. " 12 
The widely held view is that commercial transparency can only be guaranteed by 
application of the lex situs: as Wolff has explained, "Real rights should be as manifest 
as possible; third parties who intend to acquire a right in a thing must be protected 
against the risk that such a thing might be subject to a foreign law under which the 
acquisition would be void. " 13 
This argument is related, in part, to the more traditional argument which is based upon 
the principle of territorial sovereignty. 14 Immoveable assets necessarily fall within the 
12 Kruse, V, `The Right of Property', p154/5 (per Harding and Rowell, ibid., p358). 
13 Wolff (1950), ibid., p511; Cf. Trautman, D T, `The Revolution in Choice of Law: Another Insight' 
(1986) 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1101,1110; Alden, ibid., p592; and Zaphiriou, G A, `The Transfer of Chattels 
in Private International Law' (1956), at p40: "The transfer of property affects third parties and the 
definition of the applicable law cannot be left to the parties or a posteriori to the discretion of the 
court. As far as possible, the transfer must be governed by a law which can be ascertained by a third 
party so as to enable him to test the validity of the title that he will acquire. " Consider also Macmillan 
Inc. v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No. 3) [1996] 1 W. L. R. 387, per Staughton, LJ., at p399: 
"There is in my opinion good reason for the rule as to chattels. A purchaser ought to satisfy himself 
that he obtains a good title by the law prevailing where the chattel is ... but should not 
be required to 
do more than that. And an owner, if he does not wish to be deprived of his property by some eccentric 
rule of foreign law, can at least do his best to ensure that it does not leave the safety of his own 
country. " Cf. Garro, A M, `The Recovery of Stolen Art Objects from Bona Fide Purchasers', p511. (In 
Lalive, P, ed., `International Sales of Works of Art' (1988)) 
14 E. g. Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v. Slatford [1953] 1 Q. B. 248: prima facie a decree of a 
foreign government will not be effective to transfer property situated in England, and no distinction is 
to be drawn between those decrees which are confiscatory and those which are not. Consider too In re 
Helbert Wagg [1956] Ch. 323, per Upjohn, J., at p345: "1 may note in passing that the modern 
tendency is to deny extraterritorial validity to legislation, for example, upon moveables situate outside 
the State at the time of the legislation. " Cf. Morris, JHC, `Cases and Materials on Private 
International Law' (4th edition), p381; and Goodrich's (pre-1971) observation that, "Reference to the 
law of the situs for questions concerning land is the natural one for the American lawyer to make. He 
thinks in terms of a law which is territorial, and this reference fits that method of thinking. The 
combination of practical advantage and theoretical `at homeness' results in a rule the authority of 
which is unquestioned. " (ibid., p419) Cf. Cavers, D F. `The Conditional Seller's Remedies and The 
Choice-of-Law Process - Some Notes on Shanahan' (1960) 35 N. Y. Uni. Law Rev. 1126, at pl136: 
"Why one may ask, is the Restatement Second so insistent upon touching base at the situs? Probably its 
preference is rooted in notions of territorial jurisdiction, predicated in turn on the supposition that only 
the situs has power to dispose of the property in controversy. "; and Carter's remark that, "The [lex 
situs] principle is itself a manifestation of the doctrine locus regit actum - the doctrine of the territorial 
applicability of law - probably the most widely accepted doctrine in the whole of private international 
law 
... the 
doctrine of locus regit actum has sure foundations in human psychology. " (Carter, P B, 
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exclusive control of the state where, for the time being, they happen to be situated-15 
For this reason, according to Weintraub, "... it is natural that the [situs] law should be 
applied. "16 This argument, too, has found judicial support, at home and abroad. '7 In 
Castrique v. Imrie, 18 Blackburn, J. 19 explained that, "We think the inquiry is, first, 
whether the subject matter was so situated as to be within the lawful control of the 
state under which the authority of which the Court sits. "20 In particular, adherence to 
this view is apparent in the `confiscation cases'. 21 These cases evince the principle 
that "Every foreign State is bound to respect the independence of every other foreign 
State, and the Courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the 
government of another done within its own territory. , 22 Similarly, in the American 
`Transnational Trade in Works of Art: The Position in English Private International Law', at p328/9) 
(In Lalive, ibid. ) 
15 Venturini, G, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume III, Chapter 21 - Property' 
(1976), p7. Cf. Hellendall, F, `The Res in Transitu and Similar Problems in the Conflict of Laws' 
(1939) 17 Can. Bar Rev. 7,8; Carter, ibid., p329; Goodrich, ibid., at p419: "... the state of [the] situs is 
the only sovereignty which can exercise physical power over [land] and the exercise of such power is 
not an infrequent occurrence. "; and Cook, W W, `Immovables and the Law of the Situs' (1939) 52 
Harv. L. Rev. 1246, at p1247: "Under the territorial organization of modern society, only the 
appropriate officers of the government of the state in question [i. e. the situs] may lawfully deal 
physically with it. " Cf. Poison v. Stewart (1897) 167 Mass. 211,45 N. E. 737. 
16 Weintraub (1966), ibid., p4. Cf Goodrich, ibid., at p419: "It is perhaps quite natural that the 
sovereign exercise [its] power in accordance with its own rules. " Contra Alden, according to whom the 
assertion that the lex situs alone has power over the land, articulates not a reason for applying that law, 
but merely a conclusion. (ibid., p593) 
17 Glencore International A. G. v. Metro Trading International Inc., ibid., per Moore-Sick, at p294: 
"The second main ground [justifying the lex situs rule] is that it reflects the practical realities of 
control over moveables. " Further, at p295: "Practical control over moveables can ultimately only be 
regulated and protected by the state in which they are situated and the adoption of the lex situs rule in 
relation to the passing of property is in part a recognition of that fact. " Brief consideration, however, 
of the conflit mobile shows that this is not necessarily true. See note 24, infra. 
18 (1870) L. R. 4 H. L. 414. 
19 Cited, with approval, by Lord Chelmsford at p448. 
20 This first inquiry is not related purely to the question of jurisdiction, as is apparent from the court's 
second (and separate) line of inquiry, viz.: "... whether the sovereign authority of that State has 
conferred on the Court jurisdiction to decide as to the disposition of the thing, and the Court has acted 
within its jurisdiction. " (ibid., p448) 
21 E. g. Luther v. Sagor [1921] 3 K. B. 532; Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz [1929] 1 K. B. 718; The Jupiter 
(No. 3) [1927] P. 123, per Hill, J., at, p140/1; Compania Naviera Vascongado v. S. S. Cristina [1938] 
A. C. 485, per Lord Macmillan, at p490; In re Helbert Wagg [t9561 1 Ch. 323 per Upjohn, J; and 
Williams & Humbert v. W&H Trade Marks (Jersey) Limited [ 1986] 1 All E. R. 129,135. 
22 Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz, ibid., per Sankey LJ., at p729. In fact, this is the headnote (cited with 
approval in Luther v. Sagor, ibid. ) from the American case Oetjen v. Central Leather Company 246 
U. S. 297. 
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case of Poison v. Stewart, 23 Holmes, J. opined that, "It is true that the laws of other 
states cannot render valid conveyances of property within our borders which our laws 
say are void, for the plain reason that we have exclusive power over the res ... since 
no other sovereign than that of the situs can exercise dominion over the land, that 
sovereign must have power to impose whatever requirements it may deem necessary 
as conditions precedent to the acquisition and transfer of title or any other rights 
therein. " 
Even if choice of law rules based purely upon territoriality or sovereignty should lose 
favour, the lex Situs rule is further buttressed by the argument that it is simple (insofar, 
at least, as the Situs is easily ascertainable 24) and permits of easy application. 25 The 
popular view is that if a rule of law is framed in simple terms, litigation in respect 
thereof should decrease. 26 Scoles, however, has verbalised his mild criticism of the 
rule's simplistic formulation, stating that, "In part, this excessive scope of application 
23 (1897) 167 Mass. 211,36 L. R. A. 771,45 N. E. 737 (per Stumberg, G W, `Conflicts - American 
Casebook Series, 1956, p377). 
24 Hellendall (1939), ibid., p8; Carter, ibid., p328; and Williams, ibid., p87. This argument, however, 
extends only to the sites of immoveable property and corporeal moveable property, and as regards the 
latter, not even to all types thereof (e. g. goods in transit); Byrne-Sutton, Q, `Qui est le proprietaire 
legitime d'un objet d'art vole', at p501 (In Lalive, ibid. ) Whilst the situs (but in view of the enigmatic 
doctrine of renvoi, not always the lex situs) may be relatively easily ascertained where the connecting 
factor has remained static, where there arises a conflit mobile, difficulties may be encountered in 
ascertaining the connecting factor at the tempus inspiciendum. As Dr Crawford has advised, "... the lex 
situs in relation to moveables may be forever on the move. " (Crawford, E B, `International Private Law 
in Scotland' (1998), p53, at paragraph 4.20) Cf. Morris, JHC, `The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict 
of Laws' (1945) XXII B. Y. I. L. 232, at p233: "If the situs changes, it is no solution to say that the lex 
Situs governs: we require to know which lex situs to apply. " (This points, of course, not only to a 
change in the identity of the connecting factor, but also to a change in the content of the substantive lex 
causae, as occurred in Starkowski v. Attorney-General [1954] A. C. 155). See Chapter Four, supra - 
'Defining the `Situs". 
25 Von Mehren, A T, & Trautman, D T, `The Law of Multistate Problems - Cases and Materials on 
Conflict of Laws' (1965), at p193: "However lawless a power test may be in some contexts, the 
simplicity of a reference to the law of the situs, its convenience and appropriateness for conveyancing 
questions, and the plausibility of its appropriateness for all property issues, has led to the wide 
acceptance of the rule of the First Restatement, that the law of the Situs governs most questions 
concerning property ... 
" Cf. Schott & Rembar, `Choice of Law for Land Transactions' (1938) 38 
Colombia L. Rev. 1049, at p1053: "... application of lex situs, it is said, prevents needless 
complexity. "; and Alden, ibid., p597. 
26 Hancock (1967), ibid., p9. 
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[of the lex Situs] flows from the fact that the situs rule is viewed as a welcome 
simplicity, a kind of security blanket, by lawyers and judges who simply assume that 
the breadth of the traditionally stated rule enables them to resolve most issues by 
referring to the easily identified situs. "27 
The situs is, in theory, objectively ascertainable. 28 In addition to this, it has been 
argued that the lex situs' `independence' supports its being applied: Cheshire, for 
example, has remarked that, "... the lex situs has the great advantage of being a 
single and exclusive system that, possessing effective control over the subject-matter 
of the suit, can act as an independent arbiter of conflicting claims. "29 One must doubt, 
however, the veracity of this reputed nonpartisanship, particularly when the litigation 
in question is proceeding in the forum rei sitae. Nevertheless, application of the lex 
situs does rightly accentuate the focal point of the transaction, namely, the property 
itself. 3o 
In one dimension, application of the lex situs rule is entirely neutral: the rule is merely 
a rule of choice of law, and not, per se, one of substantive content. 31 Ultimately, 
resolution of the dispute in hand depends on a matter which is beyond the reach of the 
27 Scoles, E F, `Choice of Law in Family Property Transactions' (1988) 11 Receuil des Cours 13,70. 
28 Cf. Hellendall (1939), ibid., p8. As per note 24, supra, this assertion does not extend to all types of 
p9roperty. 
Cheshire, 'Private International Law' P edition (1947), p563; and Cheshire & North, 13`h edition, 
ibid., p940. 
30 Nott (1981), ibid., at p279: "... any ownership dispute normally centres on the goods rather than the 
individual involved. " 
31 Cheshire, 3'd edition (1947), at p588: "Once this ruling [that the lex situs applies] has been given, the 
choice of law has been made, we pass from the sphere of private international law. "; and Byrne-Sutton, 
ibid., at p501: "... [the lex situs] rule cannot by nature favor or hinder a purchaser in good faith or an 
illegally dispossessed owner. The final result (attribution of a valid title to one or the other) depends 
solely on the content of the competent municipal law, applicable at random according to the place of 
transfer in each, particular case. " In the context of illicit trafficking in cultural property, however, the 
concern is that the lex situs is not typically `applicable at random', but rather is applicable only after 
careful and calculated selection, by the illegal (yet sophisticated) trader or thief, of a tendentious, 
substantive law. See Chapter Ten, supra - `The Treatment of Cultural Property'. 
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conflict of laws, that is, it depends on the substance of the domestic lex Situs rule, 
which, sometimes, may favour one party, 32 and, at other times, the opposing party. 33 
It is generally argued that simplicity, objectivity and ease of application of choice of 
law rule, in turn, promote certainty and uniformity of result, and certainty is often 
deemed to be the overarching consideration in the field of property. 34 Baxter has 
argued that uniformity of connecting factor will reduce or eliminate `limping titles'; 
the lex situs, he submits, "... has attained a special place as a choice of law 
determinant, not so much due to its intrinsic merits, as to history aided by frequent 
repetition of often superficial argument by textwriters and judges, and by its 
embodiment in codes. 05 
32 E. g. Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Limited [1986] Ch. 496, where application of Italian 
law protected the title of the bona fide purchaser. 
33 E. g. Goestchuis v. Brightman 1927 245 N. Y. 186, where the internal law of New York resisted 
conferring a better title on the bona fide purchaser, preferring instead the title reserved to the 
Californian seller. 
34 Cheatham, E E, `Problems and Methods in Conflict of Laws' (1960) 99 (1) Receuil des Cours 237, at 
p3 14: "On some matters certainty is the first prerequisite and other elements may be subordinated to it. 
It is so as to the title to land. " Cf. Schott & Rembar, ibid., at p1053: "... the necessityfor the situs rule 
is not apparent. Can it nevertheless earn its own way as a wise rule? Yes ... the rationale is 
[inter alia] 
uniformity ... 
"; and Rabel, E, `The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study - Volume 1' (1958), at 
p23/4: "The lex situs ... would 
lose much of its practical reliability if it were subjected to any exceptions 
at all, especially if it allowed party autonomy as has been repeatedly suggested. " Further, Winkworth v. 
Christie, Manson & Woods Limited [1986] Ch. 496, per Slade, J., at p509: "Intolerable uncertainty in 
the law would result if the court were to permit the introduction of a wholly fictional lex situs when 
applying the principle to any particular case, merely because the case happened to have a number of 
other English connecting factors. " Consider too the tale recounted by Lalive, regarding the potential 
ambiguity of applying a non-situs rule: "... [consider] the anecdote attributed to a Master of an Oxford 
College and the famous answer he gave to a student who, upon entering the college, asked, `Sir, what 
are the rules? ' The answer is said to have been the following: 'There are no rules, but if you break 
them, you will be expelled. "' (Lalive, P, `Closing Comments', p663, Lalive, ibid. ) 
35 Baxter (1964), ibid., p34. Cf. Prott, L V, `Problems of Private International Law for the Protection 
of the Cultural Heritage' (1989) 217 (V) Receuil des Cours 215, at p266: "One virtue seen for the [lex 
situs rule] was certainty. If all States apply this rule (as they do now), then theoretically it should be 
possible to predict what rule of law will be applied, although the results of that application may turn 
out to be rather bizarre ... or unpredictable. " Bear in mind, however, the problems of definition of 
connecting factor, outlined in Chapter Four, supra - `Defining the `Situs". Differences of 
interpretation may impede uniformity of result. See note 74, infra. 
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Affiliated to the notion of certainty is the matter of party expectations. 36 The view has 
been expressed that it is appropriate to apply the lex situs since application of that law 
satisfies any expectations which parties may entertain regarding matters of choice of 
law. 37 According to Carter, "The lex situs rule is firmly based upon ... considerations 
of reasonable human expectations ... The average layman ... is often obsessed 
(consciously or otherwise) with the territorial application of law. "38 
Some commentators, following Savigny, have justified application of the lex Situs on 
the ground that the transacting parties have voluntarily submitted to the application of 
that law. Savigny stated that, "He who wishes to acquire, to have, to exercise a right 
to a thing, goes for that purpose to its locality, 39 and voluntarily submits himself, as to 
this particular legal relation, to the local law that governs in that region. "40 Whilst 
this may have been accurate at the time when Savigny was writing, 41 it is no longer 
36 Consider Second Restatement, paragraph 222, comment (b): " ... protection of the justified 
expectations of the parties is of considerable importance in the field of property. Parties enter into 
property transactions with forethought and are likely to consult a lawyer before doing so. " While this 
may be true of transactions concerning immoveable property, it is not generally true of those which 
concern moveable property. 
37 Cheshire & North, 13`h edition, ibid., p940. Glencore International A. G. v. Metro Trading 
International Inc., ibid., per Moore-Bick, J., at p294: "[The lex situs] accords with the natural 
expectations of reasonable men and facilitates business. This reflects the natural expectation that a 
transaction which is effective to transfer title to goods by the law of the country in which they are 
situated will vest a good title in the transferee which will be recognized generally. " Cf. Colwyn 
Williams, D, `Land Contracts in the Conflict of Laws - Lex Situs: Rule or Exception' (1959) 11 
Hastings Law Journal 159, at p160: "... the location of the property to which the contract relates may 
be an important and in some instances even a controlling circumstance in determining the appropriate 
law especially when the presumed intention of the parties is the criterion. " See now Article 4(3) of 
Schedule 1, Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
38 Carter, ibid., p329. Cf. Williams, ibid., p87; and Alden, ibid., p595, citing In re Estate of Erickson 
368 N. W. 2d. 525,530 (1985), where the court asserted that a Washington widow would not have 
expected a property agreement validly executed according to Washington law to control the disposition 
of real property in North Dakota. Cf. Wolff, ibid., at p512: "As the place where a thing is situate is the 
natural centre of rights over it, everybody concerned with the thing may be expected to reckon with the 
law of such place. " 
39 Discussing corporeal moveables, Savigny took the view that, "... since their object is perceived by 
the senses, and therefore occupies a definite space, the locality in space at which they are situated is 
naturally the seat of every legal relation into which they can enter. " (Savigny, F C, `A Treatise on the 
Conflict of Laws' (1869), p 129) 
40 Savigny, ibid., p129. 
41 But not, it is submitted (even in 1869) in cases of theft and sale by a non-owner in a new Situs. Cf. 
Hellendall (1939), ibid., at p7: "[Savigny's] theory which has the logical consequence that the lex situs 
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true, in a global market where commercial bargaining routinely takes place 
electronically, and at arm's length. In any event, since the lex situs rule is applied by 
Scottish and English rules of choice of law, regardless of whether or not the property 
in question has been removed to the new situs with the consent of the erstwhile 
owner, 42 this argument, per se, does not justify application of the lex Situs 43 
The strongest argument concerning application of the lex situs rule affects only 
immoveable property. Naturally, the lex situs has a legitimate interest in the proper" 
use of land within its own territory. 45 Pillet even considered that laws which deal with 
does not apply if the chattel has been removed to a new situs without the consent of its owner is not the 
basis of the English lex Situs rule. " Savigny does, however, add the caveat that, "It must first be shown, 
on the one hand, that the laws of the place where the thing is situated claim exclusive authority over all 
rights in it, without which voluntary submission would not suffice to warrant the application of the lex 
rei sitae; and if it is true, on the other hand, that he who seeks, in point of fact, to exercise a right over 
a thing must go to the place where it is situated, and therefore may become subject to the laws of that 
place, it does not follow that other states are obliged to recognise this subjection, - e. g. if a moveable 
thing is afterwards brought into the territory of another state. " (ibid., p129, note 1) 
42 E. g. Todd v. Armour (1882) 9 R. 901 and Cammell v. Sewell 1860 5 H&N 728. Note, however, 
Carnahan's Savignian analysis of Cammell v. Sewell, to the effect that, "... goods had been entrusted 
bv an agent of the English owner to the captain of the ship and ... the captain had voluntarily 
brought 
them within Norwegian territory where the wreck took place. " ((1935), ibid., p350) (Emphasis added) 
43 Consider the Scottish Law Commission's Consultative Memorandum No. 27, `Corporeal 
Moveables: Protection of the Onerous Bona Fide Acquirer of Another's Property' (1976) (hereinafter 
`SLC (Moveables)'), at p45: "The reason why most legal systems protect the original owner against 
the bona fide purchaser in cases of theft is not because of the heinousness of the crime, but because, 
unlike other cases of acquisition a non domino, the owner has not voluntarily handed over his 
moveable to an intermediary and thus facilitated the disposal. " (Emphasis added) In raising various 
domestic law options, the S. L. C. proffered, inter alia: "(a) A valid title of ownership of corporeal 
moveables should be recognised only if the acquirer derived title through a chain of unimpeachable 
legal acts from the original owner. " (ibid., pl); and "(c) An acquirer in good faith ... should 
be 
protected against the original owner notwithstanding the fact that the transfer has not been authorised 
by the owner and was in violation of his right. " (ibid., p2) Interestingly, option (g) offered a rule which 
differed according to the type of object in question (e. g. works of art or other objects created by the 
owner, or valued for intrinsic merit or sentimental reasons; fungibles; consumer goods; motor 
vehicles. ) (ibid., p3) 
44 Propriety being determined according to the lex situs' own standards. In re Hoyles, Row v. Jagg 
[19111 1 Ch. 179, per Farwell, LJ., at p185: "No country can be expected to allow questions affecting 
its own land, or the extent and nature of the interests in its own land which should be regarded as 
immoveables, to be determined otherwise than by its own Courts in accordance with its own interests. " 
45 Alden explains that "Both use and circulation [of land] affect a state's economy and the well-being 
of its residents. " (ibid., p595) Venturini makes a similar point: "the importance of proprietary rights 
over moveables and immoveables at the economic, political and social levels implies that they must be 
directly subordinate to the law of the country where the objects are situated and which in fact often 
imposes limits in relation to aliens and, more generally, for reasons of public interest. " (ibid., p7) Cf. 
Von Mehren & Trautman, ibid., at p197: "... the primary functional significance of the law of the situs 
today is its role in providing a body of rules under which transfers of land can proceed expeditiously ... 
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property fall into the category of `ordre public' and ought, for that reason, to be 
strictly territorial in their application. 46 One suspects, however, that this theory was 
based upon the premise that property is merely an adjunct of the person, and that it 
ought to be rejected, alongside the lex domicilii rule in relation to property. 
Alternatively, one might argue that a lex Situs rule based on public policy arguments 
should be employed only to permit application of the lex fori, and not any foreign 
law. 47 
The `legitimate interests' argument, however, could equally extend to certain types of 
moveable property, in particular, to cultural property. It would be reasonable that a 
certain state, having, for cultural reasons, a legitimate interest in the preservation and 
custody of an object of cultural property, may wish to impose special protective 
provisions in respect of that property (e. g. in respect of its conservation, use, 
alienation or export). 48 If, however, that property, were to be unlawfully removed 
from the territory of that legitimately interested state, the lex situs rule can operate so 
as to overlook the legitimate interests of the first state, artificially expunging the 
interests of the antecedent situs. 49 
To the extent that any such rules [e. g. of primogeniture] are found in the situs today, they obviously 
intensify the concern of the situs and might justify the application of its domestic rules. Such cases are 
rare today, however... "; Westlake, J, `A Treatise on Private International Law' (1925), at p9: "... the 
estates and interests which English law permitted to be held in land were so peculiar that great 
confusion would have arisen if its tenure could have been interfered with by deeds in foreign form. "; 
and Cook, W W, `Immoveables and the Law of the Situs' (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1246, at p1247: "... 
the basis of the rule is social convenience and nothing more ... 
" 
46 Pillet, A, `Principes de droit international prive' (1903), pp385,405. 
47 Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v. Slatford [ 1953] 1 Q. B. 248, per Devlin, J., at pp263 - 267. 
48 E. g. Duc de Frias v. Pichon [1886] 13 Journal du Droit International 593; and Attorney General of 
New Zealand v. Ortiz [ 1984] A. C. 1. 
49 Attorney General of New Zealand v. Ortiz, ibid.; and Prott, ibid., at p264: "The implications of 
applying the lex rei sitae ... are serious 
for the protection of cultural heritage. Where special protective 
provisions have been applied to items of cultural heritage by national legislation they will be ignored 
in foreign jurisdictions; even though similar, sometimes almost identical, protection will be applied to 
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  Bringing down the bastion - arguments against the lex Situs rule 
Having surveyed the arguments in favour of applying the lex situs, a more difficult 
task is to outline those arguments which may be promulgated in opposition to the rule. 
There has been a "mechanical reiterationi50 of the arguments which support the rule, 
leading to the almost unanimous conclusion that no other connecting factor is 
appropriate to deal with questions concerning property. 51 These time-honoured and 
wonted arguments in support of the rule have largely been endorsed by the courts, 
which have admitted only a very narrow margin for evasion of the situs monopoly. 52 
Criticism of the monopoly, however, has been mounting, 53 the charge being led 
principally by Moffatt Hancock. 54 In 1966, Weintraub added force to the campaign, 
stating that, "If the reasons for the [situs] rule are shallow and the results obtained 
national cultural heritage items. This means that restrictions on transfer, State rights of pre-emption, 
and export controls will all be disregarded once the item crosses the border. " 
50 Currie, B, `Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees' (1954) 21 Uni. of Chi. L. Rev. , 
620,628 
(citing Barbour, `The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree' (1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 527, 
548). 
s' Trautman has written of a widespread belief in the `inevitability' of the situs rule. (Trautman, D T, 
`The Revolution in Choice of Law: Another Insight' (1986) 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1101,1106) 
52 Cf. Hancock, M, `Conceptual Devices for Avoiding the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws: The 
Disadvantages of Disingenuousness' (1967) 20 Stanford L. Rev. 1, at p9, where he quotes Cardozo, B, 
`The Growth of Law' (1924), p66, viz.: "Judges march at time to pitiless conclusions under the prod of 
a remorseless logic which is supposed to leave them no alternative. They deplore the sacrificial rite. 
They perform it, none the less, with averted gaze, convinced as they plunge the knife that they obey the 
bidding of their office. The victim is offered up to the gods of jurisprudence on the altar of regularity. " 
Hancock himself remarked that, "Festooned with vague sophistries, [the Situs formula] was put 
forward in the most absolute form as a cornerstone of Anglo-American conflict of laws. " (ibid., p37) 
53 E. g. Colwyn Williams, D, `Land Contracts in the Conflict of Laws - Lex Situs: Rule or Exception' 
(1959) 11 Hastings Law Journal 159,160; Hay, P, `Property Law and Legal Education; The Situs Rule 
in European and American Conflicts Law' (1988), p109; Lowenfeld, A, `Revolt Against Intellectual 
Tyranny' (1985/6) 38 Stanford L. Rev. 1411, p1418; Trautman, ibid., p1101; and Alden, ibid., at p631: 
"... the absolute rationales supporting the situs rule are invalid. " Having analysed the typical 
situations in which the lex situs is applied, Weintraub concludes by "[finding] that most of the results 
reached are irrational and unjust. " (Weintraub, R J, `An Inquiry into the Utility of Situs as a Concept 
in Conflicts Analysis' (1966) 52 Cornell L. Q. 1, Pre-note) Weintraub's response, unlike that of the 
current author, is to recommend "extension into the real property area of the type of functional or 
`state-interest' analysis now rapidly gaining favor in resolving tort and contract conflicts problems. " 
(ibid. ) 
54 "Writing in the mid-1960s, when what Judge Kaufman called the We Age of Conflict of Laws' had 
largely been melted in torts and in contracts, Hancock was anxious to keep the momentum going, and 
to apply the new enlightenment to decedent estates and particularly to interests in land. If he could not 
break the `land taboo', he at least wanted to show a way around it. " (Lowenfeld, ibid., p1418) 
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from applying it are outrageous, an effort will be made to suggest a method of 
abating the nuisance that the monolith has become. "55 The purpose of this section is 
to determine whether the reasons which are frequently parroted in support of the rule 
are, in fact, `shallow', and whether the results obtained are `outrageous'. 
In 1935, Cheshire wrote that, "The proposition [that questions concerning the 
acquisition or transfer of ownership of corporeal moveables are generally to be 
decided by the lex Situs], although it has the support of Cammell v. Sewell, 56 an 
authority which has never been impugned, can scarcely be regarded as an adequate 
guide for the future. The law relating to tangible moveables has remained practically 
stationary for more than half a century, and it is clear that the difficulties which 
surround this subject cannot be satisfactorily determined by a simple reference to the 
lex Situs. "57 More than sixty years on, however, the same connecting factor continues 
to act as the conflict lawyer's guide, despite opportunities having arisen for changes 
or modifications to be introduced. 58 
55 Weintraub (1966), ibid., p3. 
56 (1858) 3 H&N 617, (1860) 5 H&N 728. 
57 Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law' (1935) 51 L. Q. R. 76,84. Cheshire predicted that, "The 
private international law concerning the transfer of corporeal moveables is still remote from its full 
development. " (ibid., p85) In 2002, the promise of `full development' is yet to be fulfilled. Cf. the 
views expressed by the same author at p563 of the 3d edition of `Private International Law' (1947), 
viz.: "... [the lex situs] is not without its disadvantages ... even though the lex situs may remain 
constant, it would not seem to be the appropriate system in every type of case. " Cf Trautman (1986), 
ibid., at p1106: "Although in tort and in contract the place of wrong and the place of contracting have 
been replaced by more discriminating and sophisticated approaches, in property the traditional 
proposition ... 
has proven more tenacious and unshakable. " Similarly, in 1945, Morris declared that, 
"The English law on [the transfer of chattels in the conflict of laws] is rudimentary in the extreme. The 
cases are scanty, old and inconclusive. " (Morris (1945), ibid., p232) 
58 E. g. Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Limited [1980] 1 Ch. 496. Consider Jefferson, M, `An 
Attempt to Evade the Lex Situs Rule for Stolen Goods' (1980) 96 L. Q. R. 508, at p511: "Would it not 
have been reasonable to reach a fair solution on the facts justified not by reference to a framework of 
watertight legal concepts but ... the 
balancing of competing values such as those mentioned in the 
judgement, but preferably with evidence led to determine their weight? " 
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The Situs rule has been mechanically applied, without reference either to the content 
of the lex situs, or to the result which its application generates. 59 Hancock, in 
particular, has proved to be critical of Story's unqualified reference to the lex Situs, 
"[Story] insisted that one broad, general principle must determine all cases. This is 
surely the hoariest fallacy of legal thinking - that a rule must be followed blindly, 
even in cases where it produces harsh and inconvenient results, for the sake of 
certainty, simplicity, uniformity, and symmetry of the law. , 60 
One harsh criticism of the lex Situs rule has been the breadth of its application. 61 Little 
attempt has been made to formulate narrower rules which are cognisant of the precise 
nature of the relationship arising in a particular dispute (e. g. buyer/seller; 
owner/creditor, owner/thief), 62 or to measure the actual impact of the particular 
problem on the property in question (e. g. does the essence of the problem affect the 
property directly, or merely tangentially? ). Depending upon the relationship between 
the parties, and the specific nature of the problem in issue, different questions may 
arise, which may vary quite fundamentally in character. 63 Similarly, Goodrich has 
reminded us that, "One of the characteristics of a mature mind is its ability to make 
59 Von Mehren & Trautman (1965), ibid., at p196: "... it is significant that there is no suggestion ... 
that the content of the various laws involved or the policies underlying the rules are in any way 
relevant to the solution of the problem. " Cf. Trautman (1986), ibid., at p1108, where reference is made 
to an "ensuing parade of cases that mechanically applied the law of the situs. " 
60 Hancock (1967), ibid., plO. 
61 Carnahan, W, `Tangible Property and the Conflict of Laws' (1935) 2 Uni. of Chi. L. Rev. 345, at 
p354: "Perhaps it may be objected that we have stated too broadly a rule that the law of the situs is 
everywhere to be given effect. " Cf. Trautman who criticised the "... tidal wave of formalism and 
overgeneralization. " (ibid., p1108) 
62 Cf. Venturini, ibid., at p4: "... opinion in Scandanavia regards it as preferable not to submit all the 
effects of a transfer of property to one single rule of private international law, but to distinguish the 
various relationships connected therewith (between the seller and the buyer, between the buyer and the 
creditors of the seller etc. ) and to apply to each of these its own proper law. "; and Weintraub (1966), 
ibid., p3. 
63 Perceiving this, Cheshire remarked that, "... it does not take much acumen to appreciate that each 
one of these [different factual scenarios] cannot satisfactorily be submitted to one system of law. " 
(Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law', 3`d edition (1947), p558). Cf. Schott & Rembar, ibid., at 
p1054: "Particular issues are crucial for choice of law. " 
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distinctions and gradations; people and issues are not black and white, but varying 
shades of gray. Likewise, a mature system of law ... develops distinctions, limitations 
and qualifications as called for, instead of fitting all problems of litigants into a 
limited series of grooves. "TM Likewise, of the domestic scholars, Cheshire adopted the 
view that, "... the search for the proper law to govern questions arising out of the 
transfer of corporeal moveables will produce nothing but confusion and obscurity, 
unless the possible questions are first broken up into their separate categories. "65 
While certain matters naturally fall within the legitimate concern of the lex situs (e. g. 
alienability of land, title recording and land use), other matters do not (e. g. capacity to 
contract in respect of land or moveables); the interest of the situs (genuine, though not 
unlimited) does not, it is submitted, justify a "universal" situs rule. 66 For example, 
Schott and Rembar have explained that some relevance may lie in the nature of the 
relief sought by the pursuer: "Thus, it is sometimes said that if damages are asked, 
there is no objection to the forum's use of a law other than that of the situs, but that 
where there is sought relief of a more `specific nature' ... 
lex Situs must be used. "67 
64 Goodrich (1941), ibid., p419. 
65 Cheshire (1947), ibid., p559. Cf. Weintraub, R, `The Conflict of Laws Rejoins the Mainstream of 
Legal Reasoning' (1986) 65 Texas L. Rev. 215,231; Travers, J N, `The Inter Vivos, Voluntary and 
Particular Transfer of Tangible Moveable Property Rights in Private International Law' (Uni. College, 
Dublin) (1989), p79; and Lowenfeld, ibid. (citing Hancock), at p1426: "... by reason of their 
oversimplified, undiscriminating character, choice of law principles of the conventional type are a 
hopelessly inadequate set of verbal tools for deciding, discussing or even thinking about choice of law 
problems. " Also Cheshire (1935), ibid., at p84: "The principle of the lex Situs is no doubt of 
predominant importance, but it is clear that the problems which a transfer of moveables may create are 
too complex and too varied to be resolved by any one single principle. " 
66 Cf. Alden, ibid., p597; Hancock (1967), ibid., at p10: "Story unfortunately failed to see that the laws 
of the forum-situs affecting title to real property fall into two categories: those whose policies require 
their enforcement in all cases and those whose policies do not. " Even in matters of alienability, the 
present situs may not always demonstrate the greatest interest e. g. Duc de Frias v. Pichon [1886] 13 
Journal du Droit International 593. Consider too paragraph A4-35 of the Giuliano & Lagarde Report 
on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, where it is stressed that Article 
4(3) of the Convention "does not extend to contracts for the construction or repair of immoveable 
property ... 
because the main subject-matter of these contracts is the construction or repair rather than 
the immovable property itself. " 
67 Schott & Rembar, ibid., p1052. Cf. Gambaro, A, `Perspectives on the Codification of the Law of 
Property: An Overview' (1997) 5 European Review of Private Law 497,502. This distinction is 
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A rule, or approach, is called for, which satisfactorily protects legitimate situs 
concerns, but which also " [eliminates] the harsh injustice worked by the mechanical, 
territorial situs formula . 
i68 Although there is wisdom in having a rule of general 
application, and not complete elasticity of approach (such as has been advocated by 
certain proponents of interest and functional analysis), "general doctrines should not 
be adhered to when confronted by more important principles. "69 
In light of this remark, one may re-consider the argument in favour of the situs rule 
which is based on maintaining the accuracy and integrity of title registers. It is 
accepted that this is a compelling reason for applying the lex Situs when a third party, 
unlikely to convince situs rule protagonists, for as Schott & Rembar conclude, "... should the [money] 
judgment be not otherwise satisfied, the plaintiff has the ultimate resource to the land by the expedient 
of suing on the judgment in the state in which the land is located. " (ibid. ) Consider also Zweigert, K 
and Müller Gindullis, D, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume 111, Chapter 30 - 
Quasi-Contracts" (1973), who remark, at p17, that, "... differences in the classification of the claim 
[e. g. in tort or property] according to the individual legal systems are irrelevant in the conflict of 
laws. ", and Carey Miller, D L, `Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law' (1991), at p179: "That an owner 
has an action to recover his property from one who holds, without a right against him to the same, is 
not in doubt. How this action is designated [as a proprietary claim, or as an obligation to make 
restitution] is unimportant ... 
" These views, it is submitted, are fundamentally wrong, at least in a 
conflict of laws context, for the connecting factor (and, in turn, the lex causae) clearly depends upon 
classification of the cause of action. 
68 Alden, ibid., p597/8. `Harsh injustice' may sometimes, but will not always, ensue; it is more likely to 
result in cases concerning the transfer of moveable property. Alden adopts the view that an interest 
analysis approach would secure the desired balance of interests, but, with respect, the present author 
would reject such an approach, at least, in relation to the United Kingdom. 
69 Jefferson, ibid., p511. Cf. the experience in tort and delict, where one may trace the development of 
the law, from the strict operation of the double actionability rule (resulting in application of the lex 
causae, in spite of overwhelming connections with another legal system; Szalatnay-Stacho v. Fink 
[1947] K. B. 1), towards a more enlightened approach, via Boys v. Chaplin [1971] A. C. 356, Johnson v. 
Conventry Churchill International Ltd [1992] 3 All E. R. 14, and Red Sea Insurance Co. Ltd v. 
Bouygues SA [1994] 3 All E. R. 749. (Consider Crawford, ibid., p290, at paragraph 13.16: "As an 
exception to the ... general rule, a particular issue might 
be governed by the law of the country which, 
as regards that issue, had the most significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties. ") The 
current, more flexible, rule of displacement permits consideration of the parties, the events constituting 
the tort or delict in question, and the circumstances or consequences of those events. (Section 12 of the 
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995: e. g. Edmunds v. Simmonds [2001] 1 
W. L. R. 1003, per Garland, J., at p1004: "... in all the circumstances ... the 
factors connecting the tort 
to England were overwhelming and it was substantially more appropriate for the applicable law to be 
the law of England. " Contra Glencore International A. G. v. Metro Trading International Inc. [2001] 1 
Ll. Rep. 284, per Moore-Bick, J., at p298) Even now, however, in spite of its predominantly Czech 
mise en scene, Szalatnay-Stacho v. Fink might not be decided any differently. (Section 13,1995 Act) 
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acting in good faith, 70 has relied upon the title register maintained at the Situs. 
However, as Weintraub has explained, "Such matters ... have absolutely no relevance 
to the original parties to the transaction for which we are seeking the governing law. 
But it is here, between the original parties, that almost all the conflicts problems in 
the cases and the literature arise and here that the situs rule has been dominant. "7' It 
is generally assumed, a priori, that the lex situs must be applied to govern the 
essential validity of a transfer of land, by reason of third party reliance upon the situs' 
title registers, but this may not, in fact, be a consideration which is relevant to the case 
in hand (e. g. where the dispute affects land in state X and concerns a matter which is 
of significance only to the original contracting parties, domiciled in state Y, and does 
not relate to the accuracy of the situs' land record or to a third party's reliance 
thereon, or to land use72). Moreover, as earlier stated, the title recording argument is 
of no import to most disputes concerning moveable property, in respect of which title 
registers are seldom maintained. 
One of the arguments against a more flexible approach to the determination of the lex 
causae is the perceived need to guarantee certainty and uniformity. Alden has 
suggested that whilst these are appropriate desiderata, "they should not be controlling 
these supposed advantages do not outweigh the more important concerns of 
fairness [and] due process ... The argument could not save ... other territorial rules, 
70 Note 132 et seg., infra. 
71 Weintraub (1966), ibid., p3. Weintraub urges that, "If it should be decided to apply some law other 
than that of the situs to such a transaction between the original parties, the victor, in order to preserve 
his victory against subsequent bona fide purchasers would have to enter of record [at the situs] the 
evidence of the adjudication of his rights. " (ibid., p4) (Cf. appreciation of the interests of different 
states, inherent. in the distinction between the choice of law rules governing formal validity and 
essential validity of a marriage. ) Cf. Alden, ibid., p593. 
72 Consider Weintraub (1966), ibid., at p3: "The first transaction is in no way impeached and there is 
no competition with anyone obtaining title under lex situs. " 
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and is no more persuasive for real property conflicts. 9973 It is, nevertheless, submitted 
that there is greater reason to preserve a strict territorial rule in relation to property, 
than in relation, say, to contract or delict. But, it is also submitted that application of 
the lex Situs connecting factor is not, per se, sufficient to ensure uniformity. Schott 
and Rembar, for example, have observed that, "... as a matter of fact [the] lex situs 
has not been uniformly applied; so ... it cannot be contended that departures produce 
any new confusion. "74 As was considered in Chapter Four, supra, there can be 
difficulties in identifying or locating the `situs' of property, and more so, in 
interpreting the expression `lex situs'. 75 It is quite feasible, therefore, that these 
nuances of interpretation do, in any event, detract from the uniformity reputedly 
achieved through application of the situs rule. 76 
Moreover, although there is a need for uniformity, this attribute may be measured 
according to a different benchmark standard: uniformity may be achieved not only 
through application of a universal connecting factor, such as the lex sites, but also, 
more simply, by treating comparable cases commensurably. 77 It would be 
objectionable if Litigant A's claim against X, in Forum Y, were determined by the lex 
73 Alden, ibid., p597. Consider Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd [1986] 1 Ch. 496, per 
Slade, J., at p506: "Consistency is an important element in the administration of justice. " (Emphasis 
added) His Lordship did not suggest that consistency was the most important element; the aim, first and 
foremost, is the administration of justice, not absolute consistency. 
74 Schott & Rembar, ibid., p1053. 
75 Cook (1939), ibid., at p1248: "Like most principles, the one under consideration [the lex situs] is 
expressed in words which seem at first sight clear in meaning but which ultimately prove to be 
ambiguous. " (See also Cook, W W, `The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws' (1942), 
p253 et seq. ) Cf. Cheshire (1935), ibid., at p84: "Circumstances may be imagined in which it is not 
even obvious what lex situs ought to be chosen. "; and Baxter, ibid., at p10: "The choice of the lex situs 
may be artificial. " 
76 Cf. Prott (1989), ibid., at p266: "Any application [of certainty] which may have been thought to have 
been given by the rule as to lex rei sitae has rather been lost because of the varieties of interpretation 
to which the rule is now subject. " 
77 Cf. Cheatham (1960), ibid., p339 et seq. Cheatham identified five discrete meanings of uniformity. 
Pertinent to the present discussion is that interpretation which ensures that all similar occurrences, no 
matter where they take place, should be treated alike in the forum, in the sense that the same treatment 
should be accorded to each, and the same principles applied to each. 
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situs, but for no explicable reason, and in equivalent circumstances (i. e. with no 
distinguishing facts), Litigant B's claim against X, also in Forum Y, were resolved by 
a law identified by an entirely different connecting factor. The existing situs rule is 
not concerned with the substance of that law which is deemed to be applicable (save 
where it offends the forum's public policy), and it does not guarantee that the 
substantive results of two equivalent cases will be identical, even though, technically, 
the same connecting factor is applied to each. 78 In practice, therefore, there is no 
greater certainty for a litigant whose goods have been stolen from him and sold 
abroad, and who is thereafter seeking to recover his stolen property, in having the lex 
situs determine the question of ownership (the situs being the place where, by chance 
or design, his goods were sold by the thief to a third party), than in having the lex 
causae determined according to a proper law approach. Either way, some uncertainty 
as to ultimate result will prevail. 
78 Contrast, for example, the result of Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Limited [19861 1 Ch. 
496 with that of Goetschuis v. Brightman 245 N. Y. 186,156 N. E. 660. Cf. Byrne-Sutton's remark that, 
"The lex situs rule unfortunately results in the application of municipal (national) laws whose solutions 
are extremely variable. Some legal systems prefer to protect a purchaser in good faith by allowing him 
to acquire immediate ownership over stolen objects ..., thus trying to preserve the security of 
transaction and commercial convenience. Others tend on the contrary to allow an illegally 
dispossessed owner to claim his property for many years after the theft, thus promoting morality in 
favour of the original owner. " (Byrne-Sutton, Q, 'Qui est le proprietaire legitime d'un object vole? ' - 
In Lalive, ibid., p500) In this regard, it is interesting to note that a 1974 Draft Convention providing a 
Uniform Law on the Acquisition in Good Faith of Corporeal Moveables (based on a 1968 UNIDROIT 
Draft Uniform Law on the Protection of the Bona Fide Purchaser), although approved by a Committee 
of Experts in 1974 and subsequently submitted for governmental negotiation, ultimately came to 
naught; the project was eventually abandoned in 1981. (Goode, R, 'The Protection of Interests in 
Movables in Transnational Commercial Law' (1998) Uniform L. Rev. 453,454) Goode has advised, 
however, that, "Over the past decade there has been a radical shift in thinking and renewed efforts 
have been made to introduce at least some measure of harmonisation into the legal treatment of real 
rights in commercial assets. " (ibid., p458) E. g. 1988 UNIDROIT Conventions on International 
Factoring and International Financial Leasing, UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Assignment in 
Receivables Financing; and the Preliminary Draft Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment. 
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Although the lex Situs rule, per se, is impartial (i. e. as a choice of law rule it does not 
dictate the substantive result of the point in issue), the result of applying the law 
identified by the connecting factor, is, ultimately, the determination of ownership. 
In 1949, in the case of Bishopsgate Motor Finance Corporation Ltd v. Transport 
Brakes Ltd, 79 Denning, U. declared that, "In the development of our law, two 
principles have striven for mastery. The first is for the protection of property: no one 
can give a better title than he himself possesses. The second is for the protection of 
commercial transactions: the person who takes in good faith and for value without 
notice should get a good title. 9,80 
The first principle is enshrined in the maxim, `nemo dat quod non habet', 81 whereas 
the latter, opposing policy, is encompassed in the French `en fait de meubles, la 
possession vaut titre. ' This distinction is rooted in fundamentally different approaches 
to the matter of ownership: the former maxim recognizes the right of an owner, and 
considers the notion of security of title to be deserving of protection, while the latter 
accords greater importance to commercial expediency, the right of a good faith 
purchaser, and the notion of security of transaction. 82 
79 [1949] 1 K. B. 322. 
80 At p336/7. Denning, U. advised that, in England, "The first principle has held sway for a long time, 
but it has been modified by the common law itself and by statute so as to meet the needs of our own 
times. " (p337) 
81 Alternatively, `nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet': no one can transfer to 
another a greater right than he himself has. 
82 Cf. Redmond-Cooper, R, (1997), at p59: "Differing legal philosophies may cause the court to make 
certain presumptions from the outset as to which party is more deserving. "; and Redmond-Cooper, R, 
`Recovery of Stolen & Looted Works' (1998), pl. Cf. Sanders Brothers v. Maclean & Co. [1883] 11 
Q. B. D. 327, per Bowen, LJ., at p343: "credit, not distrust is the basis of mercantile dealings ... 
mercantile genius consists principally in knowing whom to trust and with whom to deal, and 
commercial intercourse and communication is no more based on the supposition of fraud than it is on 
the supposition, of forgery. " Sed contra, Clayton v. Le Roy [1911] 2 K. B. 1031, per Scrutton, J., at 
p1044: "A custom which takes away one man's property and gives it to another must, in my view, be 
carefully watched, especially when it is not a universal custom, but limited to certain favoured 
localities. " [This dictum was directed to the rule of market overt, then operative in the City of London. ] 
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It has been suggested that the nemo dat rule "owes as much to logic as it does to legal 
principle. , 83 This is the approach preferred by Scots law, as was early expounded by 
Viscount Stair, viz.: "That the dispositive will of the owner alone, without any further, 
is sufficient to alienate his right, without delivery or possession, is evident in personal 
rights ... 
That the dispositive will is also sufficient to transmit real rights, it 
appeareth, because the will alone is sufficient to retain, not only rights, but even 
possession itself, though there be no corporeal act exercised therein; "84 
The Scottish Law Commission has noted that certain exceptions have been grafted 
onto the Scots common law rule by Sale of Goods legislation, 85 the Factors Acts and 
Consider, however, Harding's observation that, "French law and English law here begin from 
diametrically opposed premises, but the result in practice is not dissimilar, as one would expect in 
societies at a similar level of commercial and social development. In both systems, the general 
principle is qualified by exceptions, so that a broad area of agreement is achieved as regards the 
majority of cases ... 
The moral is that what amounts to one man's principles may constitute another's 
exceptions. " (Harding, CSP, and Rowell, M S, `Protection of Property Versus Protection of 
Commercial Transactions in French and English Law' (1977) 26 I. C. L. Q. 354,379/80) Cf. also Eisen, 
L, `The Missing Piece: A Discussion of Theft, Statutes of Limitations, and Title Disputes in the Art 
World' (1991) 81 Jo. of Criminal Law and Criminology 1067,1092. 
83 Palmer, N, 'Conversion, Trespass and Title to Art Works' (1998), p13. Palmer explains, "Where a 
thief steals a chattel from its owner and purports to sell it to X, the owner's property therefore endures 
and no property is conferred on X" `Property' in this context clearly means, not the chattel itself, but 
the right of ownership attaching thereto. (See Chapter Three, supra, note 2- `The Distinction between 
Moveable and Immoveable Property) 
84 Stair, Institutions, III. ii. 4. Cf. Erskine, Institutes, II. i. 18.: "The property of such subjects as have 
already had an owner, is chiefly acquired, or transferred from the owner to another ... 
Two things are 
therefore required to the conveyance of property in this manner; 1st, The intention or consent of the 
former owner to transfer it upon some just or proper title of alienation, as sale, gift, exchange, &c; 
2dly, The actual delivery of it, in pursuance of that intention. " Cf. Hume's Lectures (1786 - 1822), 
Volume III. 235: "The nature of a proper rei vindicatio, or real action for recovery of property, is that 
it attaches and follows the thing as the possession shifts from hand to hand. " See also Carey Miller, D, 
`Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law' (1991), p101 et seq.; note, however, Carey Miller, ibid., at p171: 
"The Institutional treatises and earlier case law refer to the vindicatory action available to an owner to 
recover possession of a moveable thing. In most modern legal writings, however, one does not find this 
term, but, broadly speaking, what it would cover seems to be subsumed under `restitution'. " Cf. Todd .v 
Armour (1882) 9 R. 901, per Lord Young, at p907: "By our law the vitium reale attaching to stolen 
goods is indelible til they return to the original owner. " Consider also section 8(2) of the Prescription 
and Limitation, (Scotland) Act 1973, as amended, and Schedule 3(g) thereof: specified as an 
imprescriptable right is "any right to recover stolen property from the person by whom it was stolen or 
from any person privy to the stealing thereof. " 
85 In respect of which, see Griffiths, A, 'Implied Terms in the Sale of Goods Act 1979' (1998), ppl, 4. 
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Hire Purchase legislation. 86 Similarly, Palmer has advised that the nemo dat rule is 
only a rule of general application; it remains subject to certain exceptions. 87 
If, as Denning, IJ. has suggested, 88 the struggle between these two doctrines has been 
evident on the domestic plane, the wider global struggle has only been more 
pronounced. 89 For example, French law, as a general rule, supports the possession 
vaut titre doctrine, 90 as does Italian law, 91 whereas in the U. S. A., as in Scotland, 92 the 
86 SLC (Moveables), p16. E. g. Factors Act 1889; Hire Purchase Act 1964 (as amended by the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974, Schedule 4); and the Sale of Goods Act 1979, as amended. Note, however, 
Carey Miller's assertion that, "... there is no general basis in terms of which the right of a bona fide 
possessor is elevated above that of the owner ... The only general form of protection of an acquirer in 
good faith is through the rebuttable presumption that the possessor of a moveable thing is owner. " 
(1991, p197) 
87 Palmer (1998), ibid., p14; and Palmer, N, ed., `The Recovery of Stolen Art: A Collection of Essays' 
(1998), p48. Cf. Harding & Rowell, ibid., at p364: "Despite the demands of commercial expediency 
there seems to have been little resistance to the entrenchment of this [nemo dat] concept on the part of 
the judges in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; indeed they appear to have been quite 
prepared to swallow it whole ... However, in the early part of the nineteenth century, Parliament 
recognised that in the interests of mercantile convenience there must be occasions in which the 
interests of the owner should give way to those of the innocent acquirer of the goods in question. " 
88 Bishopsgate Motor Finance Corporation Ltd v. Transport Brakes Ltd [ 1949] 1 K. B. 322,336. 
89 Cf. Falconbridge, J D, `Essays on the Conflict of Laws' (1947), at p382, where the author refers to 
the "ancient question upon which different systems of local laws have taken different views, namely 
where the line is to be drawn between the protection of an interest of an owner out of possession and 
the protection of the interest of an innocent purchaser from the possessor. " Cf. Benjamin, J `The Law 
of Global Custody' (1996), at p7l: "The heart of the problem is that different jurisdictions conceive of 
properly in fundamentally different ways. "; and Siehr, K, `The Protection of Cultural Heritage and 
International Commerce' (1997) 6 I. J. C, P. 304, at p306: "International commerce ... faces problems 
because national rules differ with respect to transaction concerning moveable property in general and, 
especially, with regard to cultural objects. " 
90 Article 2279, French Civil Code. Bell, J, Boyron, S, and Whittaker, S, `Principles of French Law' 
(1998), p284 et seq., especially at p288: "The basic principle is that where a thie or the finder of goods 
is still in possession of the thing, the true owner can bring an action of revert ication to reclaim in at 
any time - there is no prescription period. But where the property has been passed on, then Article 
2279 operates to protect the good faith transferee. " Cf. Franklin, M, 'Security of Acquisition and of 
Transaction: Law Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase' (1932), p593; Brissaud, J B, 
`History of French Private Law' (1968), p288; SLC (Moveables), Appendix, pl; Harding and Rowell, 
ibid., p359 et seq.; and Williams, ibid., p86. Under Article 2268, good faith is always presumed and the 
onus rests on the party who alleges bad faith to prove it. Under Article 2269, it suffices that good faith 
existed at the time of acquisition of the object in question. (Crabb, J H, `French Civil Code' (1977), 
p406; Redmond-Cooper, R, `Good Faith Acquisition of Stolen Art' (1997) 2 Art, Antiquity and Law 
55,60; and Harding and Rowell, ibid., at p361: "... in practice it would not be reasonable to expect the 
good faith acquirer, upon discovery of the fraud, to renounce his title: after all, he had taken 
possession and paid for the property in good faith. ") 
Article 1153, Italian Civil Code. The Scottish Law Commission has referred to the Italian model as 
that which offers comprehensive protection to a purchaser in that country: "Protection is given because 
of the apparent power of the transferor to alienate. " (SLC (Moveables), Appendix, pl) (Beltramo, M, 
'Italian Civil Code, Appendix F' (1996), Biondi, A, `The Merchant, The Thief, and The Citizen: The 
Circulation of Works of Art Within the E. U. ' (1997) C. M. L. R. 1173, at pt 173; and Luzzatto, R, `Trade 
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vitium reale which attaches to stolen property generally ensures enduring protection 
of the title of the original owner. 93 Of course, some legal systems may adopt a via 
media between these two doctrines94 (e. g. by permitting a dispossessed owner to 
recover his property from the bona fide purchaser, but only in exchange for payment 
of a sum equivalent to the purchase price). 95 And, as has been noted, statute may 
make inroads on either position. 96 
Prott has observed that, "There has been some debate about the morality of the 
respective rules: civilian lawyers sometimes ask whether there is anything more 
moral about protecting the owner, who has done nothing to deserve losing his 
ProPenY, than protecting the bona fide purchaser who is equally innocent. s97 In truth, 
it is submitted, neither approach is any more commendable than the other, for the 
application of either maxim guarantees that, in cases of sale by a non-owner, at least 
one innocent party (either the innocent original owner, or the good faith third party 
in Art and Conflict of Laws: The Position in Italy', p409 (In Lalive, P, ed. `International Sales of 
Works of Art' (1988)) 
92 Carey Miller, D L, `Title to Art: Developments in the U. S. A. ' (1995) S. L. P. Q. 115, at p121: "In Scots 
law the vitium reale, or 'real vice' of theft means that, in principle, an owner can always recover stolen 
property. " Cf. Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Volume 18, paragraph 618 (although note that the 
reference therein to the English rule of market overt ["a preposterous loophole, feared by private 
owners and opposed by the reputable market" - Palmer, N, 'Recovering Stolen Art' (1994) 47 Current 
Legal Problems 215,2331 is no longer correct, in respect of transactions concluded on or after 3 
January 1995: Section 1, Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994). 
93 Merryman, J H, 'American Law and the International Trade in Art', at p427 (In Lalive, ibid. ): "... 
who, as between the owner and a good faith purchaser from a thief, had the better legal claim to the 
paintings? Applying American law, the answer was clear: our law prefers the owner in such a case. "; 
and Carey Miller (1995), ibid., at p116: "The basic rule in the USA is that neither a thief nor any 
subsequent acquirer of stolen property can give a good title. " 
94 Cf. SLC (Moveables), pl et seq., at p3: "At one extreme, a dispossessed owner is granted the right to 
claim his property where he finds it ... At the other extreme an acquirer who took possession animo 
domini is protected, even though the goods had been stolen and acquisition was gratuitous. " 
95 E. g. Switzerland (Article 954(ii), Swiss Civil Code) (per Steinauer, P-H, `L'acquisition d'objets 
d'art selon le droit prive suisse', p119 - In Lalive, ibid. ) The sum payable could, alternatively, 
comprise the current market value of the res litigiosa, or a sum halfway between that figure and the 
purchase price. Cf. Fox, C, `The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural Property' (1993), p229. 
96 E. g. In a `vitium reale' jurisdiction, the owner may yet lose ownership if s/he has permitted another 
to possess and deal with property in such a way as to raise reasonably held expectations in a buyer that, 
on payment of the price, s/he will obtain good title: section 1 of the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890. 
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purchaser) will suffer denial of his or her (putative) rights of ownership. 98 On 
occasion, the notion of personal bar may operate to persuade us that the innocent 
purchaser is the party more deserving of our favour. 
Prott's verdict on this `morality' debate is interesting: the real issue, she concludes, is 
not whether one or other of the two rules is theoretically more laudable, but rather, 
"which is the rule which will best deter illicit traffic? "99 Pratt poses this question with 
particular reference to the problem of illicit trafficking in cultural property, but her 
general answer to the question is that, "The rule which will require purchasers to be 
more diligent about the status of what they are buying is best able to do this. i10() In 
fact, `nemo dat' systems, and those `possession vaut titre' systems which impose 
additional qualifications concerning the bona fides of the third party purchaser, 
require that third party purchasers exercise a high standard of diligence in checking 
the ownership or provenance of the object in question. If the requisite care cannot be 
evidenced, then, according to both doctrines, the title of the original owner may be 
preferred. Conversely, however, one might also enquire whether the original owner 
97 Prott, L V, `Problems of Private International Law for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage' 
(1989) V Receuil des Cours 215,274. Cf. Falconbridge, ibid., p382. 
98 Baxter, IFG, `Conflicts of Law and Property' (1964) 10 McGill Law Journal 1, at p22: "The 
protection of buyers in good faith and for value involves a distribution of loss between two parties both 
in good faith. " Cf. Redmond-Cooper's view: "... there is rarely a notionally `innocent plaintiff suing a 
`perpetrator defendant' (because each party is, in most cases, effectively a victim of a third party who 
has disappeared from the picture). " (In Palmer, N, ed., `The Recovery of Stolen Art: A Collection of 
Essays', ibid., p146) But consider Hayworth, A E, `Stolen Artwork: Deciding Ownership is No Pretty 
Picture' (1993) 43 Duke Law Journal 337, at p380: "... purchasers of paintings have better 
opportunities to verify the provenance of works of art than owners have in trying to locate or uncover 
stolen pieces. " 
99 Prott, ibid., p275. 
10° Prott, ibid., p275. Prott further explains that, "It is not an answer to state that the [original] owner 
can insure against his loss: in respect of cultural heritage items, monetary compensation is not a 
satisfactory solution compared to the recovery of a unique object. " (ibid. ) Both `owners' could be 
expected to insure against possible loss, and although Prott's contention regarding the inadequacy of 
monetary compensation is correct, it may be expected that at least one of the two innocent parties will 
require to be satisfied with a pecuniary remedy. Cf. SLC (Moveables), at p54: "Insurance is small 
compensation to the collector or to the heir of family treasures. Moreover, articles of no particular 
economic value may be of inestimable value to an owner, as in the case of a memento of a deceased 
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had maintained his or her intrinsically, or sentimentally, valuable pieces in 
sufficiently secure conditions. '()' 
Although these thoughts may be more germane to the harmonisation of substantive 
laws, 102 it is apparent that dynamic conflicts concerning choice of law are inextricably 
linked to the dichotomy between nemo dat and possession vaut titre policies. While 
the internal regime of the relevant lex situs will determine the resolution of the 
substantive problem in issue, the present work is concerned, not with identifying the 
better, or most effective, substantive provision, but rather, with formulating the most 
appropriate rule of choice of law. 
Returning then to the arguments against application of the lex situs rule, it can be seen 
that, related to the notion of uniformity of result, is the argument founded upon party 
expectations. This argument presupposes that transacting parties know where the 
property in question is situated at the tempus inspiciendum (generally the time of 
acquisition or transfer of the right). Whilst the situs may be self-evident with regard to 
immoveables, that is not the case in respect of all corporeal moveables, 103 or a 
fortiori, incorporeal moveables. 104 Furthermore, one would surmise that any 
expectations which parties do, in fact, entertain are suppositions as to substantive 
relative ... it cannot readily 
be assumed that insurance has superseded the need for special treatment 
Otinvoluntary dispossession of property" 
Cf. Note 114, infra. 
102 Consider Siehr, K, `International Art Trade and the Law' (1993) VI Receuil des Cours 9, at p72: 
"Although the problem of bona fide purchase is a universal and important one, it is very strange and 
puzzling that divergency in the law still exists. " However, note Goode's verdict that, "There is little 
doubt that the harmonisation of the law governing proprietary aspects of dealings in moveables is a 
great deal more, complex than that of the law relating to the contractual aspects. " (ibid., p455) 
103 Consider, for example, goods purchased from mail order catalogue. 
104 To impute to transacting parties knowledge and understanding of the legal concept of fictional situs 
(and, therefore, expectations as to applicable law) would be preposterous. 
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result, not choice of law. 105 Accordingly, Alden has concluded (correctly, it is 
submitted) that, "... protecting expectations and promoting predictability do not 
require the situs rule; any choice-of-law rule will accomplish the same result. " 106 
One area in which party expectations are likely to be strong is in relation to 
commercial transacting. With this in mind, it is noteworthy that Story identified 
certain objections to the application of the lex Situs: "If the lex rei sitae were generally 
to prevail in regard to moveables, it would be utterly impossible for the owner, in 
many cases, to know in what manner to dispose of them during his life ...; not only 
from the uncertainty of their situation in the transit to and from different places, 107 but 
from the impracticality of knowing with minute accuracy the law of transfers inter 
vivos ... in the 
different countries in which they might happen to be. Any sale or 
donation might be rendered inoperative, from the ignorance of the parties of the law 
of the actual situs at the time of their acts. "' 08 Although Story's remarks were penned 
in the context of his recommending adherence to the mobilia sequuntur personam 
principle, it is interesting to consider this rather more propitious perspective on the 
impact upon commerce of application of a non-situs law. 109 
105 Cf Alden, ibid., at p597: "... when situs law would invalidate any contract, will, trust or other 
written agreement, that law ipso facto defeats any expectations or intentions of the parties. " 
106 Alden, ibid., p596. 
107 Consider now the specific exception concerning goods in transit. See Chapter Eight, supra - `The 
Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property'. 
108 Story, J, 'Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws', p552. Cf. Lowenfeld, ibid., at p1419: "Maybe, 
[Hancock] suggests, the revolt even against the land taboo will be made easier if he can point to what 
bolder and more sensible jurists held a century ago. " Story continues, "There would be serious evils 
pervading the whole community, and equally affecting the subjects and interests of all civilised nations. 
But in maritime nations depending upon commerce for their revenues, their power and their glory, the 
mischief would be incalculable. " (ibid., p553) One might draw a modern-day parallel with electronic 
commerce, or mail order transacting, where the purchaser may have no means of determining the situs 
of the goods, let alone the lex situs, at the tempus inspiciendum. 
109 Consider also Westlake, J, `A Treatise on Private International Law' (1925), at p192: "No doubt the 
interests of commerce require that great freedom of disposition should be allowed to proprietors, and 
this consideration speaks in favour of the validity of an alienation made in the manner prescribed by 
the law of the alienor's domicile, but not less so in favour of the validity of one made in the manner 
prescribed by the law of the place of sale. " In contrast with Story, who appears to have advocated an 
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Although there has been no overt judicial dilution of Maugham, J. 's dictum, 110 his 
Lordship's pronouncement has nevertheless been enervated by the subsequent writing 
of certain distinguished scholars, including Wolff and Cheshire. Wolff was moderate 
in his criticism, stating that, "It was possibly a slight exaggeration when Maugham, J. 
said obiter [that the lex situs must apply] ... But at least this dictum states the goal to 
which the development of English law tends and which it has probably attained. " 111 
Cheshire, on the other hand, was more trenchant in his censure of Maugham, J. 's 
obiter dictum, stating that, "It is submitted with respect that there is much room for 
doubts' 12 
In particular areas of international trading, there is strong concern that operation of the 
lex Situs rule, in fact, impedes legitimate trading, or at least that it countenances or 
encourages clandestine operations. ' 13 Although the lex situs rule has been shown to be 
impartial, insofar as it does not dictate the substantive result of property litigation, 
sophisticated traffickers may abuse the rule, so as intentionally to purge objets d'art 
exclusive lex domicilii rule, Westlake seems to favour a cumulative rule of choice of law: the validity 
of a transaction may be tested either according to the lex domicilii, or to the lex Situs, the choice 
depending upon which factor upholds the validity of the transaction (i. e. choice of law should operate 
in favorem commerce). If, of course, both laws would reach the same result, then this would constitute 
a false conflict. 
110 In re Anziani, Herbert v. Christopherson [ 1930] 1 Ch. 407, per Maugham J., at p420: "I do not think 
that anybody can doubt that, with regard to the transfer of goods, the law applicable must be the law of 
the country where the moveable is situate. Business could not be carried on if that were not so. " 
111 Wolff, ibid., p516. 
112 Cheshire (1947), ibid., p559. 
113 Von Plehwe, T, `European Union and the Free Movement of Cultural Goods' (1995) 20 European 
L. Rev. 431, at p440: "Long established case law and doctrine require that the [situs] rule be adhered 
to also in cases of `laundering' o [sic] stolen art works ... " Cf. Garro, A M, 'The Recovery of Stolen 
Art Objects from Bona Fide Purchasers' (In Lalive, ibid. ), at p512: "... the problem with this classical 
choice-of-law rule is that it may encourage laundering of stolen art through jurisdictions with very 
generous protection of bona fide purchasers. Thus the very reason that the goods are where they are 
may be that their present possessor believes that the law in that jurisdiction may be favorable to him. " ; 
and Prott, ibid., p268. 
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of known defects in title. ' 14 Although, in theory, exploitation of the sites rule may 
affect all stolen property, '15 in practice, the repercussions are particularly deleterious 
to the art Market, 116 prompting certain experts to advise that "... some of the rules of 
private law, which reflect the concerns of promoting trade, should not be applied to 
works of art and other cultural items. Some have even suggested that new rules 
should be adopted specifically for cultural property. "' 17 
1 14 Cf. Prott, ibid., at p264: "As long as stolen goods are funnelled through Italy and an apparently 
bona fide transaction they can circulate freely ... as 
long as the goods are in Italy (or other chosen 
jurisdiction) at the time of the transaction, Italian (or other chosen) law will apply to the transfer of 
title wherever it takes place. " At p265, Prott advises that, "These choices are open not just to the 
wrongdoer (thief receiver or other acquirer in bad faith), but also to the person who has suspicions, 
but does not make inquiries because he does not want to be fixed with knowledge of a possible defect in 
title. " Cf. Byrne-Sutton, ibid., at p500: "[The Situs rule] not only creates legal uncertainty for all those 
concerned by international art trade, but enables calculating dealers or purchasers to buy or sell in 
countries whose solutions favor their personal transactions, thus potentially enhancing the black 
market (which in turn facilitates the sale [sic] unauthentic works of art. )"; and UNESCO (Lalive), 
ibid., at p670: "... the attention of the Secretariat of UNESCO has been drawn to some of the rules of 
private law which hamper the efforts of public institutions as well as private individuals to protect 
cultural property. Particular reference has been made to the rules concerning the lex rei sitae, the 
bona fide purchaser and statutes of limitation. " Consider too Lalive (1988), ibid., at p307: "... it is 
inevitable that certain people take advantage of the differences among the various laws within Europe, 
just as for instance they go to get a divorce to some places and not to others. " See generally Chapter 
Ten, infra - `The Treatment of Cultural Property'. It is significant also that, as regards works of art, the 
value of an object to an owner may be non-patrimonial: it may be valued purely for artistic or 
sentimental reasons. Consider in this regard SLC (Moveables), ibid., at p4, and p53: "If the original 
owner was himself the creator of an artistic object, his moral right to reclaim it from a bona fide 
acquirer might be thought stronger than the deprived owner of a consumer product. Nevertheless, the 
multiplication of fine distinctions and exceptions has few advocates. " Cf. Morris, JHC, `The Transfer 
of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws' (1945) XXII B. Y. I. L. 232, who refers, at p238, to "An alarming 
vista of apparently endless permutations and combinations .. ." (e. g. depending upon good or bad 
faith, 
consent to removal, or lack thereof etc. ) 
115 Palmer, N, `Recovering Stolen Art' (1994) 47 Current Legal Problems 215, at p233, where it is 
stated that the general rule of the common law is "applicable to cultural goods and commercial 
commodities alike. " In 1998 Palmer stated that, "The principles ... are of general application, affecting 
all types of chattel from the mundane to the aesthetically unique. " ('Conversion, Trespass and Title to 
Art Works', p1, and further, at p18) Consider also Goode, ibid., at p459: "At the international level, the 
growth of cross-border finance has made creditors acutely aware of the risks they face when dealing 
with assets based in a jurisdiction that is hostile to real rights ... 
" ; and Travers, J N, `The Inter Vivos, 
Voluntary and Particular Transfer of Tangible Moveable Property Rights in Private International 
Law' (1989), at p184: "International financing cannot develop if the financier knows that a removal of 
the subject matter of the security interest across international frontiers will adversely affect his or its 
ri qht. " 
"b Consider Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank [1905] 1 K. B. 677, affirming [1904] 2 K. B. 870, per 
Walton, J., at p874: "`An assignment of a moveable which can be touched (goods) giving a good title 
thereto according to the law of the country where the moveable is situate at the time of the assignment 
(lex Situs) is valid. ' It cannot be disputed that this statement is correct in regard to ordinary chattels; 
and if this document were not a cheque, but a valuable and portable article such as a diamond, which 
had been stolen, from the plaintiffs and sold in Vienna under circumstances which gave the purchasers 
a good title there to the jewel, the English courts would recognise that title if it was good according to 
the Austrian law, although it might not be good according to English law. " 
117 UNESCO Paper, ibid., p671. 
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Other critics of the situs rule have disparaged certain of its proponents' reliance upon 
what are perceived to be antiquated notions of sovereignty and territoriality. 118 Hay, 
for example, has argued that, "In both its jurisdictional and choice-of-law aspects the 
[situs] rule is indeed an anachronism in a conflicts jurisprudence no longer focused 
predominantly on territoriality but on 'affiliating circumstances' ... of substantive 
importance. "' 19 More generally, a "power analysis" has been held to be inappropriate 
in relation to moveable property, not least because, by the time the proceedings are 
raised, the situs of the property in question may no longer be the same as when 
ownership etc. of the property in question was allegedly acquired or transferred. 120 
Similarly, application of the lex situs has been opposed when the matter in issue is 
only of indirect concern to the Situs (e. g. capacity to deal with land, or a fortiori, 
moveable property). 121 The territorial power analysis, per se, does not reflect the 
enlightened, purposive approach which is characteristic of choice of law rules in other 
118 E. g. Stumberg, G W, `Chattel Security Transactions and the Conflict of Laws' (1942) 27 Iowa L. 
Rev. 528, at p550: "Abstract theories of state power and exaggerated views of local policy are insecure 
foundations on which to build satisfactory doctrines of conflict of laws. " 
119 Hay, ibid., p109. Cf. Weintraub (1966), ibid., at p4: "Even if it were true that only a court at the 
situs of realty has constitutional jurisdiction over the subject matter in litigation affecting interests of 
persons in that realty, this would not logically compel application of the law of the situs e. g. if the situs 
courts believed that a more rational result would be reached in such a case by applying the law of 
some other state, they would be free to apply that other law. " (Weintraub would seem to be proposing 
not merely the operation of a renvoi remission or transmission, but rather, complete capitulation by the 
lex situs in favour of the choice of law rule, or even substantive rule, of a third state. ) Goodrich has 
remarked that, "... there is no logical reason why the exercise of that power [by the forum rei sitae] 
should not follow a prior determination of the rights of the parties, that determination being reached by 
reference to the laws of some other place. Moreover, well advanced civilized society should not have to 
rely upon the primitive concept of power to enforce as the justification for a rule. " (ibid., p419) Cf 
Alden, ibid., p593: it could be said that the (present) situs has power and control over all property, 
moveable and immoveable, within its territory, "... yet those who jealously guard a state's control over 
real property within its borders do not assert that such exclusive control must be maintained over 
personal property, or even persons. " (e. g. in intestate succession to moveable property). 
120 Von Mehren, & Trautman, ibid., p197. E. g. Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. [ 1986] 1 
Ch. 496. 
121 Alden, ibid., at p593: "... physical control over the land ... is no justification 
for applying situs law 
to issues that only fortuitously involve that land. " 
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fields. Savigny even ventured to suggest that application of a non-situs rule could, on 
occasion, promote increased comity and reciprocity in the international sphere. 122 
As regards corporeal moveable property, it may be argued that the fact that there are 
certain recognised exceptions to the lex situs rule demonstrates that any arguments 
proffered in support of the rule can never be absolute; 123 on the other hand, however, 
it is said that exceptions prove the rule. The admitted exceptions to the rule were 
enumerated by counsel for the second defendant in Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & 
Woods Ltd, 124 and approved by Slade, J.: 125 "[Mr Gilman, on behalf of the second 
defendant] specifically recognised that there are five exceptions to [the general rule 
regarding the transfer of corporeal moveable property. ] The first `if goods are in 
transit and their situs is casual or not known, a transfer which is valid and effective 
by its proper law will (semble) be valid and effective in England' ... The second 
exception ... arises where a purchaser claiming title 
has not acted bona fide. The 
third exception is the case where the English court declines to recognise the 
122 Writing in the context of rules of succession to immoveable property, Savigny remarked that, "We 
might suppose the interest of our fellow-subjects to be imperilled, if in some cases landed estate in our 
country were to fall by inheritance, according to the rules of a foreign country, to a foreigner, instead 
of to a native. But the opposite result might as probably occur ... 
Or it might be supposed that the 
dignity and independence of our country would be endangered, if foreign rules of law were applied to 
the succession to an estate on its soil. But this objection is also refuted by the supposed reciprocity, 
which, more generally viewed, resolves itself into an international community of law, as the foundation 
and highest aim of our whole doctrine. " (Savigny, ibid., p93/4) Note, however, Hancock (1967), ibid., 
at p37: "It is one of the ironies of legal history that Story should have felt himself compelled to abandon 
his objective [of promoting comity and reciprocity among states] in the field of land titles and to 
advocate a needlessly parochial adherence to the law of the forum-situs in all cases. " 
123 Consider Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd [1986] 1 Ch. 496, per Slade, J., at p513: 
"The [situs] rule is not one of universal application; in particular it is not likely to be applied in any of 
the five exceptional cases already mentioned. " Consider also Gardner's remark that, "Dicey, ... while 
recognising the former supremacy of the lex situs in regard to every question dealing with immoveable 
property, points out that this predominance of the lex situs has during the last eighty years been 
undermined or limited by the recognition of several limitations thereto"; the limitations referred to 
include the example that a marriage between persons domiciled in a foreign country and subject to the 
laws of that country may operate as an assignment of English land. (Gardner, J C, `The Decreasing 
influence of the Lex Situs' (1934) 46 J. R. 244,246) 
124 [ 1986] 1 Ch. 496. Counsel was quoting from Dicey & Morris, `Conflict of Laws' (1973), 9th edition, 
539. 
125 Ibid., pp501 and 510. 
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particular law of the relevant situs because it considers it contrary to English public 
policy. The fourth exception arises where a statute in force in the country which is the 
forum in which the case is heard obliges the court to apply the law of its own country. 
One example of the application of this exception might have been the former section 
24 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, recently repealed 126 Fifthly ... special rules might 
apply to determine the relevant law governing the effect of general assignments of 
movables on bankruptcy or succession. " 127 
As Nott has pointed out, it is unclear whether the exceptions detailed by Slade, J. were 
intended merely to reiterate previously recognised exceptions, or whether "they 
represent a new departure. " 128 Nott concludes (correctly, it is submitted) that the 
former is true. 129 It is arguable that the five exceptions referred to do, in fact, represent 
five manifestations of one wider, general, exception, applicable in any case where the 
lex Situs is not the most appropriate law. 130 
126 Section 24(1) stated that, "Where goods have been stolen and the offender is prosecuted to 
conviction, the property in the goods so stolen reverts to the person who was the owner of the goods, or 
his personal representative notwithstanding any intermediate dealing with the, whether by sale in 
market overt or otherwise" 
127 Slade, J., remarked that, "None of these exceptions, however, ... 
has any relevance on the facts of 
the present case. " (ibid., p501) Cf. Carter, ibid., p323. The current edition of Dicey & Morris, 
`Conflict of Laws', 13th edition, p963, paragraph 24R-001 expressly details only one particular 
exception to the general rule. This exception (in respect of goods in transit) is to be found at p968, 
paragraph 24E-015- 
'28 Nott, S M, `Title to Moveables Acquired Abroad' (1981) 45 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 279, 
281. 
129 Nott states that, "... it appears that of the five exceptions mentioned in Winkworth's case, none is 
new in that all are either mentioned in earlier authorities, are part of some general exception that 
could apply equally well in this field as any other or else are characterised by the law as something 
other than a simple transfer of moveable property. " (ibid., p284) Cf. Cheshire & North, `Private 
International Law', 13'h edition, p945. 
130 Although Dicey & Morris do not articulate the possibility of a universal exception of this nature, 
neither do they expressly narrate the five particular exceptions. Even so, it would be strained to suggest 
that the form of possible exception to the general rule is broader than Slade, J. 's dictum implies. 
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Certain criticisms can be levelled at the specific exceptions articulated by Slade, J. 131 
In particular, the rationale behind the second exception (where a purchaser claiming 
title has not acted bona fide132) is unclear, 133 and the general tenor of this exception 
gives rise to two objections, one regarding interpretation, and the other regarding 
substance. 
In the first place, one must inquire according to which law the question of bona fides 
should be interpreted. 134 Whilst this should pose few problems where the forum and 
the situs coincide (good faith being determined according to the forum rei sitae), there 
may be difficulties of interpretation where the forum differs from the situs, and a 
fortiori, where the situs of the goods at the time of the action is different from that 
which pertained at the time when the alleged acquisition or transfer of title (or other 
right) took place. In the latter case, should good faith be determined according to the 
domestic lexfori, or the lex situs at the time of the transfer, or even the lex Situs at the 
time of litigation (which is likely to be the forum)? 135 In effect, the determination of 
good or bad faith may give rise to an incidental question. 136 
131 Mention has already been made in Chapter Eight, supra, of the difficulties concerning the first 
exception, regarding goods in transit, and the fifth exception, it is submitted, is not so much an 
exception to the general rule, than a discrete choice of law rule. 
132 Nott suggests that this exception includes "the occasion when a purchaser is, or even should have 
been, aware of the suspect antecedents of the items in question. " (ibid., p281) Cf. Cammell v. Sewell 
(1860) 5 H&N 728, per Crompton, J., at p743, where his Lordship speaks of an "innocent purchaser" 
acquiring good title to the property in question. (Emphasis added) How, or according to which system 
of law, innocence is to be determined, is not explicit. 
133 Glencore International A. G. v. Metro Trading International Inc. [2001] 1 Ll. Rep. 284, per Moore- 
Bick, J., at p295: "The second of these exceptions, that of a want of good faith on the part of the person 
acquiring title, is to my mind more doubtful. " 
134 This may be critical for, as Augustinos has reported, "unknown provenance, artificially high 
appraisals, suspicious middlemen and lightening transactions are the stuff of the antiquities trade. " 
(Augustinos, N, in Palmer, N, ed, `The Recovery of Stolen Art: A Collection of Essays', ibid., p248) Cf. 
Prott's comment that, "The dispossessed owner's problem of disproving good faith is made the more 
difficult by the traditional practices of the art trade. " (Prott (1989), ibid., p271) Prott's citation of 
Porter v. Werta 416 N. Y. S. 2d. 254,259 is enlightening: "In an industry whose transactions cry out for 
verification of title ... it 
is deemed poor practice to probe. " (ibid, p272) See also Lacey, R, `Sotheby's - 
Bidding for Class' (1998), pp 266-269,297 and 300. 
135 Cf. Prott (1989), ibid., at p262: "One version [of the lex situs rule] is to apply the law of the place 
where the goods are at the time of the litigation. This interpretation of the rule has been used in France 
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Furthermore, there arises the matter of onus of proof: upon whom does the onus of 
proving that the purchaser acted in good faith rest? Must the pursuer/plaintiff (i. e. the 
original owner) in a Scottish or English forum establish mala fides, or does the 
defending purchaser bear the burden of demonstrating his or her bona fides? Slade, 
J. 's judgment provides no answer to these questions. 137 If the lex foci incorporates a 
presumption that a party acts in good faith, but the lex situs comprises no such 
presumption, then a true conflict of laws exists. 
In the case of Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and 
Feldman Fine Arts Inc., 138 judicial attention was drawn to the notion of good faith, 
albeit without any obvious conclusions being reached as to the law according to 
which this concept should be determined. In the U. S. Court of Appeals, Chief Justice 
Bauer stated that, "... we should note that those who wish to purchase art work on the 
international market, undoubtedly a ticklish business, are not without means by which 
to protect themselves. Especially when circumstances are as suspicious as those that 
faced Peg Goldberg, prospective purchasers would do best to do more than make a 
few last minute phone calls ... in a transaction 
like this, `All the red f tags are up, all 
the red lights are on, all the sirens are blaring. "' 
139 
[Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Bensimon 56 Rev. Crit. de Dr. Int. Prive (1967), 120] - Had the court in 
[Winkworth] applied its own law (as a French court would have done under the version of the rule 
applied there, Winkworth would have won ... " 
6 See Crawford, ibid., p54, paragraph 4.21. Alternatively, it could be argued that the determination of 
food or bad faith amounts to a `stand-alone' forum requirement. Cf. note 147, infra. 
37 Likewise, Bumper Development Corp. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1991] 4 All 
E. R. 638, in which Purchas, U. stated rather starkly that Bumper had purchased the London Nataraja (a 
bronze Hindu idol) in good faith, but without divulging his route to this conclusion. Cf. In the Estate of 
Fuld 1968 P. 675, regarding the presumption of sanity and testamentary capacity; in the event of very 
slight differences between German and English law, Scarman, J. chose the presumptions of the forum 
as matters of evidence. 
138 717 F. Supp. 1374 (1989), 917 F. 2d. 278 (1990) (Westlaw report) 
139 Ibid., p294. 
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In determining whether Goldberg, the purchaser of the mosaics in question, had acted 
in good faith, the District Court judge, Noland, J. considered the following factors to 
be relevant: - 
(a) whether the purchaser knew the seller lacked title; and 
(b) whether an honest and careful purchaser would have had doubts with respect to 
the seller's capacity to transfer property rights, and, if so, whether the purchaser 
reasonably inquired as to the seller's ability to pass good title. 140 
In the case in hand, the Court of Appeals held that the purchaser had not demonstrated 
good faith, for the following reasons: - 
(a) The purchaser knew that the mosaics originated from a belligerently occupied 
state, namely, Turkish-controlled northern Cyprus; 
(b) The mosaics, which were extraordinary, and essentially immoveable property, 
were of great and unique value; 
(c) The mosaics were not ordinary commercial merchandise, but bore religious and 
cultural significance; 
(d) There was a vast disparity between the appraised value of the mosaics and the 
purchase price: Goldberg paid $1.8 million in cash, and six months later offered 
them to the Getty Museum for $20 million; 
(e) It was odd that a Turkish archaeologist was in the business of selling Cypriot 
antiquities; 
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(f) The cast of characters who acted as middlemen were highly suspicious; and 
(g) The transaction was carried out with surprising haste. 141 
Since the presence or absence of good faith would appear to be a critical ingredient of 
the test employed by many states in determining the validity of a transfer of property, 
and especially since it comprises a specific exception (whether or not well-founded) 
to the general rule of Cammell v. Sewell, it seems rather surprising that more detailed 
consideration has not been paid to the choice of law complexities of proving bona 
fides, and to the different conceptions thereof. 
Problems of interpretation aside, it is not clear why a substantive condition as to good 
faith, in particular, should be superimposed by our conflict rules; it is difficult to see 
how or why innocence is relevant unless the lex Situs demands it, and the purchaser's 
behaviour falls short of the Situs' definition thereof. 142 If the lex situs (being the lex 
causae identified by the forum) does not expressly stipulate, as a condition precedent 
to the valid acquisition or transfer of rights, that the putative purchaser must act in 
good faith, then there is no justifiable reason why this prerequisite should be 
prescribed by the forum. 143 Effectively, this exception elevates the criterion of good 
14° See Augustinos, ibid, p248. Cf. Crewdson, R, `Some Aspects of the Law as it Affects Dealers in 
England' (In Lalive, ibid. ), at p49/50, where the author outlines the questions which a prudent dealer 
should ask him or herself. 
141 Cf. Harding and Rowell, ibid., at p358: "... if to be safe [intending purchasers] must make time- 
consuming and irksome investigations of title, the pace of trading will slow down and some of the 
advantages (i. e. the profits) of trading will be lost. " This, it is submitted, may be a necessary, and 
proper, sacrifice. Cf. Crewdson, ibid., at p51: "[The dealer] cannot just shut his eyes and claim 'good 
faith'. Any suspicion requires a certain degree of investigation. " 
142 Carter speaks of an English forum "[injecting] its own domestic notions of bona fides into a foreign 
lex Causae. " (Carter, ibid., p324) 
143 Glencore International A. G. v. Metro Trading International Inc. [2001] 1 Lt. Rep. 284, per Moore- 
Bick, J., at p295: "For my own part ... I would regard the absence of good faith as essentially a matter 
for the lex situs, subject only to the right of the English court to refuse to recognize the transfer on well 
established public policy grounds if it regarded its effect as morally repugnant. " Cf. Nott, ibid., at 
p281: "... in some ways this proposition [that the purchaser must act in good faith] is a trifle confusing 
... what 
if that alternative system [i. e. the lex Situs] were to acknowledge the subsequent purchaser's 
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faith to the rank of public policy. 144 It is doubtful whether this provision (which is 
essentially a forum-imposed safeguard against a weak or easily satisfied lex Situs) is 
warranted, particularly since good faith does not appear to be a forum-imposed 
condition in any other rule of choice of law (e. g. contract 145) 
A more constructive interpretation of this good faith requisite would be to assert that 
what is prescribed is good faith, not only on the part of the purchaser, but also on the 
part of the vendor, or transferor of the right in question, as regards his or her selection 
of the relevant situs. If, for example, in Winkworth, the thief had deliberately 
identified Italian law as showing greater sympathy to bona fide purchasers, than to 
original owners (i. e. supportive of the possession vaut titre, rather than the nemo dat 
maxim), with a view to purging the netsuke, in Italy, of any vitium reale attaching 
under English law (the law of the country from which they had been stolen or illegally 
removed), then it could be argued that the general rule that the lex Situs determines 
validity, should be displaced and some other law applied, on the grounds that there 
title - mala fides or otherwise? "; Travers (1989), ibid., at p123, who avers that this `quasi-choice of 
law rule' is "confusing private international law with domestic property laws. "; and Carter, ibid., at 
p324: "Of course, if the effect of the lack of good faith would vitiate the transfer under the lex Situs ... 
no question of its recognition as being nevertheless valid in English law could arise. " 
144 Cf. Siehr (1993), who refers, at p57, to the German case of Hamburger Stadtsiegel, 
Bundesgerichthof (5/10/89): in 1945, following World War II, a seal of the City of Hamburg, in use 
since 1810, was stolen. Several years later, according to Siehr, the seal was purchased at an antiques 
fair in Braunschweig, by a couple who later sold it, in 1986, to an art dealer. The dealer advertised it 
for sale at the Cologne Antiques Fair for 6,800DM. The City of Hamburg sued the dealer, relying upon 
a particular provision of the German Civil Code which stipulated that stolen goods could not, in point 
of principle, be acquired in good faith.. Consider too Cheshire & North, 13`s edition, at p945: "This is a 
dubious exception ... 
It is suggested that this exception can only be justified, if at all, as an example of 
the broader public policy exception and that would mean that it would not apply in every case where 
the English concept of good faith had not been satisfied; but only in the rare case where the 
application of the law of the situs in the particular circumstances was quite unacceptable to English 
public policy. " 
145 Although consider the pre-1990 restrictions on party autonomy in contract, as per Lord Wright in 
Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co. [1939] A. C. 277, at p290: as well as the choice of law 
being legal, and not contrary to public policy, there was a requirement that the law selected by the 
parties be chosen in good faith. Rather than attempt to curtail parties' self-interest by means of this 
nebulous and much-debated concept, the modern approach is to insist upon the addition to the contract 
of `mandatory rules' of certain legal systems other than the chosen system. In this way, much debate 
and litigation is avoided, and there is greater certainty for parties. 
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was lack of good faith on the part of the vendor. 146 Such an interpretation would assist 
in tackling the problem of `day-trip' laundering of stolen goods. 147 This problem will 
be expanded in Chapter Fourteen, infra. 
Some ambiguity is inherent in the third exception to the general sinus rule, that is, 
where the English court declines to recognise a particular law of the relevant situs 
because the court considers it to be contrary to English public Policy. 148 It is 
indeterminable whether `it' refers purely to the particular rule of the lex situs, or, 
additionally, to the result of applying that rule. '49 While an abstract rule of law, per 
146 In fact, in Winkworth, there was no evidence that Dr D'Annone had not purchased the netsuke in 
good faith. Accordingly, as Carter has explained, "There was ... no occasion for the judge to elaborate 
on the nature or extent of this exception. It is to be noted that previous authority for its existence is very 
slender. " (Carter, ibid., p324) Under Article 1147 of the Italian Civil Code, "One who possesses 
without knowledge that he prejudices another's right is a possessor in good faith. " (Beltramo, M, 
Longo, G E, and Merryman, J H, 'The Italian Civil Code' (1969), p303); Garro, ibid., at p5 10: "Under 
Italian law a purchaser in good faith acquires title notwithstanding that the property had been stolen 
or lost or any defect in the seller's title ... good 
faith is presumed under Italian law [Article 11471. "; 
Müller-Katzenburg, (unofficial transl. ), "Article 1153 [of the Italian Civil Code] generally allows 
credulous [bona fide] acquisition of property of moveable objects and thus also of stolen ones. In 
allusion to this peculiarity of Italian law, trading circles also speak of the 'Italian Connection'. "; and 
Prott (1989), ibid., at p258, where it is stated that, `possession vaut titre' states can be used to launder 
stolen goods so that "although identifiably stolen, [the goods] can recirculate on the art market within 
a very short period of time. " 
147 Bear in mind Siehr's remark: "Talking all the time of 'stolen goods' might give the impression that 
all jurisdictions agree whether goods have been stolen or not. This is in fact not the case. " (1993, ibid., 
p60) "The classification as stolen property has to be determined by the law governing in the state of the 
[alleged? ] theft (lex loci furti). " (ibid., p80) Siehr later remarked that, "In all countries stealing is a 
crime, therefore, the acquisition of title to property by theft is forbidden. " (Siehr (1997), ibid., p304) 
Evidently, classification of the goods as stolen, or not, may give rise to another incidental question. (Cf 
note 136, supra) 
148 Nott inquires, "Might it cover legislation that sanctioned the transfer of property to an individual 
who was not a bona fide purchaser, for instance the purchaser of stolen goods? Might it cover 
legislation that allowed the confiscation of property by the government of a foreign state? " (ibid., 
p282) Cf. Carter, ibid., at p324: "... there could, of course, come a point at which the mala fides 
permissible under a rule of a particular lex situs is so flagrant that the rule will be denied effect on 
established public policy grounds. " Cf. Beale, J H, 'Jurisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner in a 
Chattel' (1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 805,806. 
149 Slade, J. 's remarks at p510 suggest that the former interpretation was the one intended: "If therefore 
a case arose where ... a person claimed a title to goods in an English court, which he would not be 
able to establish by reference to English law alone, and the content of the particular foreign law on 
which he relied was so outrageous that this court regarded it as wholly contrary to justice and 
morality, then it would, I conceive, probably refuse to recognise the rights conferred on the claimant by 
the relevant foreign law. " Cf Cammell v. Sewell (1869) 5 H&N 728, per Crompton, J., at p743: "It 
does not appear to us that there is anything so barbarous or monstrous in this state of the law [of 
Norway] as that we can say that it should not be recognised by us. Our own law as to market overt is 
analogous. " (See now, however, section 1 of the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1994); and Glencore 
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se, may not contravene the forum's public policy, the product of its application may 
well be repugnant to the forum (e. g. by favouring a thief). If `it' were to be construed 
in the second sense (i. e. as the result of applying the rule in question), then it is 
submitted that there would be greater scope for utilising this exception so as to evade 
the operation of a lex situs which, in a particular case, would work in favour of a thief. 
The fourth exception detailed in Winkworth, which arises where a statute in force in 
the forum state obliges the court to apply the law of its own country, sanctions the 
overriding of common law conflict rules by domestic statutory provision. Naturally, 
this `mandatory rules' exception is accompanied by difficulties of statutory 
interpretation. 150 Carter has suggested, however, that this exception could be 
cultivated so as to confer special protection on particular types of property. 15' This 
idea is, in principle, attractive, but, as has been evidenced elsewhere, the chief 
difficulty would be likely to be one of definition. '52 
International A. G. v. Metro Trading International Inc., ibid., per Moore-Bick, at p295: "... the court 
might refuse to recognize a transfer of property under the lex situs on public policy grounds if it 
regarded the relevant rules of foreign law to be morally repugnant. " 
150 Nott, ibid., at p283: "... everything depends on assessing the scope of the legislation in question ... 
whether its provisions are confined to transactions in England and Wales or else whether it affects any 
intermediate dealing wherever it may have occurred. "; and Reese, WLM, `Statutes in Choice of Law' 
(1987) 35 Am. Jo. Comp. Law 395, at p395/6, and p398: "Most statutes do not contain any legislative 
directive with respect to their extraterritorial application and leave the entire problem to the judgment 
of the courts ... 
It is highly possible that a legislature with only some of the many possibilities in mind 
will provide for an extraterritorial application that is either too broad or too narrow. This legislative 
determination will be binding on the courts and may compel them to reach unfortunate results ... 
In 
any event, considerable difficulty will usually be involved in drafting a satisfactory provision that deals 
in details with a statute's extraterritorial application. " Cf. Goetschuis v. Brightman 245 N. Y. 186,156 
N. E. 660, per Lehman, J., at paragraph 663: "Clearly the statute may not be interpreted so as to include 
attempted regulation of the validity of contracts made without the state in regard to property situated 
elsewhere. " 
151 "There could be room for the view that such a statute ought to be enacted in order to accord some 
special treatment to transfers of works of art and collectors' items. " (Carter, ibid., p323) 
152 See, for example, the problem of defining cultural property and cultural objects under the 1970 
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen and 
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. See Chapter Ten, supra - `The Treatment of Cultural Property'. 
390 
Winkworth illustrates only one of the ways in which a good faith purchaser of stolen 
goods may seek to protect the title which has been conferred upon him or her 
according to the lex Situs of the country to which the res litigiosa has been 
surreptitiously removed, that is, by relying upon his or her own good faith. A second 
way (which may be averred independently, 153 or in addition to the first) is to assert a 
prescriptive title to the property in question. This too involves reliance upon the 
relevant lex situs. 
Two concepts are relevant, namely, prescription and limitation of actions. Bell has 
stated that, "The mere lapse of time in some cases bars action on an obligation; in 
others, it extinguishes the obligation entirely ... Limitation is a denial of action ... 
after the lapse of a certain time ... Prescription is a 
legal presumption of 
abandonment or of satisfaction. "154 Thus, the passage of time may perfect a bona fide 
purchaser's title to the res litigiosa, simultaneously extinguishing the original owner's 
rights in relation thereto, or alternatively, the original owner may find that, likewise 
by virtue of the passage of time, he is no longer entitled to raise an action for recovery 
of the property, or for damages. Thus, the (bona fide) purchaser is armed with the 
sword of prescription and the shield of limitation. 1,55 
The purpose of such provisions is threefold, namely, to protect defenders from stale 
claims, to encourage claimants to institute proceedings without unreasonable delay, 
and to confer upon a potential defender confidence that he or she will be free from 
153 E. g. Where the lex Situs at the time when ownership is alleged to have passed operates a strict nemo 
dat policy. 
isa Bell, `Principles', paragraph 586. See further paragraphs 587-604, concerning limitation, and 
paragraphs 605-635, concerning prescription. 
iss Cf. Siehr (1997), ibid., p306. 
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suit following the expiry of a certain period of time. '56 Different states, however, 
adopt different approaches to prescription and limitation, first, in respect of the 
terminus a quo, 157 and, secondly, as regards duration of the requisite period. The 
different approaches largely reflect the balance which different states may strike 
between favouring security of title and security of transaction (i. e. between 
incorporation of the nemo dat or possession vaut titre principles). '58 
Section 23A of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973,159 contains the 
relevant provision of Scots international private law, according to which the 
prescription and limitation rules of the lex causae (i. e. in this context, the lex situs) 
should be applied, in preference to those of the lex fori: "(1) Where the substantive 
law of a country other than Scotland falls to be applied by a Scottish court as the law 
governing an obligation, the court shall apply any relevant rules of law of that 
country relating to the extinction of the obligation or the limitation of time within 
which proceedings may be brought to enforce the obligation to the exclusion of any 
corresponding rule of Scots law. " In short, if the terminus a quo, and the prescriptive 
or limitation period laid down by the lex situs, are, respectively, earlier and shorter 
156 Gotha City v. Sotheby's; Federal Republic of Germany v. Sotheby's, The Times, October 8,1998, 
Q. B. D, per Moses, J., at p4. Cf. Redmond-Cooper, R, `Exceptions to the Nemo Dat Principle: Passing 
of Title to the Good Faith Buyer' (1998), p3; Redmond-Cooper, R, p145, (In Palmer, N, ed., `The 
Recovery of Stolen Art: A Collection of Essays'); Kaye, L M, pl01 (In Simpson, E, ed., `The Spoils of 
War - World War II and Its Aftermath: The Loss, Reappearance and Recovery of Cultural Property' 
(1997)); Kaye, L M, International Foundation for Art Research Journal (1998), Volume 1, Number 3, 
p22; and Hayworth, A E, `Stolen Artwork: Deciding Ownership Is No Pretty Picture' (1993) 43 Duke 
Law Journal 337,342. 
t57 i. e. The date of accrual of the cause of action. 
158 Eg. If a state considers that the right of ownership is paramount, it will generally favour a lengthy 
limitation period, and a postponed date of accrual. 
159 Inserted by section 4 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1984 (regarding proceedings 
commenced on or after 26 September 1984). This provision circumvents the difficulties previously 
encountered in classifying foreign rules of prescription and limitation as substantive or procedural (e. g. 
Higgins v. Ewing's Trustees 1925 S. C. 440; and Stirling's Trustees v. Legal and General Assurance 
Society 1957 S. L. T. 73). Equivalent legislation has been passed in England, namely, the Foreign 
Limitation Periods Act 1984. See Walker, D M, `Prescription and Limitation of Actions' (5`h edition, 
1996), pp5, and 125; and Crawford, ibid., p411. 
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than those imposed by the lex fori, a third party purchaser will enjoy the benefits of 
the more favourable provisions. Hence, in the same way that the lex situs rule permits 
exploitation by a thief of the `possession vaut titre' policy operational in a particular 
state, so too a thief may capitalize on the more lenient prescriptive and limitation rules 
of a third state, so as deliberately to act to the detriment of the original owner. 160 As 
Fox has noted, "The dishonest may have an incentive to `shop' for jurisdictions that 
would likely rule in their favour and that have shorter statutory periods. "' 61 
There exist several potential termini a quo, including, the date of acquisition of the res 
litigiosa by the present possessor, the date of discovery by the deprived owner of the 
identity of the present possessor, and the date on which the deprived owner's demand 
for return of the goods from the present possessor was refused. 162 
Inevitably, states which employ an early terminus a quo facilitate the exploits of those 
who are engaged in the illicit trade in cultural property. 163 In contrast, those states 
which operate a `demand and refusal' policy, serve to protect the interests of deprived 
160 Not only overt thieves: consider Kaye, LM (In Briat, M and Freedberg, J A, eds., `International 
Sales of Works of Art, Volume 5: Legal Aspects of International Trade in Art' (1996), at p217: "Some 
fifty years after the end of hostilities, we are witnessing the re-emergence of art treasures missing since 
World War 11 and thought to have been lost or destroyed. This is in one sense extraordinary that 
invaluable collections ... could 
have been hidden for so long. At the same time, however, the re- 
emergence of these treasures should really come as no surprise: many of those who plundered them 
originally are now gone and holders of stolen art treasures often operate under the assumption that if 
secrecy is maintained for a long enough time the Statute of Limitations will ultimately protect them. " In 
light of Kaye's remarks, perhaps we should anticipate more significant `discoveries'. Also Kaye, 
(IFAR), ibid., at p27: "New York's position as the pre-eminent art centre of the world, and the need to 
prevent it from becoming a haven for stolen art requires that the demand and refusal rule be retained 
161 Fox, C, 'The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: An Answer 
to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural Property' (1993) 9 Am. Jo. Inter. Law and Policy 
225,245. 
162 Further, O'Keefe, P J, `Trade in Antiquities: Reducing Destruction and Theft' (1997), p86. 
163 Prott, L V, `Problems of Private International Law for the Protection of the Cultural Heritage' 
(1989) V Receuil des Cours 215, at p260: "... as long as the objects are kept out of sight during the 
running of that period, title will eventually pass. There could hardly be a rule better designed for the 
purpose of curing defects in title and depriving owners, however, diligent, of their rights of recovery. " 
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owners. The middle route, which endeavours to protect both the deprived owner and 
the present possessor, holds that the action will accrue on the date on which the 
deprived owner, exercising reasonable diligence, could have identified either the 
present possessor, or the present whereabouts of the property. 
The discovery, or due diligence, rule164 places emphasis upon the conduct of the 
deprived owner. In O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 165 it was stated that "The purpose of a statute 
of limitations is to stimulate to activity and punish negligence and promote repose by 
giving security and stability to human affairs. "166 This embodies the rationale of the 
discovery, or due diligence, rule. In Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus 
v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts Inc., Noland, J. further explained that, "The 
discovery rule ... is 
based on the reasoning that it is inconsistent with our system of 
jurisprudence to require a claimant to bring his cause of action in a limited period in 
which, even with due diligence, he could not be aware a cause of action exists. "167 
Ascertaining whether or not a party has exercised due diligence is, according to 
Noland J., fact-sensitive and determinable only on a case-by-case basis. 168 The due 
Cf. International child abduction, where time runs in favour of the abductor. (Child Abduction and 
Custody Act 1985, Schedule 1, Article 12) 
164 Strictly, the terminus a quo under the discovery rule, is the date of actual discovery of the stolen 
goods, as opposed to the date when a reasonable owner exercising `due diligence' could have 
discovered the current location of the property. 
165 83 N. J. 478,416 A. 2d 862,868 (1980). (Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. 
Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts Inc. 717 F. Supp. 1374, per Noland, J., (Westlaw), paragraph 1386) 
166 Cf. De Weerth v. Baldinger 836 F. 2d 103,486 U. S. 1056,108 S. Ct. 2823,100 L. Ed. 924 (1988), in 
which the court concluded that a plaintiff who seeks protection under the discovery rule must use 
reasonable diligence to locate the stolen property (which, in this instance, was a Monet painting 
entitled, `Champs de Ble a Vetheuil') and must make a demand for return within a reasonable period 
after the current possessor is identified. 
167 Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts Inc. 717 F. 
Supp. 1374, per Noland, J., (Westlaw), paragraph 1387. 
168 Ibid., paragraph 1389. In the instant case, due diligence was deemed to have been exercised: the 
plaintiff engaged in an organised and systematic effort, first, to notify those persons who might assist 
them (including UNESCO, museum organisations, leading Byzantine scholars and curators, and the 
press), and secondly, to seek the return of the mosaics. Cf. Fox, ibid., p240. Contra De Weerth v. 
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diligence rule, however, has been criticised precisely because "the courts have not 
established objective standards of conduct for possessors and owners to follow. "169 
Nonetheless, the court in De Weerth v. Baldinger held that the due diligence rule is 
especially appropriate with respect to stolen art, since much art is held in private 
collections, unadvertised and unavailable to the public: "An owner seeking to recover 
such property will almost never learn of its whereabouts by chance. s170 Due diligence 
would appear to be the counter-balancing consideration to the requirement of good 
faith which is regularly imposed upon a purchaser of goods. 
The due diligence rule can be contrasted with the demand and refusal rule which was 
71 
applied in the case of Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell. I Wachtler, CJ. 
held that no duty of reasonable diligence to search for missing art is imposed upon 
owners of stolen artwork. 172 The decision operated in favour of the deprived original 
owner, despite the fact that the gouache in question had been publicly exhibited on at 
least two occasions. By Wachtler, CJ. 's own admission, "... the demand and refusal 
Baldinger, ibid., where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she had exercised due diligence; she had 
not taken advantage of post-war mechanisms specifically designed to assist in locating art lost during 
times of war, and had failed to publicise her loss. Consider, however, Solomon R. Guggenheim 
Foundation v. Lubell 77 N. Y. 311,569 N. E. 2d. 426,567 N. Y. S. 2d. 623, per Wachtler, CJ., at 
paragraph 319: "... the facts of this case reveal how difficult it would be to specify the type of conduct 
that would be required for a showing of reasonable diligence. " (This dictum was based on the fact that 
members of the art community were divided upon whether publicising an art theft was the best way to 
recover a stolen painting; there was strong feeling that publication of the theft might drive the work 
further underground. ) 
169 Eisen, L E, `The Missing Piece: A Discussion of Theft, Statues of Limitations, and Title Disputes in 
the Art World' (1991) 81 Jo. of Criminal Law and Criminology 1067, at pp1071, and further, at p1090: 
"... an owner may tend to overcompensate by taking excessive investigatory measures. " Cf. Fox, ibid., 
at p245: "Unclear standards place a tremendous burden on claimants by forcing them to spend 
inordinate amounts of money and time on potentially fruitless investigation. "; and Hayworth, ibid., 
p357. 
70 Ibid., per Newman, J., paragraph 107. 
"' 77 N. Y. 311,569 N. E. 2d. 426,567 N. Y. S. 2d. 623. This case concerned a stolen gouache by Marc 
Chagall entitled, `Le Marchand de Bestiaux. ' Cf. Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon 678 F. 2d 
1150, in which it was held that, "Under New York law, innocent [sic] purchaser of stolen goods 
becomes a wrongdoer only after refusing the owner's demand for return; until the refusal, the 
purchaser is considered to be in lawful possession. " 
172 "Until demand is made and refused, possession of the stolen property by the good faith purchaser 
for value is not considered wrongful. " (ibid., paragraph 318) 
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rule ... 
does appear to be the rule that affords the most protection to the true owners 
of stolen property. " 173 The court concluded that, "... the better rule gives the owner 
relatively greater protection and places the burden of investigating the provenance of 
a work of art on the potential purchaser. v, 174 
As regards the duration of the prescriptive or limitation period, each legal system is 
able to prescribe such length of period, and conditions of possession, as it may deem 
appropriate to extinguish the right, or bar the action. 175 
The passing of the prescriptive period may generate a classic problem of conflict of 
laws in time. If, during the running of the relevant period, a change in the connecting 
factor should occur, from situs A, to situs B, a `conflit mobile' will materialise. Rabel 
has written that, "An unfinished period as such does not generate any effect... the law 
of the last situs decides conclusively. " 176 If a prescriptive title to moveable property 
has not been effectively conferred by the lex situs at the time when the goods in 
question are removed to a new situs, thereafter, the bona fide purchaser's prescriptive 
title can only be consummated by virtue of the new lex situs. 177 It may be that the new 
13 ibid., paragraph 318. Cf. Menzel v. List 49 Misc. 2d 300,267 N. Y. S. 2d 804, per Klein, J., at 
paragraph 316: "The law stands as a bulwark against the handiwork of evil, to guard to rightful owners 
the fruits of their labors. " (This case concerned the theft of another Marc Chagall painting, `Le Paysan 
ä L'echelle'. ) Cf. Kaye, ibid., pl05. 
174 ibid., paragraph 431. 
175 Consider Savigny, F C, `A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws' (1869), at p140: "... the foundation of 
all prescription is continuing possession; but possession, as being essentially a relation of facts is, with 
even less doubt than any real right, to be judged by the lex rei sitae. " 
176 Rabel, E, `The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study - Volume 1' (1958), p97/98. Cf. Savigny, 
ibid., at p140: "The term of the prescription ... and the complete acquisition of the property, must be 
judged by the law of the place at which the thing is last found, because it is only at the expiry of the 
whole period that the change of property takes place; before, it has only been in preparation. "; 
Westlake, J, `A Treatise on Private International Law' (1925), p194; and Venturini, ibid., at p20: "[The 
lex situs] decides ... the conditions of possession, the time necessary 
for completing the period of 
acquisitive prescription, whether an interruption or suspension of prescription is permissible and what 
circumstances are relevant for this purpose. " 
177 Cf. Wolff, M, `Private International Law' (1950), p530. Contra First Restatement, paragraph 259, 
comment (b): "If a chattel is successively held adversely in two or more states, title is acquired by the 
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lex Situs will take account of the period of possession in the former situs, but 
alternatively, that period may be wholly discounted, the new situs requiring that the 
full prescriptive period be expended within its own territory. 178 
Section 23A(2) of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 states that 
"This section shall not apply where it appears to the court that the application of the 
relevant foreign rule of law would be incompatible with the principles of public policy 
applied by the court. " In this regard, Redmond-Cooper has opined that, "the operation 
of a limitation period may be considered to be an aspect of public policy: to ensure 
that the legal situation corresponds with the ostensible situation, and thereby to 
protect innocent third parties who may deal with the goods in reliance upon the 
apparent situation in ignorance of the legal state of affairs. "179 
The public policy hurdle is famously difficult to surmount. Professor Walker has 
advised that there was cited in the Scottish Standing Committee one example of a 
situation where section 23A(2) could feasibly operate, namely, where a foreign 
possessor if it is held successively in the two or more states for the longest period of adverse possession 
required by any one of the states in which it is held. " Note also Zaphiriou's reference to `proportionate 
calculation', according to which, if, for example, two-thirds of situs A's prescriptive period had expired 
when the goods were situated in situs A, following removal of the goods to situs B, title would vest in 
the possessor upon the expiry of one-third of situs B's prescriptive period. (Zaphiriou, ibid., p 115) 
178 Consider, for example, Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon 678 F. 2d 1150, where the 
American court was asked to determine the ownership of two Albrecht Duerer portraits stolen from a 
castle in East Germany and fortuitously discovered in 1966 in the Brooklyn home of Elicofon, an 
American citizen, who had purchased the portraits, in Brooklyn, in good faith, more than twenty years 
earlier. The United States Court of Appeals dismissed Elicofon's claim that subsequent to his purchase 
of the goods he had acquired title under the German doctrine of Ersitzung, which awards title to the 
holder upon ten years uninterrupted good faith possession. The Court held that New York's interest in 
regulating the transfer of property located within its border overrode any interest which the German 
Democratic Republic might have had in applying its policy of Ersitzung to extraterritorial transactions: 
New York law, rather than German law, governed the claim of the good-faith purchaser of the portraits 
stolen in Germany in World War II. 
179 Redmond-Cooper, R, `Exceptions to the Nemo Dat Principle: Passing of Title to the Good Faith 
Buyer', ibid., p4; and Redmond-Cooper (In Palmer), ibid., p145. 
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prescriptive or limitation provision discriminates on grounds of race or nationality. 180 
Significantly, however, in the case of Gotha City v. Sotheby 's, '8' the court identified 
an English public policy to the effect that time did not run either in favour of a thief, 
or in favour of any transferee who did not act in good faith. 182 Moses, J. stated that 
"Public policy should be invoked for the purposes for [sic] disapplying a foreign 
limitation period only in exceptional circumstances. Too ready a resort to public 
policy would frustrate our system of private international law which existed to fulfil 
foreign rights not destroy them. "183 Furthermore, the court stated that the fundamental 
principle of justice with which it was alleged the relevant foreign law conflicted, had 
to be clearly identifiable, 194 and that the public policy escape-route should not be 
invoked, save where the relevant foreign law was manifestly incompatible with public 
policy. 185 Moses, J. expressly advised that a foreign limitation period would not be 
disapplied as being contrary to public policy merely because it was less generous to a 
particular party than was the comparable English provision. '86 
In spite of these relatively stringent conditions, the court in Gotha City concluded 
that, "To permit a party which admitted it had not acted in good faith to retain the 
advantage of lapse of time during which the plaintiffs had no knowledge of the 
180 Walker, ibid., p126. 
181 Gotha City v. Sotheby's; Federal Republic of Germany v. Sotheby's, The Times, October 8,1998, 
Q. B. D.; and Dicey & Morris, `The Conflict of Laws', p175, paragraph 7-044. 
182 Moses, J., ibid., p1, with reference to section 4 of the Limitation Act 1980. Note, however, that his 
Lordship's remarks were obiter, since, "In light of his Lordship's conclusions, ... 
he did not have to 
consider whether [German law] conflicted with English public policy ... 
" (ibid., p3) 
183 Moses, J., p3. 
"' "The process of identification must not depend upon a judge's individual notion of expediency or 
fairness but upon the possibility of recognising with clarity a principle derived from our own law of 
limitation or some other clearly recognised general principle of public policy. " (ibid., p4) 
185 Like the Scottish Standing Committee, his Lordship cited, as an example, discriminatory rules of 
limitation (e. g. Oppenheimer v. Cattermole [1976] A. C. 249) (ibid., p3) Cf. In re Estate of Fuld (No. 3) 
[1968] P. 675, per Scarman, J., at p698: "An English court will refuse to apply a law which outrages its 
sense of justice or decency. " 
186 Durham v. T&N plc, unreported, C. A, May 1,1996. "Some reason other than mere length must be 
identifted for invoking public policy. " (Gotha City, ibid., p4) 
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whereabouts of the painting and no possibility of recovering was ... contrary to the 
public policy which found statutory expression in section 4 of the 1980 Act. "187 It is 
slightly surprising that the court deemed it necessary to rely on the provisions of the 
Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984, when the second exception to the general rule 
of Cammell v. Sewell188 (applicable in cases where a purchaser claiming title has not 
acted bona fide), had been clearly endorsed by Slade, J., in Winkworth v. Christie, 
Manson & Woods Ltd., and could have been utilised in this case. 189 
The purpose of this section has not been to extol the benefits or otherwise of 
particular rules of prescription and limitation, termini a quo, or prescriptive periods. 
Rather, the purpose has been to illustrate that, as with the nemo dat/possession vaut 
titre policy dichotomy, the differences which pertain among substantive rules of 
prescription and limitation serve to aggravate the existing manipulation of the situs 
rule. In this manner also, the situs rule sanctions its own exploitation by thieves 
(particularly dealers in the illicit art market), who are able to abuse the rule in order to 
launder the commodities in which they trade, to the detriment of the original owners 
of those goods. 
Ownership - ius nudum or vested right? 
When assessing the arguments against application of the lex situs rule, with special 
reference to those cases where localisation of the connecting factor has been 
187 Gotha City, ibid., p4. The court continued, "To allow Cobert to succeed, when, on its own admission 
it knew or suspected that the painting might be stolen or that there was something wrong with the 
transaction or had acted in a manner which an honest man would not, did touch the conscience of the 
court. " This was found to be the case, even although the Court recognised that where an action was 
brought in respect of a stolen chattel, German law provided a "lengthy period of limitation. " (ibid., p5) 
"... that consideration seemed to his Lordship to be insufficient to subordinate the rights of the victim 
of a theft in favour of one who had acted without good faith. " (ibid. ) 
188 (1858) 3 H&N 617, (1860) 5 H&N 728. 
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deliberately contrived, it is worthwhile also considering the theory of vested rights. In 
the first edition of The Conflict of Laws, Dicey advised that, "... the application of 
foreign law is not a matter of caprice or option, it does not arise from the desire of the 
sovereign ... to show courtesy to other states. 
It flows from the impossibility of 
otherwise determining those classes of cases without gross inconvenience and 
injustice to litigants, whether natives or foreigners. " 190 Although the author's 
reference was to `the application of foreign law', Dicey, a leading proponent of the 
theory of vested, or acquired, rights, actually intended that what should be enforced 
by the forum were those rights which had been acquired abroad, according to the law 
of the relevant foreign state. 191 The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
proved to be the halcyon period for the theory of vested rights, 192 its popularity having 
diminished substantially in more recent decades. '93 
The theory appeases territorialists, who contend that a state can apply only its own 
law, not foreign law: 194 "since foreign law cannot be directly enforced, the 
189 [1980] 1 Ch. 496, per Slade J., at p501. (Though see doubts regarding the second exception, 
expressed at note 133 et seq., supra. ) 
'90 'The Conflict of Laws' (1896), p10 (per Graveson, R H, `Philosophical Aspects of the English 
Conflict of Laws' (1962) 78 L. Q. R. 337,344) 
191 Dicey, A V, `The Conflict of Laws' 6th edition, (1949), at p12: "English judges never in strictness 
enforce the law of any country but their own and when they are popularly said to enforce a foreign 
law, what they enforce is not a foreign law, but a right acquired under the law of a foreign country. " 
Cf. Cheshire, G C, `Private International Law' (1935) 51 L. Q. R. 76, at p90: "... the central doctrine of 
private international law exists to fulfil, not to destroy foreign acquired rights. " 
192 Graveson (1962), ibid., p354. Crawford, ibid., p24, at paragraph 3.05: "The germ of the vested rights 
theory ... can 
be found in Huber's third maxim: 'Sovereigns will so act by way of comity that rights 
acquired within the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as they do not cause 
prejudice to the power or rights of such government or of its subjects. "' 
193 Cf. Carswell, R D, `The Doctrine of Vested Rights in Private International Law' (1959), at p269: "It 
is the conclusion of this article that the doctrine has outlived its usefulness ... when it is put to a 
difficult test, inadequacies appear. "; and Kegel, G, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, 
Volume 111, Chapter 3- Fundamental Approaches' (1986), p 10. 
194 There is some truth in this statement, insofar as foreign law must be proved (in a Scottish or English 
forum, at least) as a matter of fact (else it is presumed to be the same as the substantive lex fori). 
Technically, once proved as a fact, the foreign law cannot thereafter be applied as a point of law (e. g. 
Bonnor v. Balfour Kilpatrick Ltd 1975 S. L. T. (Notes) 3). Consider Godard v. Gray (1870) L. R. 6 Q. B. 
139, per Blackburn, J., who, with reference to the decision in Castrique v. Imrie (1870) L. R. 4 H. L. 
414 (in which the French tribunal made an error as to English law), stated that, "... a mistake as to 
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territorialists must say that what the courts do is to recognise rights vested or 
acquired in other countries. "195 More recently, Sauveplanne has said of the vested 
rights theory that, "According to this doctrine the forum recognises a legal situation 
created outside the country of the forum, even though it was not created in conformity 
with the law which would have been applicable under the forum's conflict rule ... the 
court does not directly apply any law at all, but accepts as an accomplished fact a 
situation that already existed elsewhere. , 196 
A distinction, drawn by Zaphiriou, should be noted between, first, a set of facts 
relating to a certain object, which are completed in state X (thereby conferring 
ownership rights upon a named individual), followed by the removal of that object, 
without the owner's consent, to state Y; and, secondly, an incomplete set of facts in 
state X (with the result that no ownership rights are conferred according to the law of 
state X), coupled with the subsequent removal of the object to state Y. 197 
Taking the first scenario, in Savigny's opinion, "If the transmission [of property] has 
once taken place, every subsequent change of the locality of the thing is immaterial 
for the destiny of the property since the right of property once acquired cannot be 
affected by such a change of place. "198 More recently, Siehr has echoed Savigny's 
English law on the part of a foreign tribunal does not operate in all cases so as to prevent the courts of 
this countryfrom giving effect to the [foreign] judgment. " 
195 Carswell, ibid., p271. 
196 Sauveplanne, G, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume III, Chapter 6- 
Renvoi' (1990), p5. See Anton's criticism that the theory is defective in assuming that a foreign- 
acquired right should be enforced without offering justification that the foreign law in the forum's view 
is the correct law to apply. (Anton (1990), ibid., p28) 
197 Zaphiriou, ibid., p162 et seq. The second scenario, where action of some description is required in 
state Y, in order to complete the transfer of ownership, is not intended to be the focus of the present 
discussion. 
198 i. e. Without the knowledge and consent of the owner. Savigny, ibid., p139. Further, at p280: "... 
new laws leave acquired rights unaffected. Neither the truth nor the importance of this principle can be 
disputed. "; at p289: "Every one ought to be able to reckon upon the continued efficacy in the future of 
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words, advising that, "... once a right has been acquired under the applicable lex rei 
sitae this right should not be questioned once the object has changed its situs. "199 In 
short, the act of taking Mr Winkworth's netsuke across international frontiers, into 
Italy, did not affect his legal title to the collection. 200 
As a general rule, whilst removal of an object across state borders should not, per se, 
undermine pre-existing, or vested, rights in the object, this will pertain only so long as 
there are no further dealings with the object in the new situs. 201 Thereafter, according 
to the current choice of law rule, the new lex Situs will determine the existence and 
priority of interests in the object. 202 As Venturini has pointed out, however, even the 
mere removal of an object to a new situs may adversely affect `vested' rights, insofar 
the juridical acts which he has performed for the acquisition of rights, according to the existing laws. "; 
and, finally, at p307: "In the law of things, the principle of non-retroactivity generally receives simple 
and complete application ... 
If [property] is alienated by a simple contract under a law which 
recognises such alienation as valid, the right of property thus acquired remains, even if a subsequent 
law requires delivery in alienation. " Cf. Rabel, ibid., at p70: "Real rights in a moveable, validly 
created under the law of ... 
X, persist with extraterritorial effect after the moveable has been 
transported into ... 
Y. It does not matter that the same right could not have been created in Y, whose 
law has more exacting conditions. " 
'99 Siehr (1993), ibid., p77. Cf. Siehr, K, 'The Protection of Cultural Heritage and International 
Commerce' (1997) 6 U. C. P. 304, at p306: "[The situs rule] implies that once a moveable object has 
been acquired bona fide, this acquisition is a vested right and will be protected as such even if the 
location of the moveable changes in the future. "; Carter, P B, 'Decisions of British Courts During 
1981' (1981) 52 B. Y. B. I. L. 329,330; Carter, P B, `Transnational Trade in Works of Art: The Position 
In English Private International Law', at p319 (In Lalive, ibid. ): "English private international law 
holds that generally the mere fact that property is moved in this way [from one situs to another] does 
not in itself affect title. "; Luzzatto, ibid., p415; and Baxter, ibid., at p13: "There is a general feeling that 
property rights acquired in one country should be respected in another. " Consider Cheatham, E E, 
'Problems and Methods in Conflict of Laws' (1960) I Receuil des Cours 237, at p278: "The policy in 
favour of enforcement of foreign-based legal interests is stability of legal rights. " 
200 Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. [1986] 1 Ch. 496. 
201 Note, however, that the quality of inalienability may well be undermined by mere removal of the 
object from the `classifying' situs: Duc de Frias v. Pichon [1886] 13 Journal du Droit International 
593. It would appear, therefore, that inalienability is not a vested quality. Cf. Siehr (1993), ibid., p85. 
But inalienability, even if not vested, may, nevertheless, be renascent: "Property declared inalienable 
in France, which has been misappropriated or stolen then traded in a country where French 
inalienability measures have no effect, is again declared inalienable if it is brought back into France. " 
(Lagarde, P, `Le commerce de fart en droit international prive frangais', p408; in Lalive, ibid. ) 
202 Carter (1988), ibid., p329. Cf. Second Restatement, paragraph 247., comment (a): pre-existing 
interests will be recognised "... even though no such interest would have been acquired in the latter 
state if the chattel had been there at the time of the conveyance. Conversely, no interest is acquired in a 
chattel upon its removal to a second state merely because such an interest would have arisen under the 
local law of the second state if a particular transaction which occurred prior to the chattel's removal 
to the state had taken place after the chattel had been removed there. " 
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as, "A change of situs and thus of the applicable law may give rise to a problem of 
substitution inasmuch as it may be necessary to integrate proprietary rights. "203 
Accordingly, the concept of a vested right of property may prove to be something of 
an empty right. If the property to which an acquired right attaches is transferred to a 
state whose property rules incorporate the `possession vaut titre' principle, the right 
may emerge a hollow entitlement: "... the rights of innocent purchasers are certainly 
governed by the lex rei sitae at the time of acquisition. To this effect, rights earlier 
acquired by others under a former lex rei sitae, although recognized in principle, may 
be restricted. "2O4 
Ownership - universal or Provincial? 
Akin to the theory of vested rights, is the theory of universality of status. For the 
purposes of international private law, it may be possible to characterise ownership, 
not only as a right which exists relative to an object of property, but also as a right 
203 Venturini, ibid., p14. Even without a subsequent transaction taking place in the second situs, 
difficulties of transposition may still occur: "In order that a proprietary right can be recognised, the 
categories of legal interests envisaged by the first and second lex situs of the object must show some 
measure of equivalence. This equivalence exists, at least in general, in so far as full ownership is 
concerned. It is frequently absent where other proprietary rights are in issue, with the result that in 
some cases an adaptation of the original legal status of the moveable object proves impracticable. " 
(e. g. Transplantation of a right in security over moveable property without possession, or of fiduciary 
ownership or management of property held in trust, may prove troublesome. ) Cf. Wolff, M, `Private 
International Law' (1950), at p529: "! t may be that a ius in rem has come into existence under the law 
of the situs and that subsequently the chattel is transported into a country where it would not have been 
possible to create the right in the same way. In such cases the right 'acquired' elsewhere usually 
remains in force. " (e. g. Re The Anchor Line (Henderson Bros) Ltd [1937] Ch. 483) Cf. First 
Restatement, paragraph 260, comments (a) and (b). Wolff has warned that, "The question whether an 
institution known to the law of one country is equivalent to a similar institution developed in the legal 
system of a different country, in the sense that in private international law one of them may be replaced 
by the other, bristles with difficulties. " (ibid., p535) Cf. in matrimonial property, In re Bettinson [ 1956] 
Ch. 67, where the new English situs adopted a helpful, positive attitude. 
2'04 Verheul ,JP, 
`Foreign Export Prohibitions: Cultural Treasures and Minerals' (1984) 31 N. I. L. R. 
419,422. Note Baxter's remarks that, "Respect for foreign rights seems to show a desire for something 
with more moral appeal than the mathematical objectivity of some choice of law theories. " (ibid., p 14) 
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which confers upon the owner of property a unique status as owner. 205 If the latter 
characterisation is adopted, then it may be necessary to take into account the theory of 
universality of status: "Perhaps the most far-reaching characteristic of status ... is its 
quality of universality ... The general principle of status is that, when created by the 
law of one country, it is or ought to be judicially recognised as being the case 
everywhere, all the world over. By `everywhere', I mean at least in every `country' 
where the rule of law prevails. "206 
The conferral of status carries the consequences of a right in rem: "A judgment or 
decree determining what is the status of an individual is a judgment or decree in rem. 
It is, therefore, if binding at all, not only a binding judgment as between the parties to 
the suit, but is to be recognised as binding in all suits and by all parties ... [that is, it is 
to be] treated as binding and final, not only by all the courts of the same country, but 
by the courts of all countries. , 207 
205 Re Luck's Settlement Trusts [1940] Ch. 864, per Scott, LJ., at p890: "Status is in every case the 
creature of substantive law: it is not created by contract, although it may arise out of contract. "; and 
Niboyet v. Niboyet (1878) L. R. 4 P. D. 1, per Brett, LJ., at p11: "The status of an individual used as a 
legal term means the legal position of the individual in or with regard to the rest of the community. " 
While status is normally interpreted to mean "a person's legal condition in society, either absolute or 
in relation to another person" (Graveson (1974), ibid., p226), is there any reason why status should not 
concern a person's legal condition in relation to property, particularly when, as Graveson has advised, 
the status is imposed "in order to secure and protect interests of society in its institutions, and carries 
with it rights, duties, capacities, incapacities, powers and disabilities. "? (ibid. ) Graveson remarks that, 
"... whether any particular matter is one including a special status can only be judged by the degree of 
social interest in its existence and protection. " (ibid., p227) Consider Beale, J H, `Jurisdiction over 
Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel' (1927), at p811: "Ownership is a legalized relation between a 
person and a thing. The owner's property does not exist in the thing alone, but in the person of the 
owner as well. " (Emphasis added) 
206 Re Luck's Settlement Trusts [1940] Ch. 864, per Scott, U., at p891. Dr Crawford has advised that, 
"The ideal is that status should be universal so that a condition of status which our conflict rules 
regard as having been validly conferred in one country, particularly if it is the country of a person's 
domicile, should be recognised in all other countries. " (ibid., p 118, paragraph 8.03) 
207 Niboyet v. Niboyet (1878) L. R. 4 P. D. 1, per Brett, U., at p12. Cf. Re Luck's Settlement Trusts 
[1940] Ch. 864, per Scott, U., at p891: "... where a competent court in any country adjudicates upon 
the particular status of some person, it recognises the presence or absence of that status, and its 
judgment has effect as a judgment in rem. " 
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From this dictum, one might suppose that the status of owner would be recognised by 
the law of another country into which the property in relation to which the status 
existed, was removed. 208 But, it is evident that if another transaction should take place 
in the subsequent situs, purporting to confer the right of ownership upon a bona fide 
purchaser in that later situs, the status of the original owner is no longer recognised as 
a right which exists in rem. 
In this regard, it is interesting to consider a dictum of Littledale, J. in the case of 
Birtwhistle v. Vardill, viz.: "The very rule that a personal status accompanies a man 
everywhere, is admitted to have this qualification, that it does not militate against the 
law of the country where the consequences of that status are sought to be 
enforced. "209 The distinction between the abstract status which ownership confers, 
and the incidents of that status, is significant. 210 In particular, it is important to note 
Graveson's warning that, "The law which governs the incidents of a status is not 
necessarily that which governs the status itself. "211 Even if, theoretically, the original 
owner's status is initially recognised in the new situs (to which the property in 
question has been removed), by virtue of further dealings with the property in that 
new situs, the status itself, and any incidents thereof, will be abrogated if the 
substantive provisions of that law (i. e. the new lex Situs) incorporate the possession 
vaut titre principle, preferring the rights of a bona fide third party purchaser within 
that jurisdiction, to those of the deprived `owner'. 
208 Cf. Notes 198 and 199, supra, relative to the theory of vested rights. 
20 Birtwhistle v. Vardill (1826) 5 B&C 438, per Littledale, J., at p455. (per Graveson (1974), ibid., 
235) 
210 The incidents of status comprise the rights, duties, capacities, incapacities, powers and disabilities 
which are bestowed by virtue of the status. See Crawford, ibid., p121, paragraph 8.06. 
211 Graveson (1974), ibid., p232; Re Langley's Settlement Trusts [1962] Ch. 541. 
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Although the vested rights theory has declined in popularity, and the apparent 
simplicity of its territorial approach belies the complexities inherent in its application, 
its ethos is still to be welcomed. 212 So too, the underlying rationale of the universality 
of status theory is to be commended. 213 If no meaningful recognition is to be accorded 
to the `vested' right of an `original' owner whose property has been stolen from him, 
and taken, without his knowledge or consent, to a new state, with a view to its being 
sold there to a third party purchaser, then it transpires that, on occasion, the concept of 
`ownership' is reduced, regrettably, to a rather ephemeral and shallow right. 
The situs rule - promoting the peaceful enjoyment of possessions? 
One further factor which requires to be taken into account is the relevance of human 
rights in relation to property. Article 1 of Protocol Number 1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights214 reads as follows: - 
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
2.2 Consider Crawford, ibid., p25, at paragraph 3.05: "... there is no doubt that the vested rights theory, 
as encapsulated in a form of words as a guide, instils the correct attitude of international co-operation 
and open-mindedness. " 
213 E. g. Crawford, ibid., at p119, "... [in the personal law area of the subject] {sed quaere: only in that 
area? } the theory is an excellent starting point ... 
" ({ ... 
} added) 
214 Effective in the United Kingdom by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998. Consider the fourth 
exception to the general lex Situs rule, arising, "... where a statute in force in the country which is the 
forum in which the case is heard obliges the court to apply the law of its own country... " (Winkworth v. 
Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd. [1986] 1 Ch. 496, per Slade, J., at p501) 
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with the general interest to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties. " 
As was stated in Scotts of Greenock Ltd. and Lithgows Ltd. v. United Kingdom, 215 "... 
these rules [i. e. the two principles stated in paragraph one, and the third principle, in 
paragraph two] are not separate or watertight. The first rule contains a general 
guaranteed right to property. This general rule is then qualified or limited by the 
second and third rules. "216 
In a partly dissenting opinion in the case of Agosi v. United Kingdom, 217 one of the 
judges, Mr Pellonpää, remarked that, "... deprivation [of property] is the most serious 
interference with the rights of the owner ... Deprivation, whether it takes place 
through formal expropriation or other proceedings, or de facto by way of 
fundamental interference with the owner's position, can be defined as the taking of 
property which is irreversible in the sense that there is no reasonable prospect of its 
return. "218 
215 Application Number 9006/80. 
216 Ibid., paragraph 76. Cf. The Leeds Permanent Building Society and The Yorkshire Building Society 
v. United Kingdom (117/1996/736/933-935), paragraph 78; Agosi v. United Kingdom [1986] A-108, 
paragraph 48; James and others v. United Kingdom [1986] A98-B; Case of the Holy Monasteries v. 
Greece [1994] Case A301-1, at paragraph 56: "Article 1 (p1-1) ... guarantees in substance the right of 
property ... 
The first [rule] ... 
lays down the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second 
rule ... covers 
deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions. The third ... recognises 
that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest. The second and third rules, which are concerned with particular 
instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, are to be construed in the 
light of the general principle laid down in the first rule. "; and Case of Air Canada v. United Kingdom 
[1995] Case A316-A, at paragraph 29. 
217 [1986] A-108. 
218 Ibid., p20 (Hudoc report). This case concerned the seizure and forfeiture of an aircraft belonging to 
the applicant company. There was held to have been no violation of Protocol 1(1). 
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In the subsequent case of The Leeds Permanent Building Society and The Yorkshire 
Building Society v. United Kingdom, 219 the Strasbourg court stated that, "According to 
the Court's well-established case-law ..., an interference, including one resulting 
from a measure to secure the payment of taxes, must strike a fair balance' between 
the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the 
protection of the individual's fundamental rights. The concern to achieve this balance 
is reflected in the structure of Article 1 as a whole, including the second paragraph: 
there must therefore be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aims pursued. "22° 
The question which should be asked, therefore, is whether an interference with 
property (by a public authority) is compatible with Article 1 of Protocol 1, namely, 
whether it strikes a fair balance between the demands of the general interests of the 
community and the requirement of protection of an individual's fundamental rights. 22' 
Any legitimate interference with the exercise of the right to peaceful enjoyment of 
possession must, accordingly, pursue an aim in the public interest. The principle of 
`fair balance' presupposes the existence of a general interest of the community in the 
property in question. 222 It has been further stated that the issue of whether or not a fair 
balance has been struck, "... becomes relevant only once it has been established that 
the interference in question satisfied the requirement of lawfulness and was not 
219 (117/1996/736/933-935). 
220 Ibid., paragraph 80. 
221 Cf. Beyeler v. Italy (33202/96,5 January 2000). See Renold, M-A, `A Landmark Decision in Art 
Law by the European Court on Human Rights: Beyeler v. Italy' 2000, Volume 5(1), Art, Antiquity and 
Law 73,75. 
222 Beyeler v. Italy (33202/96,5 January 2000), paragraph 111. Significantly, the Court pointed out 
that national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in determining what is, in fact, in the 
general interest of the community. (ibid., paragraph 112) Consider in this regard Belvedere Alberghiera 
S. R. L. v. Italy (31524/96), concerning the order of an Italian municipality for possession of the 
applicant company's land, in implementation of a road-building scheme. Cf Carbonara and Ventura v. 
Italy (24638/94). 
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arbitrary. )s223 Compliance with the principle of lawfulness is the first condition for an 
interference to be deemed compatible with Article 1 of Protocol 1. Lawfulness, it is 
presumed, is to be determined according to the lex loci actus (which, it is anticipated, 
will generally coincide with the lex situs). 224 
Although the possibility of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 is most likely to arise 
in the context of state confiscations or expropriations, 225 one could inquire whether a 
Scottish or English forum's strict application of the lex situs rule in cases where the 
effect of applying that rule is to deprive an `innocent' owner of his or her right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, could, in fact, be said to violate Article 1. One 
might predict arguments which seek to maintain that the situs rule achieves a fair 
balance between the deprived owner's rights of possession, and the community's 
general interest in the security of commercial transacting, but in cases where (as a 
result of application of the choice of law rule in respect of property transfers) the 
deprived owner has no right of action or recourse in respect of his property, there 
would appear to be an ex facie violation of his or her proprietary rights. 
Arguments against the lex situs rule - incorporeal moveable property 
Finally, as regards the application of the lex situs rule to assignations of incorporeal 
moveable property, the most serious criticism to be levelled against the rule relates 
less to its substance, than to its nomenclature. 226 Whilst writing, in 1935, about choses 
223 Beyeler v. Italy (33202/96,5 January 2000), paragraph 107. 
224 If the two do not coincide, then it is expected that the lex situs would prevail: Princess Paley Olga v. 
Weisz [1929] 1 K. B. 718, per Sankey, U., at p729. 
225 E. g. Oppenheimer v. Cattermole [1976] A. C. 249; and Williams and Humbert v. W&H Trade 
Marks (Jersey) Ltd. [1986] A. C. 368. 
226 Although note Benjamin's general remark that, "Some might argue that the lex situs rule itself is 
anachronistic in the electronic era, and a new rule of private international law should be developed. " 
(Benjamin, J, `Determining the Situs of Interests in Immobilised Securities' (1998) 47 I. C. L. Q. 877, 
933) 
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in action, Cheshire adjudged that, "... the lex situs is nothing but an inconstant guide. 
There can be no issue out of the present confusion unless the Courts approach the 
difficulty in a more scientific manner. , 227 More recently, Rogerson has criticised the 
simplicity, illogicality and irrationality of the situs rule as it applies to incorporeal 
moveable property. 228 
While it may be straightforward to state that a debt is situated in the place where the 
debtor is resident, this assertion offers no guidance as to what is meant by the term 
`residence', 229 or by whom and according to which law that factor is to be determined. 
Furthermore, it disregards the fact that a debtor may be resident in more than one 
country230 (particularly in the case of commercial, as opposed to personal, debtors). 231 
Likewise, as has already been demonstrated, 232 a company may maintain more than 
one share register, and simply to fix the situs at the place of incorporation may not be 
conclusive. Even to reduce the factors of residence and incorporation to the place of 
enforcement (i. e. the place where the debt may be enforced, or the share transfer 
effected), 233 will not necessarily be decisive since the possibility of enforcement will 
227 Cheshire (1935), ibid., p85. 
228 Rogerson, P, `The Situs of Debts in the Conflict of Laws - Illogical, Unnecessary and Misleading' 
[ 1990] 49 C. L. J. 441. 
229 Does it, for example, equate to ordinary, or habitual, residence? Consider Crawford, ibid, p71, 
paragraph 6.02, and p102, paragraph 6.29. If the rationale is to nominate as situs the place where the 
debt is enforceable, then ordinary residence should probably suffice. (Crawford, ibid., p319, paragraph 
14.19) 
230 Or, indeed, in none! Consider the phenomenon of the floating or itinerant debtor: the Financial 
Times has carried reports of the peripatetic existence of high net worth passengers aboard 'The World 
ofResidenSea', a self-styled `seaborne-city'. (The Weekend FT March 2001, p8) 
Z 
of 
Rogerson has suggested that, "Where the debtor has more than one residence, either the debt could 
be said to be situate in more than one place or the courts must adopt further rules to isolate one 
location for the debt. " (ibid., p442) 
232 Chapter Four, supra -'Defining the `Situs". 
233 Cf. Baxter, ibid., at p16: "Situs can be given a meaning for any kind of property, by thinking of it, 
not as the location of an object, but as the place where property rights can be enjoyed or made 
effective. " 
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not automatically be confined to one country. 234 Amorphous tests such as that of 
`primary enforceability' have been adopted; 235 while the place of primary 
enforceability may be apparent when the right in question is a contractual right (e. g. 
the right to payment of a sum of money under an insurance policy), 236 a hierarchy of 
potential places of enforcement is unlikely to have been articulated where the right is 
non-contractual (e. g. goodwi11237). 
Rogerson has also accused the situs rule of being illogical. The aim, which is implicit 
in the rule, is to anchor the right in the state in which it may be enforced. The rule 
presupposes that enforcement will be readily achievable at the place where the debtor 
resides. This, however, is an ill-founded assumption, particularly in a situation where 
the debtor's residence has changed between the time when the debt, or other right, 
was created and the time when enforcement proceedings commenced, and where, in 
the interim, the debtor has taken steps to relocate his or her assets to a different 
jurisdiction. 238 
234 Consider Deutsche Schachtbau v. Shell International Petroleum Co. [1990] 1 A. C. 295, per Lord 
Oliver, at p343: "It has to be recognised that a debt is a species of property which may be recoverable 
M legal process from a debtor in more than one jurisdiction. " 
E. g. F&K Jabbour v. Custodian of Israeli Absentee Property [1954] 1 All E. R. 145. 
236 C f. Falconbridge, J D, `Essays on the Conflict of Laws' (1947), at p422: "In order to decide which of 
the several residences of the debtor is the criterion of locality of a particular debt, it is necessary to 
look at the contract which creates the debt. " 
237 Goodwill has been defined as, "the attractive force which brings in custom" (I. R. C. v. Muller & 
Co's Margarine Ltd [1901] A. C. 217, per Lord Macnaghten at p224), or "whatever adds value to a 
business by reason of situation, name and reputation. " (ibid., per Lord Lindley at p235) Lord 
Macnaghten further explained that, "One element may preponderate here and another element there. 
To analyse goodwill and split it up into its component parts, to pare it down ... seems to me to 
be as 
useful for practical purposes as it would be to resolve the human body into the various substances of 
which it is said to be composed. The goodwill of a business is one whole. " (ibid., p224) Accordingly, in 
order that its full, or collective, value might be recognised, goodwill must be enforced as a whole, not 
separately. If the assets in respect of which the goodwill attaches are in different states, it may not be 
immediately obvious in which state that right would be most effectively enforced. See Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia, Volume 18, paragraph 1364. 
238 Consider also Rogerson's remark that, "... it is a nave assumption in the modern world that the 
debtor will have assets at his residence against which enforcement of the debt can be ordered. The 
411 
Finally, there is a certain irrationality in the 'hypostatization 9239 of incorporeal 
moveable rights. This process takes place in order to align the rules affecting this type 
of property with those which regulate corporeal moveable assets, and immoveable 
property, but it is, in effect, a false analogy. 240 Reification introduces an additional 
step into what is an already complicated process. It would be preferable to simplify 
the process of ascertaining the lex causae, and as Rogerson has suggested, to 
reformulate the apposite connecting factor with greater frankness and transparency: 
"The choice of law rule which says `apply the lex situs' can be rewritten as `apply the 
law of the debtor's residence '. s24' By clothing the rule in the garb of the lex Situs, the 
courts have simultaneously imprinted upon it the mark of the taboo, thereby 
discouraging enlightened consideration of the appropriateness (or otherwise) of 
applying the situs rule242 to incorporeal moveable property. It is the stamp of the 
taboo which has deterred many commentators from subjecting the situs rule to the 
rigorous scrutiny and/or criticism which should accompany eminence. 
debtor may have many assets elsewhere - why are these other places not also contenders for the situs 
of debts? " (ibid., p455) See Chapter Fourteen, infra -'The Lex Proprietatis'. 
239 Cook (1942), ibid., p285. 
20 Cf. Baxter (1964), ibid., at p15: "The fictional situs of an intangible is ... a concept of greater 
generality than an aid in solving choice of law problems. " Scots law recognises the separate categories 
of incorporeal moveable property and corporeal moveable property (and a fortiori immoveable 
property) precisely because these types of property differ fundamentally in nature. Rules formulated to 
deal with tangible property cannot (or at least should not) be extended, without modification, to deal 
with property which exists only in the abstract. 
241 Rogerson, ibid., p453. The author continues, "By using a choice of law rule which hides this 
fundamental process the court deludes itself as to the real basis for its decision and also denies itself 
any opportunity to ask whether the choice of law rule is appropriate. " Further, "By focusing attention 
on the situs the courts are drawn into a mechanical application of some particularly complex and 
unpredictable rules, and fail to enquire whether these rules are consistent with the purpose of the 
conflict of laws, which is the desire to achieve justice. " (p459) 
242 Or, at least, of applying the law of the country where the debt is primarily enforceable - which 
might necessitate `moving the debt' to the debtor's residence as at the date of commencement of 
proceedings. (Cf mobilia sequuntur personam) 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to recount the arguments in support of, and 
against, the lex Situs rule. It is hoped that the reader will have been persuaded that the 
opposing arguments are stronger than may, at first, have been anticipated. 
In 1986, Trautman concluded that, "Many courts and scholars have yet to embrace 
fully the lesson that Professor Hancock provided long ago. "243 Trautman's words 
remain equally true today, particularly in relation to British conflict lawyers. By 
endeavouring to reinforce and to elaborate upon the arguments of Professor Hancock 
and his fellows, the aim has been to illustrate that certain of the pro-situs arguments, 
when tested in particular contexts at least, do prove to be `shallow'. The hope now is 
to formulate a rule fit to deal adequately, in the author's submission, with the 
problems encountered and described to this point. 
243 Trautman (1986), ibid., p 1101. 
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Chanter Thirteen 
Framing An Alternative Choice of Law Rule 
Traditionally, the lex Situs rule has enjoyed a special status in conflict of laws theory 
and practice, having secured upon the choice of law rostrum a position of longevity 
which is exceeded by few other choice of law rules. The intransigence of the land 
taboo is such that to suggest that the lex situs rule should now be altered or modified, 
is tantamount to conflicts heresy. Hancock has suggested, however, that, "... despite 
the continual reiteration of the situs formula by the courts and commentators, 
perceptive judges have not infrequently refused to make the needless sacrifices that it 
demands. "' Covertly, through the technique of manipulative characterisation, 2 or by 
` Hancock, M, `Conceptual Devices for Avoiding the Land Taboo in Conflict of Laws' (1967) 20 
Stanford L. Rev. 1,38. He is of the view that, "To justify their unorthodox decisions, they have had 
recourse to various escape devices. These escape devices have in most instances had the unfortunate 
effect of obscuring the real ground of the unorthodox decision: a strong sense of dissatisfaction with 
the result the situs formula would have produced. Hence, the judges deciding subsequent cases have 
sometimes failed to recognise for what it was, have taken it too seriously, and so have been beguiled 
into reaching regrettable results. " (ibid. ) Consider also Carter who takes the view that it is the 
"acceptance of the orthodoxy that choice of law denotes choice of legal system [that] has given rise to 
the need for escape routes. Rules permitting or requiring rejection of the lex Causae in particular 
circumstances mark out these escape routes. " (Carter, P B, `Rejection of Foreign Law: Some Private 
International Law Inhibitions' (1984) 55 B. Y. B. I. L. 111,112) 
2 Hancock takes the view that, "The commonest device of all ... is that of alternative classification ... 
Various disadvantages attend the use of this evasion technique ... The most basic and subtle difficulty 
encountered in using the alternative-classification device is that of explaining why, when the situs 
formula is overlapped with another, the other formula should necessarily prevail. The short practical 
answer to this question would be that, for reasons that he has not been able to articulate fully, the 
judge believes that the nonsitus formula points to the preferable result. Because such a statement 
would sound like a confession of judicial instability, most judges have wisely left this question 
unanswered or rather have let readers of the opinion answer it for themselves. " (ibid., p3819) Consider 
Anton v. Bartolo (1891) Clunet 1171; Johnstone v. Baker (1819) 4 Madd. 474; Chatfield v. Berchtoldt 
(1827) L. R. 7 Ch. App. 192; De Nicols v. Curlier [1900] A. C. 21; and Re Cohn [1945] 1 Ch. 5. 
Consider the same sentiment, albeit in a different context: "Experience both here and abroad (but 
particularly in the United States) has shown that a choice of law rule of great simplicity may produce 
results which `begin to offend our common sense', and the courts may therefore seek to escape from 
them, for example by applying to a particular issue a different classification and hence also a different 
choice of law rule. " (Scottish Law Commission Consultative Memorandum No 62/Law Commission 
No 87 - `Private International Law - Choice of Law in Tort and Delict' (1984), paragraph 4.17) 
(hereinafter 'SLC-Delict'). Consider also Dine, who has stated that, "it is clear that characterisation 
has been used to achieve what the judges considered a just result. " (Dine, J, `Choice of Law by 
Characterization' 1983 J. R. 73,97) 
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deliberate failure to prove the content of the lex situs, 3 and overtly, in cases of 
financial provision in divorce, intestate succession to property, and the guardianship 
of property belonging to children and incapable adults, the lex Situs rule has, in certain 
cases and to varying degrees, been supplanted. 4 In these latter instances, this has 
occurred because proprietary issues and questions of title have generally been 
considered to be secondary, or incidental, to the primary legal relationship or 
obligation in dispute (e. g. divorce or succession). 5 
3 Failure by the parties to prove the content of the lex Situs would result in the forum applying the 
substantive lex fori, not qua lex fori, but rather qua lex causae. Although it is difficult to imagine a 
scenario in which neither party would wish to prove the content of the foreign lex Situs, in the event 
that neither party, for any reason, plead and/or proved the content of that law, then the forum would be 
unable, exproprio motu, to establish the content of, or to apply, the lex Situs. The substantive content of 
the lex Causae (i. e. nominally the lex situs) would be presumed to be identical to that of the lex fori. 
Accordingly, the substantive lexfori would be applied eo nomine lex situs; it is most unlikely that the 
content of the lex causae would reflect the substantive domestic law actually in force at the Situs at the 
relevant time. (See Rodden v. Whatlings Limited 1960 S. L. T. (Notes) 96; Pryde v. Proctor & Gamble 
Limited 1971 S. L. T. (Notes) 18; Bonnor v. Balfour Kilpatrick Limited 1975 S. L. T. (Notes) 3; De 
Reneville v. De Reneville [1948] P. 100; and Crawford, E B, `International Private Law in Scotland' 
(1998), paragraphs 4.11 and 4.12) This situation could feasibly arise if the executors and beneficiaries 
of a deceased person's estate agreed to enter into a deed of family arrangement in respect of the (testate 
or intestate) distribution of the deceased's estate, comprising, inter alia, immoveable property situated 
abroad. If neither the executors nor the beneficiaries wished the foreign lex Situs to apply to the deed of 
arrangement, or to the consequences thereof, both may elect not to plead or prove the content of the lex 
situs. The substantive rules of the lexfori (presumably the lex ultimi domicilii of the deceased) would 
then apply to determine the effect upon the foreign property of the deed of arrangement. 
4 Chapter Seven, supra - `Cracks in the Monolith - Particular Instances'. Cf. Colwyn Williams: "Ever 
since the lex Situs became a governing rule of choice of law did incidental questions such as those 
concerning capacity, form, matrimonial rights and succession cut through its regime. " (Colwyn 
Williams, D, `Land Contracts in the Conflict of Laws - Lex Situs: Rule or Exception' (1959) 11 
Hastings Law Journal 159,163) Alternatively, Colwyn Williams observes the avoidance of the situs 
rule via other routes, referring to the "flexible doctrine of comity ... 
leaving open avenues of escape 
from a purportedly dominant lex situs. " (ibid., p 164) Cf Hancock who has warned that, "Because they 
conceal the true grounds of decision, legal fictions and other escape devices frequently mislead the 
judges in subsequent cases. " (ibid., p25) 
5 Cf. Von Mehren & Trautman: "The problem is complicated by the fact that in cases of any doubt the 
issue of title usually arises out of some kind of transaction - contract, tort, trust or marriage - that has 
significant ties with some jurisdiction other than that of the situs ... escape from the rules of the 
Restatement can be covertly achieved by a process of characterising the problem not as one of 
property but as one of some other body of law. " (Von Mehren, AT& Trautman, D T, `The Law of 
Multistate Problems - Cases and Materials on Conflict of Laws' (1965), p197) Cf. Scoles' observation 
that, "The situs rule is a generalization that seems to cloud thinking about the particular issue involved. 
There are many instances of judicial avoidance of unjust application of the situs rule either by 
characterisation or by frank recognition of its inappropriateness to particular issues. " (Stoles, E F, 
`Choice of Law in Family Property Transactions' (1988) II Receuil des Cours 13,75) To illustrate his 
premise, Scoles cited Poison v. Stewart (1897) 167 Mass. 211,36 L. R. A. 771, and Proctor v. Frost 89 
N. H. 304,197 A. 813 (1938). It is submitted that Scots and English cases demonstrating `frank 
recognition of [the lex situs'] inappropriateness to particular issues" are extremely rare, if not 
unknown. Cf Carter's conclusion that, "... private international law has been bedevilled by the 
generality of many of its choice-of-law rules. " (ibid., p112) 
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It is hoped that the preceding chapters have demonstrated that there are identifiable 
cracks in the situs monolith. Acting on that premise, it is intended now to propose an 
alternative choice of law rule in respect of property law matters. 
The objectives of a new choice of law rule 
In traditional conflicts methodology, choice of law is less an art, than a science. ' On 
the American platform, Von Mehren and Trautman have remarked that one 
shortcoming of the traditional approach is the breadth of categories for which a 
particular connecting factor may be deemed apposite: "The larger the category, the 
less rational the results are likely to be in cases somewhat removed from the 
category's core or central conception. "7 Also articulating his objection to the rote 
application of broad, general rules to particular or peculiar issues, Scoles has 
expressly called for narrower, more detailed rules, to replace over-inclusive (albeit 
time-honoured), single-contact rules. 8 
6 According to Von Mehren & Trautman, choice of law involves "little more than an inquiry into the 
proper categorization of cases and a selection of an appropriate connecting factor for each category. " 
(ibid., p178) 
7 Von Mehren & Trautman, ibid., p104. 
8 Scoles, ibid., p90. Cf. Cheatham's remark that, "The issues in conflict of laws are not simple and 
uniform ones, which might be dealt with by broad and sweeping rules. The issues are numerous and 
diverse and the rules which deal with them must be correspondingly numerous and diverse so as to 
reflect the variety of factors involved. Each issue can then be viewed in its full setting: narrow issues 
broadly viewed. " (Cheatham, E E, `Problems and Methods in Conflict of Laws' (1960) I Receuil des 
Cours 237,308) Consider Baade, who more recently has opined that, "When a broad category is 
segmented into narrower frames of reference with custom-tailored choice-of-law rules, there arises the 
possibility of depepage or 'patching': different segments or phases of a legal connection ... are 
determined potentially by rules emanating from different legal systems. This is an accepted feature of 
modern codified choice-of-law systems and treaties, and a built-in feature of the most significant 
relationship method and of governmental interest analysis, both of which proceed issue by issue. " 
(Baade, H W, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume III, Chapter 12 - Operation 
of Foreign Public Law' (1991), p31) Contra Baxter, who quotes Zaphiriou in asking, "`Is it desirable 
to subject a transaction to a single law as regards all its aspects or is it preferable to split the 
transaction into various questions and subject these various questions to different laws? ' ... 
[It is] 
desirable to keep to a minimum the number of rules ... governing a class of transaction. 
'Specialization' multiplies the chances of doubt. " (Baxter, I F, `Conflicts of Law and Property' (1964) 
10 McGill Law Journal 1,13, quoting Zaphiriou, G, `Transfer of Chattels in Private International Law' 
(1956), pp66167) 
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As was suggested in Chapter One, supra, the widespread preference for certainty has 
resulted in rules of choice of law concerning property in respect of which there are 
few exceptions. More recently, some commentators have argued that transactions 
concerning `special' types of property (e. g. cultural property or intellectual property), 
do not fit naturally, or comfortably, into the traditional lex Situs groove. 9 
Throughout this work, criticism has been levelled at the blanket use of mechanically- 
applied, single-contact connecting factors. 1° Baxter has pointed out that, "If choice of 
law depends on location, this will lead to an `atomised' set of answers where a man's 
property is in various jurisdictions, or to uncertainty where goods are in transit. gill 
Similarly, criticism has been levelled at the adoption of certain `approaches' to choice 
of law, such as interest analysis, functional analysis, and the broad test of the Second 
9 As regards the treatment of cultural property, Lyndel Prott (UNESCO Cultural Heritage Section) has 
called for a discrete set of conflict rules applicable only to items of cultural property and tailored 
accordingly. (Prott, L V, `Problems of Private International Law for the Protection of the Cultural 
Heritage' (1989) V (217) Receuil des Cours 215,306) As regards intellectual property rights, Fawcett 
and Torremans have submitted that to apply the standard choice of law rule in respect of moveable and 
immoveable property, to intellectual property rights, is ill-advised: "... their application to intangible 
rights, such as intellectual property rights, would be particularly cumbersome. We submit that the 
international nature of intellectual property rights and their exploitation, ... require a sui generis 
regime ... a modified or sui generis regime 
in relation to choice of law is equally called for. " (Fawcett, 
J J, and Torremans, P, `Intellectual Property and Private International Law' (1998), p487) Fawcett and 
Torremans expressly state that, "[the] application of the traditional property approach, as it has been 
outlined by Dicey & Morris, to intellectual property is problematical. It is submitted that a sui generis 
approach, that is closely linked to certain property principles, would be a better solution. " (ibid., p494) 
Fawcett & Torremans have even suggested that because intellectual property rights are effectively 
competition rules (conferring as they do exclusive rights of use and exploitation), they do, in fact, form 
part of the public policy of each legal system. (ibid., p494) 
° Cf Alden: "The unjust results created by blind application of territorial conflicts rules still obtain in 
real property disputes while more enlightened legal theories govern practically all other disputes ... 
Why this solitary territorial rule has survived is unclear ... the situs rule leads to exactly the same sort 
of unjust and inequitable decisions that led to the demise of other territorial rules. " (Alden, R, 
`Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts' (1987) 65 Texas Law Review 585,586); and 
Lando: "The more rigid rules are, the more frequent the clash between law and equity will be. This is a 
serious objection to rigid solutions... An excessively remorseless rigidity should be avoided. " (Lando, 
0, `International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, Volume 111, Chapter 24 - Contracts' (1976), 
p78) 
Baxter (1964), ibid., pll. Cf. Alden: "During the last half century, American conflicts law and 
principles of jurisdiction have abandoned this territorial approach for issues other than real property 
... 
Unfortunately, this re-evaluation and reformation has not extended to the Situs rule. " (ibid., p591) 
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Restatement, as methods by which to resolve concrete, international (as opposed to 
interstate) choice of law disputes. In 1976, Lando inquired (in the context of choice of 
law rules of contract) whether, "... a method [is] to be adopted which ensures justice 
in the individual case, but which will abandon to a greater or lesser degree the quest 
for predictable solutions? Or are rules to be introduced which pay regard to the need 
for foreseeability, but which, if applied consistently, will sometimes cause hardship in 
the individual case. "12 It is the responsibility of those who would advocate a new 
choice of law rule in property to provide a balanced response to these questions. 
At this juncture, the present author parts company with those American and Canadian 
scholars with whom, to some extent at least, she has hitherto allied herself, namely, 
Hancock, Weintraub13 and Alden. The interest and functional analysis approaches 
promulgated by those scholars mark the apogee of choice of law flexibility, the 
pendulum having swung as far as is possible from the certainty and predictability of 
the situs rule. 14 These approaches bring to mind early criticism of the principle of 
comity. Savigny, for example, 15 cited a dictum of Lord Wensleydale in Fenton v. 
Livingstone, 16 namely, "How could any reasonable results be attained with an idea so 
infinitely vague and unlegal? In fact one cannot even approximate to a correct 
12 Lando, ibid., p78. 
13 Kegel has suggested that Weintraub is "... the most moderate of the American innovators in the 
extent to which he deviates from traditional conflicts law. " (Kegel, G, `International Encyclopaedia of 
Comparative Law, Volume III, Chapter 3- Fundamental Approaches' (1986), p58) 
14 In noting these extremes, it is interesting to consider Carnahan's view that, "As a consequence, 
perhaps, of the youthfulness of the subject, Conflict of Laws doctrines are frequently marked by 
extreme indefiniteness or by equally extreme rigidity. At times its principles are stated in the vaguest 
terms ... 
At other times the principles are expressed with definiteness, real or apparent ... This 
definiteness may be productive of great injustice. " (Carnahan, C W, `Conflict of Laws and Life 
Insurance Contracts' (1958), p. xi, foreward to I" edition) Cf. Kegel: "The [traditional] conflicts rule ... 
is the product of efforts ... to allocate 
legal problems among territorial jurisdictions, not to decide 
cases justly. " (1986, ibid., p192); and Baxter: "Private international lawyers seem at times fascinated 
by intellectual systems, regarding as irrelevant the comparative justice of the final answers. " (Baxter, I 
F, 'Recognition of Status in Family Law' (1961) 39 Can. Bar Rev. 301,348) 
15 Savigny, F C, `Treatise on the Conflict of Laws' (1869), p33. 
16 (1858) 3 Macq. 497. 
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decision of the simplest case of private international law upon this principle. Where is 
the beginning of the end of comity? How can questions of law be solved according to 
views of policy, which are the most shifting and uncertain things in the world? ' , 17 As 
has been demonstrated in the opening chapter of this thesis, the two extremes of the 
situs rule and interest/functional analysis, are manifest in the polarised styles of the 
First and Second Restatements. 18 
It has been argued that the risk of injustice which may result from the mechanical 
approach could be minimised by what Carter has described as, "... the careful and 
detailed formulation of a large number of choice of law rules, each tailored to cover a 
fairly precisely defined, and often relatively narrow, range of situations. "19 It is 
necessary, therefore, to expand upon what are considered to be more appropriate 
connecting factors and particularly to consider what emphasis should be attributed to 
non-territorial contacts which connect the dispute in question with a legal system 
other than the lex situs. 20 
" Ibid., at p548. 
18 Contrast the First Restatement, paragraph 257, and the Second Restatement, paragraph 222 (Chapter 
One, supra - `Choice of Law Methodology'). Cf. Morris' observation that, "The policy behind the 
original Restatement seemed to be 'This is the law because we say so; we give no reasons; we cite no 
authority; we state no history; we concede no doubt nor divergence. ' But now the Restatements have 
abandoned dogma and seek to persuade, to rationalize and to justify. And quite right too. Nowhere is 
this retreat from dogma more apparent than in the Restatement Second of the Conflict of Laws. " 
(Morris, JHC, 'Law and Reason Triumphant - or - How not to Review a Restatement' (1973) 21 Am. 
Jo. of Comp. Law 322,322/3) 
19 Carter (1984), ibid., p112. Cf. Goodrich who, in 1941, stated that, "it was a point too clear to be 
labored' that "courts should be prepared to reexamine broad theories and shape them to fit the 
complications of changing life. " (Goodrich, H F, `Two States and Real Estate' (1941) 89 Uni. of Pen. 
L. Rev. 417,429) 
20 Consider Alden: "The situs rule emphasizes, like its sibling the 'wooden' lex loci delicti doctrine, one 
isolated contact - the presence of land. That contact may or may not be significant given the facts of 
the case and the issues in the underlying litigation. " (ibid., p629) Cf. in the context of delict, the dictum 
of Lord Wilberforce in Boys v. Chaplin [1971] A. C. 356, at p391: "No purely mechanical rule can 
properly do justice to the great variety of cases where persons come together in a foreign jurisdiction 
for different purposes with different pre-existing relationships, from the background of different legal 
systems. " Consider too Briggs' remark that, "In the past several years there has developed a now 
widely held idea that in the solution of a conflict-of-law problem all foreign contacts should be 
considered in order that the result most satisfactory to the forum may be selected. " (Briggs, E W, 'The 
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Finding flexibility within the connecting, factor 
In seeking to formulate an alternative choice of law rule in respect of property law 
matters, the aim, expressed in Chapter One, is to provide flexibility through the 
medium of the connecting factor. Flexibility, however, must be tempered by respect 
for simplicity, for as Baxter has advised, "... the purpose of law is to solve disputes, 
not to give intellectual pleasure. i21 
Previous (largely unsuccessful) attempts have been made to reform choice of law 
rules concerning property. The Hague Conference on Private International Law has 
delivered three conventions in this area, viz.: the 1955 Convention on the Law 
Applicable to International Sales of Goods, 22 the 1958 Convention on the Law 
Governing Transfer of Title in International Sales of Goods, 23 and the 1958 
Convention on the Jurisdiction of the Selected Forum in the case of International 
Sales of Goods. 24 
The endeavours, in this context, of the Hague Conference having proved largely 
ineffectual, European member states took steps, in 1969, to harmonize "... matters 
most closely involved in the proper functioning of the common market. "25 
Negotiations concerning the first of these `matters', the law concerning contractual 
Jurisdictional-Choice-of-Law Relation in Conflicts Rules' (1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, at 1165. 
(Emphasis added) 
21 Baxter (1964), ibid., p37- 
22 Concluded 15 June 1955. See also the 1980 Declaration and Recommendation Relating to the Scope 
of the 1955 Convention. This Convention is in force in nine states, but not in the United Kingdom. 
23 Concluded 15 April 1958. This Convention was signed by Greece and Italy, but has never entered 
into force. As its name suggests, the scope of the Convention was limited to proprietary issues arising 
from the sale of goods, and endorsed the lex Situs rule. 
24 Concluded 15 April 1958. This Convention was signed by Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and Greece, but likewise, has never entered into force. 
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and non-contractual obligations, proved partially successful, resulting as they did in 
the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. 26 Less 
successful, however, were the efforts concerning the second matter, namely, "the law 
applicable to corporeal and incorporeal property. i27 
The structure of a new rule 
In contrast with the truth of the words penned by Professor Cheshire in 1935,25 it may 
no longer be asserted that International Private Law is free from legislative 
intervention. The view has recently been expressed that, "... choice of law structures 
are increasingly becoming legislative in origin. "29 Acting on the assumption that 
material changes in this area of the law are likely to be orchestrated not by the 
judiciary, but by parliamentary draftsmen, it is important to consider the various 
structures which could be employed in the formulation of an alternative choice of law 
rule. 
u Giuliano & Lagarde Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
('G&L Report') [19801 OJ C282 1, p5/6. 
Applicable in the United Kingdom by virtue of the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. The remit 
of the original project having proved too ambitious, it was decided, in 1978, to concentrate purely on 
contractual obligations. (Dicey & Morris, `The Conflict of Laws' 13`s edition, p1199, paragraph 32-010; 
and Scots Law Commission Number 129/Law Commission Number 193, Joint Report `Private 
International Law: Choice of Law in Tort and Delict', 1990, p1, paragraph 1.2 ('the 1990 Report' }) A 
convention (colloquially termed `Rome II'), concerning non-contractual obligations, is currently under 
negotiation. 
27 G&L Report, p5/6. Professor Arndt, Oberlandsgerichtspresident, was appointed rapporteur for 
negotiations concerning proprietary harmonization. (ibid., p6) It is possible that the lack of progress in 
this matter is attributable to the appointment of a German reporter, for it is explained that "... the 
Member States' delegations (with the sole exception of the German delegation) declared themselves to 
be fundamentally in agreement on the value of the work in making the law more certain in the 
Community. " (G&L Report, p5) Professors Giuliano and Lagarde's last words on property matters 
explain that, "It was agreed that Mr Arndt's report on the law applicable to corporeal and incorporeal 
property would be discussed later, Mr Arndt having explained that a comparative study of the principal 
laws on security rights and interests should precede his report. " (p6) No further action appears to have 
been taken regarding the original remit. 
28 `Private International Law' (1935), Preface; `Private International Law', 13'x' edition, p. viii. (Note 
13, Chapter Two, supra - `The Land Taboo') 
29 Leslie, R D, `Building Blocks for Choice of Law Structures' (1998) 19 Statute Law Review 202, at 
p202. 
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(a) A simple rule comprising a single-contact connecting factor 
In the context of choice of law in delict, the Scottish Law Commission ('the SLC') 
advised that, "To achieve maximum certainty, a choice of law rule must be based on a 
clear and simple connecting factor, with as few exceptions as possible. "30 By analogy, 
such a model would point towards an exclusive lex Situs rule, free from exception. 31 
In view of the existing exceptions to the situs rule (at least as concerns moveable 
property), 32 this model would not be a feasible alternative. 33 In any event, the danger 
of blunt, general rules has already been mentioned, 34 and is pithily summarised by 
Professor Siehr, thus: "Forgotten is the wisdom and experience shown by the ... 
proverb: grasp all, lose all. "35 
fib) A rule comprising a single-contact connecting factor, coupled with 
exceptions 
This model describes the choice of law rule which currently applies to corporeal 
moveable property. Exceptions, it is said, prove the rule, and their benefits are clear: 
"The use of an exception provides the flexibility which is lacking where a single point 
30 SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.16. Such rules, it was acknowledged, "... have a high degree of rigidity. " 
(ibid. ) 
31 As regards choice of law in delict, the SLC acknowledged that, "... cases may arise where the law 
selected on the basis of a simple connecting factor is that of a country which has in reality very little 
connection with the actual occurrence. "(SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.16. ) Cf. Boys v. Chaplin [1971] 
A. C. 356, per Lord Wilberforce, at p391: "No purely mechanical rule can properly do justice to the 
great variety of cases where persons come together in a foreign jurisdiction, for different purposes with 
different pre-existing relationships, from the background of different legal systems. " 
32 Chapter Eight, supra - 'The Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property'. 
33 "A certain but crude choice of law rule which is not sufficiently subtle to cater adequately for the 
circumstances of particular cases may result in the application of what is clearly not the most 
appropriate law. " (SLC Delict, 1984, paragraph 4.17) This is as true of an exclusive lex situs rule as it 
was of an exclusive lex loci delicti rule. Consider Carter's view that, "In this sphere of law [property], 
somewhat ironically and uncharacteristically, the rules of private international law can be, and largely 
are, relatively simple. " (Carter, P B, `Transnational Trade in Works of Art: The Position in English 
Private International Law' in Lalive, P, 'International Sales of Works of Art' (1988), p330) 
34 Cf Knoepfler: "... the law applicable which, by definition, should be the closest to the actual 
situation, may sometimes prove very remote. " (Knoepfler, F, `Le commerce de fart en droit 
international prive suisse', in Lalive, ibid., p387) 
35 Siehr, K, `International Art Trade and the Law' (1993) VI Receuil des Cours 9,255. 
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of contact is used on its own. s36 The currently-recognised exceptions to the general 
property rule constitute `sub-rules', each sub-rule "... designed to deal with different 
circumstances. , 37 Exceptions which attend a general rule may be formulated in one of 
two ways: - 
(i) A series of specific exceptions 
It would technically be possible to expand the list of currently recognised 
exceptions, 38 so as to cater, specifically, for other `exceptional09 circumstances (e. g. 
an exception might be created to deal specifically with stolen goods, or with cultural 
property). 40 
The call for exceptions to general rules is not new. In 1959, Colwyn Williams wrote 
that, "In recent years, many scholars writing in the field of conflict of laws have 
36 Cheshire & North , 'Private International 
Law' 13`s edition, p680. 
37 Cheshire & North, ibid., p680. 
38 Note, however, the reluctance so to do in the case of Glencore International AG v. Metro Trading 
International [2001] 1 Ll. Rep. 284; [2001] 1 All E. R. 103. 
39 'Exceptional' relates, not to the rarity of the factual scenario or the nature of the dispute, but to the 
weight of argument in favour of displacement or reversal of the general rule (i. e. the 'exception' may 
be applied more often than the `rule' itself; such a result, of course, may justify a re-casting of the 
eneral' rule). 
This is akin to Von Mehren & Trautman's `hierarchical' single-contact rule. Von Mehren and 
Trautman have suggested that, "... if one is not prepared, in the atypical situation, to abandon the 
traditional approach and work with other methods of analysis, an intermediate solution may be to use 
connecting factors, developing alternative ones for the unusual situation ... 
for example, a hierarchy of 
connecting factors. " (ibid., p167) Consider Jefferson's view that, "General doctrines should not be 
adhered to when confounded by more important principles ... Even within the unreformed scheme is 
there not still room for argument that a different connecting factor might be adopted where the goods 
have been stolen. " (Jefferson, M, `An Attempt to Evade the Lex Situs Rule for Stolen Goods' (1980) 96 
L. Q. R. 508,511) Cf. Byrne-Sutton: "Stressing the rather weak position of illegally dispossessed 
owners, at the mercy of a well organized black market in art, certain writers have suggested the 
possibility of giving up the lex Situs rule in the case of sales involving stolen chattels, and applying 
instead the law of the country where the object was stolen. " (Byrne-Sutton, Q, `Qui est le proprietaire 
legitime d'un objet d'art vole? ', in Lalive, ibid., p500); and Prott (1989), ibid., p281. Prott has 
suggested that, "Since rigid application of the lex rei sitae rule to cases concerning disputes about 
important cultural objects seems to lead almost inevitably to the evasion of protection (whether the 
protection is of owners' rights or community access), there is good reason, in this area at least, to look 
for some other appropriate connecting factor. " (Prott (1989), ibid., p280) In fact, Prott favours the 
creation of a new legal category (that is, cultural property as a category sui generis), and the 
formulation of a bespoke choice of law rule, rather than an exception to a more general property rule. 
(ibid., pp306 and 314) 
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argued that the now overgeneralized choice of law rules be broken down to a much 
larger number of narrower rules of more specific application. 941 
Two difficulties pertain to the operation of specific exceptions: the first concerns the 
definition and delimitation of an exception, 42 while the second relates to the 
connecting factor which is denoted by the exception. 
When examining choice of law in delict, the SLC recognised that, "a rule which 
applies the lex loci delicti without exception is inadequate to cope with all the varied 
and unpredictable circumstances in which tort and delict cases occur. 
43 The same 
may be said, mutatis mutandis, of the lex loci rei sitae regarding choice of law in 
property. However, it would be impossible specifically to enumerate the `varied and 
unpredictable circumstances' in which application of a general rule (whether lex loci 
delicti, or lex loci rei sitae) would prove inadequate. 44 Even if it were possible to 
articulate the potentially numerous exceptions, it is questionable, from the perspective 
of simplicity, whether it would be desirable so to do. 
45 
41 Colwyn Williams (1959), ibid., p159. 
42 Note the distinction drawn by Dr Leslie between an exception within a rule (e. g. section 12 of the 
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 {'the 1995 Act')), and an exception to 
a rule (e. g. section 13 of the 1995 Act). (Leslie, ibid., p208) 
43 SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.92. 
44 "The circumstances in which the application of the lex loci delicti produces results which 'will begin 
to offend our common sense' are difficult to define with accuracy. " (SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.93) 
Nevertheless, "... it may at least be said that the policy reasons which support the application of the 
lex loci delicti become less weighty or disappear entirely when the occurrence and the parties are more 
closely connected with a country other than the locus delicti than they are with the locus delicti itself. " 
(ibid. ) 
45 .. variations from simplicity [i. e. from a single rule] ought to be in common sense terms, enabling 
people to make their arrangements without fear of legal quixotics. "(Von Mehren & Trautman (1965), 
p292) Cf. Goode: "In an international instrument it is better to have rules that are tough and simple 
than those which seek to do equity through a myriad of finely tuned detail. It is the fear of complexity 
that may in the past have deterred transnational commercial lawyers from tackling the proprietary 
aspects of commercial dealings. " (Goode, R, `The Protection of Interests in Movables in Transational 
Commercial Law' (1998) Uniform Law Review 453, p463) 
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It is likely that specific exceptions to a general rule would, in turn, designate single- 
contact connecting factors, possibly supported by a further exception. 46 This is 
probably preferable to reference, within an exception, to open-ended rules of closest 
connection, 47 which would provide no guidance, save to exempt the property or 
transaction referred to, from the operational reach of a general rule. 48 
(ii) A general exception 
In its analysis of choice of law in delict, the SLC discovered that, "Attempts to refine 
the [lex loci delicti rule] by the introduction of well-defined exceptions seem to ... run 
up against the paradoxical difficulty that no single specific exception is wide 
enough .,, 
49 This echoes an earlier reflection by Professor Cheshire to the effect that, 
"... the possible permutations of the questions that it [private international law] 
raises are so numerous that the diligent investigator can seldom rest content with the 
solution that he proposes. "50 Accordingly, in choice of law in delict, the pursuit of 
specific exceptions was jettisoned in favour of a recommendation for one general 
exception. 51 The obvious disadvantage of such a provision is the "uncertainty inherent 
46 E. g. The formal validity of marriage is referred to the single-contact lex loci celebrationis, except 
where application of that law is unreasonable (e. g. in cases of belligerent occupation - Taczanowska v. 
Taczanowski [1957] P. 301), or impossible (Penhas v. Tan Soo Eng [1953] A. C. 304). (Crawford, E B, 
`International Private Law in Scotland' (1998), p145, paragraph 9.22) 
47 i. e. Without the assistance of presumptions etc. 
48 E. g. Goods in transit. 
49 SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.115. 
so Cheshire & North, Preface to 1s` edition. 
51 "... a general exception whose operation would not be confined to any particular set of 
circumstances ... the only test would 
be that the occurrence and the parties had their closest and most 
real connection, with a country other than the locus delicti ... it would not be practicable to define 
further the concept of 'closest and most real connection'. " (SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.116, and 
paragraph 4.12 1) See now section 12 of the 1995 Act. 
425 
in a general exception. i52 In contrast, however, the perceived benefits of generality 
have found expression within `proper law' fonnulae. 53 
(c) A proper law approach 
In order to describe the concept of `situs', Wolff employed what may be termed 
`proper law' language, viz.: "... the place where a thing is situate is the natural centre 
of rights over it. "54 
The objective of a proper law approach is to identify and apply the most appropriate 
law in each case, that is, the law of the country with which the particular transaction 
or occurrence, and the parties had, at the relevant time, 55 the closest and most real or 
significant connection. 56 It has already been suggested that the ascertainment of a 
`proper law' necessitates a qualitative, rather than a purely quantitative appraisal of 
the facts and circumstances. 57 As Professor Lando explained in the context of choice 
52 SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.121. 
53 In the context of choice of law in contract, Lando advised that, "A via media between the inflexible 
rules ... and the policy 
directed methods ... is supplied 
by the centre of gravity method. " (Lando, ibid., 
p81) 
4 Wolff, M, 'Private International Law' (1950), p512, and at p507 as regards immoveable property, 
viz.: "Immoveables are part of the country and so eternally and closely connected with it that all rights 
over them have there their natural centre of gravity. " Cf. Zaphiriou's comment that "The centre of 
gravity of proprietary rights is the situation of the chattel. " (ibid., p216); and Von Mehren & 
Trautman's suggestion that, "Another device for avoiding the rigidity of the single-contact approach is 
to take a look at all significant contacts and to attempt to ascertain the center (sic) of gravity, or 
primary focus, of the transaction; when a number of contacts are concentrated in a single jurisdiction, 
it may be that the aggregation of contacts indicates that this jurisdiction's law is more appropriate 
than the law indicated by any one single contact point. " (ibid., p168) Similarly, Baxter considered the 
`centre of gravity' to be the place where rights and obligations have `functional effect'. (1964, ibid., 
16) 
The tempus inspiciendum must be expressed or implied within each choice of law 'rule'. 
56 Cf. SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.140, and paragraph 4.130: "Flexibility is the great attraction of a 
simple choice of law rule which would apply the law which had the 'most significant connection with 
the chain of acts and consequences'. " Dr Morris had earlier remarked that, "To those who hanker after 
certainty in their rules of law, this may seem like taking refuge behind a verbal formula in order to 
avoid the necessity of following precedent. "(Morris, JHC, 'The Proper Law of a Tort' (1951) 64 Harv. 
Law Rev. 881,. 882) Note, however, the belief that the Scots lawyer's predilection is generally `for 
principle rather than for precedent. " (Stewart v. London, Midland and Scottish Railway Company 1943 
S. C. (HL) 19, per Lord Macmillan, at p39) 
57 Chapter One, supra - `Choice of Law Methodology'. 
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of law in contract, "... the proper law should not be ascertained by counting but by 
weighing the connecting factors. "58 
In the same manner that exceptions to a general rule may be formulated in two 
different ways, so too a proper law approach has more than one manifestation. 
A `bare' proper law 
A proper law approach may be described as `bare' if the choice of law `rule' does no 
more than stipulate that the law of closest and most real or significant connection 
should apply. 59 Although a bare proper law approach would avoid problems of 
definition (e. g. Of Situs)60 it must be questioned whether such a `rule' would, in fact, 
constitute any rule at all. Whilst it may be easily prescribed that the law of closest 
connection should apply, the resulting question is: "How is the closest and most real 
connection to be identified? "61 A provision which narrates merely the intended result, 
without guidance or direction as to how that result should be achieved, is nothing 
more than a precatory declaration. 62 In choice of law in delict, the SLC concluded 
that, "... the attractions of a bare proper law rule are purchased at a high price. The 
58 Lando, ibid., p81. Cf. Cheshire & North, ibid., at p684: "The points of contact may be evenly spread 
amongst two or more countries ... 
It is still, however, possible to identify the country with which the 
obligation has the closest and most real connection by attaching weight to individual points of 
contact. " 
59 This is one of the `centre of gravity' variants described by Professor Lando: "... one [variant] will 
rely always on the constellation of the particular connecting factors of the contract to determine its 
centre individually. No presumptions are admitted. " (Lando, ibid., p81) Cf. Cheshire & North, ibid., 
p684: "The closest and most real connection is identified in the light of the whole facts and 
circumstances, without the use of sub-rules or the aid of presumptions. " One particular manifestation 
of the bare proper law approach was the objectively-ascertained proper law of contract (e. g. The 
Assunzione [ 1954] P. 150). 
60 "The advantage ... 
is that it does not place reliance on a single point of contact or series of single 
points of contact, none of which is on its own satisfactory as the choice of law rule ... it avoids 
definitional problems. " (Cheshire & North, ibid., p684) Note, however, that definitional problems 
emanating from the doctrine of renvoi would not be avoided (i. e. as to depth of the applicable law). 
61 Cheshire & North, ibid., p682. 
62 Cf SLC (Delict), paragraphs 4.132 and 4.133: "... a pure proper law rule, without elaboration, 
would be unacceptably uncertain and unsuitable for statutory reform. " 
427 
great disadvantage of the proper law approach on its own is its uncertainty. "63 This 
disadvantage would translate into choice of law rules concerning other substantive 
areas, including property law. Accordingly, steps should be taken to fortify the proper 
law approach by the use of presumptions. TM 
(ii) A `presumptive' proper law 
To protect the flexible benefits of a proper law approach, but equally, to curtail the 
uncertainty inherent in a `bare' approach, a `presumptive' proper law approach may 
be adopted. 65 As with exceptions to a specific rule, 66 presumptions may relate either 
to specific circumstances or events, 67 or, alternatively, a general presumption may be 
framed. 68 The purpose of presumptions is to attribute significance, in advance, to 
particular factual and/or legal connections, and to relieve69 individual courts of the 
63 SLC - Delict (1984), paragraph 4.131. Cf. Gow's criticism of the proper law of tort, viz.: "With 
respect it is submitted that such reasoning would land in absurdity ... What then will be the proper law 
of a tort committed in Eire by a Frenchman against a Portuguese and the action against the wrongdoer 
is raised in the court of a country other than Eire? " (Gow, J J, `Delict and Private International Law' 
(1949) 65 L. Q. R. 313, at p316) 
64 In the delictual context, the SLC perceived that this was "... a more promising approach. " (SLC 
(Delict), paragraph 4.135) Thus, "... the country with which the occurrence and the parties had the 
closest and most real connection would, unless the contrary were shown, be presumed to be ... 
" (SLC 
(Delict), paragraph 4.140) See now, of course, sections 11 and 12 of the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. These sections do not, in fact, reflect a true proper law approach, 
but rather comprise a general rule, with displacement provision. The search for a new choice of law 
rule in delict necessarily involved presumptions to identify the lex causae/lex loci delicti (not so 
termed), from which an exception would be allowed (section 12). 
65 This is the second variant of the proper law approach suggested by Professor Lando (ibid., p81) (E. g. 
Article 4 of the Rome Convention) Consider Leslie, ibid., p208; and Lando, ibid., at p82: 
"Presumptions will perceptively reduce the uncertainty and lack of predictability which are likely to 
result if the centre of gravity or individualisation without the assistance of presumptions is made the 
basis of the choice of law. " Note, however, the point expressed by the authors of Cheshire & North, 
that presumptions offer "more flexibility than sub-rules, but correspondingly less certainty. " (Cheshire 
& North, ibid., p683) In drawing an analogy between the choice of law rules in contract, and in 
unjustified enrichment, it is interesting to note that the authors of Cheshire & North observed that, 
"The identification of the proper law of the contract was far more predictable than might be thought 
from the flexible nature of the test. But in the meantime, until the case law has developed, it has to be 
admitted that there would be considerable uncertainty. "(ibid., p684) 
66 Paragraph (b), supra. (note 36 et seq. ) 
67 E. g. Articles 4(2), (3) and (4) of the Rome Convention. 
66 E. g. The general presumption in Scottish and English international private law that the content of a 
foreign lex causae is the same as the domestic lexfori. 
69 Wholly, or partially, depending upon whether the presumption in question is irrebuttable, or 
rebuttable. 
428 
responsibility of making, in each individual case, a qualitative assessment of the facts 
and circumstances which have arisen. The purpose is to determine, in each instance, 
the state in which the (qualitative) preponderance of contacts lies, 70 thereby 
producing, it is hoped, at least within the conflict rules of one system - or, if a 
Convention-based rule, in more than one system, depending on the presence or 
absence of an authoritative Report, and availability of resort to a court of overriding 
authority - some degree of predictability. 
It is submitted that, in the context of choice of law in property, a presumption in 
favour of the lex situs would be justifiable, not only from the point of view of 
substance, but also from the perspective of securing approval of any alternative rule. 
As Professor Hancock has advised, "Many of today's judges have been trained to 
regard the situs formula as a basic principle ofAnglo-American conflict of laws. They 
will find it easier to join in an opinion rejecting that principle if the break with 
tradition has been softened by the use of a conceptual device that ... is itself a part of 
that tradition. 9971 
The use of presumptions has provoked some criticism since, "To enter upon the 
search with a presumption is only too often to set out upon a false trail. It may tend to 
divert attention from the necessity to consider every single pointer. "72 This criticism, 
70 Cf. Leslie: "... designation of one of a number of connected legal systems as being that most closely 
connected will have, in some circumstances, to be rather arbitrary, To help overcome these problems, 
the ascertainment of the most closely connected system may be assisted by a list of relevant factors or 
by indications or rebuttable presumptions. " (Leslie, ibid., p20516) 
" Hancock (1967), ibid., p40. 
72 Lando, ibid., p81, quoting, Cheshire & North, 9th edition, p216. 
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however, may be deflected by the fact that, in general, presumptive rules of choice of 
law are rebuttable. 73 
(iii) Rebuttal and displacement: setting the threshold 
Where a specific or general presumption is rebuttable, the obvious question is: at what 
height should the threshold for reversing or overturning the presumption be set? 74 
Article 4(5) of the Rome Convention provides, for example, that, "... the 
presumptions in paragraphs 2,3, and 4 shall be disregarded if it appears from the 
circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another 
country. , 75 
The same consideration affects the displacement of a general choice of law rule by 
means of specific exception(s), 76 (or even the displacement of a specific exception by 
73 E. g. The specific presumptions contained in Article 4(2), (3), and (4) of the Rome Convention may 
be rebutted (or `disregarded') by operation of Article 4(5). Consider Definitely Maybe (Touring) Ltd v. 
Marek Lieberberg Konzertagentur Gmbh [2001] 2 U. Rep. 455, per Morison, J., at p458, and 
Caledonia Subsea Ltd v. Micoperi Srl 2001 S. L. T. 1186, per Lord Hamilton at p1192, for discussion to 
the effect that `disregarded' equates to `rebutted'. Cf. Cheshire & North, ibid., at p683: "There would 
be one paragraph setting out the closest and most real connection test, a second paragraph setting out 
the presumptions, and a third paragraph providing that the presumptions shall be disregarded if it 
appears from the circumstances that the closest and most real connection is with another country. " 
Similarly, the general presumption that the content of a foreign lex causae is the same as the domestic 
lex fori may be rebutted by averment and proof of the actual content of the foreign law. (Crawford, 
ibid., p407, paragraph 18.30; and Bumper Development Corp. Ltd v. Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis [1991] 4 All E. R. 638) 
74 "... how easy should it be to rebut the presumptions? ... there would be little point in providing 
presumptions if they were easily rebutted and this would also reduce the certainty of the proper law 
scheme as a whole. " (SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.141) Cf Leslie, ibid., p208; and Caledonia Subsea Ltd 
v. Micoperi Srl 2001 S. L. T. 1186. 
75 Emphasis added. 
76 Consider the advice of the SLC regarding choice of law in delict: "... a general exception which was 
not confined in its operation would render our choice of law rule as a whole unacceptably uncertain ... 
a threshold or trigger requirement should be built into any general exception, which would serve to 
prevent departure from the lex loci delicti in the absence of strong grounds for doing so. " (SLC 
(Delict), paragraph 1.222) 
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a more general one). 77 Section 12 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1995 provides that: - 
"If it appears, in all the circumstances, from a comparison of - 
(a) the significance of the factors which connect a tort or delict with the 
country whose law would be the applicable law under the general rule; 78 
and 
(b) the significance of any factors connecting the tort or delict with another 
country, 
that it is substantially more appropriate for the applicable law ... to 
be the law 
of the other country, the general rule is displaced and the applicable law ... is 
the law of that other country. "79 
As regards choice of law in property, the threshold for rebuttal of a presumption in 
favour of the lex situs could be set at various heights. First, at the lowest and most 
lenient level, rebuttal could be dependent upon the application of a non-situs law 
being `more appropriate' (i. e. requiring a direct comparison between the 
appropriateness of applying the lex situs and the non-situs law). Secondly, the test 
could stipulate that application of the non-situs law must be `substantially more 
" "... the general exception would then apply as a residual or `safetynet' provision. " In choice of law 
in delict, the SLC rejected the general rule/specific exception/general exception formulation believing 
that such an amalgam would be, "undesirably complex". (SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.124) Interestingly, 
this is the formulation adopted in Article 4 of the Rome Convention. It may be surmised that a 
`complex' form was required in the international instrument, so as to satisfy the `minimum 
requirements' of as many states as possible, whereas such compromise was not required in the purely 
domestic frame of the proposed legislation to deal with choice of law in delict. 
78"... the applicable law is the law of the country in which the events constituting the tort or delict in 
question occur. " (Section 11(1) of the 1995 Act) 
9 Section 12 of the 1995 Act. (Emphasis added) Cf. SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.94: the SLC 
recommended that displacement of a strict, territorial rule would be warranted where parties are in an 
`insulated environment', that is, "... where the occurrence and the parties are such that they do not 
interact with their geographical location. " (ibid. ) 
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appropriate' (i. e. imposing a more onerous burden of proof on the party seeking to 
reverse the presumption). Thirdly, an even stronger preference for the lex situs could 
be sustained through rebuttal being dependent upon the transaction, or occurrence, 
and the parties having only an insignificant connection with the Situs and a substantial 
connection with another country. 80 The third test would necessitate not merely a 
direct comparison between the competing laws, but would require, in addition, a 
qualitative appraisal of the connection with the lex situs (i. e. before the general rule 
may be displaced, there requires to be an insignificant connection with the prima facie 
applicable law). 81 It could be argued that the third test is, in fact, subsumed within the 
first or second tests. Arguably, the third formulation is incomplete: the transaction etc. 
may have an insignificant connection with the situs, but have no substantial 
connection with any other country. It may be suggested that unless there is a 
substantial connection with another country, the lex situs, however insignificantly 
connected, ought to apply. Clearly, the fixing of a threshold represents a policy 
decision. 
The `proper law' precedent 
For the purposes of the current exercise, it is interesting to note Professor Lando's 
remark that, "Analogous reasoning is relevant in the field of private international 
law. , 82 In 1949, Dr Morris argued that liability for tort should be governed by `the 
proper law of the tort', a submission which, even the author himself conceded, 
8° This is a test of `cumulative' comparison. Cf SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.123. Contra 1990 Report, 
p12, paragraph 3.9. 
Cf. 1990 Report, p13, paragraph 3.11. This would prevent displacement of the prima facie applicable 
law where there is "... some significant connection with this law even though there is a much stronger 
connection with another law. " (ibid. ) In delict, this realisation prompted a lowering of the threshold. 
82 Lando, ibid., p81. (i. e. lessons can be gleaned between areas of the subject. ) 
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amounted to "heterodox". 83 Morris' contention relied heavily upon the successful 
operation of the proper law doctrine in the field of contract, endorsing as he did 
Nussbaum's description of the "elaboration"84 of the proper law doctrine [in contract] 
as "... among the outstanding contributions of English learning to the general theory 
of private international law. "85 
Among the recognised merits of a proper law approach are first, that "... the rule 
enables proper weight to be attributed in a particular case to factors of constantly 
varying significance", 
86 and secondly, that it facilitates isolation of particular 
problems. 87 It is not suggested that the task of ascertaining the proper law would be a 
simple one, but as Morris observed in the delictual context, "If we adopt the proper 
law of the tort, we can at lease choose the law which ... seems to have the most 
significant connection with the chain of acts and consequences in the particular 
situation before us. The task might not be easy, but at least we should be asking the 
right questions .,, 
88 
Whilst the `bare' proper law approach has been abandoned in contract and delict, in 
favour of more tightly-framed `presumptive' or `quasi-presumptive' provisions, 89 the 
83 Morris, JHC, `Torts in the Conflict of Laws' (1949) 12 M. L. R. 248,250, and 252. 
84 Morris (1951), ibid., p881. 
85 Nussbaum, `Principles of Private International Law' (1943), p168 (per Morris (1951), ibid., p881). 
16 Morris (1951), ibid., p882. 
87 Morris argued (with reference to choice of law in tort) that, "A proper law approach, intelligently 
applied, would furnish a much-needed flexibility ... we ought to 
have a conflict rule broad and flexible 
enough to take care of exceptional situations as well as the more normal ones, or else we must 
formulate an entirely new rule to cope with the exceptional situations. Otherwise the results will begin 
to offend our common sense. " (1951, ibid., p884/5) Morris conceded that, in the general tort case, "... 
there would be no need to look beyond the law of the place of wrong. " (ibid., p884, and also at p894) It 
is submitted that, in a wide range of property cases, the same would likely be true of the lex Situs. 
88 Morris (1951), ibid., p888. 
89 Articles 3 and 4 of the Rome Convention, and sections 11 and 12 of the 1995 Act. 
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`proper law' trait9° still pervades the legislative measures in these fields. It is now 
intended to apply the analogy employed by Morris, 91 and thereby to extend the proper 
law approach to choice of law in property. 
Beyond the ineluctable - framing a new `lex yroprietatis' 
From what has previously been outlined, two basic models could be proffered: first, a 
lex situs rule, coupled with a `proper law' exception (i. e. that, where appropriate, a 
law of closer and more real, or significant, connection should displace the situs 
rule), 92 and, secondly, a general rule that the applicable law should be the law of the 
country with which the transaction and the parties had, at the relevant time, the closest 
and most real connection, coupled with a presumption in favour of the lex situs. 93 
While the first model would comprise a particular rule softened by general exception, 
the second model would start from a premise of generality, tending towards 
refinement, in particular cases, by means of rebuttable presumptions. 94 
A further choice-of-law formulation, which is herein proposed, retains the 
fundamental three-fold division in respect of immoveable property, corporeal 
moveable property and incorporeal moveable property. Within that division, however, 
90 Paragraph (c), supra. 
91 Also by Baxter, viz.: "A `lex proprietatis' would be similar (in certain respects) to the proper law of 
a contract ... if the selection 
is made on the basis of the system most closely associated with the 
contract and the real issue before the court. " (1964, ibid., p16) 
92 Cf. Model 1, SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.144. The 1990 Report indicated that, in delict, Model 1 (a lex 
loci delicti rule, with proper law [the law of the place of closest and most real connection] exception) 
was preferred by "the clear majority of consultants", as well as by the Law Commission and the SLC. 
(1990 Report, pp3 and 10, paragraphs 1.8 and 3.2) 
93 Cf. Model 2, SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.144/5. 
94 "[A flexible solution] is very much the mirror-image of the sub-rules: it provides the maximum 
flexibility, so necessary in a rapidly developing area of law, and correspondingly the maximum 
uncertainty. " (Cheshire & North, pp680,683) Cf. The two models proposed in the context of delict: 
"The two options have the same objective: that is, the selection in an acceptably high proportion of 
cases of the system of law which it is most appropriate to apply. In some sense each option is the 
converse of the other. " (SLC (Delict), paragraph 4.145) 
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further sub-divisions have been utilised, 95 specifically to take account of the special 
characteristics which distinguish static conflicts from dynamic conflicts, original- 
party disputes from remote-party disputes, and cases of voluntary dispossession from 
those of involuntary dispossession. 96 
Whilst the over-arching aim of the proposed scheme is to introduce greater flexibility, 
so as to cater for the `exceptional' 97 case, it is recognised that the legitimate interests 
of the lex situs must be protected. Under the proposed scheme, it is intended to protect 
the legitimate interests of the lex situs, 98 and of third parties acting according to, or in 
reliance upon, the lex loci rei sitae, by means of the mechanism of mandatory rules. 
This mechanism (whereby it is sought to safeguard certain rules of a legal system 
other than the primary lex causae99) has proved successful, particularly in the context 
95 Consider Baxter (1964), ibid., at p16: "Determination of the lex proprietatis means the establishment 
of sub-categories - and the introduction of 'specialization'. " Recall also Professor Cheshire's remark 
that, "It is generally assumed both by judges and jurists that the questions engendered by a transfer of 
moveables are determinable by one single law ... 
The assumption, however, is untenable. It represents 
an over-simplification of the problem, since it ignores the different types of question that may arise. " 
(Cheshire, G C, 'Private International Law' (1947), 3d edition, p558) Cf. the pre-statutory reform 
position in tort, when Morris recognised that, "The questions that may arise ... are numerous enough to 
suggest doubts as to whether the application of a single formula ... can possibly produce socially 
adequate results. " (Morris (1951), ibid., p892) Consider also Schott & Rembar's assertion that, 
"Particular issues are to be crucial for choice of law. " (Schott & Rembar, 'Choice of Law for Land 
Transactions' (1938) 38 Colombia L. Rev. 1049,1054) 
96 Cf. Garro, A M, `The Recovery of Stolen Art Objects from Bona Fide Purchasers', in Lalive, ibid., at 
p514: "Alternative approaches to the situs rule may consider its [i. e. the situs rule's] application only if 
the owner consented to the removal of the chattel to the jurisdiction where it was sold, so that the 
wrongdoer may be precluded from choosing a jurisdiction with a generous bona fide purchaser rule. " 
97 See note 39, supra. 
98 Which are clear, at least, in respect of immoveables (i. e. integrity of title records, alienability and 
land use), but are less clear in respect of moveables. As regards the latter, legitimate interests could 
include the question of alienability of certain objects (e. g. state-designated cultural property - 1970 
UNESCO Convention, Articles 1,4 and 7(b)(ii)). It could be argued that a state's policy on vitium 
reale falls within the ambit of alienability. 
99 Cf. G&L Report, at p26: "The principle that national courts can give effect under certain conditions 
to mandatory provisions other than those applicable ... 
by virtue of the choice of the parties or by 
virtue of a subsidiary connecting factor, has been recognised for several years. " Lipstein had earlier 
remarked that, "It may be argued that, within certain limits, foreign rules which claim to be 
peremptorily applicable and are thus rules of immediate application in the country where they have 
been introduced should also be respected elsewhere, even if they do not form part of the proper law. " 
(Lipstein, K, 'Inherent Limitations in Statutes and the Conflict of Laws' (1977) 26 I. C. L. Q. 884,898) 
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of choice of law in contract. 100 The device has also been employed in the context of 
the law of trusts, '°' and of agency. 102 Mandatory rules may be conceived of as a 
means by which to curtail party autonomy, and they constitute, in effect, one facet of 
public policy. '03 While the operation of mandatory rules is not intended to be far- 
reaching (Baade, for example, has suggested that, "It seems likely that the `special 
connection' principle will become accepted only in areas where the forum too 
adheres `in concreto' to the `internationally recognised' objectives of a foreign 
mandatory rule claiming applicability outside of the lex causae"), 104 the 
characterisation of rules qua mandatory must be performed by the very law whose 
rules are subject to scrutiny. This calls for an `enlightened' (in the sense of an interest, 
or functional, analysis) approach, a technique which is `foreign' to jurisdiction- 
selecting states. 
Historically, the interests of the situs, and of third parties acting in reliance upon the 
lex loci rei sitae, have been protected by a virtually universal application of the lex 
situs. It is recognised that the lex Situs will, in many cases (indeed, possibly in most 
cases; but not in all) constitute the appropriate connecting factor. However, to cater 
for the exceptional case, in a manner which the present rules do not permit, it is 
recommended that, as regards the transfer of immoveable property, there should be 
100 Articles 3(3) and 7 of the Rome Convention. Noting, of course, that the United Kingdom has 
exercised the right, reserved under Article 22, not to apply the provisions of Article 7(1), which 
protects the mandatory rules of the law of another country (i. e. other than that of the applicable law) 
with which the situation has a close situation. 
101 Article 16 of the (1985) Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their 
Recognition (implemented in the United Kingdom by virtue of the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987). 
102 Article 16 of the (1978) Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency (to which the United 
Kingdom is not a party). 
103 Consider Baade's assertion that mandatory rules "... [enlarge] the public policy exception so as to 
include mandatory provisions of foreign law in addition to those of the forum. " (1991, ibid., p33) 
104 Baade, ibid., p33. Cf. Briggs (1948), ibid., at p1179: "There is little doubt that an enlightened policy 
of the situs would dictate that it often give effect to foreign transactions affecting local land ... 
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formulated a rebuttable presumption in favour of the lex situs, coupled, in cases of 
rebuttal, with a provision which safeguards the mandatory rules of the lex situs. 105 As 
regards the transfer of corporeal moveable property, a choice-of-law division is 
introduced, in this thesis, so as separately to deal with cases concerning only the 
parties to a particular transfer of property, and those cases which affect, in addition, 
third parties. Moreover, separate treatment has been accorded to those cases where an 
owner of property has been voluntarily dispossessed thereof, and those where he/she 
has been involuntarily dispossessed. Finally, as regards the assignation of incorporeal 
moveable property, a choice-of-law provision is introduced which takes direct 
account of the particular parties who are claiming entitlement to the right in question, 
or who are engaged in dispute in respect thereof. 
Ordinarily, at least, a property settlement entered in a divorce decree by the domiciliary court would 
seem to be one of the clearest kinds of such cases. " 
105 See Chapter Fourteen, infra - `The Lex Proprietatis'. Cf. As regards conveyancing and formal 
validity, Article 9(6) of the Rome Convention. 
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Chapter Fourteen 
The `Lex Proprietatis' 
In this final Chapter, two models are presented for consideration: Model 1, a draft 
Convention on the Law Applicable to the Transfer of Property, and Model 2, The 
Transfer of Property (Applicable Law) Bill. Model 1 is intended to be a draft 
international instrument (i. e. potentially open to acceptance by any number of 
contracting states), whereas Model 2, the alternative, more moderate proposal, is 
intended to constitute a purely internal (i. e. Scottish and/or English) measure. ' The 
drafts are presented merely with a view to `opening discussions' concerning possible 
legislative intervention in this area. 
While the author's preference would be for continued judicial refinement of choice of 
law rules in property (this being one of the few areas of choice of law which remains 
untouched by parliamentary draftsmen), 2 in view of apparent judicial reluctance 
(demonstrated in Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd, 3 and Glencore 
International A. G. v. Metro Trading International Inc. 4), to broaden or supplement the 
existing exceptions to the lex Situs rule, it is submitted that legislative intervention is 
now the only feasible means by which to temper the situs rule. 5 
' Cf. The relationship between Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1995, and `Rome II' (currently under negotiation). 
2 Dr Crawford has remarked that, "This is both refreshing and alarming. " (Crawford, E B, 
`International Private Law in Scotland' (1998), p315, paragraph 14.15) 
3[1980]1 Ch. 496. 
4 [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 284. 
5 Cf. North, P M, `Torts in the Dismal Swamp: Choice of Law Revisted' (In `Essays in Private 
International Law') (1993), p88; and Walker, D M, `A Legal History of Scotland', Volume VI (2001), 
p618. 
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In considering the Models which follow, the reader is asked to assess what is the 
rightful domain of the lex Situs, and to consider the range of application which cannot, 
and should not, rightly be denied the lex Situs. Equally, however, the reader is 
respectfully invited to desist from condoning the mechanical application of the Situs 
rule; to recognise that in some matters the appropriateness of applying the lex situs is 
outweighed by the appropriateness of applying some other law. 
In the opening chapter of this thesis, the author beseeched the reader's indulgence by 
asking that such doubts as may have existed be cast to one side. In bidding now the 
reader to look beyond the ineluctable, the epilogue is as expressed by the Bard, viz.: 
"... Our doubts are traitors, 
And make us lose the good we oft might win 
By fearing to attempt. "6 
6 William Shakespeare, (1564) - (1616), `Measure for Measure', i, 4, [5]. 
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Model 1 
Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to the Transfer of Property 
Arrangement of Paragraphs 
Part I- General 
1. Scope 
2. Characterisation of issues 
3. Applicable law 
4. Application to events occurring in the forum 
Part II - Characterisation 
5. Characterisation of property 
Part III - Choice of applicable law: immoveable property 
6. Transfer of immoveable property - general rule and presumption 
7. Transfer of immoveable property - displacement rule 
8. Passing of risk in respect of immoveable property - general rule and presumption 
9. Passing of risk in respect of immoveable property - displacement rule 
10. Mandatory rules of the lex Situs 
Part IV - Choice of applicable law: corporeal moveable property 
11. Proprietary rights 
12. Original parties - dynamic conflicts - party autonomy 
13. Original parties - dynamic conflicts - applicable law in absence of party choice - 
general rule and presumptions 
14. Original parties - dynamic conflicts - displacement rule 
15. Original parties - static conflicts - general rule and presumptions 
16. Original parties - static conflicts - displacement rule 
17. Competing transferees - applicable law 
18. Definition of remote parties 
19. Mandatory rule protection of remote parties 
20. Remote parties - voluntary dispossession 
21. Remote parties - involuntary dispossession 
22. Wrongful removal of corporeal moveable property 
23. Operation of mandatory rules of lex loci originis - or - 
Return of corporeal moveable property to the locus originis 
24. Wrongful removal - applicable law following return to the locus originis - 
general rule 
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25. Wrongful removal - applicable law following return to the locus originis - 
displacement rule 
26. Expenses of returning corporeal moveable property to the locus originis etc. 
Part V- Choice of applicable law: incorporeal moveable property 
27. Original parties - creation of a right (debtor and creditor) - general rule 
28. Original parties - creation of a right (debtor and creditor) - general rule - 
ascertainment of the relevant date 
29. Original parties - creation of a right (debtor and creditor) - displacement rule 
30. Original parties - assignation of a right (assignor and assignee) - assignability 
31. Voluntary assignation of a right - party autonomy 
32. Voluntary assignation of a right - applicable law in absence of party choice 
33. Involuntary assignation of a right - general rule 
34. Remote parties - enforcement of the assignation - mutual rights and obligations of 
debtor and assignee - applicable law 
35. Remote parties - competing assignees - applicable law 
Part VI - General 
36. Renvoi 
37. Public policy 
38. Interpretation 
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Part I- General 
The rules in this Part apply for the purpose of choosing the law ('the 
applicable law') to be used for determining issues relating to property. ' 
2. The characterisation for the purposes of international private law of issues 
arising in a claim as issues relating to property is a matter for the courts of the 
forum. 2 
3. The applicable law shall be used for determining the issues arising in a claim, 
including in particular the question whether a claim in property has arisen. 3 
4. For the avoidance of doubt the rules stated herein apply in relation to events 
occurring in the forum as they apply in relation to events occurring in any 
other country. 4 
Part II - Characterisation of nrouerty5 
5. (1) The characterisation for the purposes of international private law of 
property as immoveable or moveable property, or corporeal or incorporeal 
property, is a matter6 for the courts of the forum applying the law7 of the 
country where the property is situated at the date of commencement of the 
proceedings. 8 
' Cf. section 9(1) of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 ('the 1995 
Act'). 
2 This includes the question whether, say, the passing of risk, or the need for delivery, is a contractual 
or a proprietary matter. Cf. section 9(2), 1995 Act. 
3 Cf. section 9(4) of the 1995 Act; and in contract, compare the question raised in Boss Group Ltd. v. 
Boss France SA [ 19961 4 All E. R. 970. Paragraph 3 above links the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2. 
Cf. Current Law Statutes 1995, Volume 3, p42-18. Once the forum has characterised the issue as 
relating to property (per paragraph 2), the applicable law alone will determine whether a claim in 
property has arisen, as well as other substantive issues. 
Cf. section 9(6) of the 1995 Act. If this were not the case, then technically `possession vaut titre' 
States could become the destination for day-trip transactions aimed at laundering stolen goods. It is 
submitted, however, that if a `possession vaut titre' forum is also the situs of the object, it should, in 
appropriate cases (q. v. ) be able to displace the application of its own law (qua lex situs, but not qua lex 
fori). 
5 Paragraph 5(1) merely articulates the process which operates at present (albeit subconsciously). 
6 i. e. Characterisation of property, not characterisation of issues arising in a claim as issues relating to 
pý roperty (for which, see paragraph 2, supra). 
See paragraph 36, infra. Renvoi is essential here, otherwise there would be a possibility that the 
putative situs would not constitute the actual situs. Characterisation by the forum of property qua 
immoveable etc. is, in effect, only a provisional characterisation, subject to confirmation by the law 
(including the conflict rules) of the putative situs. 
8 This presents a conflit mobile. Cf. section 46(3) of the Family Law Act 1986. The condition as to time 
('at the date of commencement of the proceedings') qualifies the words `country where the property is 
situated', not the word `law'. In practice, the situs at the time of litigation is the only situs which can 
reasonably or practically apply for the purposes of characterisation. In the event of a change in the 
substantive lex situs between the date of the relevant act (e. g. the transfer of property), and the date of 
commencement of the proceedings, and in the event of a change in characterisation of the nature of the 
property as a result thereof, the question whether or not that change should carry retrospective effect, is 
one for the internal lex Situs (i. e. the Situs at the date of commencement of the proceedings). 
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(2) For the purposes of this Part, property shall be deemed to be situated as 
follows: - 
(a) Property which is, according to its attributes, 9 immoveable and 
corporeal, at the place where it is physically situated; 
(b) Property which is, according to its attributes, immoveable and 
incorporeal, at the place where the right may be enforced at the date of 
commencement of the proceedings; '° 
(c) Property which is, according to its attributes, moveable and 
corporeal, ' 1 and, at the date of commencement of the proceedings: - 
(i) has an ascertainable physical location, at the place where it is 
physically situated; or 
(ii) has an unascertainable physical location, 12 at the place where it 
most recently held an ascertainable physical location; 13 save that 
(iii) maritime vessels, aircraft, and rolling stock shall be deemed to be 
situated at their place of registration; 4 
(d) Property which is, according to its attributes, moveable and 
incorporeal, and: - 
(i) in respect of which a register of ownership is maintained, at the 
place where the register is kept, 15 and in cases where more than 
one register is kept, at the place where the principal register is 
kept; or failing which, 
9 This wording underlines the importance of the `factual', as opposed to the `legal', Situs. See Chapter 
Four, supra - `Defining the `Situs". 
'0 E. g. A servitude right of access over a plot of ground would be enforceable at the place where the 
plot is physically situated. 
Including `displaced' constructive fixtures (e. g. the key, or title deeds, to a house in state X, which 
is/are taken into state Y, is/are situated in state Y). This Part (i. e. concerning ascription of situs) does 
not employ the concept of `fictional' or `legal' situs, save in respect of paragraph 5(2)(c)(iii) (maritime 
vessels, aircraft and rolling stock). 
12 E. g. Goods in transit. 
13 i. e. The lex loci ultimi sitae (which will generally coincide with the lex loci expeditionis, that is, the 
place of dispatch). For the reasons cited in Chapter Eight, supra, the lex loci ultimi sitae is preferred to 
the place of intended destination (cf. revival of domicile of origin rule). It should be borne in mind that 
this paragraph refers only to the ascription of a situs, and not to the identification of the applicable law. 
Separately, whilst it would be possible specifically to define the fictional situs of a unit of aggregate 
moveables, it is submitted that it is less strained to attribute to an object which comprises part of an 
aggregate unit, a factual situs in accordance with paragraph (c) (i) or (ii), as is appropriate. It is 
suggested that it is preferable to take account of the special, aggregate nature of such an object through 
the mechanism of choice of law rules, rather than through the definition of situs. 
14 It may be anticipated that, ex sua natura, assets such as these will cross interstate and international 
boundaries more frequently than will other types of property. 
15 Cf. Brussels Convention, Article 16(3) and Regulation 44/2001, Article 22(3); Standard Chartered 
Bank Ltd v. I. R. C. [1978] 1 W. L. R. 1160; and Macmillan Inc v. Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No 
3) 1199611 W. L. R. 387. 
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(ii) is represented by documentation, in the country in accordance with 
whose law the documentation has been drawn (the `lex cartae'); or 
(iii) is not of a type referred to in paragraph 5(2)(d)(i) or (ii), at any 
place where the party against whom the right is enforceable ('the 
debtor') has, or is likely to have, assets in respect of which the 
right may be satisfied. 16 
Part III - Choice of applicable law: immoveable property 
Transfer of immoveable property 
6. (1) Any question pertaining to the creation (including alienability), 
acquisition, ' use, disposal or transfer18 (hereinafter `the transfer') of an 
interest in immoveable property, and its effect on the proprietary rights of any 
person claiming, by any law, to be interested therein, shall be governed by the 
law of the country with which the transfer is most closely connected. 
(2) It shall be presumed that the transfer of an interest under paragraph 6(1) is 
most closely connected with the law of the country where the immoveable 
property is situated19 (hereinafter `the relevant lex Situs'). 
7. (1) Paragraph 6(2) shall be disregarded if it appears, in all the circumstances, 
from a comparison of: - 
(a) the significance of the facts which connect the transfer with the 
relevant lex situs; and 
(b) the significance of any factors which connect the transfer with another 
country ('the non-situs country') 
that it is more appropriate20 for the applicable law for determining the issues 
arising in the case, or any of those issues, 21 to be the law of the non-situs 
16 This demonstrates a purposive, `non-exclusive' approach to the definition of situs. See Chapter 
Eleven, supra - `The Assignation of Incorporeal Moveable Property'. 
17 Including acquisition by means of prescription. 
18 Eg. By gift. 
19 Or, properly, the law of the country where the immoveable property was situated at the time when 
the interest is alleged to have been transferred. It is not necessary, however, to articulate this 
qualification since the situs of such property, ex sua natura, cannot change, save in cases of adjustment 
of territorial boundaries. 
20 There is no need for a higher threshold (e. g. 'substantially more appropriate'), since paragraph 10 
will safeguard the interests of the relevant lex situs). Cf. paragraphs 9,14 and 19, infra. 
21 Inclusion of the phrase `or any of those issues' incorporates, in effect, the doctrine of depegage. 
According to Dr Leslie, "Depecage, properly so called, occurs where the connecting factor in a single 
choice of law rule indicates different legal systems as applicable to different aspects of the same 
transaction. " (Leslie, ibid., p205) As the SLC asked in relation to delict, "... the question arises 
whether our reformed choice of law rule ... should select a single system of law which would apply to 
all the substantive issues ... or whether the individual... issues in the case should be identified and the 
choice of law rule ... applied separately to each. 
" (SLC (Delict), 1984, paragraph 6.73) More 
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country, 22 and in such cases, the applicable law shall be the law of the non- 
situs country. 23 
(2) The factors that may be taken into account as connecting a transfer with a 
country for the purposes of paragraph 7(1) include, in particular, factors 
relating to the parties; 24 any pre-existing relationship, or course of dealings, 
between the parties; 25 and any contractual or other obligation in 
implementation of which the transfer was effected or the issue arose. 
[OR] 
[7A Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 6(2), if it appears from the 
circumstances as a whole that the transfer or issue is more closely connected 
with another country ('the non-situs country'), the rule contained in paragraph 
6(2) shall be disregarded, and the applicable law for determining the issue or 
issues arising (as the case may be) shall be the law of that non-situs country. ] 
Passing of risk 
8. (1) Where: - 
(a) one party ('the first party') has agreed, or is otherwise obliged'26 to 
transfer 2 an interest in immoveable property to another ('the second 
party') (together `the parties'); and 
(b) according to the law applicable to the agreement or other obligation to 
transfer the interest, 28 but not according to the relevant lex Situs, the 
property is at the second party's risk, or vice versa, 29 
colloquially, Weintraub has referred to it as an "issue-by-issue, onion-peeling approach. " (Weintraub, 
R, `Commentary on the Conflict of Laws' (1986), p71) 
22 E. g. Cases of transfer of title to foreign land in the event of divorce (cf Briggs, ibid., p1179), or 
succession; or as regards capacity to transfer land abroad (Bank of Africa Ltd. v. Cohen [1909] Ch. 
129); or the transfer of foreign timeshare property (cf. Article 16(1)(b), Brussels Convention); or the 
sale of a plot of ground which straddles two contiguous states (e. g. Scherrens v. Maenhout Case 158/87 
[1988] E. C. R. 3791), where most of the plot is situated in state X and only a small, or low-value, 
proportion of the plot is situated in state Y. Exclusively to apply the lex situs in all cases would 
disregard, or discount, the possibility or significance of a pre-existing relationship between the parties 
etc. 
23 i. e. The non-situs country as at the time when the interest is alleged to have been transferred, or the 
issue to have arisen. Whether or not substantive changes in the lex situs (or non-situs) are taken into 
account is a matter for the domestic law of the situs (or non-situs) to determine. (Note 8 supra) 
24 E. g. Domicile and habitual residence. Cf. (in the context of unjustified enrichment) Cheshire & 
North, ibid., p677. 
25 E. g. Circumstances concerning succession to the foreign (immoveable) property of a deceased 
person, or concerning financial provision on divorce and the division of (immoveable) matrimonial 
p6roperty situated abroad. 
E. g. By virtue of a gratuitous, or non-gratuitous, unilateral obligation (which, according to Scots law, 
must be in writing if the obligation concerns an interest in land: section 1(2)(a)(i) and (ii), 
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995). 
27 By means of sale, exchange, donation, succession, or transmission etc. 
28 i. e. The `contractual' lex causae which may, or may not, be the same as the law applicable to the 
transfer of property, under paragraph 6(1), supra. Cf. Hamilton v. Wakefield 1993 S. L. T. (Sh. Ct. ) 30. 
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the law applicable to determine whether risk has passed from the first party to 
the second party, shall be the law with which the issue is most closely 
connected. 
(2) It shall be presumed that any issue arising under paragraph 8(1), is most 
closely connected with the relevant lex Situs. 
9. (1) Paragraph 8(2) shall be disregarded if it appears, in all the circumstances, 
from a comparison of: - 
(a) the significance of the facts which connect the issue with the relevant 
lex situs; and 
(b) the significance of any factors which connect the issue with another 
country ('the non-situs country') 
that it is more appropriate30 for the applicable law for determining the issues 
arising in the case, or any of those issues, 
31 to be the law of the non-situs 
country, 32 and in such cases, the applicable law shall be the law of the non- 
situs country. 33 
(2) The factors that may be taken into account as connecting an issue with a 
country for the purposes of paragraph 9(1) include, in particular, factors 
relating to the parties; 34 any pre-existing relationship, or course of dealings, 
between the parties; 35 any contractual or other obligation in implementation of 
which the issue arose; and the instrument of transfer by which the purported 
transfer was effected or the issue arose. 
[OR] 
[9A Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 8(2), if it appears from the 
circumstances as a whole that the issue is more closely connected with another 
country ('the non-situs country'), the rule contained in paragraph 8(2) shall be 
disregarded, and the applicable law for determining the issue or issues arising 
(as the case may be) shall be the law of that non-situs country. ] 
29 i. e. According to the `contractual' lex causae, the property is at the transferee's risk, but according to 
the lex Situs, it remains at the transferor's risk. 
30 Note 20, supra. 
31 Note 21, supra. 
32 E. g. A transfer of land in state X, by A (domiciled in state Y) to B (domiciled in state Y), in 
implementation of an agreement drawn in accordance with Y law. By Y law, risk passes upon 
conclusion of the contract, whereas by X law, it passes upon delivery (i. e. registration of title). If the 
land were damaged by fire following conclusion of the contract, but before delivery, there may be 
grounds for arguing that, in view of the factors connecting the issue with Y law, it is more appropriate 
that Y law be applied to determine whether or not risk has passed. 
33 Note 23 supra. 
34 Note 24 supra. 
35 Note 25 supra. 
446 
10. When applying under Part III the law of a non-situs country, effect shall 
nevertheless be given to the rules of the relevant lex situs, if and insofar as, 
under the last-mentioned law, those rules cannot be derogated from by 
agreement or any other means, but must be applied whatever the law 
applicable to the transfer or issue (hereinafter `mandatory rules'). 36 
Part IV - Choice of applicable law: corporeal moveable property 
11. (1) This Part shall apply for the purpose of ascertaining the law applicable to 
determine the existence and validity37 of proprietary rights in any object of 
corporeal moveable property. 
(2)`Proprietary rights' shall include38 rights of ownership, possession, 
enjoyment or use39 of an object of corporeal moveable property ('an object'). 
Original parties - Dynamic conflicts40 
12. Subject only to paragraph 19 below, any question pertaining to the transfer4' 
of an interest in an object from one party (`the first party') to another ('the 
second party') (together `the original parties') shall be governed by the law 
chosen by the original parties. 42 The choice must be express, or demonstrated 
36 Cf. Article 3(3), Rome Convention. Such mandatory rules are likely to concern alienability, 
registration and recording requirements, or land use. This provision should be sufficient to protect 
`state interests', as well as the interests of `remote' parties (e. g. in the Scherrens v. Maenhout scenario 
[Note 22, supra], if the law of the situs forbade the sale of its land to a foreign national, that prohibition 
would `trump' the application of the `non-majority' situs law) (See Chapter Nine, supra - `The 
Contract/Conveyance Borderland', at note 12). The `mandatory' character of rules must be determined 
by the relevant lex situs. Accordingly, in practice, only if the relevant lex situs were supportive of 
interest analysis or functional analysis, and only where the forum rei sitae would seek to identify the 
purpose or rationale underlying its own rule, would the lex situs be likely to defer to the application of 
another law: only if the underlying purpose etc. of the lex situs would not be furthered by its 
application in a particular case, would the situs be likely to characterise its rule as non-mandatory (e. g. 
the Transvaal rule concerning the capacity of the transferor in the case of Bank of Africa Ltd v. Cohen 
[1909] 2 Ch. 129). However, were the lex situs to reject interest analysis, it would be likely that the 
forum rei sitae would classify all of its rules regarding the transfer of immoveable property as 
mandatory, thereby emasculating paragraphs 7 and 9. Thus, it seems unlikely that a Swiss, Bermudan 
or Jersey restriction on sale of immoveable property to non-nationals would be regarded, respectively, 
by Swiss, Bermudan or Jersey law, as other than mandatory or overriding. 
3 Cf. Article 8, Rome Convention. See paragraphs 23 and 23", infra. 
38 This is not an exhaustive definition. (Cf. Article 10(1), Rome Convention, and section 12(2) of the 
Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995) 
39 It is submitted that this model could extend also to rights in security over corporeal moveable 
property, but rights in security have not been the focus in this work, and for that reason, specific 
reference has been omitted. 
40 Paragraphs 12,13 and 14 deal with dynamic conflicts (Appendix A), whereas paragraphs 15 and 16 
deal with static conflicts (i. e. the rules which operate in cases where the situs of the object in question 
does not change, but where there is a clash between the applicable law in contract and in property). 
41 See paragraph 6(1), supra. Paragraph 19 deals with aspects of alienability. 
42 It is unclear whether the proper law rule, which currently applies to the transfer of goods in transit, 
leaves scope for the exercise of party autonomy. See Chapter Eight, supra - 'The Transfer of Corporeal 
Moveable Property'. Support for the exercise of party autonomy, at least as between the original 
parties, can be gleaned from Cheatham's observation that, "If some question which depends upon the 
validity or effect of the transfer arises between the parties themselves, as, for example, where a transfer 
between two domiciled Englishmen is made in London of goods situate in Paris ... there is no very 
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with reasonable certainty by the terms and form of the transfer, or the 
circumstances of the case. 43 By their choice, the original parties may select the 
law applicable to the whole or a part only of the transfer. 
13. (1) To the extent that the law applicable to the transfer of an interest in an 
object has not been chosen in accordance with paragraph 12, the transfer shall 
be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely 
connected. 44 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph 13(1)45 :_ 
(a) It shall be presumed that the transfer of an interest in an object is 
most closely connected with the law of the country where the 
object was physically situated at the time when that interest is 
alleged to have been transferred (hereinafter `the relevant lex loci 
rei sitae'); 
(b) In the case of an object, the physical situation of which was 
unknown or unascertainable 46 at the time when the interest therein 
is alleged to have been transferred, it shall be presumed that the 
transfer is most closely connected with: - 
(i) in the case of an object represented by documentation, 47 the 
lex cartae; 48 and 
(ii} in all other cases, 49 the law of the place where the object 
so most recently held an ascertainable physical location. 
apparent merit in the view that French law should govern the matter. The more appropriate law in 
such a case would appear to be that with which the transfer is most closely connected, namely, English 
law as being the lex actus ... the 
legal system with which the transfer has the most real connexion ..., in 
other words, equivalent to the proper law of a contract. " (Cheatham, E E, et al, `Cases and Materials 
on Conflict of Laws' (1957), p650/1) It is submitted that this argument extends, a fortiori, to property 
transfers effected by mail order, or distance selling, including transfers of property effected in 
implementation of electronic contracting. 
43 Cf Article 3(1), Rome Convention. 
44 Cf. Article 4(1), Rome Convention. 
45 i . e. 
For the purposes of ascertaining the law which is applicable to the transfer of an interest in an 
object, in the absence of choice by the original parties. 
46 E. g. By reason of its being in transit. It is submitted that a subjective test should be applied, that is, 
the situs is `unknown or unascertainable' to or by the parties, rather than an objective test (i. e. 
`unknown or unascertainable' to or by a `reasonable person'). 
47 The question whether the object is, in law, represented by documentation, should be determined by 
the lex cartae - being the law in accordance with which the documentation in question has been drawn, 
or the applicable law in terms of the Rome Convention. 
48 See paragraph 5(2)(d)(ii) (i. e. the country in accordance with whose law the documentation has been 
drawn). 
49 i. e. Where the situs of the object is unknown or unascertainable, and the object is not represented by 
documentation. 
50 Cf paragraph 5(2)(c)(ii), supra (i. e. the lex loci ultimi sitae). 
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Original parties - Dynamic conflicts - Displacement of general rules 
14. (1) Paragraph 13(2) shall be disregarded if it appears, in all the circumstances, 
from a comparison of: - 
(a) the significance of the facts which connect the transfer with the 
country whose law would be applicable under paragraph 13(2); 51 and 
(b) the significance of any factors which connect the transfer with another 
country ('the other country') 
that it is more appropriate52 for the applicable law for determining the issues 
arising in the case, or any of those issues, to be the law of the other country, 
and in such cases, the applicable law shall be the law of the other country. 53 
(2) The factors that may be taken into account as connecting a transfer with a 
country for the purposes of paragraph 14(1) include, in particular, factors 
relating to the parties; 54 any pre-existing relationship, 55 or course of dealings, 
between the parties; any contractual or other obligation in implementation of 
which the transfer was effected; the length of time during which the parties 
were present, if at all, in the country; and the length of time during which, and 
the reason for which, the object was physically situated, if at all, in the 
country. 
[OR] 
[14A. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 13(2), if it appears from the 
circumstances as a whole that the transfer is more closely connected with 
another country, the presumptions contained in paragraph 13(2) shall be 
disregarded, and the applicable law for determining the issue or issues arising 
(as the case may be) shall be the law of the other country. ] 
51 i. e. The relevant lex loci rei sitae, the lex cartae, or the lex loci ultimi sitae. 
52 As with paragraph 7 (note 20 supra), there is no need for a higher threshold (e. g. 'substantially more 
appropriate'), since paragraphs 18 and 19 should safeguard the interests of any remote parties relying 
upon the relevant lex loci rei sitae. 
5 As regards the conflit mobile, see note 8 supra. Displacement may occur, for example, where A, 
domiciled in state X, transfers to B, also domiciled in state X, an object situated in state Y. The parties 
do not choose the applicable law under paragraph 12. Under paragraph 13(2)(a), the applicable law 
would be Y law. Paragraph 14(1) could operate so as to displace the application of Y law with that of X 
law. Consider, for example, the engagement ring scenario depicted in Chapter Eight, supra - 'The 
Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property', at note 92: in cases such as these, where the situs is 
transient or fortuitous (albeit ascertainable), its application may be less appropriate than applying, say, 
the parties' common personal law. 
54 E. g. Domicile and habitual residence. 
55 E. g. As regards the transfer of an object situated abroad, where the transfer arises out of the 
regulation of financial provision on divorce or the division of matrimonial property. 
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Original parties - Static conflicts 
15. (1) Where according to the law applicable to any agreement between the 
original parties, or other obligation, to transfer an interest in an object from the 
first party to the second party, 56 but not according to the law of the country 
where the object was physically situated at the time when the aforesaid 
agreement was concluded, or other obligation became binding, the object is at 
the second party's risk, or vice versa, the law applicable to determine whether 
risk has passed from the first party to the second party, 57 shall be the law with 
58 which the issue is most closely connected. 
(2) For the purposes of paragraph 15(1), it shall be presumed that the issue 59 is 
most closely connected with: - 
(a) in any case where the original parties have chosen the applicable 
law under paragraph 12, the law which is applicable thereunder; 
and 
(b) in any other case, the law of the country where the object was 
physically situated at the time when the aforesaid agreement was 
concluded, or the aforesaid obligation became binding. 
Original parties - Static conflicts - Displacement of general rules 
16. (1) Paragraph 15(2) shall be disregarded if it appears, in all the circumstances, 
from a comparison of: - 
(a) the significance of the facts which connect the issue with the country 
whose law would be applicable under paragraph 15(2); 60 and 
(b) the significance of any factors which connect the issue with another 
country ('the other country') 
that it is more appropriate61 for the applicable law for determining the issues 
arising in the case, or any of those issues, to be the law of the other country, 
and in such cases, the applicable law shall be the law of the other country. 62 
56 i . e. According to the 
`contractual' lex causae. 
57 Cf. Section 20 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
sg This paragraph deals with the problem of static conflicts (i. e. where a choice of law problem arises, 
even though the situs of the object in question has remained constant). The differential treatment 
accorded to static conflicts and dynamic conflicts echoes the distinction recommended by Morris. 
(Morris, JHC, `The Transfer of Chattels in the Conflict of Laws' (1945) XXII B. Y. I. L. 232,234) 
Paragraph 16 allows displacement of the general rule set out in paragraph 15(2) in cases where the 
issue in question (i. e. the passing of risk) is more closely connected with another law, and provides for 
application of the `contractual' lex causae, or the lex loci rei sitae, as is appropriate in the individual 
case, without the forum first having to engage in what, in this context, may be an artificial exercise of 
characterisation. See Chapter Eight, supra -'The Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property'. 
59 i. e. Whether risk has passed from the first party to the second party. 
60 i. e. The law chosen by the parties, or the law of the country where the object was physically situated 
when the agreement was concluded, or the obligation to transfer the interest became binding. 
61 Note 52, supra. 
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(2) The factors that may be taken into account as connecting an issue with a 
country for the purposes of paragraph 16(1) include, in particular, factors 
relating to the parties; 63 any pre-existing relationship, " or course of dealings, 
between the parties; any contractual or other obligation in implementation of 
which the issue arose; the instrument by virtue of which the purported transfer 
was effected; the length of time during which the parties were present, if at all, 
in the country; and the length of time during which, and the reason for which, 
the object was physically situated, if at all, in the country. 
[OR] 
[16A. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 15(2), if it appears from the 
circumstances as a whole that the issue is more closely connected with another 
country, the presumptions contained in paragraph 15(2) shall be disregarded, 
and the applicable law for determining the issue or issues arising (as the case 
may be) shall be the law of the other country. ] 
Competing transferees65 
17. In the event that: - 
(1) the first party purports to transfer an object to more than one transferee, 66 
or proprietary rights in respect of the object and deriving from the first 
party6 are claimed by more than one party68 (hereinafter `the competing 
transferees'); and 
(2) each transfer or claim is valid according to the law which governs it under 
this part , 
69 
the conflicting claims of the competing transferees shall be determined as 
follows: - 
62 Note 53, supra. E. g. The purported sale of a painting, temporarily situated (for the purposes of 
exhibition) in state X, by A (domiciled in state Y) to B (domiciled in state Y), in implementation of an 
agreement drawn in accordance with Y law. By Y law, risk passes upon conclusion of the contract, 
whereas by X law, it passes upon delivery. If the painting were destroyed by fire following conclusion 
of the contract, but before delivery, there may be grounds for arguing that, in view of the factors 
connecting the issue with Y law, it is more appropriate that Y law be applied to determine whether or 
not risk has passed. Cf. Note 32. 
63 E. g. Domicile and habitual residence. 
64 Note 55, supra. 
65 See Appendices BI and II. 
'6 Appendices BI and II. 
67 As opposed to the scenario in Appendices C and D where the competing claim (of C) does not derive 
from the first party, A. 
68 Appendix BI and II. 
69 E. g. A purports to transfer an object, situated in state Y, to B, in state X, and simultaneously to C, in 
state Y. The transfer to B is valid according to X law, which does not require delivery of the object, and 
the transfer to C is valid according to Y law, which does require delivery of the object. (Appendices BI 
and II) 
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(a) where the validity of the competing transfers and/or claims is 
governed, under this Part, by the same law, in accordance with that 
law; 70 and 
(b) in any other case, 71 in accordance with the relevant lex loci rei 
sitae. 2 
Remote parties 
18. The remainder of this Part shall apply for the purpose of ascertaining the law 
applicable to determine the existence and validity of proprietary rights claimed 
by any person, institution, or other body, who or which, is not one of the 
original parties (hereinafter a `remote party'). 
19. With respect to the transfer of any object, notwithstanding: - 
(1) the original parties' choice of applicable law under paragraph 12; or 
(2) the operation of paragraphs 13 to 16 inclusive, 
nothing shall prejudice the operation of any rule of the relevant lex loci rei 
sitae73 which classifies the object as inalienable, 74 [or which subjects the 
object to attachment there by creditor(s). 75] 
70 Appendix B III. 
71 Appendix B IV. 
72 i. e. The law of the country where the object was physically situated at the time when the interest is 
alleged to have been transferred (paragraph 13(2)(a)) (In Appendices BI and B II, state Y. ) But, 
original parties, A and B, cannot, by their choice of applicable law (e. g. X law), 'trump' the rights of 
any party (C) claiming under the relevant lex loci rei sitae (e. g. Y law). Note Goode's observation: "It 
is not ... open to parties to 
derogate from rights conferred on third parties ... the power of derogation 
is necessarily confined to the relations between the grantor and the grantee of those rights, for 
example, as to additional conditions for the vesting of such rights in the grantee. " (1998, ibid., p462) 
Cf. Cheatham's remarks concerning the rights of third parties. (1957, ibid., p651) Paragraph 17(2)(b) 
presupposes that the situs is the same at the time of both transactions (i. e. that the object was situated in 
state Y, at the time when the property was transferred by A to B, and at the time of the transfer from A 
to Q. But, using the scenario depicted in Appendix B I, given that the law of X does not require 
delivery, theoretically, A could transfer the object to B while it was situated in state X, and thereafter 
(even although, according to X law, title has passed to B), without authorisation from B, remove the 
object to state Y and transfer it to C, in state Y. If delivery were made to C in state Y, that transfer 
would be effective, according to Y law. In such a scenario, the competition between B and C would be 
resolved as follows: it would not be dealt with under paragraph 17; rather, A and C (assuming that C 
had possession of the object) would be classed as `original parties', and B as a `remote party', 
voluntarily dispossessed of the object (insofar as he did not insist upon delivery of the object to him), 
and therefore deemed to be acting `suo periculo' under paragraph 20. 
73 i. e. The law of the country where the object was physically situated at the time when the interest 
therein is alleged to have passed from the first party to the second party (paragraph 13(2)(a)). 
74 Consider the scenario where A sells to B an object situated in state Y, and under paragraph 12, A and 
B (original parties) agree that the transfer shall be governed by X law. If, according to X law, the object 
is alienable, but according to Y law, it is inalienable, the operation of Y law would protect the 
proprietary rights of any third party acting in reliance upon Y law, as well as the independent interests 
of state Y in classifying the object as inalienable. This would not, however, lead to a different decision 
in a case such as Duc de Frias v. Pichon [1886] 13 Journal du Droit International 593 (inalienability 
according to a prior situs). Such cases would require to be treated as wrongful removals (paragraph 21 
et seq). `Inalienable' is nowhere defined within the Model. Classification of property as inalienable 
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Remote parties - Voluntary dispossession 
20. In the event that: - 
(1) any person, institution, or other body having proprietary rights in respect 
of an object (hereinafter `the deprived party'), relinquishes 
[control/possession] of the object by voluntarily delivering it, or authorising 
delivery thereof, to a third party in another jurisdiction and for a particular 
purpose; 76 and 
(2) the third party, in breach of the particular purpose, and without 
authorisation from the deprived party, purports to transfer77 the object to 
another party ('the current possessor'), the transfer being valid according to 
the law which governs it under this Part; 78 or 
(3) the object is attached, in that other jurisdiction, by the third party's 
creditor(s) ('the attaching creditor), by attachment valid according to the law 
of the country where the object was physically situated at the time when the 
attachment is alleged to have taken effect, 
would be a matter for the relevant lex loci rei sitae (cf. Macdonald v. Macdonald 1932 S. C. (HL) 79). 
What the author intends this rule to accommodate is `Duc de Frias-type' inalienability (e. g. res sacrae; 
res religiosae; res extra commercium), rather than goods with the taint of theft (i. e. res furtiva), since 
Model 1 contains detailed provisions which deal expressly with property which has been wrongfully 
removed from a rightful possessor. (paragraphs 21 et seq, infra) 
75 E. g. If A, domiciled in State X, sends his watch to B, in State Y, for repair, and the watch is subject, 
in State Y, to B's repairer's lien (or other security right under Y law), A should not be able to defeat 
B's rights under Y law, by transferring the watch to C, also domiciled in State X (by transfer governed, 
at the parties' choice under paragraph 12, by X- or any other - law which does not require physical 
delivery to effect the transfer) (i. e. B's rights under Y law, the relevant lex loci rei sitae, should be 
preserved). Sed contra, section 31 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985: " (1) ... the whole estate of 
the debtor shall vest as at the date of sequestration in the permanent trustee for the benefit of creditors 
... 
(8) the `whole estate of the debtor' means his whole estate at the date of sequestration, wherever 
situated ... 
" (Emphasis added) Cf., in England, sections 306 and 436 of the Insolvency Act 1986. But 
these provisions must be subject to the view of the situs: "There is no territorial limitation, therefore, 
but in respect of property situated abroad it is for the foreign lex Situs to determine the effect which it 
gives to Scottish sequestration. " (Crawford, ibid., p344, paragraph 16.10) (i. e. the lex loci rei sitae 
should be able to protect `remote' parties acting in reliance upon that law. ) 
76 See Appendix C. Where the deprived party voluntarily delivers the object to a third party within the 
same jurisdiction, but the third party unlawfully removes it from the jurisdiction, the question of title 
becomes more difficult: see Appendix D. Whilst it is submitted that the deprived party who voluntarily 
sends property abroad acts `suo periculo', the present author is less certain whether a deprived party, 
who neither sends the object abroad, nor consents to its removal into a new jurisdiction, should 
nevertheless be deemed to have acted `suo periculo' merely by ceding controllpossession of the object 
to a third party. On balance, it is submitted that the latter type of case should be treated as one of 
involuntary dispossession. (paragraph 21 et seq) 
77 See paragraph 6(1), supra. 
78 i. e. According to paragraphs 12 to 16. (In this context, the third party and the current possessor 
being the `original parties') 
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the conflicting claims of: - 
(a) the deprived party and the current possessor; or 
(b) the deprived party and the attaching creditor 
shall be determined as follows: - 
(i) where the validity of the competing claims is governed, under this Part, 
79 by the same law, in accordance with that law; and 
(ii) in any other case, in accordance with the law of the country where the 
object was physically situated at the time when the interest therein is 
alleged to have been transferred to the current possessor, or attached by 
the attaching creditor. 
(4) Where the current possessor or the attaching creditor purports to transfer8° 
the object to another party, the transfer being valid according to the law which 
governs it under this Part, 81 the conflicting claims of the deprived party and 
the other party shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 20(3)(i) and (ii), mutatis mutandis. 82 
Remote parties - Involuntary dispossession 
83 
21. The remainder of this Part shall apply where a deprived party84 is unable to 
exercise proprietary rights in respect of an object, by reason of a wrongful 
removal thereof, by a third party, to another jurisdiction. 85 
79 Using Appendix C: if A's claim were based on X law, it could be that C's claim might also be based 
on X law: even if, for example, the transfer from B to C took place in state Y, giving rise to a 
presumption that Y law should govern the B-C transfer, the application of Y law could feasibly be 
displaced under paragraph 14 (e. g. in `day-trip transactions', where the circumstance of aY situs had 
been contrived by B and/or Q. It is more likely, however, that paragraph 20(3)(ii) would apply. 
80 See paragraph 6(1), supra. 
81 i. e. According to paragraphs 12-16. 
82 i. e. In paragraph 20(3)(ii), replace the words `current possessor' and `attaching creditor' with the 
words `other party'. 
83 E. g. Where A's property is stolen, in state X, by B, and then sold by B, in state Y, to C (original 
parties B and C; remote party A), and A thereafter raises an action for recovery of the object from C. 
See Appendix E. (i. e. the classic Winkworth scenario) 
See paragraph 20(1). 
85 E. g. By virtue of `surreptitious removal' (per Edgerly v. Bush 81 N. Y. 199) of the object, whether by 
theft or illegal export. Paragraph 21 is not intended to cover any case where an owner of goods has 
voluntarily ceded possession of an object, whether in security or for the purposes of sale (e. g. to a 
creditor, by security based on agreement [e. g. pledge], or implied by law [e. g. a repairer's lien]; or to a 
purchaser under a conditional sale or hire purchase agreement). In such cases, the transferor is to be 
deemed capable of making contractual provision to guard against the wrongful removal of the object by 
a creditor, conditional purchaser, custodian etc. In cases of voluntary dispossession, it is submitted that 
the risk should generally be borne by the deprived party (i. e. that party should be deemed to act `suo 
periculo': paragraph 20). While paragraph 21 et seq are modelled on the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (implemented in the United Kingdom by the Child 
Abduction and Custody Act 1985), they do not extend to the wrongful retention of an object: wrongful 
retention could be said to arise where a deprived party had lent the object in question to a foreign party, 
for the purpose of valuation, exhibition, or repair, and the custodian failed to return it in accordance 
with the parties' agreement. It is submitted, however, that such cases would amount to voluntary, rather 
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For the remainder of this Part, `lex fori' shall be understood as meaning the 
law of that other jurisdiction, that is to say, of the forum rei sitae. 
22. The removal of an object shall be considered86 wrongful where: - 
(1) it is in breach of the proprietary rights attributed to the deprived party, 
either jointly or alone, under the law of the country 87 in which the object was 
physically situated immediately prior to the removal (hereinafter `the lex loci 
originis' 
8); 89 and 
(2) at the time of removal those rights were actually exercised, either 
jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal; 90 and 
(3) the deprived party did not authorise, consent to, or subsequently 
acquiesce in, the removal of the object from the country in which the object 
was physically situated immediately prior to the removal (hereinafter `the 
locus originis'). 91 
than involuntary, dispossession (e. g. A, domiciled in Scotland, sends his watch to B in Geneva, for 
repair. B, in breach of his agreement with A, sells the watch, in Switzerland, to C. Since A parted with 
possession of the watch voluntarily, paragraph 20 would apply. A would constitute the `remote party', 
parties B and C being the `original parties'. According to paragraph 19, the transfer between B and C 
would be subject to the mandatory rules of the relevant lex loci rei sitae (Swiss law) concerning 
alienability. If Swiss law were to prefer the title of C, the consequences for A would be similar to the 
consequences for Mr Winkworth, save that A might have a personal claim against B. 
86 i . e. By the forum. 97 This would extend to proprietary rights granted by, or recognised by, the lex loci originis. See 
paragraph 36, infra. 
8 Cf. Garro, ibid., p514. In referring to the `country of origin' of a stolen item, Garro recommended 
application of "the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant interest in protecting the property 
which is the object of the transaction. " It is submitted that a connecting factor such as this would be 
indeterminate: e. g. as regards protection of `La Gioconda', would it be considered that France, the 
country by whom the painting is currently owned and in which it is presently exhibited, has a greater 
interest than, say, does Italy, the country of which the artist was a national and in which the artist, and 
the work, are highly respected? Similarly, as regards protection of the Elgin/Parthenon Marbles, would 
it be considered that the United Kingdom, or Greece, has a more significant interest in their protection? 
Contra Reichelt, who has referred, as regards the transfer of cultural property, to the law of closest 
connection, presumed to be the state of origin. Reichelt has not, however, explained what she means by 
the `state of origin', and the possibility of more than one state claiming that designation is not 
discussed. (Reichelt, G, `International Protection of Cultural Property' (1985) Uniform Law Review 
43,91) 
89 In Todd v. Armour (1882) 9 R. 901, for example (Appendix F II), the removal of the horse to 
Scotland, by `C', would not constitute a wrongful removal, since it was not in breach of the proprietary 
rights attributed to the pursuer under Irish domestic law (the sale by market overt was valid according 
to Irish law, thereby purging the earlier defect in title). Had the sale of the horse in Ireland been 
unlawful according to Irish law, the removal of the horse to Scotland would have been wrongful (e. g. 
Appendix F I). 
90 Cf. Article 3(b), Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 
91 Cases where a party has been voluntarily dispossessed of an object (e. g. where an owner has 
voluntarily sent an object furth of the locus originis, for the purpose of repair, exhibition or security) do 
not constitute `wrongful removals'. As indicated in notes 72,76 and 85, supra, however, voluntary 
dispossession does not encompass owners who did not consent to removal of the object from the locus 
originis: such cases are considered to be instances of involuntary dispossession (e. g. Goetschuis v. 
Brightman 245 N. Y. 186,156 N. E. 660) Appendices DI and II reveal that the terms of the contract in a 
'Goetschuis v. Brightman scenario' will have a significant effect on the outcome under these proposals. 
Authorisation of, consent to, or acquiescence in, the removal of an object outwith the jurisdiction of the 
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23. Where an object has been wrongfully removed by a third party, in any 
proceedings92 to determine the existence and validity of proprietary rights in 
respect thereof, 93 notwithstanding the third party's purported transfer of the 
object to another party, 94 or any subsequent purported transfers thereof, 95 or 
any purported attachment of the object by the third party's creditor(s), 
including any choice of law under paragraph 12 hereof, or the operation of 
paragraphs 13 to 16 inclusive, effect shall nevertheless be given to the 
mandatory rules96 of the lex loci originis. 97 
In considering whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be 
had to their nature and purpose, and to the consequences of their application or 
non-application. 98 
[OR] 
23. A Where an object has been wrongfully removed and, at the date of 
commencement of proceedings94 ('the relevant date') to determine the 
existence and validity of proprietary rights in respect thereof, 100 the object is 
locus originis, in effect, converts an instance of involuntary dispossession into one of voluntary 
dispossession (to be dealt with under paragraph 20). 
92 Proceedings, that is, in the forum rei sitae, or alternatively, in any forum which exercises personal 
jurisdiction over the current possessor of the object. 
93 Including, in particular, those of the deprived party. 
94 Appendix E. 
95 Appendices FI and II. 
96 i. e. Rules which cannot be derogated from by agreement or any other means, but which must be 
applied whatever the law applicable to the transfer. (cf. paragraph 10, supra) 
9 i. e. The law of the country in which the object was physically situated immediately prior to the 
removal (paragraph 22(1)). It may be suggested that a more generous provision should be adopted, so 
as to include, for example, the mandatory rules of "the law of another country with which the 
[situation/transfer] has a close connection" (cf. Article 7(1), Rome Convention). If, for example, in 
Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd, the objects had been stolen from a museum in France, to 
which Mr Winkworth had lent them for the purposes of a temporary exhibition, arguably, it would be 
more important for the mandatory rules of English law to apply (e. g. as to alienability), than those of 
the French lex loci originis. 
98 Cf. Articles 3(3) and 7(1), Rome Convention. The difficulty, of course, is in ascertaining what are 
the mandatory rules of a particular state concerning the transfer of corporeal moveable property. It is 
submitted that, even if it were possible, it is not, in fact, necessary (in view of the approach of the 
Rome Convention) to enumerate the particular mandatory rules which may apply. As with the situation 
outlined in note 36, supra, the `mandatory' character of rules would require to be determined by the lex 
loci originis (or, if appropriate, the law of close connection). Potentially, mandatory rules could include 
rules concerning inalienability (e. g. Duc de Frias v. Pichon, ibid. ); the exercise of good faith by a 
purchaser of goods; the rule that a thief cannot transfer valid title to stolen property; and the rule that 
time must not run in favour of a thief. (Cf. City of Gotha v. Sotheby's (No. 2) 1998,8 October, Times, 
per Moses J, paragraph 11.4 (p53)) It is presumed that the relevant prescription and limitation rules of 
the lex causae (i. e. the lex loci originis, or, if appropriate, the law of close connection) would apply. 
99 Proceedings, that is, in the forum rei sitae, or alternatively, in any forum which exercises personal 
jurisdiction over the current possessor of the object. 
100 This formulation (i. e. 'to determine the existence and validity of proprietary rights') is designed to 
test, and rank, competing proprietary rights, rather than merely to test the validity of a particular 
transfer of an interest in an object. 
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physically situated in a country other than the locus originis, 101 then, 
notwithstanding the third party's purported transfer of the object to another 
party, 102 or any subsequent purported transfers thereof, 103 or any purported 
attachment of the object by the third party's creditor(s), including any choice 
of law under paragraph 12 hereof, or the operation of paragraphs 13 to 16 
inclusive: - 
(1) if a period of less than one year'°4 has elapsed from the date of wrongful 
removal, the judicial authority of the country where the object is physically 
situated at the relevant date shall order return of the object forthwith to the 
locus originis; '°5 
(2) if proceedings have commenced after the expiry of a period of one year 
from the date of wrongful removal, the judicial authority of the country where 
the object is physically situated at the relevant date shall also order return of 
the object to the locus originis, unless it is demonstrated that: - 
(a) the proceedings were brought: - 
(i) more than [one] 106 year after the date when the deprived party 
knew, or ought reasonably to have known, 107 the location of the 
object and the identity of the current possessor or the attaching 
creditor; or 
(ii) following the expiry of a period of twenty years from the date of 
wrongful removal; 108 
101 This last clause is necessary, for in some cases (e. g. Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd 
[1986] 1 Ch. 496), the object has already been returned to the locus originis, and proceedings have 
been raised in that country. 
102 Appendix E. 
103 Appendices FI and II. 
104 This is an arbitrary, but, it is submitted, a reasonable period. (Cf. Article 12, Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction) 
105 Appendix G. 
106 The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention imposes a three year period (Articles 3(3) and 5(5)), whereas the 
Return of Cultural Property Regulations (S. I. 1994/501) ('the 1994 Regulations') impose a one year 
period. (Regulation 6(6)(a)) It is submitted that the shorter period would attract wider support. 
107 The wording 'or ought reasonably to have known' imposes an obligation of due diligence upon the 
deprived party, and is intended to assist in striking a balance between security of title and security of 
transaction. But consider note 108, infra. Consider also Robertson v. Robertson 1998 S. L. T. 468 in 
which the Inner House held that a father did not truly acquiesce in his children becoming habitually 
resident in Germany, since his apparent inactivity in seeking to secure the return of his children to 
Scotland was due to his having received erroneous legal advice. See also note 111, infra. 
108 This imposes a special, long-stop limitation period. With reference to `cultural' property, the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention favours a period of fifty years (Articles 3(3) and 5(5)), whereas the 1994 
Regulations favour a general period of thirty years, but with special provision for a seventy-five year 
period (Regulation 6(7) and (8)). Section 8 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, as 
amended, imposes a long-stop period of twenty years, and it is submitted that an equivalent period is 
appropriate for present purposes. As regards cultural property, the (legitimate) concern is that the 
current possessor may endeavour to conceal the object for the duration of the relevant limitation period. 
To minimise this, the wording in paragraph 23A(2)(a)(i) could be amended so as to read `more than one 
year after the date when the deprived owner knew the location of the object and the identity of the 
current possessor. ' (i. e. This would prescribe a rule of actual discovery of the object, rather than one of 
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[Possible additional/optional bespoke rules concerning {cultural} 
property109: - 
(b) the current possessor acquired the object in good faith; 110 and/or 
(c) the deprived party failed to exercise due diligence in seeking to 
identify the current possessor or the attaching creditor, and/or locate 
and recover the object; "' and/or 
(d) the object has an estimated monetary value of no less than £X; 112 
For the purposes of this Part, the demonstration of [good faith, and/or of] 
due diligence, shall be determined according to the lex fori. ]113 
diligent discovery). Equally, difficulties of definition aside, it would be technically possible to 
formulate a longer `long-stop' limitation period in respect of cultural property. 
109 Save perhaps for paragraph 23A(2)(d), infra, it is not considered that measures such as these would 
be appropriate in cases concerning `non-cultural' property. While a bespoke cultural property rule may 
be attractive in theory (as recommended, for example, by Byrne-Sutton [Byrne-Sutton in Lalive, ibid., 
p501]), it is suggested that, in practice, its formulation (particularly the definition of key terms such as 
`cultural property') and operation (e. g. the reconciliation of competing public and private interests), 
would be problematic. Consider in this regard Prott's conclusion that, "A solution which takes account 
of the special characteristics of the cultural heritage to change the lex rei sitae rule to a more flexible 
formula may be easier to achieve than the painstaking effort to concert the many, variable principles of 
property law in different jurisdictions. " (Prott, 1989, ibid., p281) Nevertheless, additional/optional 
bespoke provision may be acceptable, for example, to states party to the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
and/or the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and could be effected by means of a cultural property protocol 
to a general property Convention. Moreover, there may be support for a flexible rule such as is 
contained in Article 9 of the UNIDROIT Convention, viz.: "Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a 
Contracting State from applying any rules more favourable to the return of a wrongfully removed 
object than provided for by this Convention. " 
110 The difficulty with this criterion would be that the requirement for a purchaser to exercise good faith 
would, in effect, be elevated to the rank of public policy (cf. Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods 
Ltd. 1986 1 Ch. 496, per Slade, J. ) It is likely that states whose domestic law does not require 
urchasers to exercise good faith would be reluctant to agree to such a provision. ý11 
Cf. The 1994 Regulations, Regulation 3(1) (e. g. reporting the theft; consulting relevant stolen 
property databases; if appropriate, alerting Interpol etc. ). Cf. note 107, supra. 
12 It would be possible to impose a de minimis financial criterion, intended to prevent vexatious 
litigation. (But see paragraph 26, infra. ) Cf. the financial thresholds laid down in Regulation 2(3) and 
Schedule 1 of the 1994 Regulations, and The Return of Cultural Objects (Amendment) Regulations 
1997 (S. I. 1997/1719). Questions would arise, however, as to the basis of valuation and the impartiality 
of the valuer. The 1994 Regulations do not prescribe a method of valuation. One possibility would be 
to use an insurance valuation. Furthermore, as the 1997 Regulations demonstrate, it would be necessary 
to provide a review, or adjustment, mechanism, by which the monetary values could be altered in line 
with inflation etc. Closely related to the matter of valuation, is the question of authenticity, since 
authenticity will impact significantly upon valuation. 
113 It is submitted that these criteria can be practicably tested only according to lex fori, that is to say, 
the forum where the object is then situated (cf. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction). If bespoke rules regarding cultural property were to be agreed, a bespoke rule 
concerning the exercise/demonstration of good faith (at the point of purchase) could also be agreed: for 
example, a rule mirroring Article 4(4) of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention could be incorporated, viz.: 
"In determining whether the current possessor [acquired the object in good faith or] exercised due 
diligence, regard shall be had to all the circumstances of the acquisition, including the character of the 
parties, the price paid, whether the current possessor consulted any reasonably accessible register of 
stolen objects, and any other relevant information and documentation which he could reasonably have 
obtained, and whether the current possessor consulted accessible agencies or took any other step that 
458 
24114 Following return of the object to the locus originis, the law applicable to 
determine the conflicting claims of the deprived party and the current 
possessor, or the attaching creditor, shall be determined as follows: - 
(1) where the validity of the competing claims is governed, under this Part, by 
the same law, 115 in accordance with that law; and 
(2) in any other case, in accordance with the lex loci originis. 116 
a reasonable person would have taken in the circumstances. " It should be noted, however, that `good 
faith' and `due diligence' are bilateral concepts, affecting both the deprived owner (in endeavouring to 
locate the object and identify the possessor), and the current possessor (in checking provenance etc), 
and that the standards to be met will vary according to the nature (and apparent value) of the res 
litigiosa. The temporal aspect would also require to be considered: clearly, certain conduct which may 
now be expected of a good faith purchaser (e. g. where relevant, inspection of a complete provenance, 
or consultation of an Art Loss Register) might not have been expected, say, at the time of acquisition. 
Conduct should, accordingly, be tested according to the standards which prevailed at the time of 
acquisition. See Appendix H. 
14 Paragraphs 24,25 and 26 would apply only to paragraph 23", and not to paragraph 23. 
15 Cf. Note 79, supra. 
116 Contra, paragraph 20(3)(ii). The significant factor, therefore, is the `locus originis', the country in 
which the object was physically situated immediately prior to the wrongful removal. In the same 
manner that the return of an abducted child to the state of his/her habitual residence (in terms of the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction) does not guarantee a 
particular custody result (insofar as the substantive content of the custody law of the state of the child's 
habitual residence is not a factor considered by the `requested' state), so too the return of an object to 
the locus originis would not, per se, protect the title of the deprived party. Consider Garro, ibid., p514: 
"... the application of the lex rei sitae or the law of the 'country of origin' of the stolen property does 
not warrant a better protection to the dispossessed owner nor assures certainty in the result of the 
dispute. This is so because the conflict rule per se lacks any significant content as to how far should 
bona fide purchasers be protected; it all depends on the domestic law on bona fide purchasers which is 
to be applied pursuant to the chosen choice of law process. " But, where the locus originis is a 
`possession vaut titre' state, the deprived owner should be presumed to be aware of the content of that 
law. Accordingly, the application of that law would not prejudice him/her in the same way as may 
occur under the current choice of law rule, whereby a thief may deliberately exploit the `possession 
vaut titre' or prescription and limitation rules of a third state, for the specific purpose of defeating the 
deprived owner's title (e. g. in 'day-trip' transactions). (See Chapter Twelve, supra - 'The `Situs' Rule - 
For and Against') The purpose of returning the object to the locus originis has been identified by Droz, 
viz.: such a rule "... would simply re-establish the status quo ante without obliging the State where the 
object is situated [potentially an entirely fortuitous or transient situs] to decide on any other aspects of 
the question. " (Droz, GAL, 'La protection internationale des biens culturels et des objets d'art', in 
Lalive, ibid., p543) It is submitted that application, in paragraph 24(2), of the lex loci originis, rather 
than the lex loci rei sitae at the time of transfer to the current possessor, or attachment by the attaching 
creditor, is justified by the involuntary nature of the deprived party's dispossession. It should be noted 
that Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings enables `secondary 
proceedings' to be opened in a member state, in addition to the `main insolvency proceedings' opened 
in a different member state. Article 28 provides that, as a general rule, the law applicable to the 
secondary proceedings shall be that of the member state within the territory of which those proceedings 
have opened. The involuntary nature of the dispossession is, it is submitted, strong enough a 
characteristic to override the claims of the creditor in the lex fort, and there is no reason, it is submitted, 
why, following return of the wrongfully removed object to the lex loci originis, secondary proceedings 
could not be opened within that jurisdiction. The purpose of paragraph 24(2) is to treat the deprived 
party in the same manner as he would be treated by the law of the country in which he voluntarily 
exercised his proprietary rights (e. g. the practical effect of this paragraph in Winkworth v. Christie, 
Manson & Woods Ltd [1986] 1 Ch. 496, would be that the competing claims of Mr Winkworth and Dr 
D'Annone would be determined, not according to Italian law, but rather according to English law). 
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25. (1) Paragraph 24(2) shall be disregarded if it appears, in all the circumstances, 
from a comparison of: - 
(a) the significance of the facts which connect the circumstances of the 
case 11 with the locus originis; 118 and 
(b) the significance of any factors which connect the circumstances of the 
case with another country' 19 
that it is more appropriate for the applicable law for determining the issues120 
arising in the case, or any of those issues, to be the law of the other country, 
and in such cases, the applicable law shall be the law of the last-mentioned 
country. 
121 
(2) The factors that may be taken into account as connecting the circumstances 
of the case with a country for the purposes of paragraph 25(1) include, in 
particular, factors relating to the deprived party and/or the current possessor, 
or the attaching creditor, 122 and the length of time during which, and the 
reason for which, the object was physically situated in that country. 123 
26. Expenses incurred in implementing an order under this Part for return of an 
object shall be borne, in the first instance, by the deprived party. Upon 
determining the existence and validity of proprietary rights in respect of an 
object, the judicial authorities of the locus originis may, where appropriate, 
direct the person who wrongfully removed the object, or the current possessor, 
or attaching creditor, to pay necessary expenses incurred by the deprived 
party, including any costs incurred or payments made for locating the object 
and/or identifying the current possessor, or attaching creditor, and the costs of 
returning the object to the locus originis. 124 
"' Wording more specific than 'the circumstances of the case' would prove troublesome. Relevant 
circumstances may include the nature and provenance of the res litigiosa, the parties, and the basis of 
their claims to the object. 
Its E. g. Length of time during which the object had been situated in the locus originis. 
1t9 E. g. The lex loci rei sitae at the time when the object was transferred to the current possessor. 
120 i. e. The existence and validity of proprietary rights in respect of the object. 
121 Accordingly, taking the facts of Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd., the application of the 
English lex loci originis could be displaced if, for example, it transpired that Mr Winkworth was 
neither domiciled nor habitually resident in England, but was merely in England on a short-term basis, 
and that the property had been situated in England on a temporary basis (e. g. for the purpose of having 
the netsuke valued or restored). 
122 E. g. Domicile or habitual residence. 
123 Factors such as the events leading to, and the circumstances surrounding the deprived party's 
dispossession of the object (e. g. a well-publicised theft or illegal export), and the current possessor's 
acquisition thereof (e. g. the inspection of provenance details or a database search) would be relevant 
only to the question of good faith and/or due diligence (which are considered at the stage of returning 
the object to the locus originis, and not at the stage of choosing the applicable law). Similarly, factors 
such as a decision of the Spoliation Advisory Panel, would be relevant, not to choice of law, but only to 
the end (substantive) result; accordingly, such a factor could be considered only by a rule-selecting 
forum, which is prepared to `look before it leaps'. 
124 Cf. 1994 Regulations, Regulation 8, and Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, Article 26. 
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Part V- Choice of applicable law: incorporeal moveable property 
Original parties - Creation of a right (Debtor and Creditor) 125 
27. (1) Any question pertaining to the creation of a right of incorporeal moveable 
property ('a right') shall be governed by the law of the country with which, at 
the relevant date (as hereinafter defined), the right is most closely connected. 
(2) For the purposes of this Part, it shall be presumed that a right is most 
closely connected with the country in which it may be enforced. ' 26 
28. In this Part, the relevant date shall be: - 
(1) For the purposes of paragraphs 27127 and 30,128 the date on which the right 
in question is purported to have been created; and 
(2) For all other purposes, the date of commencement of proceedings 
concerning the right in question. ' 29 
125 E. g. An insurance company and the insured party. See Appendix I. 
126 This is generally the `proper law of the right', but there are exceptions (e. g. consider a beneficial 
interest under a trust deed drawn in accordance with Scots law, administered in Scotland, and having 
Scottish trustees: the (putative) proper law of the right would be Scottish. If, however, the trust fund 
were invested in an offshore bank account in Jersey, the (putative) place of enforcement would be 
Jersey). A right will be enforceable in any country in which the debtor has, at the date of creation of the 
right or any later date, assets against which the right may be satisfied. This may lead to the designation 
of more than one state. It is submitted that among such states the actual place of enforcement should be 
at the option of the pursuer. 
127 i. e. Creation of a right. 
128 i. e. Assignability of a right. 
129 It is necessary to draw a distinction between the country in which the right may be enforced, first of 
all, at the time of its creation, and secondly, on the date on which it is sought to enforce the right 
against the debtor. For example, if, at the time when a debt is created, the debtor was resident in 
France, and his entire estate (against which the debt may be satisfied) was situated in France, any 
question pertaining to the creation of that debt would (according, at least, to this model) be governed by 
the law of the country with which the right was most closely connected, which, in turn, would be 
presumed to be the law of the country in which the right may be enforced. But, if there were no 
qualification as to the temporal aspect of enforcement (i. e. no specification of the time at which closest 
connection were to be determined), the law of closest connection would be deemed to be the law of the 
country in which the right may be enforced (i. e. in which the debtor has assets) at the date of 
commencement of proceedings to enforce the debt. If, by that date, the debtor had relocated his 
property (and possibly also his person) to another country, say, to Italy, then the effect would be to 
apply to any question pertaining to the creation of the debt not French law, but Italian law. This would 
be an absurd result since at the time of creation of the debt in question, there was no connection 
between the parties and their transacting, and Italy. Hence, it is submitted that the country of closest 
connection must be determined either on the date on which the right in question is purported to have 
been created, or on the (later) date on which it is sought to enforce the right. The relevant date will 
depend, in each case, upon the nature of the particular dispute (e. g. whether it concerns merely the 
existence/creation of the right; or whether the purpose of the proceedings is to enforce the right against 
the debtor). It is submitted that in cases which concern matters other than the creation or assignability 
of a right, the later date should be the `relevant date', for the aim, in such cases, is to enforce the right 
against the debtor (i. e. it would be inappropriate, in such circumstances, to apply the law of the country 
in which the debt was enforceable at the time of its creation, for by the time the creditor may seek to 
enforce the debt, the debtor, innocently or with calculating intent, may have relocated his assets to 
another country, thereby defeating the creditor's attempts to enforce the debt). It is quite possible that a 
dispute may concern the existence/creation of a right, and not the question of enforcement: for 
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29. The presumption in paragraph 27(2) shall be disregarded if it appears, from 
the circumstances as a whole that at the relevant date130 the right (or purported 
right) was more closely connected with another country. ' 31 
Original parties - Assignation of a right (Assignor and Assignee) 132 
30. The assignability of a right shall be governed by the law of the country with 
which, at the relevant date, 133 the right was most closely connected, as 
determined in accordance with paragraphs 27(2) and 29 above. 134 
example, an insured party may seek a declaration that a life assurance contract has been concluded, 
giving rise to a right enforceable thereunder, but without actually seeking to enforce that right [which 
may, in any event, be enforceable only upon the death of the insured party) against the assurance 
company. 
130 Paragraph 28, supra. 
131 Cf. Article 4(5), Rome Convention. If, using the scenario depicted in note 129, supra, immediately 
following the (purported) creation of the debt, the debtor (say, an Italian national), as anticipated by 
himself and the creditor (also, say, an Italian national), and with the consent or acquiescence of the 
creditor, removed himself and his assets to Italy, and remained there until such time as enforcement 
proceedings were raised against him in Italy by the creditor, it may be argued that, on the date on which 
the debt is purported to have been created, it was more closely connected with Italian, and not French, 
law. Consider also Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v. Five Star General Trading LLC and others 
[2000] 2 Ll. Rep. 684; [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1344; [2001] 3 All E. R. 257. The dispute concerned a marine 
insurance policy. Although the insurers in question were French, the insurance policy was, in fact, 
governed by English law. Hence, English law was the proper law governing the underlying contract of 
insurance, but French law was the lex sites of the chose in action which had been assigned (insofar as 
France would be the place of enforcement of the right). The `presumption' that the law of the place of 
enforcement would be the law of closest connection, was, in effect, displaced by an application of 
English law, the law governing the obligation assigned 
132 E. g. The insured party and a third party creditor, such as a bank. See Appendix I. 
133 Paragraph 28(1), supra. 
134 Consider the assignability of future wages (e. g. by a husband, H, to his estranged wife, W). If, at the 
date of creation of W's right to the wages, H were domiciled in State X (according to the law of which 
wages are assignable), but he subsequently acquired a domicile of choice in State Y (according to the 
law of which wages are non-assignable), the question would arise whether assignability should be 
governed by the law of the country in which W's right is/was enforceable (a) on the date on which her 
right is purported to have been created (i. e. X law); or (b) on the date of commencement of 
enforcement proceedings against H (i. e. Y law). Save perhaps in cases where the forum would adopt an 
interest analysis approach, it is submitted that X law should apply. If the rule were otherwise (i. e. if Y 
law applied), then it would be within H's power to relocate, deliberately frustrating W's entitlement 
(under X law) to his wages. Paragraph 29 would provide scope for applying to the question of 
assignability another, more closely connected law, but it is to be hoped that the choice made by the 
forum would not fall upon Y law unless there was, on the date when W's right was purportedly created, 
a pre-existing connection between H and Y law. Article 12(2) of the Rome Convention does not deal 
with the temporal conflict of laws, merely applying `the law governing the right to which the 
assignment relates'. 
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31. The voluntary disposal or assignation135 ('the assignation') of a right from one 
party (`the assignor') to another party (`the assignee') (together `the original 
parties') shall be governed by the law chosen by the original parties. ' 36 The 
choice must be express, or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the 
terms and form of the assignation, or the circumstances of the case. By their 
choice, the original parties may select the law applicable to the whole or a part 
only of the assignation. 137 
32. To the extent that the law applicable to the voluntary assignation of a right has 
not been chosen in accordance with paragraph 31, the assignation shall be 
governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected. 138 
33. The involuntary139 assignation of a right from the assignor to the assignee shall 
be governed by the law of the country with which, at the relevant date, 140 the 
right is most closely connected, as determined in accordance with paragraphs 
27(2) and 29 above. '4' 
Remote parties - Enforcement of the assignation (Debtor and Assignee)'42 
34. Mutual rights and obligations of the debtor'43 and the assignee shall be 
governed by the law of the country with which, at the relevant date, 144 the 
right is most closely connected, as determined in accordance with paragraphs 
27(2) and 29 above. 145 
135 Contractual, or non-contractual (e. g. donation). 
136 i . e. 
The proper law of the assignation. Cf. Article 12(1) of the Rome Convention. 
137 Cf. Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention. 
131 For contractual assignations, see Article 4 of the Rome Convention, and for non-contractual 
assignations, the proper law of the assignation will be akin to the objectively ascertained proper law of 
contract (cf. The Assunzione [ 1954] P. 150). 
139 See Chapter Eleven, supra - `The Assignation of Incorporeal Moveable Property', note 173 et seq. 
140 Paragraph 28(2); in effect, the date on which diligence proceedings to enforce the debt are 
commenced. 
141 Consider, for example, the case where a judgment creditor in State X sought to enforce (in respect 
of a debt owed to him by his judgment debtor in State Y) a debt owed by a third party to the judgment 
debtor, by means of an arrestment of funds in the hands of the third party (the third party arrestee) in 
State Z. The key factor is the law of the place where the debt is enforceable (i. e. where it can be 
enforced against the third party arrestee) at the date of commencement of proceedings against the third 
party arrestee. 
142 E. g. The insurance company and the third party creditor, that is, the bank. See Appendix I. 
143 i . e. 
The party against whom the right is enforceable (paragraph 5(2)(d)(iii), supra). 
' 4° Paragraph 28, supra. 
145 i . e. The 
law of the country where the right may be enforced at the date of commencement of 
proceedings against the debtor (paragraph 28(2)). If the rule were otherwise, the debtor would be able 
to frustrate enforcement of the debt by relocating his assets after creation of the debt. 
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Remote parties - Competing assignations (Competing Assignees)"' 
35. In the event that: - 
(1) the assignor purports to assign the same right to more than one party, or 
the same right deriving from the assignor is claimed by more than one 
party147 (hereinafter 'the competing assignees'); and 
(2) each assignation is valid according to the law which governs it under this 
Part, 148 
the conflicting claims of the competing assignees shall be determined as 
follows: - 
(a) where the validity of the competing assignations is governed, under 
this Part, by the same law, in accordance with that law; 149 and 
(b) in any other case, in accordance with the law of the country with 
which, at the relevant date, 150 the right is most closely 
connected, '5' as determined in accordance with paragraphs 27(2) 
and 29 above. 
Part VI - General 
36. The application of the law of any country specified by this Convention 
means: - 
(1) for the purposes of Part II, and concerning the application of the relevant 
lex situs in cases arising under Part III, the rules of law in force in that 
country, including the rules of international private law forming part of 
that law; and 
(2) in any other case, subject only to recognition by the lex loci originis of 
proprietary rights attributed to the deprived owner under paragraph 22(1) 
above, the rules of law in force in that country, excluding the rules of 
international private law forming part of that law. 152 
146 E. g. Competing third party creditors. See Appendix I. 
147 i. e. In the event of an involuntary assignation of the right. 
148 i. e. According to paragraphs 30-33. See Appendix J I. 
149 See Appendix J II. 
150 Paragraph 28, supra; in effect, the date of commencement of the `conjoined' enforcement 
proceedings against the debtor. '51 
See Appendix J III. 
152 i. e. Renvoi is operative only in respect of (a) the characterisation of property (note 7, supra); (b) 
transfers of immoveable property which are governed by the relevant ! ex situs (note 19, supra); and (c) 
note 87, supra. Renvoi is applied to the characterisation process for reasons of logic, and to 
immoveable property, on account of the enduring physical control of the property by the situs. 
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37. The application of any rule of law of any country specified by this Convention 
may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the 
public policy ('ordre public') of the forum. 153 
Interpretation 
38. (1) In this Convention: - 
"attaching creditor" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 20(3); 
"competing transferees" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 17(1); 
"current possessor" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 20(2); 
"debtor" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 5(2)(d)(iii); 
"deprived party" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 20(1); 
"lex cartae" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 5(2)(d)(ii); 
"lex loci originis" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 22(1); 
"locus originis" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 22(3); 
"lex fori", for the purposes of involuntary dispossession in Part IV, has the 
meaning assigned by paragraph 21. 
"mandatory rules" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 10; 
"the original parties" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 12; 
"the relevant date", for the purposes of Part IV, has the meaning assigned by 
paragraph 23A 
"the relevant date", for the purposes of Part V, has the meaning assigned by 
paragraph 28; 
"the relevant lex loci rei sitae" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 
13(2)(a); 
"the relevant lex Situs" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 6(2); and 
"remote party" has the meaning assigned by paragraph 18. 
(2) All references in this paragraph are to this Convention. 
153 Cf. Article 16 of the Rome Convention, and section 14(3)(a) of the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. This provision should not apply (i. e. public policy should not be 
invoked) where the forum in question is the forum rei sitae in terms of paragraph 21 of Part IV. 
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Model 2 
The Transfer of Property (Applicable Law) Bill' 
Arrangement of Sections 
Part I- General 
1. Scope 
2. Characterisation of issues 
3. Applicable law 
4. Application to events occurring in the forum 
5. Intra-UK provisions 
Part II - Characterisation 
6. Characterisation of property 
Part III - Choice of applicable law: immoveable property 
7. Transfer of immoveable property - general rule and rule of displacement 
8. Passing of risk in respect of immoveable property - general rule and rule of 
displacement 
9. Mandatory rules of the lex situs 
Part IV - Choice of applicable law: corporeal moveable property 
10. Proprietary rights 
11. Transfer of corporeal moveable property - general rule 
12. Transfer of corporeal moveable property - rule of displacement 
13. Passing of risk in respect of corporeal moveable property - general rule and rule 
of displacement 
14. Application of mandatory rules of the forum 
15. Competing transferees - applicable law 
1 Unlike Model l,, Model 2 is intended to be a national, as opposed to an international, instrument, for 
implementation pending agreement and implementation of an international instrument. Cf. the 
relationship between Part III of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 and 
`Rome IF, currently under negotiation. 
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Part V- Choice of applicable law: incorporeal moveable property 
16. Original parties - creation of a right (debtor and creditor) - general rule 
17. Original parties - creation of a right (debtor and creditor) - general rule - 
ascertainment of the relevant date 
18. original parties - creation of a right (debtor and creditor) - displacement rule 
19. Original parties - assignation of a right (assignor and assignee) - assignability 
20. Voluntary assignation of a right - party autonomy 
21. Voluntary assignation of a right - applicable law in absence of party choice 
22. Involuntary assignation of a right - general rule 
23. Remote parties - enforcement of the assignation - mutual rights and obligations of 
debtor and assignee - applicable law 
24. Remote parties - competing assignees - applicable law 
Part VI - General 
25. Public policy etc. 
26. Renvoi 
27. Interpretation 
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Part I- Generale 
1. The rules in this Part apply for the purpose of choosing the law ('the applicable 
law') to be used for determining issues relating to property. 
2. The characterisation for the purposes of international private law of issues arising 
in a claim as issues relating to property is a matter for the courts of the forum. 
3. The applicable law shall be used for determining the issues arising in a claim, 
including in particular the question whether a claim in property has arisen. 
4. For the avoidance of doubt the rules stated herein apply in relation to events 
occurring in the forum as they apply in relation to events occurring in any other 
country. 
5. This Act extends to any country within the United Kingdom; consequently, `the 
forum' means the courts of England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, as 
the case may be. 
Part 11 - Characterisation of property3 
6. (1) The characterisation for the purposes of international private law of 
property as immoveable or moveable property, or corporeal or incorporeal 
property, is a matter for the courts of the forum applying the law of the 
country where the property is situated at the date of commencement of the 
proceedings. 
(2) For the purposes of this Part, property shall be deemed to be situated as 
follows: - 
(a) Property which is, according to its attributes, immoveable and corporeal, 
at the place where it is physically situated; 
(b) Property which is, according to its attributes, immoveable and 
incorporeal, at the place where the right may be enforced at the date of 
commencement of the proceedings; 
(c) Property which is, according to its attributes, moveable and corporeal, 
and, at the date of commencement of the proceedings: - 
(i) has an ascertainable physical location, at the place where it is 
physically situated; or 
(ii) has an unascertainable physical location, at the place where it 
most recently held an ascertainable physical location; save that 
Z Save for paragraph 5, the provision and notes in Part I are as per Model 1, notes 1-4. 
3 The provision and notes in Part 11 are as per Model 1, notes 5- 16. 
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(iii) maritime vessels, aircraft, and rolling stock shall be deemed to 
be situated at their place of registration; 
(d) Property which is, according to its attributes, moveable and incorporeal, 
and: - 
(i) in respect of which a register of ownership is maintained, at the 
place where the register is kept, and in cases where more than 
one register is kept, at the place where the principal register is 
kept; or failing which, 
(ii) is represented by documentation, in the country in accordance 
with whose law the documentation has been drawn (the `lex 
cartae'); or 
(iii) is not of a type referred to in section 6(2)(d)(i) or (ii), at any 
place where the party against whom the right is enforceable 
('the debtor') has, or is likely to have, assets in respect of which 
the right may be satisfied. 
Part III - Choice of law: immoveable propertv4 
Transfer of immoveable property5 
7. (1) The general rule is that any question pertaining to the creation (including 
alienability), acquisition, use, disposal or transfer (hereinafter `the transfer') of 
an interest in immoveable property, and its effect on the proprietary rights of 
any person claiming, by any law, to be interested therein, shall be governed by 
the lex situs, which: - 
(a) in the case of property which is, according to its attributes, 
immoveable and corporeal, shall be the law of the country 
where the property is physically situated [at the time when the 
interest therein is alleged to have been transferred6l; and 
(b) in the case of property which is, according to its attributes, 
immoveable and incorporeal, shall be the law of the country 
where the right may be enforced. 7 
4 Where the wording is the same as that in Model 1, Part III, the notes also are as per Model 1. 
5 Model 2 adopts a general rule in favour of the lex situs, coupled with a rule of displacement. This 
demonstrates a stronger leaning towards application of the lex Situs than does Part III of Model 1. 
Model 1 comprises a general rule in favour of applying the law of closest connection, combined merely 
with a presumption that the lex Situs will be the law of closest connection. 
6 By implication, the applicable law is the law of the Situs `at the time when the interest is alleged to 
have been transferred', so it is not strictly necessary to articulate this temporal qualification. See Model 
1, note 19. 
7 The temporal qualification is as per note 6, supra. 
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(2) The general rule expressed in section 7(1) shall not apply where it appears, 
in all the circumstances, from a comparison of: - 
(a) the significance of the facts which connect the transfer with the 
lex Situs; and 
(b) the significance of any factors which connect the transfer with 
another country ('the non-situs country') 
that it is more appropriate8 for the applicable law for determining the issues 
arising in the case, or any of those issues, 9 to be the law of the non-situs 
country, 10 and in such cases, the applicable law shall be the law of the non- 
situs country. '' 
(3) The factors that may be taken into account as connecting a transfer with a 
country for the purposes of section 7(2) include, in particular, factors relating 
to the parties; any pre-existing relationship, or course of dealings, between the 
parties; and any contractual or other obligation in implementation of which the 
transfer was effected or the issue arose. 12 
[OR] 
(2A) The general rule expressed in section 7(1) shall not apply where it 
appears from the circumstances as a whole that the transfer or issue is more 
closely connected with another country ('the non-situs country'), and in such 
cases the applicable law for determining the issue or issues arising (as the case 
may be) shall be the law of that non-situs country. 
Passing of risk 
8. (1) Where: - 
(a) one party (`the first party') has agreed, or is otherwise obliged, 13 to 
transfer'4 an interest in immoveable property to another ('the 
second party') (together `the parties'); and 
(b) according to the law applicable to the agreement or other obligation 
to transfer the interest, 15 but not according to the lex sinus, the 
property is at the second party's risk, or vice versa, 16 
8 Cf. Model 1, note 20. In Model 2, section 9 will safeguard the interests of the lex situs. 
9 Incorporation of the doctrine of depecage is as per Model 1, note 21. 
10 Cf. Model 1, note 22. 
11 i. e. The non-situs country as at the time when the interest is alleged to have been transferred, or the 
issue to have arisen. Cf. Model 1, notes 8 and 23. 
12 Cf. Model 1, notes 24 and 25. 
13 Cf. Model 1, note 26. 
14 Cf. Model 1, note 27. 
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the general rule is that the law applicable to determine whether risk has passed 
from the first party to the second party, shall be the lex situs. 
(2) The general rule expressed in section 8(1) shall not apply where it appears, 
in all the circumstances, from a comparison of: - 
(a) the significance of the facts which connect the issue with the lex 
Situs; and 
(b) the significance of any factors which connect the issue with another 
country ('the non-situs country') 
that it is more appropriate'? for the applicable law for determining the issue 
arising in the case to be the law of the non-situs country, 18 and in such cases, 
the applicable law shall be the law of the non-situs country. 19 
(3) The factors that may be taken into account as connecting an issue with a 
country for the purposes of section 8(2) include, in particular, factors relating 
to the parties; any pre-existing relationship, or course of dealings, between the 
parties; any contractual or other obligation in implementation of which the 
issue arose; and the instrument of transfer by which the purported transfer was 
effected or the issue arose. 20 
[OR] 
(2A) The general rule expressed in section 8(1) shall not apply where it 
appears from the circumstances as a whole that the issue is more closely 
connected with another country ('the non-situs country'), and in such cases the 
applicable law for determining the issue or issues arising (as the case may be) 
shall be the law of that non-situs country. 
9. When applying under Part III the law of a non-situs country, effect shall 
nevertheless be given to the rules of the lex Situs, if and insofar as, under the 
last-mentioned law, those rules cannot be derogated from by agreement or any 
other means, but must be applied whatever the law applicable to the transfer or 
issue (hereinafter `mandatory rules'). 21 
15 i. e. The `contractual' lex Causae which may, or may not, be the same as the law applicable to the 
transfer of property, under section 7(l), supra. 
16 i . e. According to the 
`contractual' lex causae, the property is at the second party's (the transferee's) 
risk, but according to the lex situs, it remains at the first party's (the transferor's) risk. 
17 Cf. Model 1, note 30, and Model 2, note 8, supra. 
18 Cf. Model 1, note 32. 
19 i. e. The non-situs country as at the time when the interest is alleged to have been transferred, or the 
issue to have arisen. Cf. Model 1, notes 23 and 33. 
20 Cf. Model 1, notes 34 and 35. 
21 Cf Model 1, note 36. 
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Part IV - Choice of law: corporeal moveable Property 
10. (1) This Part shall apply for the purpose of ascertaining the law applicable to 
determine the existence and validity of proprietary rights in any object of 
corporeal moveable property. 22 
(2) `Proprietary rights' shall include rights of ownership, possession, 
enjoyment or use of an object of corporeal moveable property (`an object'). 23 
Transfer of corporeal moveable property 24 
11. Subject to sections 1425 and 1526 below, the general rule is that any question 
pertaining to the transfer27 of an interest in an object from one party ('the first 
party') to another ('the second party'), and its effect on the proprietary rights 
of any person claiming, by any law, to be interested therein, shall be governed 
by the law of the country where the object was physically situated at the time 
when the interest is alleged to have been transferred ('the lex loci rei sitae'). 28 
12. (1) The general rule expressed in section 11 shall not apply in the following 
cases29: - 
(a) where the physical situation of the object, at the time when the 
interest therein is alleged to have been transferred, is unknown and 
unascertainable; 30 
(b) where the physical situation of the object, at the time when the 
interest therein is alleged to have been transferred, is casual or 
accidental; 31 
22 Cf. Model 1, note 37. 
23 Cf Model 1, notes 38 and 39. 
24 Model 2, whilst echoing the static/dynamic conflict distinction introduced in Model 1, does not 
utilise the original-party/remote-party distinction there employed, or the voluntary/involuntary 
dispossession distinction. Rather, Model 2 employs a general rule in favour of the lex loci rei sitae, and 
seeks primarily to build upon the existing (recognised) exceptions to that rule. 
25 Regarding mandatory rules. 
26 Regarding competing transferees. 
27 Per section 7(1), supra. 
28 Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd [1986] 1 Ch. 496, per Slade, J., at p501. The general 
rule, as argued by Mr Gilman, Counsel for the second defendant, was accepted by Mr Mummery, 
Counsel for the plaintiff (per Slade, J., at p502/3). Cf Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v. Slatford 
[1953] 1 Q. B. 248, per Devlin, J., at p257: "There is little doubt that it is the lex Situs which as a 
g9eneral rule governs the transfer of movables when effected contractually. " 
In Winkworth, Slade, J. noted five specific exceptions to the general rule (ibid., p501). Section 12 of 
Model 2 employs a choice of law structure which comprises specific exceptions to a general rule, 
coupled also with one general exception. 
30 E. g. Because the object was in transit at the relevant time. 
31 i. e. Ascertainable, but fortuitous, or random. In Winkworth, Slade, J. formulated this exception in the 
following manner, viz.: "... if goods are in transit and their situs is casual or not known. " (ibid., p501) 
His Lordship, however, did not explain what was intended by the expression `casual'. Was it intended 
to extend to a `fortuitous' situs (e. g. the engagement ring scenario depicted in Chapter Eight, supra - 
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(c) where the transfer forms part of a general or universal assignation 
of property occurring upon the event of the first party's marriage, 
bankruptcy or succession; 32 
(d) [where an object, having been stolen or otherwise unlawfully 
removed from one party ('the deprived party') in the jurisdiction of 
one country ('the first country'), has thereafter been removed from 
the first country without the consent or acquiescence of the 
deprived party, has been taken to another jurisdiction ('the second 
country'), and there transferred to another party ('the current 
possessor'), and [subsequently] - OR - [within a period of no more 
than { three33 } years from the date of { theft or unlawful removal 
from the deprived party} - OR - {removal from the first country) 
34 
returned by the current possessor to the first country; 35] or 
`The Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property', at note 92) or merely to a `transient' (i. e. continually 
moving or changing [e. g. a consignment of goods travelling across Europe on a freight train]) situs; and 
does `transient' denote something more fleeting than `temporary'? Due to these ambiguities of 
interpretation, it is submitted that it is preferable to divide this provision into two discrete exceptions: 
the first exception (in this Model), section 12(l)(a), deals with cases where, due to its transient (i. e. 
continually changing) nature, the situs is "unknown and unascertainable", while the second exception, 
section 12(1)(b) deals with cases where the situs is random or fortuitous. Although an object may be in 
transit, it might happen that its situs at the relevant date was, in fact, known, or at least ascertainable; 
yet, the situs might properly be regarded as `casual' in the sense of `not appropriate for taking account 
of. ' (i. e. the object could be (1) in transit; (2) ascertainable; and (3) casual [e. g. it may be known that 
the object, though in transit, was situated in the Grand Central Station, Ruritania, at the relevant time 
and that the situs, though identifiable, was fortuitous or random]). In these circumstances, it is 
submitted, the situs is an inappropriate single-contact localising agent or connecting factor. See section 
12(2)(a), infra. 
32 Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v. Slatford [1953] 1 Q. B. 248, per Devlin, J., at p257: "The 
maxim mobilia sequuntur personam is the exception rather than the rule and is probably confined to 
certain special classes of general assignments such as marriage settlements and devolutions on death 
and bankruptcy. " 
33 This is an arbitrary figure. A period of one year might encourage concealment of the object by the 
current possessor, whereas a three-year period would strike a more reasonable balance between the 
deprived party and the current possessor. 
34 The present author prefers the first terminus a quo. 
35 This is, in substance, the `exception' propounded by Counsel for Mr Winkworth (ibid., p510), but 
rejected by Slade, J. (ibid., p514) It is submitted that this exception, though narrowly formulated, 
should now be re-considered. In view of increased concern regarding the illicit international trade in art 
and antiquities (evidenced, at governmental level, by the Seventh Report of The Culture, Media and 
Sport Committee, `Cultural Property: Return and Illicit Trade', dated 18 July 2000, and the Report of 
the Ministerial Advisory Panel on Illicit Trade, dated December 2000 [See Chapter Ten, supra - `The 
Treatment of Cultural Property']), and the recognised problem (which is exacerbated by the situs rule), 
of cross-border 'day-trip' transactions, it is suggested that Mr Mummery's argument is, in the current 
climate, more persuasive than perhaps it was in 1980, and that the opportunity to temper the Situs rule, 
passed over more than twenty years ago by Slade, J., should now be seized. Consider Prott and 
O'Keefe's conclusion that, "There is no doubt that, on any version, the application of the lex rei sitae 
lessens the protection of cultural heritage objects. Restrictions on transfer, export and other 
protections applied by the country of origin will all fail to be observed, in the interest of 'security of 
commerce', once the goods have passed through a transaction in another country. Since so many 
States now have rules on inalienability, classification, pre-emption, notification of transfer and export 
control, comity and reciprocity would suggest the wisdom of recognizing and enforcing such 
restrictions, at least in respect of important and identifiable cultural heritage items. " (Prott, LV and 
O'Keefe, P J, `Law and the Cultural Heritage', Volume 3, p641, paragraph 1241) In view not only of 
the difficulty in defining terms such as `cultural property' or `cultural objects', but also the absence of 
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(e) where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the 
transfer or issue is more closely connected with another country 
('the non-situs country' )36 
The factors that may be taken into account as connecting a transfer 
or issue with a country for the purposes of section 12(1)(e) include, 
in particular, factors relating to the parties; any pre-existing 
relationship, or course of dealings, between the parties; the length 
of time during which the parties were present, if at all, in the 
country; and the length of time during which, and the reason for 
which, the object was physically situated, if at all, in the country. 
(2) Where application of the general rule expressed in section 11 has been 
displaced under section 12(1), the applicable law shall be: - 
(a) in cases falling under section 12(1)(a) or (b), the law with which 
the transfer is most closely connected; 37 
(b) in cases falling under section 12(1)(c), the law designated by the 
relevant choice of law rule concerning, as the case may be, 
matrimonial property, bankruptcy or succession; 
(c) in cases falling under section 12(1)(d), the law of the first 
country; 38 and 
(d) in cases falling under section 12(1)(e), the law of the non-situs 
country. 
Passing of risk 
13. (1) Where according to the law applicable to any agreement between the 
parties, or other obligation, to transfer an interest in an object from the first 
party to the second party, 39 but not according to the law of the country where 
the object was physically situated at the time when the aforesaid agreement 
any cogent reason for treating valuable, `non-cultural' stolen goods differently from stolen `cultural' 
goods, it is submitted that the proposed section 12(l)(d) exception should apply to all categories of 
corporeal moveable property. However, while it is submitted that the 12(1)(d) exception would now be 
justifiable, it is submitted that a greater margin of judicial discretion and flexibility than is permitted by 
section 12(l)(d) would be desirable. It is likely that such a narrowly formulated exception would rarely 
be employed. Accordingly, the author's preference would be for the circumstances anticipated by 
section 12(1)(d) to be incorporated (though not explicitly) within, and dealt with according to, the 
wider exception enshrined in section 12(1)(e), infra. 
36 Cf. Article 4(5) of the Rome Convention. 
37 i. e. The `proper law' approach which currently applies to the transfer of goods in transit. (Chapter 
Eight, supra - `The Transfer of Corporeal Moveable Property') Notably, the factors which fall to be 
considered, under the current rule, in determining the proper law in respect of goods in transit, are 
nowhere articulated. Arguably, therefore, it is not necessary, in this Model, to articulate those factors 
which are deemed to be relevant for this purpose. 
38 Subject, however, to the general remarks made in note 35, supra, concerning the unduly narrow 
scope of section 12(1)(d). 
31 Cf. Model 1, note 56. 
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was concluded, or other obligation became binding, the object is at the second 
party's risk, or vice versa, the general rule is that the law applicable to 
determine whether risk has Jassed from the first party to the second party shall 
be the last-mentioned law. 4 
(2) The general rule expressed in section 13(1) shall not apply where it 
appears, in all the circumstances, from a comparison of: - 
(a) the significance of the facts which connect the issue with the 
country whose law would be applicable under section 13(1); 41 and 
(b) the significance of any factors which connect the issue with 
another country ('the non-situs country') 
that it is more appropriate42 for the applicable law for determining the issue 
arising in the case to be the law of the non-situs country, 43 and in such cases, 
the applicable law shall be the law of the non-situs country. 44 
(3) The factors that may be taken into account as connecting an issue with a 
country for the purposes of section 13(2) include, in particular, factors relating 
to the parties; any pre-existing relationship, or course of dealings, between the 
parties; and any contractual or other obligation in implementation of which the 
issue arose; the instrument of transfer by virtue of which the purported transfer 
was effected; the length of time during which the parties were present, if at all, 
in the country; and the length of time during which, and the reason for which, 
the object was physically situated, if at all, in the country. 45 
[OR] 
(2A) The general rule expressed in section 13(1) shall not apply where it 
appears from the circumstances as a whole that the issue is more closely 
connected with another country ('the non-situs country'), and in such cases the 
applicable law for determining the issue or issues arising (as the case may be) 
shall be the law of that non-situs country. 
40 i. e. The law of the country where the object was physically situated at the time when the agreement 
was concluded, or other obligation became binding, not the `contractual' lex causae. 
41 Cf. Model 1, note 60. In contrast with Model 1, in this more moderate Model, since there is no scope 
for exercise by the parties of party autonomy (save in relation to Part V, paragraph 20, infra), the law in 
question is the law of the country where the object was physically situated when the agreement was 
concluded, or the obligation to transfer the interest became binding. 
42 Cf Model 1, notes 20,52 and 61, and Model 2, notes 8 and 17, supra. In this Model, section 14(2) 
will safeguard the interests of the lex loci rei sitae. 
13 C f. note 18, supra. 
44 Cf. Model 1, note 62. 
45 Cf. Model 1, notes 63 and 64. 
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14. With respect to the transfer of any object, notwithstanding the operation of 
sections 12 and 13 above, 
(1) Nothing in this Part shall restrict the application of the rules of law of the 
forum in a situation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law 
otherwise applicable to the transfer of an interest in an object; 46 and 
(2) Nothing shall prejudice the operation of any rule of the relevant lex loci rei 
sitae which classifies the object as inalienable. 47 
Competing transferees 
15. In the event that: - 
(1) the first party purports to transfer the same object to more than one 
transferee, or proprietary rights in respect of one object and deriving from 
the transferor are claimed by more than one party (hereinafter `the 
competing transferees' ); 48 and 
(2) each transfer or claim is valid according to the law(s) which govern(s) it 
under this Part, 49 
the conflicting claims of the competing transferees shall be determined as 
follows: - 
(a) where the validity of the competing transfers and/or claims is 
governed, under this Part, by the same law, in accordance with that 
law; 50 and 
(b) in any other case, in accordance with the law of the country where 
the object was physically situated at the time of the later, or (in the 
case of more than two competing transferees) latest, transaction-51 
46 Cf Article 7(2), Rome Convention. In principle, this provision could extend to the good faith 
exception articulated by Slade, J. (ibid., p501), namely, where a party claiming proprietary rights in 
respect of an object has not acted in [accordance with the forum's conception of] good faith. However, 
for the reasons stated in Chapter Twelve, supra - `The 'Situs' Rule - For and Against' - it is submitted 
that this exception should not, in fact, be incorporated within any statutory statement of the relevant 
choice of law rules in relation to property. As has already been argued, unless the exercise of good faith 
is to be classed as a manifestation of United Kingdom public policy, the significance, or otherwise, of 
good faith should be a matter for the lex loci rei sitae, not the forum. This could be made explicit by 
inclusion of the following clause: `save that any rules of law of the forum concerning the exercise 
and/or demonstration of good faith shall not be classified as mandatory'. Technically, section 14 could 
also incorporate the third exception detailed by Slade, J., namely, "... where a statute in force in the 
country which is the forum in which the case is heard obliges the court to apply the law of its own 
country. " (ibid., p501) Slade, J. cited as one example of this exception the former section 24 of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1893, now repealed. (ibid., p501) 
"Cf. Model 1, note 74. 
48 Cf. Model 1, notes 65 - 68. 
49 Cf. Model 1, note 69. 
50 Cf. Model 1, note 70. 
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Part V- Choice of law: incorporeal moveable property52 
Original parties - Creation of a right (Debtor and Creditor) 
53 
16. (1) Any question pertaining to the creation of a right of incorporeal moveable 
property ('a right') shall be governed by the law of the country with which, at 
the relevant date (as hereinafter defined), the right is most closely connected. 
(2) For the purposes of this Part, it shall be presumed that a right is most 
closely connected with the country in which it may be enforced. 54 
17. In this Part, the relevant date shall be: - 
(1) For the purposes of sections 1655 and 19,56 the date on which the right in 
question is purported to have been created; and 
(2) For all other purposes, the date of commencement of proceedings 
concerning the right in question. 57 
S' Cf. Prott and O'Keefe, ibid., p640, paragraph 1240. The solution proposed in this paragraph differs 
from that in paragraph 17 of Model 1 (at note 72), since incidental recourse cannot be taken, within the 
scope of Model 2 as drafted, to the rules concerning voluntary dispossession by the `first' competing 
transferee. 
52 Due to the widespread confusion concerning the choice of law rules applicable to the assignation of 
incorporeal moveable property, it is submitted that a comprehensive restatement would be valuable. 
The provision and notes are as per Model 1. 
53 E. g. An insurance company and the insured party. See Appendix K. 
sa This is generally the `proper law of the right', but there are exceptions (e. g. consider a beneficial 
interest under a trust deed drawn in accordance with Scots law, administered in Scotland, and having 
Scottish trustees: the (putative) proper law of the right would be Scottish. If, however, the trust fund 
were invested in an offshore bank account in Jersey, the (putative) place of enforcement would be 
Jersey). A right will be enforceable in any country in which the debtor has, at the date of creation of the 
right or any later date, assets against which the right may be satisfied. This may lead to the designation 
of more than one state. It is submitted that among such states the actual place of enforcement should be 
at the option of the pursuer. Cf. Model 1, note 126. 
ss i . e. 
Creation of a right. 
56 i . e. Assignability of a right. 57 It is necessary to draw a distinction between the country in which the right may be enforced, first of 
all, at the time of its creation, and secondly, on the date on which it is sought to enforce the right 
against the debtor. For example, if, at the time when a debt is created, the debtor was resident in 
France, and his entire estate (against which the debt may be satisfied) was situated in France, any 
question pertaining to the creation of that debt would (according, at least, to this model) be governed by 
the law of the country with which the right was most closely connected, which, in turn, would be 
presumed to be the law of the country in which the right may be enforced. But, if there were no 
qualification as to the temporal aspect of enforcement (i. e. no specification of the time at which closest 
connection were to be determined), the law of closest connection would be deemed to be the law of the 
country in which the right may be enforced (i. e. in which the debtor has assets) at the date of 
commencement of proceedings to enforce the debt. If, by that date, the debtor had relocated his 
property (and possibly also his person) to another country, say, to Italy, then the effect would be to 
apply to any question pertaining to the creation of the debt not French law, but Italian law. This would 
be an absurd result since at the time of creation of the debt in question, there was no connection 
between the parties and their transacting, and Italy. Hence, it is submitted that the country of closest 
connection must be determined either on the date on which the right in question is purported to have 
been created, or on the (later) date on which it is sought to enforce the right. The relevant date will 
depend, in each case, upon the nature of the particular dispute (e. g. whether it concerns merely the 
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18. The presumption in section 16(2) shall be disregarded if it appears, from the 
circumstances as a whole that at the relevant date58 the right (or purported 
right) was more closely connected with another country. 59 
Original parties - Assignation of a right (Assignor and Assignee)60 
19. The assignability of a right shall be governed by the law of the country with 
which, at the relevant date, 61 the right was most closely connected, as 
determined in accordance with sections 16(2) and 18 above. 62 
existence%reation of the right; or whether the purpose of the proceedings is to enforce the right against 
the debtor). It is submitted that in cases which concern matters other than the creation or assignability 
of a right, the later date should be the `relevant date', for the aim, in such cases, is to enforce the right 
against the debtor (i. e. it would be inappropriate, in such circumstances, to apply the law of the country 
in which the debt was enforceable at the time of its creation, for by the time the creditor may seek to 
enforce the debt, the debtor, innocently or with calculating intent, may have relocated his assets to 
another country, thereby defeating the creditor's attempts to enforce the debt). It is quite possible that a 
dispute may concern the existence/creation of a right, and not the question of enforcement: for 
example, an insured party may seek a declaration that a life assurance contract has been concluded, 
giving rise to a right enforceable thereunder, but without actually seeking to enforce that right [which 
may, in any event, be enforceable only upon the death of the insured party] against the assurance 
company. Cf. Model 1, note 129. 
58 Section 17, supra. 
19 Cf. Article 4(5), Rome Convention. If, using the scenario depicted in note 57, supra, immediately 
following the (purported) creation of the debt, the debtor (say, an Italian national), as anticipated by 
himself and the creditor (also, say, an Italian national), and with the consent or acquiescence of the 
creditor, removed himself and his assets to Italy, and remained there until such time as enforcement 
proceedings were raised against him in Italy by the creditor, it may be argued that, on the date on which 
the debt is purported to have been created, it was more closely connected with Italian, and not French, 
law. Consider also Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v. Five Star General Trading LLC and others 
[2000] 2 Ll. Rep. 684; [2001] 2 W. L. R. 1344; [2001] 3 All E. R. 257. The dispute concerned a marine 
insurance policy. Although the insurers in question were French, the insurance policy was, in fact, 
governed by English law. Hence, English law was the proper law governing the underlying contract of 
insurance, but French law was the lex Situs of the chose in action which had been assigned (insofar as 
France would be the place of enforcement of the right). The `presumption' that the law of the place of 
enforcement would be the law of closest connection, was, in effect, displaced by an application of 
English law, the law governing the obligation assigned. Cf Model 1, note 131. 
60 E. g. The insured party and a third party creditor, such as a bank. See Appendix K. 
61 Section 17(1), supra. 
62 Consider the assignability of future wages (e. g. by a husband, H, to his estranged wife, W). If, at the 
date of creation of W's right to the wages, H were domiciled in State X (according to the law of which 
wages are assignable), but he subsequently acquired a domicile of choice in State Y (according to the 
law of which wages are non-assignable), the question would arise whether assignability should be 
governed by the law of the country in which W's right is/was enforceable (a) on the date on which her 
right is purported to have been created (i. e. X law); or (b) on the date of commencement of 
enforcement proceedings against H (i. e. Y law). Save perhaps in cases where the forum would adopt an 
interest analysis approach, it is submitted that X law should apply. If the rule were otherwise (i. e. if Y 
law applied), then it would be within H's power to relocate, deliberately frustrating W's entitlement 
(under X law) to his wages. Section 19 would provide scope for applying to the question of 
assignability another, more closely connected law, but it is to be hoped that the choice made by the 
forum would not, fall upon Y law unless there was, on the date when W's right was purportedly created, 
a pre-existing connection between H and Y law. Article 12(2) of the Rome Convention does not deal 
with the temporal conflict of laws, merely applying `the law governing the right to which the 
assignment relates'. Cf Model 1, note 134. 
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20. The voluntary disposal or assignation63 ('the assignation') of a right from one 
party ('the assignor') to another party ('the assignee') (together `the original 
parties') shall be governed by the law chosen by the original parties. 64 The 
choice must be express, or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the 
terms and form of the assignation, or the circumstances of the case. By their 
choice, the original parties may select the law applicable to the whole or a part 
only of the assignation. 65 
21. To the extent that the law applicable to the voluntary assignation of a right has 
not been chosen in accordance with section 20, the assignation shall be 
governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected. 66 
22. The involuntary67 assignation of a right from the assignor to the assignee shall 
be governed by the law of the country with which, at the relevant date, 68 the 
right is most closely connected, as determined in accordance with sections 
16(2) and 18 above. '9 
Remote parties - Enforcement of the assignation (Debtor and Assignee)70 
23. Mutual rights and obligations of the debtor71 and the assignee shall be 
governed by the law of the country with which, at the relevant date, 72 the right 
is most closely connected, as determined in accordance with sections 16(2) 
and 18 above. 3 
63 Contractual, or non-contractual (e. g. donation). 
64 i. e. The proper law of the assignation. Cf. Article 12(1) of the Rome Convention. 
65 Cf. Article 3(1) of the Rome Convention. Cf. Model 1, note 137. 
66 For contractual assignations, see Article 4 of the Rome Convention, and for non-contractual 
assignations, the proper law of the assignation will be akin to the objectively ascertained proper law of 
contract (cf. The Assunzione [1954] P. 150). Cf. Model 1, note 138. 
67 See Chapter Eleven, supra - `The Assignation of Incorporeal Moveable Property', note 173 et seq. 
68 Section 17(2), supra; in effect, the date on which diligence proceedings to enforce the debt are 
commenced. 
69 Consider, for example, the case where a judgment creditor in State X sought to enforce (in respect of 
a debt owed to him by his judgment debtor in State Y) a debt owed by a third party to the judgment 
debtor, by means of an arrestment of funds in the hands of the third party (the third party arrestee) in 
State Z. The key factor is the law of the place where the debt is enforceable (i. e. where it can be 
enforced against the third party arrestee) at the date of commencement of proceedings against the third 
party arrestee. Cf. Model 1, note 141. 
70 E. g. The insurance company and the third party creditor, that is, the bank. See Appendix K. 
71 i. e. The party against whom the right is enforceable (section 6(2)(d)(iii), supra). 
72 Section 17(2), supra. 
73 i. e. The law, of the country where the right may be enforced at the date of commencement of 
proceedings against the debtor (section 17(2)). If the rule were otherwise, the debtor would be able to 
frustrate enforcement of the debt by relocating his assets after creation of the debt. Cf Model 1, note 
145. 
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Remote parties - Competing assignations (Competing Assignees)74 
24. In the event that: - 
(1) the assignor purports to assign the same right to more than one party, or 
the same right deriving from the assignor is claimed by more than one 
party75 (hereinafter `the competing assignees'); and 
(2) each assignation is valid according to the law which governs it under this 
Part, 76 
the conflicting claims of the competing assignees shall be determined as 
follows: - 
(a) where the validity of the competing assignations is governed, 
under this Part, by the same law, in accordance with that law; 77 and 
(b) in any other case, in accordance with the law of the country with 
which, at the relevant date, 78 the right is most closely connected, 79 
as determined in accordance with sections 16(2) and 18 above. 
Part VI - General 
25. Nothing in this Act: - 
(1) authorises the application of the law of a country outside the forum as the 
applicable law in so far as to do so: - 
(a) would conflict with principles of public policy; 80 or 
(b) would give effect to such penal, revenue or other public law as 
would not otherwise be enforceable under the law of the forum; 81 
or 
(2) affects any rules of evidence, pleading or practice, or authorises questions 
of procedure in any proceedings to be determined otherwise than in 
accordance with the law of the forum. 82 
74 E. g. Competing third party creditors. See Appendix K. 
75 i. e. In the event of an involuntary assignation of the right. 
76 i. e. According to sections 19 - 22. See Appendix J I. 
77 See Appendix J II. 
78 Section 17, supra; in effect, the date of commencement of the `conjoined' enforcement proceedings 
against the debtor. 
" See Appendix J III. 
80 Despite Slade, J. 's treatment of infringement of the forum's public policy as a particular exception to 
the situs rule, it is submitted that this so-called `exception' should merely be absorbed within a general 
public policy provision. 
Cf. Section 14(3)(a)(ii) of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. E. g. 
Attorney-General for New Zealand v. Ortiz & Ors [ 1984] A. C. 1. 
82 Cf. Section 14(3)(b) of the 1995 Act. 
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26. The application of the law of any country specified by this Act means: - 
(1) for the purposes of Part II, and concerning application of the lex situs in 
cases arising under Part III, the rules of law in force in that country, 
including the rules of international private law forming part of that law; 
and 
(2) in any other case, the rules of law in force in that country, excluding the 
rules of international private law forming part of that law. 
[OR] 
26A The applicable law to be used for determining the issues arising in a claim 
shall exclude any choice of law rules forming part of the law of the country or 
countries concerned. 83 
Interpretation 
27. (1) In this Act: - 
"competing transferees" has the meaning assigned by section 15 
"debtor" has the meaning assigned by section 6(2)(d)(iii) 
"lex cartae" has the meaning assigned by section 6(2)(d)(ii) 
"lex loci rei sitae" has the meaning assigned by section 11 
"mandatory rules" has the meaning assigned by section 9 
"the original parties" has the meaning assigned by section 20 
"the parties" has the meaning assigned by section 8(1)(a) 
"transfer" has the meaning assigned by section 7(1) 
"first party", for the purposes of Part III, has the meaning assigned by section 
8(1)(a) 
"first party", for the purposes of Part IV, has the meaning assigned by section 
11 
"second party", for the purposes of Part III, has the meaning assigned by 
section 8(1)(a) 
"second party", for the purposes of Part IV, has the meaning assigned by 
section 11 
(2) All references in this section are to this Act. 
83 Cf. Section 9(5), 1995 Act. The author's preference is for the first formulation of section 26, and not 
section 26 ", but section 26A would be in line with recent Hague Conventions and the 1995 Act. 
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Postscript 
It will be noted that Model 2 adopts a general rule in favour of the lex situs, coupled 
with a rule of displacement. This demonstrates a stronger leaning towards application 
of the lex situs than does Part III of Model 1. Model 1 comprises a general rule in 
favour of applying the law of closest connection, combined merely with a 
presumption that the lex situs will be the law of closest connection. 84 
Model 2, whilst echoing the static/dynamic conflict distinction introduced in Model 1, 
does not utilise the original-party/remote-party distinction there employed, or the 
voluntary/involuntary dispossession distinction. Rather, Model 2 employs a general 
rule in favour of the lex loci rei sitae, and seeks primarily to build upon the existing 
(recognised) exceptions to that rule. 85 
Whilst the author's preference would be to follow the more refined approach of 
Model 1, it is evident that the success of a Convention depends not only upon the 
content of its rules, but also upon the extent of its international acceptability, and upon 
wider political considerations. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that few areas 
of the conflict of laws (of which this is one) remain unregulated by international 
convention. 
It has been suggested (albeit in a quite different context) that, to many, total 
abstinence is easier than perfect moderation. 86 As regards choice of law rules in 
property, it is doubtless true that maintenance of the status quo would be `easier' than 
84 Cf. Model 2, note 5, supra. 
482 
would be the cultivation of `perfect moderation'. It is hoped, however, that the reader 
might now have been persuaded that, in this context, moderation of the general rule is 
desirable. In presenting Models 1 and 2 for consideration, the author avails herself of 
the words of Sir Winston Churchill, viz.: 
"Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. 
But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning. "87 
85 Cf. Model 2, note 24, supra. 
86 St Augustine of Hippo, (AD 354 - 430) ('On the Good of Marriage', AD 401). 
87 Sir Winston Churchill, (1874) - (1965), Speech at the Mansion House, London, 10 November 1942. 
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